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Ahstrart 
The economic crisis of the early 1990s in Sweden, along with the dramatic rise in 
unemployment, followed by retrenchments in certain social policy arrangements, led to an 
understanding that the Swedish welfare system, known as the `last bastion of Social 
Democracy, ' is collapsing. It has been assumed that in an era of globalisation, national 
economic and political systems could not survive, and, in adapting to a new global economic 
order, were doomed to dismantle their expensive social policy arrangements. This doctoral 
dissertation examines such assumptions and tries to answer the question of whether the 
changes in the Swedish welfare system in the past two decades were mainly systemic or 
mainly programmatic. Further, it examines the factors that are regarded as posing the greatest 
challenges to the continuity and the future of the comprehensive welfare states? 
A careful consideration of development in Sweden indicates that despite the turmoil of the 
1990s, the broad design of the post-war Swedish welfare settlement, with its egalitarian and 
universalist characteristics, continues to exist. Further, while adjustments in social transfer 
systems have led to a decrease in the level of all transfers, so far, the changes have been 
modest, which rejects the indications that the Swedish welfare state would have initiated a 
new trajectory. The legacies of previous policy choices, and the widespread institutional and 
public support for the existing arrangements, are suggested as the main factors which 
prevented large scale changes. 
Nevertheless, this thesis acknowledges that the circumstances which favoured the expansion 
of state welfare in the post-war era - secure growth, full employment, moderate welfare 
needs, consensus in the labour market, and national politico economic autonomy - have been 
reversed by labour market restructuring, demographic changes, and economic globalisation. 
Therefore, even if the Swedish welfare settlement has so far been resilient in the face of 
current challenges, the future of the system is less `secure' than at any time in its postwar 
history. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the Swedish welfare state and how it has dealt with the 
social, political and economic challenges of the past twenty years. Its major objective 
is to consider whether the changes which have undoubtedly occurred during this period 
can be ascribed to the impact of `globalisation' on Swedish welfare institutions, or 
whether they can be better understood in terms of a range of `endogenous' factors, 
political decision-making among them, but also more `structural' issues concerning, 
for example, the impact of demographic change, that may have influenced the course 
of Swedish social policy. The argument here is that the broad contours of the post-war 
Swedish welfare settlement continue to exist, in the sense that the system's core 
elements remain in place. Thus the egalitarian, universalist character of the Swedish 
system is still visible - replacement rates are generous and public services extensive, 
for example. Moreover, there has been a real effort to try to maintain high levels of 
social spending and in pursuit of this goal the system continues to be financed by 
equally high levels of general taxation. The redistributive elements in welfare policies 
are long-established, and therefore institutionalised, which has made far-reaching 
retrenchment efforts difficult. 
This general picture, however, needs to be understood in the context of certain 
apparently radical changes, which have affected the Swedish welfare state particularly 
over the past ten years. In the area of pensions, for example, a radical and institutional 
change has occurred. As a result of pension reform, the earnings-related pension 
system has been changed and employee contributions have been introduced, meaning 
that pensions will now be funded by equal contributions from employers and 
employees. This reform, is typical of other measures which are designed to make 
transfer programmes self-financing - the implication being that the Swedish system is 
developing towards `market conformity in the transfer system' (Stephens 1996: 56). As 
a result, it can be argued that the Swedish welfare state has moved from its universalist 
and redistributive roots, really because even the Swedish Social Democrats as the 
architects of the universalist welfare system - realised that the system had to adopt to 
new economic and demographic conditions. 
Although most policy areas have faced a degree of `deterioration', there has generally 
been less institutional movement than in the case of pensions. Economic crisis in the 
early 1990s with an unprecedented increase in unemployment saw demands on the 
welfare state rise, while all-important tax revenues fell dramatically. Not surprisingly, 
governments were compelled to cut replacement rates, introduce waiting days, increase 
qualifying conditions and so on. In fact these highly visible retrenchments made during 
a period of severe crisis were `made good' in the later years of the decade - as we shall 
see, certain benefit rates have increased, though not to the generous levels of the pre- 
crisis period. Even so, other changes seem to have been more long-lasting, arguably 
changing the institutional make-up of the system itself. Examples include certain 
changes in service delivery. A movement toward privatisation, started in the late 1980s 
and intensified in the beginning of the 1990s, led to the entrance of private competition 
in delivery of services, but within a framework of public financing. Although the 
changes have been far too modest and the major part of welfare services are still 
provided by the public sector, and therefore there is no reason to suggest that the 
changes are fundamental - or transformational -a precedent has nevertheless 
been set 
and more far-reaching changes could threaten the system in future. Apart from 
privatisation of service delivery, a process of `creeping' privatisation in the insurance 
system has also started, which in the longer term may entail a shift of welfare 
responsibilities to companies. In both cases, by accepting the idea of private 
competition with the state, it has been giving room to the market in areas, which 
have 
traditionally been dominated by the public sector. 
Along with privatisation, there has also been a process of decentralisation, which was 
prompted to transfer the authority of central government to lower levels of 
government, especially in matters such as the delivery of services. In practice, the 
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extension of the power of municipalities in the provision of services led to increasing 
differences between local authorities in delivering services. In the longer term, there is 
a risk that the gap between rich and poor municipalities increases. 
Despite the changes I mentioned here, I argue that none are sufficiently radical to 
jeopardise the egalitarian, social democratic nature of the welfare regime in Sweden. 
Actually, the system has emerged, relatively speaking, almost intact, in terms of the 
fact that the universal welfare systems main objectives, such as equality, reasonable 
standards, and income balance between those in and those out of the labour market, are 
still fulfilled. In other words, the structural support to the citizens is almost the same as 
it was before. My research has also shown that the actual income transfer remained 
quite solid, although as a result of retrenchments in the 1990s, the level of benefits 
decreased marginally. 
Having said that, I am also going to argue that during the period some significant 
changes in the infra-structural issues, such as the stability of the power balance in the 
political system, cooperation in labour market and the influence of labour movement 
have been observed which caused a successive erosion of the system's structural 
supports. As a result, the infra-structural issues seem to be more acute now than it used 
to be. Consequently, I am arguing that the system's institutional support is not as 
secure as it once was. In other words, those pillars, which underpin the welfare system, 
such as a peaceful industrial relations, union influence in the labour market, the level 
of state authority in delivery of services, and the stability of public support 
for the 
Social Democratic Party as the major architect of the Swedish welfare system, are now 
weakened. In past elections, voters have turned their backs on the 
Social Democratic 
Party, and by doing so, a question mark has been placed over the welfare state. 
Consequently, the hegemony of Social Democrats has been questioned by both left and 
right, and so the probability that the Social Democratic Party could 
lose power and the 
country be governed by alternative governments, 
is greater than in the first decades of 
the post war period. 
In addition to weakening of public support for the Social Democratic Party, even 
in the 
labour market the broad consensus between the encompassing trade union and 
employer organisation (SAF) has been eroded in the past decade. As 
long as the 
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consensual social partnership remained, partners in the corporatist Swedish labour 
market were able to negotiate conflicting demands, and therefore the capacity for 
broad, nation-wide social pacts existed. Further, whilst trust between trade unions and 
employer's organisations existed, the aim of full employment and the extension of 
welfare programmes, was maintained. The failure of the social partners to compromise 
on sustainable welfare programmes prevented them from entering into further 
bargained consensus, which previously had guaranteed stability in the Swedish labour 
market. 
Membership of the EU is a further change, which may also undermine the security of 
the welfare system in the longer term. Although there is no EU social policy or 
obvious restrictions against the national state's sovereignty concerning welfare 
expenditures, there are reasons to believe that further integration in the union, per se, 
would make the Swedish welfare state, to some degree, adapt itself to the rest of the 
Union. However, membership of the EU ended a period of uncertainty, which the 
process of globalisation caused for national states. There is no doubt that the process of 
globalisation has had certain impacts on the welfare system although not as widespread 
as some might suggest. The impacts are mainly indirect in the way that nation states 
can no longer simply adopt expensive social policies without risking punishment by 
the market. 
Since the world economy has been internationalised in its basic dynamics, fears were 
raised that in the new global order, the control of national states on market forces 
would be successively diminished, and instead, the transnational companies, as the 
major agents of change, would dictate the conditions for the welfare state. In doing so, 
the viability of domestic strategies of national economic management would largely be 
reduced and by that, the era of `the strong state' as the agency of governance would be 
over. Membership of the EU once again placed the national state in an international 
political order, which recognised the nation state's sovereignty in relation to the 
market. Although the nation state would lose part of its traditional sovereignty, at the 
same time it would gain sovereignty in a new political order. In other words, the EU as 
supra national state would prevent the dominance of transnational companies and 
thereby re-establish the hegemony of the political institutions. The prevailing 
unpredictability of the late 1980s and early 1990s, caused by globalisation, was partly 
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reduced by membership of the EU and the welfare state could in the longer term, once 
again find its place in a larger Union. 
Research Methodology 
Although this study investigates the changing nature of the Social Democratic welfare 
regime in the context of globalisation in general, by focusing on the evolution of a 
particular system, i. e. the Swedish welfare state in the recent decades, it can be called a 
case study. The case study is one of the most appropriate instruments for examining 
the evolution of institutions, because, as Flyvberg (1991) stresses, it produces context- 
dependent knowledge, which gives the researcher the necessary feedback for subtle 
details. 
In a sociological analysis of the development of the Swedish welfare system, the 
strategy I have chosen matches the historical material with a general model of the 
universalist welfare approach. Therefore, the general model had to be identified, both 
in relation to other approaches and in terms of a historical process. This approach 
permitted the analysis of the existing historical material relating to Sweden as well as 
the opportunity to match it to other cases of welfare state development. This, in turn, 
meant that I could study the historical development of the `Swedish welfare system' in 
a manner, which allowed comparison between its different phases. 
For such sociological interpretation of historical material I have relied on secondary 
sources, although I am aware that the purpose of some of the authors of these sources 
differ from the objectives of this study, but as Hyman (1987) stresses, for certain 
research problems, such as historical aspects, secondary data may be the only available 
data. Furthermore, even for research into contemporary issues, secondary data gives 
the researcher the possibility to access a wide range of materials covering different 
areas and, therefore, it creates greater scope and depth than allowed by the use of 
primary data. In this study in particular, the use of secondary sources in analysing data 
collected at different times on similar issues concerning welfare policies, led to a better 
understanding of the historical context in describing and explaining changes. 
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Another form of primary sources is archival records, which have been used frequently 
in this study. These data, mainly in Swedish, are collected from diverse sources, which 
can be distinguished as four basic kinds (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1996: 318- 
20). First, actuarial records, which describe the personal demographic characteristic of 
the population, served by the record keeping agency, such as birth and death statistics 
(In Sweden SCB is the agency which provides such statistics). Second are official 
records concerning public votes, budget decisions, legislators activities and the like. 
Third are governmental documents such as records of social welfare programmes, 
government policies, parliamentary records and so on. Fourth are various reports or 
other information produced or transmitted by the mass media. In addition to these 
records, reports and information produced by the unions and the political parties have 
also been used as public records. 
In addition to these sources, I have also consulted other people's accounts of the 
Swedish welfare system. I have also conducted a number of semi-structured (or non- 
directive) interviews with key personnel in the Swedish Parliament (five), interest 
organisations (four), local governments (Three), bureaucrats at local or central level 
(two) and also academics (three). Semi-structured interviews are a flexible form of 
personal interviewing in which the researcher may employ a schedule to ask a 
prespecified set of questions, but the questions may be asked in an unspecified order or 
with little or no direction from the interviewer. Moreover, as Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias (1996: 235) describe in this form of interview `the respondents are 
encouraged to relate their experience, to describe whatever events seem significant to 
them, to provide their own definitions of their situations, and to reveal their opinions 
and attitudes as they see fit. The interviewer (researcher) has a great deal of freedom to 
probe various areas and to raise specific queries during the course of the interview. ' 
As Silverman (2000: 291-292) noted, the popularity of interview methods among 
qualitative researchers is striking. Apart from the common features of the qualitative 
research, in which the interviews are a sort of `conversation with a purpose', and the 
style of interviews are flexible and fluid, the specific styles employed by researchers 
usually differ greatly. The characteristics of an interview, then, depend on the research 
topic, the purpose of the study, the level of engagement by interviewer and interviewee 
and the experiences during the interview itself It is therefore crucial to state that the 
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use of the semi-structured mode of interviews employed in this study can be seen both 
in relation to the nature of this research topic, which mainly focus on the changes 
initiated by the political actors, and the variety of the interviewees, who represented a 
range of groups. Further, I cannot neglect my own background as a journalist who 
challenges the interviewees in public position by some in-depth questions in areas 
where the interviewees would otherwise either tend to avoid straightforward answers, 
or answer questions other than those they are asked. However, the information 
gathered and the knowledge produced by the semi-structured interviews in this study 
may be insufficient and does not cover every aspect of the study simply because the 
number of interviewees was limited (17) and every interview took place during a 
limited period of time (1-2 hours). 
By employing the semi-structured interview method, I also aimed to conduct 
interviews in such a way that allowed the interviewees not only answer to the `formal' 
interview schedule, but also encouraged them to contribute information that was not 
necessarily anticipated in my pre-devised list of questions. Knowing that almost all of 
the interviewees in this study have had influential positions spanning a long period of 
time, and are also accustomed to being interviewed by journalists, it was logical to 
assume that they, or at least some of them, would prefer to comment on the questions 
categorically and concisely. A rigidly structured interview method lacks the 
`flexibility' of the semi-structured approach and thus risks interviewees failing to 
`engage' in the interview. By careful listening to the interviewees and sometimes 
asking challenging questions I was able to ensure a high level of interviewee 
engagement. 
Another advantage of the semi-structured interview, particularly for this study, 
is the 
chance it provides for the interviewer to focus on questions which are specific to the 
particular role and position of each interviewee. While the 
interviewees in this study 
represented different political, social and professional 
institutions, the semi-structured 
method made it possible to allow them to develop points 
in depth and to return to them 
at will during the course of the interview. 
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The rationale behind selection of the interviewees 
The selection of the interviewees has been largely determined by the nature of this 
study, which focuses on the changes in the welfare system. Because the changes were 
adopted by the actors either in the political establishment or in the labour market, it 
was natural to ask these actors about the process of changes in the past and about those 
suggested for the future. There are three groups that seemed to have had a crucial 
impact on determining the content and the direction of the Swedish welfare system: 
political actors at the central level, who determine the main objectives of the welfare 
institutions; politicians and bureaucrats at local level, who are involved in 
implementation of the policies; and interest organisations, such as the two major core 
elements in the labour market (trade unions and the employers' organisations), who 
represent the interest of the actors in the private and public sector. 
The most significant dimension which needed to be considered in selecting the 
interviewees was that they should be drawn in a balanced manner from the opposite 
sides of the political establishment and labour market divide. Therefore, it was crucial 
to map out the influential political orientations in the two political blocs and 
subsequently to identify the parties or factions on each side, particularly those who 
were closely involved in the formation of the welfare system. It was also important to 
choose the key individuals who have had a central role in determining the content of 
the policy. 
Although the Swedish political parties have historically been divided into two blocs, it 
is also important to note that each bloc is divided into different political parties. Even 
factions in each party, such as in the Social Democratic Party, can represent different 
perspectives. Differences inside each political bloc can be sometimes extensive. For 
instance, in the Social Democratic Party, the main architect of the Swedish model, 
there are two approaches: `the traditionalists' and `the new thinkers'. While the former 
holds similar views to the Left Party, the latter can in some strategic aspects be 
compared to the bourgeois parties. The bourgeois parties in turn, are also divided into 
neo-liberals and those in the centre. Therefore it was necessary to select interviewees 
from each of these political orientations rather simply from each political party. The 
interviewees are also in key positions in their parties, either as the leader of a party 
(Ingrid Burman, the Left Party) or as a (former) member of the leadership committee 
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of a party (Stig Malm in the Social Democratic Party who represents the `traditional' 
approach). Others are either former members of Parliament (Widar Andersson, as a 
`new thinker' in the Social Democratic party), or those who are the members of the 
Committee on Social Insurance in the parliament (Bo Könberg, the Liberal Party: 
Birgitta Carlsson, the Centre Party and Sten Tolgfors the Conservative Party). In 
selecting the interviewees certain background characteristics were also considered, 
such as the individual's political experience, which would have extended over at least 
two decades. Most of the interviewees had high positions in the respective parties even 
during the 1980s. 
The selection of political actors at the local level had other objectives, mainly because 
the political processes at local level are different to those at central level. The main 
difference is that the local politicians are more concerned about `pragmatic' local 
issues rather than with the wide-ranging ideological conflicts that dominate rational 
political debate. The main objective of these interviews was to reveal the nature of the 
policy of implementation at the local level. In other words, whether the changing 
policies outlined by the central government would have faced conflicts by the political 
actors at the local level. Consequently, the dividing line between left and right seems 
not to be as significant as it often appears to be at national level. The aim was, 
therefore, to choose interviewees from different municipalities who could explain the 
process of implementation of policies adopted at a national level in the local 
communities. Three local politicians were interviewed. The first represented greater 
metropolitan Stockholm city (Ebba Bodell, Stockholms Party), the second, an urban 
municipality in the greater metropolitan (Haninge commun located south east of the 
Stockholm county), and third, an influential member in Falun city council which 
represents a middle-range city in mid-Sweden. These interviewees represented 
different parties. 
The third group of interviewees were bureaucrats working at the central and local 
levels. Three interviewees were each selected from the different levels (governmental, 
county and municipality). The main aim of these interviews was to look at the process 
of implementation of the changes in welfare policy from a bureaucrat-angle. The 
interviewees represented the attitudes of the regular bureaucratic organisation towards 
the changes in the welfare policy and social policy arrangements. The bureaucrats 
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could outline a clear picture of the problems that political decisions made at the centre 
could have at local level 
The fourth group of interviewees were the representatives from the interest 
organisations that have a great influence on society, especially in the labour market. 
One of these groups was comprised of representatives from the trade unions. The two 
former chairmen of the LO were important interviewees for this purpose. The reason 
for interviewing these two men in particular was because they led the union in two 
different decades. While Stig Malm was the chairman in the 1980s, Bertil Jönsson took 
over the LO in the beginning of the 1990s. Further, these two represented different 
factions in the LO. While the first one represented the traditionalist faction, the other 
was more in favour of adapting the Swedish labour market to the rest of the EU. 
Another interviewee was the representative of the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprises, which would represent the views of the employers about the changing 
relations in the labour market and in the welfare system. A third interest group, who 
has had certain influence in the process of change, was the pensioners' Central 
Organisation (PRO). This organisation took an active part in long-term negotiations, 
which took place before the pension reform was made in 1998. 
The final group of the interviewees were some academics that have been involved in 
studying the Swedish welfare system. The interviewees were not only recognised as 
influential in the field of social policy and labour relations in the academic sphere 
(Sven Hort), researcher in the Welfare Commission appointed by the Swedish 
government (Johan Fritzell), and prominent economist of the trade union (Rudolf 
Meidner) but they also had great insight into the ongoing changes in the political and 
labour market institutions. 
The general nature of the interviews 
Since the main objective of the interviews was to outline the nature of changes in the 
Swedish welfare state in the past and possibilities for the future, an interview guide (in 
Appendix) has been provided, which specifies different aspects of the research 
hypothesis. Questions about the past were focused on basic issues, which in prior 
studies were analysed as essential aspects, and which impacted the creation of the 
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welfare state. Issues concerning the political support to the system, changes in 
economic conditions, labour market relations, and changes in different welfare 
programmes dominated questions about the past 
Another set of questions focused on the future of the welfare state. The interviewees 
were given freedom to express their scenario about the future development of the 
Swedish system. In this regard the questions once again were focused on the degree of 
political support for the generous welfare system, the relation between elements of the 
labour market, the process of the privatisation in the delivery of public services, and 
the effects of EU membership on the Swedish welfare state. However, while the 
interview guide was employed in all interviews, depending on the characteristic of 
each interviewee the emphasis was larger on those issues, which were central to the 
interviewee. For instance, representatives from the labour market were particularly 
questioned about the changes in that area while representatives of the Pensioners' 
Organisation were questioned more closely about changes in the pension system. By 
the same token, the local politician was mostly questioned about the privatisation issue 
or the attitude of the local public administration or service sector to the new policies. 
The only two groups of interviewees that responded equally to the majority of the 
questions, were the politicians and academics. 
The structure of the study 
The first chapter outlines the theoretical approach by presenting the three approaches, 
which attempt to account for the development of welfare state regimes. While `the 
logic of industrialism thesis' attempted to explain the emergence of the welfare state in 
relation to the process of industrialisation and economic growth, `the power resources 
approach' focused on the process of the expansion of welfare systems by linking it to 
the power struggle among the main political and social groups in capitalist societies. 
`The institutionalisation thesis', then, mainly explains the mechanisms, which facilitate 
the continuity and survival of arrangements in the event of changes in the power 
balance. The core notion of the chapter is that all the approaches, which explain the 
processes of emergence and development of welfare states, are essential elements in 
explaining the origins and implication of welfare state development. However, as the 
policy of retrenchment is the major concern of this thesis, the discussion focuses on the 
problems, which may arise when one would employ these theories in discussion about 
welfare state retrenchment. While the economic conditions, social composition and 
political context in which the systems were once founded are facing continuous 
changes, it would be a mistake to employ the same theories as those which once were 
successful in explaining welfare state expansion. As Pierson (1996) argues, the 
retrenchment of welfare states occurs in a particular context that may completely differ 
from the condition of welfare state expansion. The argument of the chapter is that 
changes in the political environment, economic conditions and the state of institutions 
and social groups provide new conditions, which make it difficult for the actors to 
initiate extensive transformations of welfare institutions. The policy of retrenchment in 
welfare states with large popular support is generally limited to modest adjustments. 
In the second chapter, the research focuses on the nature of globalisation and its impact 
on welfare regimes in Europe and the United States. This discussion is essential to the 
thesis, mainly because the welfare states in general, and the Swedish universalist 
welfare state in particular, are based on the rule of the strong state. The major threat to 
such authority seems to have been the process of globalisation which has given the 
internationally based trans-national companies the opportunity to extend their 
influence and to undermine the national political actor's sovereignty. Apart from the 
changing power balance, the new global economy is said to have had certain impacts 
on the mode of industrial organisation and structure of the production and division of 
labour. Technological development toward `robotism' is an obvious labour-saving 
device in industrial manufacturing and service industries. Further, it has been argued 
that, in the new order, capital outflows from advanced industrial nations to low-paid, 
newly-industrialising countries threatens the stability of the labour market 
in advanced 
economies, and subsequently causes a decline in the level of employment. 
Since 
welfare state is at root a national phenomenon, and since welfare policies are 
based on 
the level of taxation, particularly on employers and capital, and on the degree of labour 
regulation, the argument here is that in an increasingly globalised world, 
large firms 
are going to act as the major threat against the foundation of nation states. 
By the same 
token, the process of integration of EU has been suggested as the external threats 
against the Western European welfare states. This conclusion was 
drawn since many 
member states had adopted retrenchment policies since the 1970s, although the 
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retrenchments differed in their range, depth and nature. However, in opposition to such 
understanding, the chapter emphasises that membership of the EU so far has not had 
any considerable impact on the influence of nation-states in shaping national social 
policies, and the structure of the Swedish welfare system is still the same as it was 
before Sweden joined the EU. On the contrary, by leaving social policy in the hands of 
member states, the EU has recognised the sovereignty of nation states as architects of 
their own welfare systems according to the desire of public opinion and the specific 
traditions of each country. It is likely, however, that in the longer term the need for 
harmonisation of social policies will grow, which means that the role of nation states 
will successively decrease. In short, even if globalisation matters mainly in weakening 
the influence of national governments on the economic sphere to some extent, this 
chapter rejects the overestimation by globalisation enthusiasts of the impact of the new 
international economic order on welfare state performance, and instead, points to 
internal factors, such as the crucial elements that determine the continuity of welfare 
states. 
After having discussed the process of welfare state development and the internal and 
external problems welfare systems face in the new global order Chapter Three 
examines the historical development of the Swedish welfare state. The SAP's 
dominant position in the Swedish political system is understood as the decisive factor, 
which gave the labour movement a prominent role in forming the political process. 
The national representativeness of the party, its success in winning the support of the 
middle classes, and its ability to cooperate with the Agrarian party are understood as 
the key factors that gave the party the political strength to implement its universalistic 
welfare system. The argument of this chapter is that the formation of the universalistic 
welfare system in Sweden is first and foremost a result of the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party's ambition and political goals. The party was determined to establish 
an egalitarian system by democratic means. To achieve that objective, the party strove 
to build `the strong nation state' which came to be the major precondition for the 
formation of the universalistic welfare system. Such a strong state was a result of 
cooperation between a strong political movement (the SAP), a well-organised labour 
movement close to the SAP, and a centralised employer organisation. The first 
prominent move toward universalism in Sweden began after the Second World War 
with a universal pension reform. After that, reforms in key areas such as health 
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insurance and sickness benefits, employment insurance, and family policy reforms 
were implemented. 
The chapter also explores the expansion of welfare reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when the essential parts of an expansive welfare system were established. In so doing, 
the thesis seeks to demonstrate the strength of the Social Democrat's ambition to 
expand the universalistic welfare model in which the endeavour to construct a more 
egalitarian society seems to have been the central aim. The key purpose of the chapter 
is to establish the case for an expensive welfare system existing by the time of the 
economic downturn in the late 1980s. Since the mid-1970s the extensive welfare 
provision and the comprehensive social insurance were addressed as the major reasons 
for the instability of a budget with extreme deficits in the period of recessions. 
Continuity in the expansion of the system, which gave Sweden its reputation as a high 
welfare spender, was a result of the broad support of the solidaristic welfare policy by 
both labour and middle classes and both political blocs. Such support, as is argued in 
this chapter, was a consequence of the Social Democratic Party's effort to form a 
social policy based on national interest rather than class interest. The expansion of the 
system in all social policy areas, based on a social contract between the state and the 
citizens, lead to an increased spending power of all groups in society and therefore the 
consumption of the whole of society increased dramatically. At the end of the period, 
the generous welfare system was criticised by a large groups of economists who 
believed that the stability of the system was questionable. 
Before examining the nature of the Swedish welfare system in the 1990s in chapter 
Four, the thesis concentrates on Swedish economic development, by considering the 
changing nature of the Swedish economy and the possible connections between 
economic and welfare changes. The emergence of an unprecedented unemployment 
rate at the beginning of the 1990s, which placed a huge pressure on public finances, is 
undoubtedly regarded as the major structural problem that caused the immediate 
economic crisis, with far-reaching consequences for the public budget. Despite the fact 
that the financial crisis, caused by a large increase in public expenditure, constituted 
the immediate crisis of the 1990s, the chapter looks at other structural changes in the 
economic sphere that were decisive factors in producing the economic crisis. Among 
these structural changes, the chapter considers the liberalisation of the capital market, 
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low levels of economic growth, problems with inflation, and changes in social 
investment and the financing of the welfare system. 
One of the arguments in this chapter is that the economic crisis of the early 1990s, 
along with several major changes in the Swedish economy, is to be seen as the direct 
consequence of changes initiated by the Swedish government to adapt the country's 
economy to the process of globalisation. This process started in the mid-1980s as a 
defensive response to the neo-liberal entry in the international market. The 
liberalisation of capital markets and the deregulation of credit markets are among 
typical responses to the new order. These measures, which encouraged loan-financed 
consumption and speculative investment, were among structural reforms which created 
a situation in which the economy became overheated, which caused a rapid 
deterioration of the economy, with a steep rise in unemployment and the rapid re- 
emergence of a budget deficit. Falls in gross domestic product were the consequence 
of a rapid liberalisation of the financial sector, which challenged the stability of the 
Swedish welfare system. 
Another major argument in this chapter is that when the economic crisis hit the 
Swedish economy, the Social Democrats, who were first and foremost committed to 
the survival of the welfare state, became determined to support any efforts that could 
restore economic stability. In other words, during the 1990s, the major goal of the 
Social Democrats was not to retain the high level of standards in the benefit system at 
any price but to save the foundation of welfare system itself against internal and 
external threats. In the short term, this could result in a far-reaching retrenchment in 
welfare expenditure. 
Chapter five is then engaged in an analysis of the Swedish welfare state as it currently 
operates, concentrating, as stressed above, particularly on unemployment benefits, old 
age pensions, health insurance, and family allowances. Since the economic crisis of the 
1990s resulted in a large budget deficit in public expenditures, and since social policy 
constitutes the major part of the public budget, savings in social spending became the 
most obvious means for governments to balance the budget. Among different 
techniques for welfare cuts, governments tended to prefer reductions in cash transfers, 
which was considered to be the most efficient way to reduce spending. Therefore, in 
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this chapter the focus will be on changes to cash transfers during the period under 
review, together with the pattern in which the changes occurred. 
The argument here is that, as long as the Social Democrats were in office and the 
economic conditions were appropriate, the Swedish welfare system was not only intact 
but was also gradually expanded. Retrenchments of the benefit system in the 1990s 
started when unemployment rose dramatically and budget deficit increased 
considerably and, subsequently, the government's financial capacity shrank. The first 
wave of retrenchments, which occurred in the first half of the 1990s, had a defensive 
character. It meant that savings were primarily addressed at reducing the budget 
deficit, although the size of the retrenchments was far less than the large expenditures 
caused by the unprecedented rise in unemployment. In the second wave of 
retrenchments, however, the Social Democratic government pursued a policy, which 
aimed to harmonise the welfare system to the new economic and social order. 
However, as is argued in this thesis, the reforms accomplished during the 1990s have 
not changed the structure of the universal welfare system. Even those that might have 
had some elements of a structural nature were not on a large scale. 
Once again, the Social Democrats as the architects of the generous welfare system 
were those who introduced the most radical reforms. Two thirds of the 1990s savings 
were initiated in the second half of the period in which the Social Democrats were in 
office. The argument in this chapter is that the Social Democrats seem to have had the 
political legitimacy to initiate essential changes in the welfare system in order to save 
its long-term structural survival. Simply because the party was understood as the 
traditional defender of the generous welfare system and, therefore, had a strong base 
among those who are in favour of a generous welfare state. 
In the final chapter, the work continues by an analytical discussion about the nature of 
the debates about the Swedish welfare system. This part constitutes the wider debate 
relating to political support of the system, the crisis of the corporatist system, and 
discussions about privatisation of public services. In the chapter, it is argued that the 
major threat to the universal welfare system comes from the rising uncertainty among 
some of the social and political actors, who are no longer actively supporting the 
traditional redistributive welfare system. Further, it seems that the strong political 
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consensus between the two major political blocs about the foundation of the generous 
welfare system seems to have become fragile. Likewise, the `historic compromise' 
between the labour movement and the employer's organisation is virtually forgotten. 
Despite the rising opposition to a universal welfare system, some other factors are in 
favour of the continuity of the generous welfare system. Public support for the 
generous welfare system has been quite strong throughout the decade of crisis. In the 
political sphere, despite frequent calls for change from the neo-liberal intelligentsia, 
and some doubts in the ranks of Social Democratic `new-thinkers', the political 
support to the universal welfare policy is still quite strong. Moreover, the strong local 
and central state institutions, which have been created by the welfare system, are also 
its defenders. They have effectively resisted any attempts made by the non-socialist 
government, such as far-reaching privatisations in public services, aimed to transform 
the system - so far. 
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Chapter 1 
Development and Retrenchment in welfare state regimes 
This chapter aims to examine the key theories that attempt to account for the 
development of welfare state regimes. Ever since the 1970s when the advanced welfare 
states faced mounting political challenges and retrenchments dominated the debates 
about the welfare state, there have been many efforts seeking to offer some basic 
propositions about retrenchment politics. The crucial question seems to have been 
whether the politics of retrenchment was a consequence of economic changes in the 
global sphere, or a result of political changes that occurred mainly as a result of rising 
costs associated with maturing welfare states. Furthermore, debaters asked whether the 
policy of retrenchment inevitably harmonises all welfare models, or just `adjusts' the 
nature of social provision in national systems. Some suggest that welfare regimes, as a 
number of qualitatively different configurations embedded in historical pathways, 
make a process of international `convergence' impracticable. 
One of the most popular approaches during the 1990s was the globalisation thesis, 
which treated the contemporary development of the welfare state as a process driven 
largely by changes in the global order. In the post-industrial era the increased 
economic interdependence in the advanced industrial societies put pressure on national 
diversity and, as a consequence, the national characteristics of welfare states would 
decline in significance. The globalisation thesis, which is covered more extensively in 
the next chapter, advocated the prospects for cross-national convergence and thereby 
neglected, for instance, the different responses by different welfare regimes to the 
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problems associated with a changing economic order. The globalisation thesis is 
related to the `logic of industrialism' theory, which explained the expansion of welfare 
states as a consequence of economic development caused by rapid industrialisation 
foremostly in western societies. The argument is that changes in the economic order 
have a crucial impact on the state of national social policy models. 
Another approach that has been used in explaining the development of the welfare 
states has been the power resources perspective, which understands the distribution of 
political resources among social classes as the major agent that determines the 
development of welfare systems. Retrenchments are, first and foremost, a consequence 
of the weakness of the political hegemony of left parties and organised labour, rather 
than the process of economic globalisation. 
The third approach, on which this thesis is mainly based, is the `path dependence' 
approach that focuses on the historical development of the welfare system. The `state- 
based', path dependent approach argues that institutions which have been deeply 
embedded are difficult to change - even if globalisation and changes in power 
resources are considered to exist and both have an impact on welfare 
systems. Therefore, this approach suggests that the most significant source of change 
to the conditions in which welfare states function is not external but internal factors - 
even if globalisation is considered to exist and provide a context for welfare state 
change. The argument in this thesis is that endogenous factors such as slowdown in the 
growth of productivity, the maturation of governmental commitments, population 
ageing, and restructuring of households and their relationship to work and paid 
employment have a more significant impact on the functioning of welfare states than 
movements in the international economy per se. 
In this chapter, the consideration is to explore why welfare states developed, and point 
out how `national' these regimes proved to be. Then, in the next chapter, the focus will 
be on globalisation to see whether nation-states have had to change their welfare 
structures entirely or whether they have - or at least some of them have - managed to 
retain the key features of these systems as they were developed in the immediate pre- 
war and then the post-war period. This should allow me to argue that Sweden has had 
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to make `adjustments' but has not radically changed the institutional basis of its 
welfare arrangements. 
The logic of industrialism thesis - economic determinism 
Until the 1970s, the most well developed theory of welfare state growth was `the logic 
of industrialism thesis' which found a correlation between welfare state expansion and 
the process of economic growth. The theory, which was particularly developed by 
Wilensky (1975), but also supported by others (Pampel and Williamson, 1989), saw 
the strong economy as the major source for the foundation of the affluent welfare 
states. In other words, as economic growth progressed the process of welfare state 
development with increased services and higher transfers continued. However, even 
though the theory could explain the reasons for the foundation of welfare states in the 
rich countries in relation to poor nations, it was less successful in explaining the 
differences between the different models of welfare emerging within the affluent states 
(Pierson, 1996). 
The economic: crisis of the 1970s, with extended cuts in welfare expenditures in most 
welfare states, was the most prominent event that was claimed to have supported the 
theory. By relating the poor economic performance to the downward adjustments in 
social policies, the advocates of the economic determinist argument could lay stress on 
economic efficiency and market friendly policies as the crucial factors for the survival 
of the welfare states. 
Since the 1980s, advocates of economic determinism focused on a new argument for 
the relationship of the welfare state to the process of economic development - global 
economic changes, particularly the globalisation of capital markets, were the driving 
force of change. Globalisation would create a new condition in which national 
governments would no longer have powerful economic policy tools to manipulate 
social policy options. Therefore, as a result, national social policy was assumed to face 
extensive restrictions because the new restrictions in monetary and fiscal policies 
would reduce the local actors' freedom to adopt strategies suited to the expansion of 
the national welfare state. In the new era, it was suggested, a convergence of national 
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social policy models would be inevitable. The argument referred mainly to heightened 
economic integration that, first and foremost, would give the firms the possibility to 
operate where social costs were at their lowest level. 
In discussions about the contemporary welfare state, the advocates of economic 
determinism focus most specifically on the actions of firms in the changing economic 
conditions and their investment decisions. While in the global market, competition 
between firms intensified, it was claimed that reducing costs became the central issue, 
which would decide the outcome of the competition. Therefore it has been claimed that 
the development of `social wages' would receive most attention in a firm's calculation 
for their actions. By aiming to relocate the production to low social wage areas, firms 
put pressure on the national governments to reduce the level of social provisions to an 
`appropriate' level, in an effort to maintain employment levels. This argument, which 
is presented in the concept of a new `logic of industrialism', ignores the role of the 
democratic political institutions and their crucial influence on the structure of the 
welfare state. The economic benefits and efficiency of the market dictate the 
conditions in which the political system could act. In the longer term, the policy of the 
welfare regime cannot be derived from anything but economic trends. 
There have been at least three major critical objections to the economic determinist 
argument. First, the claim that the globalisation of the capital market would have a 
crucial impact on national government's social policy options has been shown to be 
overestimated. Almost two decades after the start of the process of globalisation, the 
consequences of global economic changes on national government performances in 
social policy areas are still limited (See chapter two). According to Pierson 
(1996: 147): 
While monetary and fiscal policies may face new restrictions, there is little evidence that 
supply-side policies of transfers and services need be constrained, so long as tax bases 
remain sufficient to insure relatively low deficits. Some social policies may in fact 
contribute to economic growth, for example, by encouraging the formation of human 
capital and certain kinds of labour market flexibility. 
The second objection is against the argument that firms invest in countries with low 
social wages. While such threats cannot be ruled out, the evidence for extended 
relocation to low social wages area remains limited. Social wage is just one condition 
for investments, whereas firms take other factors such as infrastructure and worker 
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productivity into consideration. Instead of focusing on social wages, the consideration 
is profitability of investments. If overall conditions make investments in countries with 
high social wages more profitable, capital mobility will not be the deciding factor 
(Garrett, 1998; Streeck, 1995). 
Third, the economic determinist argument pays insufficient attention to the influence 
of political forces in maintaining the structure of the existing arrangements. While in 
the past decades, it has been argued that social wages had considerable impact on 
national states' economic performances, responses to the recommendations, which 
called for downward adjustments in social policy were quite different. Dependent on 
the balance of political forces, governments in each industrial society adopted the 
strategy that had wider public support. In other words, economic conditions were 
prominent, but were not the only decisive factor which could dictate the restructuring 
of social policy. Political forces in favour of the existing welfare system and the 
institutionalised arrangements have included two other central factors which had 
fundamental impacts on the development of welfare states. 
The power resources approach 
Welfare states are programmes of social provision initiated and developed by the 
political establishments, rather than by the market actors. Therefore their expansion 
and decline should be studied according to the power resource perspective, which 
largely focuses on differences in the distribution of political resources among classes 
as the most crucial factor. That is the core notion of the power resources approach. 
For 
the most prominent theorist of the power resource perspective (Stephens, 
1979; Huber 
and Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985), social programmes are 
first 
and foremost a result of unions and leftist parties struggling to secure the economic 
stability of wage earners. In the process of the expansion of social programmes, 
the left 
parties and unions were the major advocates of these programmes, whereas 
the 
employers and to some extend - at least at the 
beginning of the process of expansion - 
the bourgeois parties, were on the other side. The stronger the left parties and unions 
were, the more comprehensive and generous social provisions came to 
be. 
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By attributing variations in social provision to differences in the distribution of 
political resources, the power resource argument connects the expansion and 
retrenchment of the welfare states predominantly to the strength of unions, and the 
centrality of left parties. In past decades, support for left parties in different countries 
has varied over time, and overall, the left parties have not had the same influence as 
during the postwar period. This is partly because the social bases of these parties, 
which mainly consisted of the working class, have decreased. There is a broad 
consensus that in many advanced industrial societies the influence of trade unions has 
shrunk considerably (Katz, 1993; Locke and Thelen, 1995; Golden et al., 1999). The 
process would suggest fundamental cutbacks in social programs; something that in 
reality has not occurred. Does this fact diminish the relevance of the power resource 
perspective? To answer this question one should say, despite relative decline in the 
strength of the two traditional power resources in favour of welfare states, new 
supporters of social provisions have been emerging. 
Networks of social groups dedicated to the defence of established social policies, 
emerged as prominent actors contributing to the growth and sustainability of these 
programmes (Pierson, 1996; Kriesi, 1999). These interest groups consist of both 
recipients of the various benefits and those who provide the public services. Although 
these groups had not necessarily contributed to the creation of the welfare system, they 
were recipients of various key benefits such as pensions, and health care; in this way 
the welfare state contributed to the development and well being of these groups, which 
could be expected to resist cutbacks, which threatened their interests. Most of the new 
left movements are the new generation of radicals who were established during the late 
1960s and had social justice and redistribution of resources as their main goals. As 
Kriesi (1999) suggests, the new type of social movement politics which have 
developed in the past two decades become institutionalised and, like the traditional 
movements such as labour movement, have great capacity to mobilise social groups in 
the arena of politics: 
As a result of twenty years of mobilization by the new left and the new social movements, 
a third arena - an arena of movement politics - has come to be established alongside the 
traditional arenas of party and interest group politics. Movement politics have become an 
accepted way of doing politics and it provides an additional channel of political 
articulation linking the citizenry and the state -a channel that form a complement rather 
than a substitute for the conventional politics in the arenas of party and interest group 
politics (Kriesi 1999: 421). 
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Apart from the mobilised interest groups who could actively influence the 
contemporary political struggles, there were others, who were not organised, but had 
the opportunity to intervene in the process of the distribution of political resources 
through their votes at the polls. Therefore, non-mobilised recipients of social 
programmes should also be understood as a potential power resource that can decide 
welfare state outcomes. Consequently, the initial pattern of the power resources 
perspective in explaining the expansion of the welfare state, which was only based on 
class struggle over social provisions, is not completely valid in the era of retrenchment. 
New bases of organised and non-organised support to the maturing social programmes 
are as crucial as the left parties and the unions' success in preventing unpopular 
cutbacks in social provisions. In other words, welfare state expansion contributed to 
the development of new social groups that would stand beside the traditional advocates 
of social programmes against various efforts towards retrenchment. 
Apart from such groups of people, the new institutions that emerged since the initial 
stages of the formation of welfare states have established new patterns of governance 
with routinised arrangement structures, which are not easy to change. The argument 
here is that while unions, and to some extent even the left parties, have weakened, the 
role of the institutions and the policy legacies associated with welfare states, have 
increased considerably. Public policies, which were once adopted and introduced by 
the political actors, have in a historic process created resources, incentives and 
structures that are not easy to change. 
The path-dependency approach 
Although this thesis draws some elements from the two approaches reviewed earlier in 
this chapter - `economic deterministic' and `power resources' - the theoretical 
framework, which guides the analysis in what, follows here is the institutionalist path 
dependency approach. To be more specific, the argument here is that, while in the 
earlier stages of expansion of welfare states, economic growth, the strength of the 
labour movement and the centrality of left parties determined much of the political and 
institutional arrangements of welfare states, in the later period, path dependence has 
become the most crucial factor in maintaining existing arrangements. The long-term 
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relationship between left governments and social policy development has strong 
elements of path dependence. In other words, in the Scandinavian countries in 
particular, the dominance of left parties and unions and their cooperation with the 
centralised employers organisation, which provided such favourable conditions for the 
development of an advanced system of social provision, has become literally 
`institutionalised' and thus a core feature of `system maintenance'. 
The core of the argument, which stresses path-dependent processes as the major 
dynamics of welfare state development, is that welfare states are not created in one 
night and can not be remade at will when the preferences of the political actors change, 
or the balance power shifts. Instead, welfare regimes are national systems of social 
provision, adopted and extended over long periods of time, and therefore should be 
seen as parts of historically generated configurations (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Steinmo, 1993; Pierson, 2000). To be clearer, resources and incentives, which are 
produced by policies initiated by political actors during a long period of time, generate 
new structures and opportunities for social and political groups that are then 
impossible to ignore. Without a proper appreciation of historical pathways it is 
difficult to understand the development of contemporary welfare states, and also 
prospects for politics of social policy retrenchment, which dominated the debates in 
the late decades. 
Therefore, the essential starting point here is that by understanding welfare states as 
historically generated regimes which are products of complex conjunctural causation, 
the path dependence approach attaches great importance to the coerces of political 
development. The first feature of political processes, which have generated 
dramatically different kinds of welfare systems, is that in each of the processes, 
multiple factors and institutions have been working together over extended periods of 
time. Apart from power resources, other dimensions such as the rules of electoral 
competition, the relationship between legislature and executive, and 
the place of 
subnational governments in politics were crucial 
for the development of the political 
processes. The other variables that have 
had an effect on the developing process were 
economic development, the structure of social groups, women's 
labour force 
participation, policy legacies, religious traditions, and so 
forth. As a result, the 
outcomes of each system shifts with the others simply 
because the value of variables 
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which have had direct impact on the outcomes differed from one case to another 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 2000). 
Second, the courses initiated in a political process are hard to reverse, or to be clearer, 
path dependent processes are marked by irreversibility (Stephens, Huber and Ray, 
1999; North, 1990; Steinmo, 1993; Pierson, 2000). The existing order and institutions 
are inherited from certain developing processes in the past and, thereby, have 
distinctive historical roots. To explain the impact of the inherited values and 
institutions on the contemporary events, one can claim that certain courses of political 
development may generate self-reinforcing processes which may even affect the 
preferences of the actors and lead them to take the current values in a particular setting 
as given. For instance, in the Nordic countries, with their strong labour movements, 
long-term efforts to pursue a high social wage path seem to have gradually eliminated 
low-wage sectors, and as a result, low-wage employers have, over time, adapted 
themselves to the preferences of the new environment. In such a condition, where the 
new rules are institutionalised, every effort to adopt previously available alternatives 
would not only be difficult to implement but also unattractive (Pierson, 2000; Huber 
and Stephens, 2001). On the contrary, in the United States, which never had a strong 
labour movement, low wage sectors are still an essential part of welfare capitalism. As 
a result, the preferences of employers in Sweden and the United States differ, as they 
have adapted and made commitments to different rules and arrangements. 
In this regard, it has also to be argued that in societies with strong social democratic 
labour movements, the ideological hegemony of the generous universalist welfare 
system dominated public opinion to the extent that bourgeois coalition governments 
found that the only way to win elections was to adopt social democratic policies. Such 
ideological hegemony mechanisms functioned as a complement to path dependence, 
which has resulted in political actors passing policies that had been put on the agenda 
by dominant political institutions from an earlier period. In other words, ideological 
hegemony implies that the actors' intentions and desires are not self-generating, but 
are products of social and political struggles over decades and even centuries (Huber & 
Stephens, 2001). 
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Third, path dependence prevents radical changes. There is no doubt that in the process 
of development, every welfare state faces situations in which certain changes or 
adaptations of the particular existing arrangements to new conditions becomes 
inevitable. Factors such as a changing balance in power resources in the political 
establishment, changing economic conditions, or the emergence of new demands by 
new social groups, may provide conditions in which actors find it necessary to 
introduce some changes in the existing arrangements. However, in these cases, the 
path dependence, which involves previous institutional choices, limits the space for 
decision makers to adopt far-reaching changes (North, 1990). One of the most 
important systems, which clearly fit this dilemma for the advocates of changes, is the 
old-age pension system. In most countries, pension systems are based on a pay-as-you- 
go system (PAYG) in which current employees' contributions finance the previous 
generation's pensions. Attempts to make essential changes to the system, such as 
shifting to privately funded arrangements - especially in countries in which the PAYG 
system has been in place for a long time - found it impossible to introduce private 
pension arrangements. The burden on current contributors to both finance the previous 
generation and save for their own would be so heavy that it could not be maintained 
(Pierson, 2000). 
As is evident from the example, the major factor, which more or less freezes the 
existing pension system or at least allows limited incremental cutbacks or adjustments, 
is not primarily power resources issues, but a path dependency which narrows the 
choices for policy makers and other advocates of change. Even in other areas of the 
welfare system, such as the labour market, health care provision, child care and elderly 
care, the structures are so effectively embedded and institutionalised, and different 
parts of the institutional framework are so interlocked, that partial changes would 
jeopardise the institutional complementarities (Pierson, 2000; Soskice, 1999). 
The fact that in a path dependent process major organisations and institutions of social 
policy emerged and developed in parallel, or through a sort of mutual adjustment, 
makes them point in the same direction. Within national systems, every institution and 
social organisation is under continual pressure to adapt itself to the environment 
it 
works within, and consequently to the other institutions, not least because of 
competitive reasons, simply because it has to share the limited 
financial resources with 
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the others. In such a process, with constant adjustments of social institutions both to 
other institutions and to changing conditions, it is difficult for political actors to bring 
about dramatic changes in the structure of a welfare system institution without that 
causing a response in the whole system of governance. In other words, because 
institutions in a national system develop together over a long period of time, it is likely 
that the self-reinforcing processes of development gradually push institutional 
preferences in a common direction with the result that the need for further radical 
change is mitigated. Consequently, a national system with strong historical continuity 
is resistant both to initiatives for internal changes as well as to external pressures for 
convergence across systems. In this regard, as Pierson (2000: 812) emphasises, 
Arguments about regimes and path dependence thus constitute part of a forceful 
counter to accounts that expect forces associated with globalisation to sweep away 
differences among contemporary welfare states. 
Institutionalisation as a long-term and gradual process 
So far this chapter has argued that welfare state development, as a part of political 
development, frequently unfolds in a path dependent fashion. A set of supporting 
institutional arrangements, which developed in the early post-war period, have locked 
in welfare state development, and so made every attempt for the transformation to 
different arrangements extremely difficult. While in the beginning of the period, power 
resource configurations were the major factors for political choice and the foundation 
of the welfare system, in the later period, other factors such as public opinion, policy 
configurations and institutional arrangements have successively dominated, and 
thereby limited political choices for incoming governments, although these ostensibly 
may have different political preferences than those who initiated and established the 
system (Huber and Stephens, 2001). 
Arguments about path dependence explain two major questions about the welfare state. 
First, the origins of differences between different welfare regimes which account 
for 
variations in welfare state outcomes across countries, was 
first and foremost a 
consequence of differences in the dominant political colouring of the 
incumbent 
governments. Apart from power resources which according to 
Esping-Andersen's 
(1990) typology, in the `Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism ', were crucial in shaping 
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the Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and Liberal regimes, the path dependence 
approach is important as a complementary approach in explaining the shaping of the 
systems. This means that different social and historical processes in these societies, 
and the early years of party governance, profoundly affected the politics of social 
policy (Huber and Stephens, 2001). 
Second, the path dependence approach accounts for the institutionalisation of the 
welfare state as a long-term and gradually-unfolding process (Pierson, 2000; Rothstein, 
1998; Huber and Stephens, 2001). The process of institutionalisation of arrangements 
occurred during a long period of massive welfare state expansion in the decades after 
the war. This picture of long-term changes in the process of development of the 
arrangements cautions us not to overestimate limited and short-term changes in 
welfare arrangements, or draw far-reaching conclusions as soon as a system faces 
small changes. Clearly speaking, while most of the programmes adopted in the process 
of expansion were meant to cover the social risks, which were embedded within the 
process of development in advanced economies, public opinion understood them as an 
inseparable part of the advanced industrial system. The adoption and rapid expansion 
of essential arrangements such as pension systems, unemployment insurance 
programmes, health care, and disability programmes, were a response to needs arising 
from the process of industrialisation, which are as urgent now as they were when they 
first emerged. While these components of welfare systems are the major commitments 
of the political establishments to citizens and the need for such benefits increases over 
time, there is no room for Scandinavian governments, with their universalistic and 
comprehensiveness approach, to pursue active policies of social policy retrenchment. 
During the past decades, the programmes mentioned above accounted for a large part 
of the total social protection outlay, and in most of the programmes, the size of these 
expenditures increased. 
In some of the major programmes, especially in the pension system, expenditure 
reflects lagged policy commitments rather than newly introduced policies. The time 
delays delays between policy enactment and their implications on public expenditure 
are very long. In the case of contributory pensions, as Pierson (2000: 814) notices, the 
time delay may be 70 years: 
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The time it takes for the bulk of the pensioner population to be composed of those who 
worked a full career under new rules - before policy choices are fully reflected in 
ongoing expenditures. 
Other kinds of gradual changes are those caused by technological or social changes. In 
the health care system, technological advancement has over time increased the 
expenditures without any changes in programme rules coming through, or new 
generous policies being introduced. The introduction of women into the paid 
workforce, which has lead to the growing role of women in society, changes in 
migration patterns, changes in fertility rates, and population ageing, are among other 
social changes which occur over time and produce build-ups in outlays without new 
generous policy commitments being introduced. 
These slow-moving long-term processes, which are policy effects rather than policy 
enactment, are sources of increasing costs of social insurance benefits which are 
crucial in our understanding of the changes in contemporary welfare states. 
Accordingly, while a large share of the upward trend in public expenditure seems to 
have been the lagged effects of the earlier policy changes, it would be a mistake to lay 
stress on power resources as the major factor deciding changes in expenditure at all 
stages of welfare state development. Having said that, it has to be emphasised that in 
most affluent democracies (particularly in Scandinavia) welfare programmes have 
historically been initiated and adopted by the political establishment, and in this 
regard, the left parties and unions were the strongest advocates of generous policies, 
but the crucial point is that when an arrangement is started, it has been successively 
institutionalised. It means that the programmes could survive and reproduce itself with 
support from other sources, such as the consumers of the services and benefits, interest 
groups, and the provider of services. However, in the era of economic crisis in which 
the bourgeois parties advocated policy changes directed towards austerity and cuts in 
expenditure, the left parties and unions once again took a central role in defending the 
existing benefits and previously adopted commitments. In some new areas, such as 
early retirement, however, the political establishment took on completely new policy 
initiatives to compensate these vulnerable social groups. 
The historical development approach, which emphasises the institutionalisation of the 
welfare state creates the need for us to generate new explanatory accounts for 
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understanding of the long-term consequences of policy choices, rather than focusing 
on short-term changes. Institutions, both the political establishment which makes the 
rules of the game for political struggles, and policy legacies which include 
comprehensive programmes and arrangements, are structures which provide the basis 
for processes of social learning that affect prospects for future programme expansion 
(Pierson, 1996). Apart from long-term commitments that lock-in particular paths of 
policy development, the institutions also represent different kinds of social interest, 
which are not easy to get rid of by political manoeuvring. 
Protecting Social Programmes: The mass public and core institutions 
In the period of welfare state expansion, conservative parties generally avoided rolling 
back welfare reforms instituted by the left parties (and to some extent Christian 
Democratic parties). Each new reform was accepted after it had been instituted. The 
reason for this lack of resistance was the fact that the reforms were popular with the 
mass public. As advocates of power resources (Korpi, 1983; Huber and Stephens, 
2001) suggest, during the period of expansion policy, the labour movement and others 
defined the agenda with progressive standpoints. The other political parties had no 
other choice than to follow the flow. In the era of retrenchment it seems that the mass 
public has once again acted as a major defender of welfare arrangement - at least in 
Scandinavia. Recipients of social benefits, who are more concentrated and well 
organised now than before, are generally more dependent on welfare provision and 
therefore more determined to defend their interests. On the other hand, political parties 
are extremely careful not to jeopardise their re-election by making unpopular cutbacks. 
The Conservatives and neo-Liberal parties, who are traditionally opposed to the strong 
state and were in favour of rollbacks, have shown no inclination to pursue an extended 
retrenchment politics. Apart from the Conservative Party 
in the United Kingdom, who 
during the 1980s attacked some essential parts of the welfare system, the only other 
case in which neo-liberals have pursued a policy of 
large-scale retrenchments in the 
institutionalised arrangements was in New Zealand during the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Castles, 1996). 
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However, there is no doubt that, where budgetary pressures have been great, cuts in 
social policy have followed, though it is striking that in advanced welfare states, 
governments, regardless of their ideological preferences, have generally avoided 
pursuing radical retrenchments. Whenever retrenchments were an absolute necessity, 
most governments - regardless their colour - attempted to bring about an all-party 
consensus for major reforms. Moreover, to avoid unpleasant protests from the mass 
public, governments in affluent democracies avoided making drastic changes to the 
existing structures of the programmes and instead, focused on limited changes to meet 
the need for budgetary cuts. In this regard, in many advanced welfare states, even 
though governments initiated reforms in the fields of industrial relations policy, or 
even privatised some public industries, there were limited efforts to experiment with 
changes in the welfare programme such as the privatisation of public services (Pierson, 
1996). As Garret (1993) suggests, only when a government believes that it enjoys 
strong public support and thus a strong electoral position would it encourage radical 
retrenchments. 
The analysis leads us to suppose that a fear of punishment by the voters makes 
political establishments act quite conservatively and be unwilling to pursue a policy of 
radical change. Political forces prefer to channel the direction of change towards 
incremental modifications of existing policies. In other words, democratic political 
institutions chose nondecision rather than major policy changes which are generally 
unpopular and require broad consensus, which is not easy to achieve. Consequently, 
the existence of influential democratic political institutions makes decision-making 
difficult, and therefore, the likelihood of success for a retrenchment strategy minimal. 
This would preserve the status quo, which in this case favours the endurance of the 
welfare state (Pierson, 1996). 
The discussion so far reflects an understanding of the nature of welfare states and the 
process and the conditions in which they were created and expanded, which relies not 
so much on the different characteristics of welfare regimes, or the nature of the 
particular approach to social rights within them. The main aim, so far, has been to 
identify the crucial sources of expansion, and main factors, which have supported the 
stability of the system. As the combination of the three factors - the economic growth 
caused by industrialisation, the state of power resources and, the nature of path 
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dependency - were different in different countries, the outcomes were also different 
types of welfare regimes, which the next section explores. 
Categorizing welfare regimes 
In discussing the process of expansion and retrenchment of welfare states, it is useful, 
or even necessary, to explore the variations and profiles of different kinds of welfare 
regimes. Classification of welfare regimes is important because there are great 
variations between clusters of welfare regimes in matters such as relations in labour 
market institutions, the nature of social policy arrangements, and the institutionalised 
interactions between state, unions and the employers, etc. Apart from that, since every 
welfare regime (or cluster of regimes) is created in a specific historic and political 
context, it is likely that the system is shaped according to the dominant political, 
cultural, and industrial relation, and other factors, and therefore could respond 
differently to the changing conditions. Classification of welfare regimes, therefore, 
allows us to identify the crucial features of these regimes and by that, as Esping- 
Andersen (1999: 73) stresses, `more easily identify some underlying connection logic 
of movement and maybe even causality. ' 
Classification of welfare states started from an early stage, since it was recognised that 
the construction and development of welfare states in advanced industrial societies was 
following different patterns, with a consequent large variation in rights and interests. 
One of the earliest attempts to classify the types of developing welfare regimes was 
made by Titmuss (1974), who divided the system into three categories: the residual 
welfare model, the industrial achievement- performance model, and the institutional 
redistributive model. The Titmussian typology suggested that most welfare states 
embrace elements of all three models. It had also an evolutionary approach which 
suggested that all welfare states developed from the residual model, went through an 
industrial achievement-performance model, and moved towards an institutional basis. 
In practice, the differences between the different clusters of welfare states increased, 
and by that, the need for new classifications which would explain such 
differing 
aspects grew. Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology, which became the most 
debated 
among scholars, in different to Titmuss, does not focus only on the 
level of social 
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expenditure but also places emphasis on income-maintenance programmes, and 
furthermore, focuses on state-market nexus. The two key defining dimensions which 
were crucial in Esping-Andersen's typology were the degree of de-commodification 
and modes of stratification. By these categories, welfare states in all advanced 
capitalist societies could be analysed and labelled in different categories. While the 
decommodifying aspect refers to the systems' compensation for the citizens who are 
forced to leave the labour market, modes of stratification suggests the impacts of 
welfare system measures on the gaps between social strata. The initial typology made 
by Esping-Andersen (1990) suggests three ideal typical regime types which since then 
has been adapted and analysed by many scholars. The description of the three ideal 
types, which follows here, is based on Esping-Andersen (1990,1999) but also on many 
others (for instance, Pierson, 1998: 174-178; Huber and Stephens, 2001: 85-112) who 
have also analysed it: 
" The liberal welfare regimes, with their roots in the English nineteenth-century 
political economy, promote market solutions with the notion of `less eligibility' 
and `self help'. These states are characterised by modest benefits which are often 
means-tested and offered to those groups who are in absolute need. Replacement 
rates in transfer programmes are moderate to low. Therefore, one could say that the 
systems are residual in the sense that social programmes are mainly targeted rather 
than being social rights. The residual characteristic of the liberal policy also means 
that the conception of social risk is limited to a few services, because most of the 
responsibility is given to the individual (personal retirement accounts, life 
insurance and the like). Public delivery or public founding of services are limited 
and in the extreme residual cases, like the United States, they consist of just parts 
of health and education. Instead, the state promotes the private provision of market 
forms of welfare. Moreover, the liberal welfare states are characterised by passive 
family policy, therefore, the rate of female employment is quite low. In the labour 
market, the unions have poor influence, and wage bargaining is decentralised and 
the systems are known to be less corporatist. Overall, in the liberal models, the 
state intervention in the economy is very little. By that, the liberal systems 
represent a low level of decommodification, and these systems do indeed promote 
an increase in social stratification. The United States and the UK are known as the 
major candidates of the liberal regimes. 
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" The conservative (Christian democratic) welfare regimes are the dominant model 
in central Europe, which has mainly been shaped by the monarchical etatism, 
influenced by Catholic social teaching and partially in response to the demands of 
labour movements. In the conservative regimes, the central issue is that the 
entitlements are fragmented and related to occupations of different groups (or 
social strata). In other words social rights are defined by occupation and existing 
class, and as a result, different groups enjoy different entitlements. Based on this 
status segmentation, the emphasis on transfers is considerable, and the replacement 
rates are moderate to high. Services are publicly funded but privately delivered. 
The impacts of churches in shaping the conservative systems can be observed in 
their attitudes to the family, in which benefits are gender differentiated and most 
supports are designed for the traditional form of the male-dominated family. Even 
regarding the services, these systems tend to leave most of the delivery of services 
to the family, the church or other intermediary institutions. The creation of 
Conservative welfare regimes was in response to the needs of the working class. 
By social policy, the authoritarian states sought to defuse the threat of working 
class mobilisation, therefore, they have never established an advanced labour 
market policy. Even though the unions in central European countries are strong, 
wage bargaining is sectoral and the role of labour in corporatist bargaining is 
moderate. Finally, the role of the state in the economy is modest. By these features 
one can argue that the conservative regimes have a moderate degree of 
decommodification, and aim to keep the social stratification unchanged. Germany, 
France and the Netherlands are some of the conservative welfare regimes. 
" In the social democratic welfare regimes, which operate in the Nordic countries, 
usurpation of the market has been the central aim. The systems were established in 
the after-war decades, during a long period of stable Social Democratic 
governance, and reached their matured forms at the end of the 1960s, and 
therefore, internationally, these kinds of welfare regimes are latecomers. The 
central characteristic of Social Democratic regimes is universalism, which means 
that citizens, regardless of their occupation, are entitled to most of the benefits. 
Comprehensiveness is the other major feature, and refers to the fact that the social 
programmes existed in all major programme areas. The third central feature is 
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egalitarianism, which both refers to the active promotion of life chances to 
everyone, but also to the redistributive quality of the system, which effectively 
eliminated poverty. In these systems, promotion of an equality of the highest 
standard was accomplished by high income replacement rates in transfer 
programmes, high levels of publicly delivered social services, and large 
investments on labour force training and mobilisation. Strong unions with high 
levels of contract coverage could, through centralised wage-bargaining, influence 
the labour market, and by taking part in the corporatist policy making processes, 
contribute to the development of the whole welfare system. The Social Democratic 
model has also been famous for its commitment to full employment. The goal was 
partly achieved by the expansion of public employment, which also led to the 
highest level of female labour force participation. Overall, the Social Democratic 
regimes represent the most explicit efforts to de-commodify welfare and have 
actively tended to decrease the social stratification. The Nordic countries such as 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway are the most advanced social democratic regimes. 
Studying the typologies of welfare regimes, one can easily trace the impact of the 
historical legacy on the making of the post-war welfare states. As a consequence of the 
dominance of the liberalistic legacy with its roots in English political economy, the 
liberal regimes advocated an unlimited faith in the market economy and, therefore, 
tended to minimize the state's role in promoting public solutions. The risks should be 
individualised and by that the citizens' entitlements be reduced to the lowest levels. 
The historical legacy was present even in the central European countries where 
fragmentation of social groups and differentiation of class and status were crucial in 
the making of the post-war conservative welfare regimes. The democratic regimes 
followed almost the same pattern that the early social reformers in these authoritarian 
societies initiated. The Nordic social policy model also has its roots, especially 
in the 
case of poor relief, in the liberalistic model (Kuhnle, 1981,1990). 
However, Esping- 
Andersen (1999) believes that this figure was gradually transformed, first into social 
assistance and then, in the post-war period, into the modern entitlement programmes. 
But even for the Social Democratic regimes, authors like Baldwin (1990) and Esping- 
Andersen suggest the impact of the historical roots as the most significant factor in 
shaping the system: 
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It is not difficult to trace the historical link between what Social Democratic leaders 
pursued in the name of socialist solidarity, and what eventually emerged, especially in 
Sweden. It is, however, possible that this historical `correlation' is spurious in the sense 
that a culture of universalistic solidarities has its roots much further back in the 
Scandinavian Society (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 78). 
The typology of the `three worlds of welfare capitalism' has, since its invention, met 
two kinds of criticism (Pierson, 1998). The first category of criticism constituted those 
who accepted the classification made by Esping-Andersen but suggested a rather 
narrower classification, and by that, tried to add new clusters of countries to the `three 
worlds of capitalism'. Among the authors who disputed the number and the types of 
regimes, and the classification of various countries in Esping-Andersen's typology, we 
can name Castles and Mitchell (1993), and Liebfried (1993). Castles and Mitchell 
distinguished a fourth cluster, which was constituted by countries like Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK (which in Esping-Andersen's typology were classified as liberal 
states). According to Castles and Mitchell, these welfare states have for a long time 
combined low expenditure with high levels of redistribution. Apart from that, in 
Australia (and to some extent, in New Zealand) there is great emphasis on 
egalitarianism and wage-earner rights, which are more social democratic features 
rather than liberal. However, since taxation regimes in these countries - particularly in 
the UK - have changed, much of the radicalism in these regimes is also eliminated, 
(Pierson 1998) but, as some initial elements of the system are still functioning, this 
kind of regime is also to be accepted as a specific type of welfare regime. 
Consequently, these countries were classified as Antipodeans fourth world - not least 
by Esping-Andersen (1999: 89). Further, the countries in Southern Europe, such as 
Portugal, Spain, Greece and, in some limited respect even Italy and France, which in 
Esping-Andersen's initial typology were clustered in the Conservative model, are 
identified by Liebfried (1993) and Ferrera (1996) as a new distinctive group, called 
`Latin Rim' or `rudimentary welfare states'. Liebfried believes that although these 
welfare states have had the ambition to be like the other conservative regimes, in 
practice, different elements of their systems - particularly delivery systems - mostly 
rely on the systems of social support from the family and the church. These welfare 
states are therefore suggested as the Mediterranean fourth world. Other clusters of 
countries which are suggested to have been ignored by Esping-Andersen are the East 
Asian countries with Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and the countries in Latin America. 
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The second set of criticism is harsher because it questions the basis on which the 
classification was made, which refers to narrow focus upon labour market indicators. 
Decommodification, which is one of the major measures for Esping-Andersenis 
classification, is rejected as inappropriate because it considers welfare entitlements for 
those who have a place in the labour market. This critique, which foremostly comes 
from feminist authors, (Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993; Pringle, 1998,2002) implies that 
the starting point of Esping-Andersen is a traditional social democratic society in 
which the notion of full employment is one of the preconditions. Lewis (1992) believes 
that welfare states, for example, vary greatly in correspondence to the state of women 
in paid employment. Therefore, she constructs a typology in which welfare states 
correspondence to a `male-breadwinner model', and the function of social policy in 
relation to the gendered division of work in labour market (for men) and 
caring/homemaking (for women) are central. In the classification of Lewis, Britain 
classifies as a state with strong male-breadwinner features, whereas France occupies a 
moderate position and Sweden is suggested as a system with the strongest aspects of 
gender equality. 
Pringle (2002) takes one step further in the critiques of Esping-Andersen when he 
emphasises that Esping-Andersen's class-based analysis addresses the `welfare needs' 
of a particular group of the population, i. e. males in the labour market, but virtually 
ignores the other social groups. Pringle believes that the modern welfare states are 
predominantly constructed for `white-males, ' simply because during the period of 
expansion, the traditional household with a male-breadwinner dominated. In the post- 
modern era, he emphasises, not only gender issues, but also other important social 
divisions such as ethnicity, age, disability and sexuality have received greater 
attentions, and therefore, they have to be taken into consideration for the classification 
of welfare states. 
The changing social, structural, and economic conditions have not only questioned 
the static classification of welfare regimes, but also altered the realities in which 
welfare states operate. The question arises here is whether these changes have been so 
crucial that the essential characteristic of welfare states had to transform, or the 
changes have occurred successively, and by that, the systems succeeded to adapt 
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themselves to the evolutionary process. The changes are divided in two groups, the 
internal and the external. The next section focuses on the internal factors. 
Domestic politics and welfare state change in contemporary societies 
Since the economic crisis of the 1970s, welfare regimes, regardless of their type, have 
been facing some major challenges. Whereas at the beginning of the period most 
scholars tended to link the challenges to changes in the global economy, in the latter 
period some focused their attention towards a series of domestic factors which have 
influenced the development of the welfare state and challenged its future. The aim of 
this section is to account for the factors which have given rise to the policies of 
retrenchment. 
There is no doubt that contemporary welfare states and the societies in which they are 
located have experienced crucial changes. These changes have occurred in areas such 
as the industrial process, the structure of family, the demographic structure and so 
forth. As a consequence of the changing process not only the rights, the role and, the 
responsibilities of people in the society and towards each other have changed but also 
the pattern of social relationship have fundamentally changed. In the debates about 
welfare state crisis, there has been an obvious tendency to understand the difficulties 
caused by the effects of external factors - globalisation - as the main source of 
pressure on welfare states and pay marginal attentions to impacts of changing pattern 
of social relationship. Factors, such as the slowdown in the growth of productivity and 
consequent economic growth, inflation control, the maturation of governmental 
commitments, population aging, and the restructuring of households and their 
relationship to the world of paid employment, all understood as domestic issues, have 
also received some attention, although on a limited scale. For some scholars such as 
Iversen (2001), Pierson (2000), and Pringle (2002) these profound transitions of post- 
industrialism have generated the current turmoil around the welfare state and therefore 
have to be identified as the major threat against the central features of national welfare 
states rather than the globalisation scenario. Despite the broad consensus among these 
scholars in focusing on such domestic difficulties for welfare arrangements of national 
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social policy structures rather than considering the effects of globalisation as the main 
cause of contemporary crisis, different factors are reviewed here as the source of 
pressure on the welfare state. The following sections addresses these issues - 
deindustrialisation, maturation of governmental commitments, population ageing, and 
Transition in household structures - which are considered to be more crucial for the 
future of welfare states. 
Changes in industrial processes and economic growth 
Among the scholars there has been a tendency to start the discussion about changes in 
social relation with identifying changes in the economic area and in the production 
relations with the implications these changes have had on the class structures. The 
notion that workplace and the relation to the production are the major sources for the 
development of social identity and social contact motivated such focus on workplace 
(Mullard and Spicker, 1998). To be faithful to the tradition, one could argue that in the 
area of the labour market and production the most significant changes have been the 
transition from manufacturing to service industries. The enormous growth of 
teleworking, which by moving work from the workplaces to the homes, have changed 
the concept of `workplace', has had a considerable impact on social relations. 
However, although these changes are sociologically interesting, they are less 
interesting for the present discussion about the welfare state crisis. Another change 
which is caused by the changing pattern in industrial relation, and according to 
Mullard and Spicker (1998) is more essential, is the absence of work. The 
phenomenon of increasing long-term unemployment, which has been the most obvious 
development in, the past two decades, has to be seen as a crucially important factor. 
This change in the labour market has created a social group quite literally `shaped' by 
long-term exclusion from labour market and the negative impact that joblessness has 
on financing circumstances and social status. Although, in capitalist welfare states 
views about the unemployed and methods of dealing long-term unemployment differ, 
there is no doubt that in most of these societies the costs of coping with this problem 
has placed public budgets under pressure. Apart from the financial pressure on welfare 
states, the increasing gap between those in and those outside the labour market can 
cause a breakdown of social networks and so contributes to growing social difficulties. 
In those societies where the process of deprivation due to long-term unemployment has 
occurred without active intervention from the state, the concentration of the most 
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deprived groups in poor areas has led to a process of residential segregation 
(Andersson, 1998). In most welfare states this increasing segregation is regarded as the 
most significant social problem caused by changes in the industrial processes. 
Unemployment as the most significant problem for the established welfare states 
emerged during the late 1970s when it was recognised that rising inflation was a threat 
to welfare states. As Notermans (1999) argues, the inflationary pressure which 
emerged in the 1970s changed the conditions for the institutional structures of the 
economies, which since the 1930s were made in response to the deflation governing 
the economies. The emergence of inflation caused national governments to impose 
some policy constraints to stabilise their economy. Consequently, most governments 
targeted certain post-war institutional structures such as full employment policies, 
credit market regulation, discretionary monetary policy, and essential parts of generous 
welfare states. Although there seems to be a sort of symmetry between Noterman's 
domestic version of the monetary policy constraint and the globalisation thesis 
financial mobility argument, the essential point here is that the origin of these two 
constraints are different. As Schwartz (2001: 25) emphasises, Noterman's argument `at 
least has the virtues of starting from actors trying to cope with the problems they face, 
rather than starting from an actorless system imposing constraints, and it also opens up 
the institutional aspects of the post-war welfare state to scrutiny. ' 
For Iversen, the shift in employment structures from manufacturing to services is more 
crucial for welfare state distress. In contrast to Schwartz (2001) who put the emphasis 
on globalisation as the major reason for the affect on employment in welfare states, 
Iversen (2001) understands dramatic increases in productivity in the manufacturing 
sector, and changes in consumption patterns as the decisive factors, which cause 
disruption of employment. This process, which has led to a rapid de-industrialisation in 
advanced economies, was crucial to social change, and in turn, increased the intensity 
of the growth of compensatory social policy, as is revealed in figure 1.1. There had 
been a steady shift in the employment structure long before the 1980s. Baumol (1967) 
had stressed much earlier, that labour intensive services such as education, child care 
and health care, were unable to match productivity increases in manufacturing that 
were completely independent of changes in the global economy. By arguing that 
productivity in the manufacturing sector was the major change that caused severe 
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pressure on welfare states, Iversen not only rejects economic openness as the major 
reason for the decrease in the employment rate, but also dismisses claims which have 
pointed to globalisation as the major source of threat to the contemporary welfare state. 
Pierson (1998,2000a) also emphasises the shift from manufacturing to services as the 
major social change that created intense fiscal problems. He found slower economic 
growth, mainly caused by the shift in the workforce to activities with limited 
productivity improvements, as the major factor which has been leading to fiscal strain 
for mature welfare states. In essence, tying the development of the welfare state to 
economic growth could not be sustainable forever. The remarkable growth of the 
economies of industrial societies since the Second World War, which made the 
expansion of the welfare state possible, could not proceed at the same fast pace at 
which it had begun. The human and social costs of such high growth would have been 
devastating and at some point, as Pierson (1998: 184) stresses, problems such as 
`stress-related illness, the diseases of affluence, unsatisfying labour and the direct 
economic costs of these social ills make the `economy of the welfare state' self- 
defeating. ' 
Figure 1.1 Manufacturing and service employment 1960-94 
(% civilian employment, OECD average) 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Source: OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-94 
Manufacturing 
employment 
-s - Service 
employment 
Maturation qfgovei-nniental commitments 
Another post-industrial shift that has created intense fiscal problems for the welfare 
state, is a greater reliance upon state-provided welfare. 
The maturation of 
governmental commitments has successively generated new social groups with a 
large 
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dependency on the welfare state, both for their income and for employment. As is 
shown in figure 1.2, the number of welfare state clients, including public social welfare 
employment as well as recipients of pensions, disability, social assistance, and 
unemployment benefits, has increased consistently. In other words, in many countries 
more than half of the population receives transfer or work income from the welfare 
state (Flora, 1989). In countries with universal programmes, especially in health care 
and education, the reliance on services is even greater. 
The budget deficit created by the growing rise in expenditures on benefits and welfare 
services has always been a potential threat, and a sign of the financial vulnerability of 
the system. During the period of welfare state development, such increases were partly 
due to the desire for higher standards, which were mainly represented by central and 
local government as well as the specialists who acted as a spur to improve standards, 
and partly, too, to rising public expectations. As Pinch (1997: 23) emphasises: 
Once a service is provided by the public sector, demands tends to increase... instead of the 
`hidden hand' of the private market, there is a political body to whom representations can 
be made in the face of limited services. 
Therefore, pressure groups such as trade unions, the women's movement and 
ecological movements have been attempting to defend their interests in the face of 
growing economic problems. As long as economic growth sustained the desire for 
higher standards welfare state growth was achievable, but with declining revenues 
welfare systems faced major financial problems and expenditure cuts in services 
became inevitable. 
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Figure 1.2 Welfare state Clienteles as a percentage of the electorate, 1950-80 
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Demographic changes -population ageing 
Apart from structural problems that were mainly caused by the changes in economy, a 
further and rather different challenge to welfare regimes has been the cataclysmic 
long-term effects of population ageing. In all OECD countries, the proportion of 
people who are living longer and demanding more medical care is growing, and 
consequently, pension and health spending (much of which goes to the elderly) has 
been increasing all the time. Between 1960 and 1990, pension and health spending in 
OECD countries increased from 7.1 to 14.3 per cent of GDP (Schwartz, 2000: 26). 
Such a rapid increase, which was significantly larger than the rise in unemployment 
expenditures, induced virtually all OECD countries to initiate policy reforms in their 
old age pensions. Although most of the changes in the pension system aimed to cope 
with the fiscal deficit in the future rather than the present, the efforts have clearly 
shown the increasing worries about the fiscal stress on the welfare system. 
In this regard, it has to be emphasised that one of the main reasons for some industrial 
nations' reluctance to keep or build up costly welfare system programmes has been the 
rapid population ageing and the prospect of unpayable future pension burdens 
(Pierson, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Garrett, 1998). 
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Transition in household structures 
Another important change which has been occurring in the affluent societies is the 
impermanence of the family as the basis institution in the societies. The rearrangement 
of a household's structures, and the relationship between households and the labour 
market, has had a profound impact on the traditional welfare system which was 
designed for the traditional `male-breadwinner' household structure of intact families. 
The most prominent transformation in household structures seems to have been a 
massive increase in women's labour force participation (Pierson 2000). With women 
in the labour force outside of the home, most of the unpaid work in the home, such as 
care for children, elderly and disabled, have become social tasks which have to be 
carried out by the welfare system. While women's participation in the labour market is 
a citizenry and democratic right, one can conclude that everywhere, but especially in 
`conservative' Continental welfare states which have a relatively low tradition of 
women's labour force participation, the costs of care provision are expected to grow in 
the future (Daly, 1997; Pierson, 2000). Knowing that public sector caring services are 
quite expensive, and in the Scandinavian countries with the most advanced care 
system, the spending for such services in 1995 were over 3 per cent of GDP, one can 
argue that the `liberal' and `conservative' welfare systems are more likely to face 
challenges in providing publicly-funded care services. 
Another change with profound consequences for welfare states is the sharp fall in the 
fertility rate, which has mainly occurred since women's labour force participation 
increased. However, the sharpest fall in fertility, as Esping-Andersen (1999) notes, has 
occurred in countries where the women's labour force participation rates have been 
lowest. Despite that, low fertility, which in Pierson's (2000: 96) words is a 
consequence of `cultural change, the availability of birth control, and the expansion of 
opportunities for women', is going to severely punish welfare states, and mainly those 
which have generous provision for their elderly populations. 
The above discussion indicates that, apart from demographic changes, the other issues 
debated among scholars, in one way or another, have been related to the economic 
problems, which are either caused by changes in the international economy or are 
generated primarily within affluent democracies as a consequence of domestic social 
or structural changes. While the impact of changes in the global economy on welfare 
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states is undeniable, the argument in this chapter is that the domestic social and 
economic transformations occurring in OECD countries are equally important. In the 
longer-term, I argue that the destinies of welfare states are going to be decided by two 
domestic factors: first, the ability of the national political establishment to adjust the 
system to social, economic and political realities, and second, the public support and 
popular enthusiasm for social provision. In contrast to the predominant understanding 
among the advocates of the globalisation thesis, who tend to anticipate an inevitable 
dismantling of the generous social policies, efforts on a national level are focused on 
restructuring and modernising of social contracts in order to adopt the systems to the 
new social and economic conditions. In this regard, some advocates of strong welfare 
states, such as Esping-Andersen (1996), reject the overemphasis on the impact of the 
international economic order on welfare states. He believes that diagnoses, such as the 
`market distortion view'; the consequence of the new global economy on domestic 
policy choice; and even population ageing, might overemphasise the risks. By 
speaking about the diversity of welfare state types, he also rejects too many 
generalisations. Supporters of the existing universalistic welfare system such as Korpi 
(1994) believe that many difficulties that the welfare state faces are caused by market 
failure rather than generous social policy programmes. In their view, overload on 
existing social programmes is a result of badly-functioning labour markets. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical approaches to the development of 
welfare systems. The processes of emergence and development of welfare states 
reveals that the three theoretical approaches, which have been discussed in this study, 
have all contributed essential elements to understanding the origins and impact of 
welfare state development. While `the logic of industrialism thesis' was to explain the 
emergence of the welfare state in relation to the process of 
industrialisation and 
economic growth, `the power resources approach' focused on the process of the 
expansion of welfare systems by linking it to the power balance 
between political 
actors. The power resources thesis implies that the 
kinds and direction of welfare state 
regimes have been decided by a power struggle 
between the main political groups and 
social classes in capitalist societies. `The 
institutionalisation thesis', then, mainly 
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explains the mechanisms, which facilitate the continuity and survival of arrangements 
in the event of changes in the power balance. 
By employing each of these theoretical approaches in analysing welfare state 
development, one benefits from aspects of each for the understanding of different 
stages of development. This `pluralist' way of considering a range of theories, which 
all try to explain an event, which has been developing during a long-term process, 
shield one from the limits a single specific approach may provide. Problems may arise, 
particularly when discussions about the retrenchment of the welfare system employ the 
same rules and arguments, which were used when the expansion of the welfare system 
was taking place. The economic condition, social composition and political context in 
which the systems were once founded, have passed through dramatic changes and so 
new conditions have been provided. Therefore, it would be a mistake to believe that a 
theory which successfully explains welfare state growth could be relevant in 
understanding its retrenchment or decline (Pierson, 1996,2000). Retrenchments of 
welfare states occur in a particular context which may completely differ from the 
condition of welfare state expansion. The political environment in which the process of 
expansion has been shaped and the goals pursued by the actors, may have undergone 
crucial changes, and therefore, theoretical approaches should not be applied as they 
were for explaining the era of expansion. 
There in no doubt that welfare states are projects associated with capitalist economies. 
They were established in a process of industrialisation, but cross-national variations in 
social provisions and welfare arrangements are largely a consequence of differences in 
the social constellation and the distribution of political resources among classes. The 
power resources perspective could then best explain the reasons for patterns of welfare 
expansion. Decades of welfare state rule have seen development of arrangements and 
social legacies so embedded that neither temporary economic crisis nor governmental 
change could motivate an extended retrenchment in social programmes. Arrangements 
and benefits, once offered, are difficult to cut. The politics of retrenchment is different 
from that operating during the expansion of the welfare state. The large public social 
programmes which have been provided, and the extended social groups who are 
recipients of different kinds of benefits, are now a central part of the political 
landscape which determines the future of the welfare state. 
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However, it is generally accepted that the matured welfare states have been facing 
some serious challenges, which make changes or, at least, adaptation of the systems to 
the new order inevitable. Some of the challenges are suggested to have had domestic 
origins which refers to the growing differences between the existing social and welfare 
programmes and real social demands. In the economic field one could point factors 
such as slow-down in the growth of productivity, economic growth and, high inflation 
rate. In the social area restructuring of households have caused great commitments 
especially to matured welfare states, and the demographic trends have implied an 
increasing pressure on the public budget. The prognoses for the future point ageing as 
the most treating aspect for the matured welfare states. Despite these changes, there are 
scholars who tend to play down the impacts of these challenges on welfare states by 
arguing that the structures of industrial societies have not changed dramatically. The 
course of internal changes is suggested to have been constantly. These scholars, 
instead, emphasise external factors - economic globalisation. This view, which 
explores in the next chapter, suggests that the growing economic interdependence of 
countries worldwide as the major threat against foundations of welfare states, which 
are, based on national states' supremacy on domestic politics such as institutional 
welfare policies. 
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Chapter 2 
Welfare States and `Globalisation' 
We have briefly looked at a number of points made by scholars who believe that lots 
of state adjustments can be explained by internal factors. However, there is debate here 
because others assume that external factors of globalisation have had tremendous 
impacts on the autonomy of welfare states. This chapter, therefore, examines the 
ongoing debates about the major reasons that explain the crisis of welfare systems in 
the recent decades. In analysing the crisis, scholars generally distinguish between two 
different perspectives. The global perspective, which examines welfare state 
development in the context of the changing world economy and international system, 
and the evolutionary perspective, which relates the systems to general long term 
changes in social structure. Most scholars (Flora, 1989; Strange, 1996; Lash & Urry, 
1987; Giddens, 1990) from different disciplines point to the process of globalisation as 
the most significant change in the world, which reduces the role of national 
governments to control of the social and economic spheres. Others (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999; Boyer and Drache, 1996; Pierson, 2001) prefer to describe the 
ongoing process as a `certain trend toward internationalisation' and, by that, reject 
overstatement of the process of globalisation. However, with regards to the changing 
conditions in international relations, which undoubtedly have had certain impacts on 
the role of national governments or have largely influenced the social structures, this 
chapter will mainly focus on this perspective. 
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As stressed above, in most of the literature about the present crisis of the welfare state, 
fundamental changes in the welfare system have largely been ascribed to changes in 
the global system. The core notion of the concept of globalisation is that, at least from 
an economic viewpoint, trade and finance capital have become `denationalised', the 
state's control of the domestic market has progressively diminished. In its place, 
TNCs, as the major agents of change, have begun to dictate conditions for the new 
global order. In the new situation, national economies have lost their importance and 
consequently domestic strategies of national economic management have become less 
viable. In other words, by the extending globalisation, the era of the domination of the 
nation state as an agency of governance, which, since the Keynesian breakthrough in 
the post-war period led to the creation of the `strong state', is now over. In other 
words, by entering in to this new order, institutions and activities associated with state 
economic management such as the welfare state, could suffer as resources were either 
reduced or reallocated. 
As the process of globalisation is asserted to have had the crucial impact on the 
welfare state, the major emphasis of this chapter will be on the contemporary policies 
of globalisation. However, despite general consensus about the ongoing changes in 
many aspects of social life, partly as a result of globalisation, there is substantial 
disagreement about the conception, dynamic, and consequences of the new global 
order (Held et al., 1999; Sykes et al., 2001). In this regard, the attempt is to focus, both 
on aspects of the globalisation thesis that seem to be realistic, but also on those aspects 
which overstate the case. 
The importance of the global perspective in identifying the reasons for the changes is 
that the Social Democratic welfare states are mainly based on the nation-state's 
effective control of the economy. For this reason, particular issues relating to 
globalisation and welfare in OECD countries, such as the `end of organised capitalism' 
will be discussed. Another issue is the expansion of TNCs, which are major agents of 
the new order. This chapter will examine the creation of these companies and their 
impact on welfare state economies. TNCs matter because they embody key factors in 
the production process regarding the state of employment within nation states, as well 
as the financing of production. 
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It is argued that globalisation has had certain impacts on the mode of industrial 
organisation and institutional forms of the Fordist state, which are associated with the 
post-war era (Jessop, 1994; Lash & Urry, 1987). Fordism was a method of mass 
production based on a strict division of labour, and closely associated with scientific 
management, which dominated the process of industrial production. However, due to a 
range of factors, including rapidly changing labour markets and rising international 
competition, many observers came to believe that Fordism had given way to `post- 
Fordism', typified by the application of new production methods concerned with 
flexibility, the disintegration of large firms, and a closer integration of product 
development, marketing, and production, which provided a new set of institutions in 
the labour market. New competition laws were needed, and labour management 
relations, as well as financial markets, also had to be restructured (Gertler, 1988). 
Overall, in this chapter I sketch out whether the transition from organised to 
disorganised capitalism has reduced the nation state's autonomy over how it conducts 
social policy. First, an overview of the economic crisis of the 1970s, which is 
understood as the start of the major economic change in the international economic 
system, that is, globalisation. 
Description of the general nature of globalisation 
For many scholars (Flora, 1989; Therbom, 1986; Stephens and Huber and Ray, 1999), 
the oil crisis of the early 1970s is the starting point for the crises of the welfare states. 
The crisis destabilised the world economy and thereby created structural problems for 
the labour market and the household in the industrialised societies. The oil crisis has 
also made many observers believe that there is an obvious connection between a 
state's dependence on the world market and the extent to which it becomes vulnerable 
to international crises. Since most liberal welfare states are strongly integrated in the 
global economy, major changes in the world market would affect the nation-state's 
economy. 
One of the major impacts of the crisis was the reappearance of mass unemployment, 
which had largely disappeared since the 1950s. Low economic growth and accelerating 
technological innovation have been named as the two main features of the structural 
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changes in the world economy, which resulted in mass unemployment. The economic 
crisis of the 1970s had mainly concerned industrial jobs. As industrial mass production 
was one of the basic conditions for the creation of the western nations' welfare states, 
the threats against mass production inevitably caused difficulties for welfare states 
whose existence was predicted on full employment. In other words, the `Keynesian 
consensus', which prevented any trade-off between social security and economic 
growth, apparently could not resist the pressure from the globalisation of the world 
economy (Esping-Andersen, 1996a). The decline in industrial employment created a 
situation in which in Nordic countries like Sweden full employment could only be 
attained via services. This strategy was not viable because rising public deficits 
restrained further expansion of public employment. Other countries like UK and USA 
allowed low wages and by that provided conditions for the private sector to expand. 
Increasing public spending was another structural problem for many nation-states' 
economies, and was a result of low economic growth and mass unemployment 
attributed to changes in the international economy. The high level of social spending 
was a result of reduced public revenues and increased public expenditure, which since 
the mid 1970s became the major problem of most welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 
1996b; Flora, 1989). To solve the problem, almost all welfare states cut public 
expenditure, although benefits were not cut back to the levels reached prior to the first 
oil crisis. These measures, in turn, caused a dramatic increase in tax levels, which had 
a political dimension, i. e. public resistance to higher revenues as well as to reduced 
spending. These problems represented a crisis of the welfare state as a whole because 
they could only be solved by far-reaching changes in its basic institutions and 
assumptions about the role of welfare. Otherwise, and if the economic condition would 
not be changed for the better and the macro-constellation remained stable, the basic 
institutions would suffer a loss of legitimacy. 
An additional problem was also the legitimacy of the welfare state, which, over a 
long 
time, had gained broad public approval, but in the 1970s came under criticism. The 
public and political consensus was based on the notion that state 
intervention would 
correct market failure by securing the basic needs of social groups suffering 
from the 
economic environment created by free competition. The consensus 
became fragile 
when the left began to criticise welfare states because of their 
lack of efficiency, and 
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the right attacked the expansion of public sector costs, which was held to undermine 
economic growth (Offe, 1986; King, 1987). In this respect, neo-liberals argued that by 
involving high levels of taxation, the welfare state erodes incentives to work, save and 
invest, which caused `market distortion' (Esping-Andersen, 1996a). Moreover, by 
pulling human and capital resources away from industries and into the public sector, it 
`crowded out' private sector alternatives (George, 1996: 6). In other words, there 
existed a new and fundamental trade-off between egalitarianism and employment. 
The duration of the economic crisis of the 1970s, with its mass unemployment and cuts 
in social benefits, had, for the first time after the War, questioned the authority of 
national governments. Apart from the weakening of the authority of nation states, other 
issues such as rapid technological change in products and processes, which was 
assumed to strengthen companies and thereby the market's position in relation to the 
state, have also been debated (Castells, 1996). Another issue was the rapid increase in 
the power of the TNCs. It was suggested that the international integration of markets 
would decrease the role of workers in decision-making about production, simply 
because labour intensive industries would move production to economies with low 
labour costs. By the same token, the new economic order would also put pressure on 
the tax regime to be more harmonised internationally. All these changes, which are 
going to be discussed in the next section, would, according to advocates of 
globalisation, suggest the `end of organised capitalism'. 
The changing authority of national governments 
Changes in governments' authority over national states have been frequently discussed 
among political scientists and economists. While the majority of scholars of political 
science and international relations (Dowd, 1993) do not believe that these changes are 
essential, and therefore would not have a great impact on the government's role to 
exercise power through political decision, studies of international political economies 
emphasise the growing authority of the market in the formation of politics. Strange 
(1996) and Lash & Urry (1987) are among those scholars who believe that since the 
1970s the influence of private enterprise in finance, industry, and trade, on the world 
market has increased dramatically and that domestic governments exercising 
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legitimate political authority have lost a great deal of their power. The market is now 
also the domain that has crucial authority in at least two areas that in the past either 
belonged to the state (the realm of the state itself) or was strongly influenced by the 
state (the economy). However, in the matters in which the market would be less 
effective than the state, governments continue to exercise control. Hirst & Thompson 
(1999) argue that there are still opportunities for the nation state to develop a domestic 
economic policy and at the same time create national strategies for international 
control. Especially, they stress that the international economy can be governed, and in 
this matter, domestic economic policy and international processes are related to each 
other. 
Hence governing powers cannot simply profilerate and compete. The different levels 
and functions of governance need to be tied together in a division of control that 
sustains the division of labour. If this does not happen then the unscrupulous can exploit 
and the unlucky can fall into the `gasps' between different agencies and dimensions of 
governance. The governing powers (international, national and regional) need to be 
`sutured' together into a relatively integrated system. If this does not happen then these 
gaps will lead to the corrosion of governance at every level (Hirst and Thompson, 
1999: 269-270). 
Hirst and Thompson are sceptical about the dominant image among the extreme 
globalisation theories like Ohame (1990,1995) who stresses the dominant position of 
TNCs and the uncontrollability of market forces in the internationalised world 
economy. They believe that nation states still have the possibility to exercise control 
over the international economy, and therefore, national political strategies are viable. 
Apart from the role of nation state in the system of international governance, Hirst and 
Thompson (1999: 277) regard the nation state as an important political organisation 
that can be the primary source of binding rules - law - within a given territory: 
Nation states as sources of the rule of law are essential prerequisites for regulation through 
international law, and as overarching public powers they are essential to the survival of 
pluralistic `national' societies with diversified forms of administration and community 
standards. 
Looking back over the past two decades, it is not hard to observe that the 
internationalisation of production as a result of the extension of multinational 
companies was the most comprehensive change to the world economy, which in turn 
undermined the concept of nationality, and thereby the influence of governments. The 
social effects of firms changing their production system, for example, mass 
unemployment, are a direct result of TNCs' lack of responsibility 
for the negative 
consequences of their action on societies (Hall, 1999). Strange (1996: 59) stressed the 
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significance of the protection of workers from their employers. Until the 1970s, this 
was a major responsibility of the modern state, but in recent years `management of 
labour relations has shifted from the offices of government to the boardroom of 
TNCs. ' While some writers, such as Hu (1993), believe that TNCs are in fact national 
companies which operate in a world market, Strange (1996: 57) pointed to examples of 
several TNCs which have most of their business abroad, and for whom the `home 
market' is not the main aim, and therefore cannot keep them in the national border. As 
an example, Strange mentions Northern Telecom, which is a Canadian- registered 
company but operating mostly in the US-market; the majority of its employees are in 
America and a great deal of its production, operation and business takes place in the 
US. Mercedes Benz is another big TNC company, which has its financial holding 
company registered in Switzerland, but its headquarters placed in Germany. These 
companies turn to their national governments only when they need some financial or 
other kind of support; otherwise they have no strong national loyalty and can move 
their operations abroad without hesitation if it is advantageous. Held et al. (1999) have 
almost the same perception about the trend towards internationalisation of production 
but instead of TNCs, they still talk about multinational corporations (MNCs), as the 
major agent in such a process. For Held et al. (1999: 237) MNCs are `huge corporate 
empires' which have their bases in a few countries but through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) control and manage subsidiaries in a number of countries outside 
their home bases. 
The globalisation of production and investment and the widespread influences of the 
large firms on national states have also received great attention in Castells trilogy The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. For Castells (1996,1997) the process 
of globalisation with mobility of capital and the ability of firms to move production 
and investment is the most crucial change in the late 20th century, which not only 
produced a new society but also has threatened welfare states: 
This is because it becomes increasingly contradictionary for firms to operate in globalised, 
integrated markets, while experiencing major cost differentials in social benefits, as well as 
distinct levels of regulation between countries.... welfare states are being downsized to the 
lowest common denominator that keeps spiralling downwards. So doing, a fundamental 
component of the legitimacy and stability of the nation-state fades away, not only in 
Europe but throughout the world... Therefore, the nation-state is increasingly powerless in 
controlling monetary policy, deciding its budget, organising production and trade, 
collecting its corporate taxes, and fulfilling its commitments to provide social benefits 
(Castells, 1997: 252-254). 
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Overall, the lack of control on TNCs causes an uncertainty for the national labour 
market in which the state of employment in the private sector is largely determined by 
companies that have no accountability to the national governments. Since the rapid 
technological development of industrial societies, these companies tended to move part 
of their production to the newly industrialised countries in which the costs of labour 
were far lower than in the advanced economies. 
Technological innovation and financial supremacy 
A shift in the state-market balance of power is mainly the result of the accelerating 
pace of technological change (Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999; Lipsey, 1999). The 
rapid technological change in products and processes has not only had its effect on 
civilian life, through increasing wealth, but also strengthens companies, and thereby 
the market's position in relation to the state. It is true that technological development 
has always been important for nation-states, particularly in the military arena, but 
technological change in civilian life, which is controlled by the private sector, reduced 
the government's monopoly over technological innovation. 
Technological innovations in the production, structure and processes need extensive 
investment, and here arises the second source for market improvement - the ability to 
finance capital costs for such investment (Held et al., 1999; Kobrin, 1999). TNCs' 
ability to cover the costs for production of the evermore capital-intensive process of 
production explains the changing role in state-market relations. The supply of capital 
to finance technological innovation has taken place mostly in the market, which in turn 
has increased the role of the institutions creating and marketing credit in the world 
economy. Despite that, Scholars like Dunning (1999) emphasise the historic role of the 
state in creating the appropriate conditions for technological innovations: 
In the early stages of development, government play a critical function in setting up a 
market system and providing assets of a public-goods character (e. g. social infrastructure) 
to enable the efficient production of privately financed goods and services. Assuming the 
absence of major innovations, the role of governments may then be expected to decline - 
particularly where there is little uncertainty, and few economies of scale or externalities of 
production or consumption. But, then, as economic growth becomes more dependent on 
technological and organisational innovations, and these involve increasingly large 
expenditures on human resources development and supportive physical infrastructure, the 
systemic functions of government again become important; even though, in some areas, its 
role as a producer and regulator might decrease (Dunning, 1999: 53). 
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However, TNCs' dominance in investment for technological development has often 
been in contrast to the national states' interests, because they only take the firm's 
interests into consideration and, as a result, organise production process for possible 
advantage - such as cheap labour or access to material (Dunning, 1988). For example, 
TNCs have moved most of their labour-intensive production process to cheap labour 
markets and kept the technological advanced part of production, which demands 
limited labour, in the home market. 
As a result of technological and financial changes, and the accelerated integration of 
national economies into one single global market economy, The advocates of 
globalisation thesis (Ohame, 1995; Castells, 1996; Strange, 1996,1999) argue that the 
authority of the governments of all states, large and small, strong and weak, has been 
weakened. They also believed that governments who failed to manage the national 
economy, to maintain employment and sustain economic growth, to avoid imbalances 
of payments with other states, to control the rate of interest and so on, are victims of 
the market economy. In particular they relate changes in the international political 
economy to the structural power of the United States, and particularly to financial 
deregulation, which began in the 1970s (or earlier in the USA) and then extended to 
the world market economy (Strange, 1999). A further primary function of the state that 
has been weakened is the control of the national currency (Edwards, 1995; Shepherd, 
1994, ch. 9; Held et al., 1999). After the deregulation of financial markets, most states, 
especially small and medium sized states, lost control over their monetary systems, and 
instead, market judgments made a decisive impact on the values of national currencies. 
The monetary system was not the only field where the market increased its influence. 
In the following section, changes in two other areas - labour market relation and tax 
regimes - will be explored. 
The changing nature of labour market relations 
The conventional wisdom about the effects of globalisation on domestic politics 
suggests that the international integration of markets has negatively affected the role of 
workers in decision-making about both production and production processes. Many 
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firms, particularly labour intensive industries in economies competing solely on the 
basis of cost of low-skilled workers, tend to move production to economies with low 
labour costs. According to advocates of the globalisation thesis (Hassel & Schulter, 
1998; Strange, 1996; Wood, 1994), such market integration has significantly weakened 
the position of organised labour movements in relation to TNCs. In the era of the 
nation state, from the 1930s, one of the state's major responsibilities was to guarantee 
workers the right to organise themselves and defend their interests in relation to their 
employer. Unions could actively participate in negotiations with management and 
investors, and influenced the overall economic strategies at the national level. But 
since the 1970s, the financial market has successively taken the upper hand, and the 
main part of decisions about companies has been taken out of governments' and 
Unions' control. According to these scholars, one of the obvious results of this change 
is that job security in the manufacturing industry has encountered difficulties. TNCs 
have excluded governments from the political management of labour relations because 
much more of the bargaining now takes place within firms. Where national 
governments threaten to intervene, TNCs can threaten to switch activities to other 
countries. 
The globalisation thesis, therefore, gives the TNCs a more decisive and dominating 
role, which in the longer term is totally incompatible for national governments. By 
deciding the strategy of investment and production, TNCs can influence employment 
on a large scale and this can affect the socio-political situation in national societies. On 
the other hand, as a result of the state's shrinking authority in society and the economy, 
certain social groups, who had been protected by its authority, become increasingly 
exposed to global structural forces of change. Some of the major losers have been 
labour unions, which in certain countries such as the UK, lost much of their influence 
in collective bargaining with employers and the right to strike. Trade unions were 
powerless to stop multinational companies' decisions to move production to countries 
that had no effective labour laws. Internationalisation of production, as Huber and 
Stephens (2001: 319) admit, has undermined the hegemonic position of blue-collar 
unions, especially in export-oriented manufacturing. Employers demanded greater 
flexibility of wages and the firms control over wage formation have increased 
considerably: 
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Where employers made demands for flexibility and decentralisation of bargaining, these 
demands assumed special weight because of the shift in power relations in favour of 
capital caused by internationalisation of production. As shifting investments and 
production from one country to another has become easier and the threat of exit has 
become more credible, capital has gained leverage vis-ä-vis both labour and governments 
in negotiations over wages, taxes and issues of control. 
Tax regimes in the new order 
Other major changes developing as a result of TNCs' dominance in the world 
economy concern conditions for taxation (Steinmo, 1993). As long as firms acted 
mainly in the home market, it was quite easy for governments to exercise control over 
companies' operations and to raise revenue from corporations. But the growth of trade 
and international production decreased governments' abilities to influence companies' 
business in the world economy (Picciotto, 1992). Before the globalisation of the world 
economy, nation states had the legal capacity to control those firms, which attempted 
to avoid paying taxes, but after the 1970s, such control decreased, mainly because 
nation states' ability to collect taxes outside their territory was severely limited 
(Picciotto, 1992). Moreover, the possibilities for firms to avoid paying tax by using tax 
havens grew rapidly, and in the early 1980s, many TNCs avoided tax by doing so 
(Johns, 1983; Strange, 1996). 
According to conventional wisdom on globalisation, this situation has had a negative 
impact on governments' ability to finance the costs of public services, and above all 
the welfare system, and as a consequence, they have been forced to raise the tax 
pressure on individual citizens and small local businesses. Scholars such as Picciotto 
(1992) believe that international taxation is the only effective way to increase a 
government's tax-income from international firms. Otherwise governments are forced 
into debt to overcome fiscal deficits. Strange (1996: 65), for example, believed that, 
While TNCs do not take over from the governments of states, they have certainly 
encroached on their domains of power. They are increasingly exercising a parallel 
authority alongside governments in matters of economic management affecting the 
location of industry and investment, the direction of technological innovation, the 
management of labour relations and the fiscal extraction of surplus value. 
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Transnational production and unemployment 
The dominant view about production processes is that since the start of the process of 
globalisation they have split more and more into sub processes (Greider, 1997). 
Labour-intensive processes have been moved into low-wage economies in East Asia, 
Latin America, and after 1990, even to East and Central Europe. Only advanced and 
highly automated production processes have remained in Western Europe and North 
America. This trend towards trans-national production intensifies pressure on 
companies, especially in advanced welfare state economies, to `modernise' by 
reducing their labour costs by substituting capital for workers (Keane and Owens, 
1986: 20). The modernisation of production has lead to a considerable decline in 
manufacturing's share of employment, simply because technological innovations 
increased manufacturing productivity, and progressively fewer and fewer workers 
were needed to produce a given level of output. As a consequence, developed 
economies tend to shift to services, new technologies, and the production of machinery 
and advanced goods. Despite attempts to regenerate the advanced economies which 
were affected by considerable job losses, by expansion of their service sectors, it has 
proved difficult to find employment for large numbers of semi-skilled male workers 
(McKeown, 1999). Long-term male unemployment has been the major problem of the 
industrial and economic development of advanced economies (Mullard and Spicker, 
1998). Redundant workers could either be educated in new skills or, if they have a few 
years remaining before their pension, leave the labour market earlier. In both cases the 
change would cause increased costs for the state. 
The weakening of the nation state was not only a result of changes in the economic 
field, i. e. global movement of money and capital, together with development in 
technology and methods of production which reduced nation states influence on the 
economy, but also in political matters. Regimes' responses to global changes during the 
1970s were different. While some Social Democratic governments chose to continue 
the Keynesian demand management policies and to maintain full employment, despite 
the new division of labour, others, often with conservative identity, abandoned the full 
employment policy. But what Mishra (1990) claims is that, despite Social Democratic 
governments' resistance to unemployment, changes in the international division of 
labour and the globalisation of capital compelled these governments to abandon the 
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full employment strategy within one decade. The point of this account, however, is that 
this change was partly a result of the shifts in the modifications of the organisation of 
production, from Fordism to Post-Fordism. According to scholars such as Jessop 
(1994) and Pierson (1994), the transformation of the Fordist state to a Post-Fordist 
state was a result of attempts to manage crises and contradictions which arose within 
the traditional post-war economies based on mass production and mass unionisation. 
Fordist capitalism, based on national growth and development of the national single 
market economy, was highly dependent on certain forms of political and social 
regulation to control the market economy (Hassel & Schulter, 1998). Jessop (1990: 2) 
described the concept of the Fordist accumulation regime as a combination of mass 
production and mass consumption. The labour processes, and so the labour markets 
were both highly regulated and stable. Such stability was provided by collective 
bargaining between the employers and the Unions, the latter of which organised a large 
majority of the workforce (Teague & Grahl, 1992). Keynesian economic policy was a 
key component of Fordism, and the state's financial support for companies provided 
stable utilisation of production facilities. This led to rising employment and increased 
production. As a result, a pattern of employment was established in which a large 
number of people possessed stable and often relatively high-paid work. 
However, the Fordist state was dependent on high level growth rates, so when the 
OECD economies went into a period of low growth at the beginning of the 1970s, the 
system faced a structural crisis. The process of mass production and mass consumption 
lead to labour shortages, and rising wages and prices, which altogether caused 
instability in the labour market regulation. These conditions favoured the 
establishment of what has been called the post-Fordist accumulation regime. In the 
labour market, the post-Fordist regime stressed flexibility and the decreasing of 
regulations, which meant that the use of the workforce, as well as the organisation of 
production, would be more flexible (Gertler, 1988). While in Fordism the dominant 
labour process was the mass production of complex consumer durables, the post- 
Fordist labour process can be defined as a flexible production process based on 
flexible machines or systems and an appropriately flexible workforce. The post-Fordist 
pattern of labour process has micro electronic-based information and communications 
technology as its crucial hardware. In the labour market, by introducing non-standard 
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employment contracts, changing work organisation, and other deregulation in favour 
of increasing flexibility, the influence of trade unions would decrease considerably. 
Ferner and Hyman (1992) believe that in the new order, labour market regulation 
would have a more decentralised, flexible and differentiated character. Post-Fordism 
may also be conceived as a response to the economic development towards the 
internationalisation of economic activities. Because of increasing international 
competition, the international mobility of production, the internationalisation of R&D, 
and essential increases in international financial operations, national economies have 
lost their importance for most companies, which focus mainly on the international 
market (Pearce & Singh, 1992). 
Summarising the discussion so far, the advocates of the globalisation thesis refer the 
changes in the economic situation in industrial society to decreasing economic growth, 
with increasing mass unemployment and cuts in social benefits as a consequence. 
Further, the rapid increase in the power of TNCs and, in turn, the weakening of the 
government's authority and the influence of labour, are other essential changes which 
have occurred in industrial relations. The basis of the changes is suggested to have 
been the rapid technological innovation, deregulations in the mobility of capital and 
production, and changes in the international monetary and trading system, which lead 
to the adaptation of new tax regimes. These changes in the organisation of capitalism, 
as Lash and Urry (1987) suggest, lead to disorganisation of the capitalist societies. 
Lash and Urry (1987) point to several reasons for the emergence of disorganised 
capitalism: the growth of the world market; deregulation of national markets, thereby 
causing the weakening of national states; the deconcentration of capital; and a rapid 
increase in the scale of external activities of large corporations. Capitalist societies 
displayed several other features, which show changes in the capitalistic system. One of 
these changes is the expansion of the service class (of managers, professionals, 
educators, scientists etc. ), which has had a strong impact on the development of 
organised capitalism and then in the `disorganising' of modern capitalism. The decline 
in the role and power of the working class and their declining organisation is another 
sign of disorganised capitalism. The absolute and relative numbers of employees in the 
manufacturing industry has declined, and the dominance of this class in the 
organisation of the modern capitalist society has disappeared. On the other hand, the 
importance of service industries for the structuring of social relations has increased. 
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For example, the number of smaller plants has increased, the labour process has 
become more flexible, and feminisation has increased. 
Overall, deindustrialisation in advanced economies was apart from changing 
consumption patterns even an inevitable product of shifting trade patterns and the 
associated new international division of labour. However, in the case of Swedish 
industry, which has historically been positive to rationalisation, and, since the workers 
laid off have seldom had any problems in finding new jobs, changes in international 
economy and the multinationalisation of Swedish firms has not in itself had negative 
employment effects. 
The Globalisation thesis 
We have briefly examined some of the aspects which in the recent debates about 
changes in the industrial societies have been named as the major factors which have 
had a tremendous impact on the autonomy of the nation state. However, as in the case 
of other big ideas, there is substantial disagreement about the concept of globalisation. 
Held et al. (1999) distinguish between three different schools of thought about the 
concept of globalisation; the hyperglobalisers, the sceptics, and the 
transformationalists. Despite the general acknowledgement about the intensification of 
the process of globalisation in a historical perspective, these three approaches have 
different understandings of the causal dynamics, as well as the structural consequences 
of this social economic phenomenon. As Held et al. (1999) observe, among advocators 
of either of these three schools, we find scholars from different traditions of social 
enquiry - liberal, conservative and Marxist. 
For the hyperglobalisers (Ohame, 1995; Strange, 1996; Wriston, 1992) the major issue 
is that in the era of the domination of the global economy, to which every society in 
the world is subject, the national state has lost its traditional role and become an 
`unnatural' unit in the process of economic globalisation. In the new era, transactional 
networks of production, trade, and finance have reduced the national governments real 
power so considerably that they are no longer the primary economic and political units 
of world society. 
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If the world trade, investment, and labour flows are the major features of the process of 
globalisation, sceptics (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Boyer and Drache, 1996) reject the 
claim by presenting statistical evidence, which confirms that the levels of economic 
interdependence are not historically unprecedented. They stress that national 
economies are still major units in the world economy, and what we observe is not 
globalisation, but heightened levels of internationalisation. The sceptics believe that 
the world economy is undergoing a significant rationalisation in which three major 
financial and trading blocs are forming. Therefore, instead of global integration, Weiss 
(1998) stresses the emergence of `regional' integration in Europe, Asia-Pacific and 
North America, which is opposite to globalisation in that it accentuates the dynamics 
of local and regional levels. By the same token, Weiss (1998: 184) rejects the notion 
that a global welfare policy will replace the national policies, and in contrast, believes 
that the role of the nation state in policy choices will expand. 
For transformationalists (Giddens, 1990; Castells, 1996; Mann, 1997) there is no doubt 
about the fact that globalisation, as a process which is rapidly taking place and is the 
main driving force behind changes, is occurring in the world. Unlike the sceptics, they 
believe that transitions in areas of social politics and economics worldwide are 
historically unprecedented. National affairs are no longer saved from international 
impacts, and therefore, the societies cannot shape their own way of development free 
from external systematic intervention. However, the transformationalists make no 
claim about the future of an ongoing process, as the hyperglobalisers so optimistically 
do. Transformationalists believe that in contemporary globalisation the sovereignty of 
national governments still exist, but as a result of comprehensive changes in the 
international economies, national economies are reorganised considerably, and by that, 
the power and function of national governments have also been reconstituted. Given 
this changing process, many transformationalists (Held et al., 1999; Murphy, 1996; 
Rosenau, 1997) believe that the power and authority of national governments has 
transformed or been reconstituted, and by such mechanism, national governments have 
adapted themselves to the process. In the following section, the three dominant 
tendencies in the globalisation debate will be further analysed. 
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Analysing the globalisation thesis 
In the arguments of the hyperglobalisers, and to some extent even the 
transformationalists, about the changes in the global order, the major theme is that the 
governments' authority over national states has changed dramatically, and in turn, the 
influence of the market on the formation of politics has increased enormously. The 
argument is based on the claim that the influence of private enterprise in finance, 
industry, and trade, on the world market has increased so much that the political 
establishment and the unions cannot compete against the dominance of the market. 
There is no doubt that the process of globalisation and the changes, which have been 
discussed earlier in this chapter, have had certain impacts on the development of 
industrial societies, but I will argue that the evidence provided by the hyperglobalisers 
does not imply that the changes have led to a total transformation of the national 
economies to global economies. As Hirst and Thompson (1999: 4) emphasise, the 
changes mainly show differences between `certain trends toward internationalisation', 
but do not confirm `the strong version of globalisation thesis'. I will continue the 
discussion by focussing on the arguments of Hirst and Thompson who stress that there 
is no commonly accepted model of the new global economy and its differences from 
the previous state of international economy. Their arguments against `the more 
extreme globalisation' contain five basic notions, which are briefly presented here 
(1999: 2-3): 
1) The present highly internationalised economy implies no basic changes in the 
international economy based on modern industrial technology. Comparing economic 
activity in different periods, in terms of their openness and integration since the 1850s, 
one should conclude that the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914 was more open 
than the current international economy. For example, the comparison of trade to GDP 
ratios shows that in most industrialised countries the proportion of merchandise trade 
to GDP was higher in 1913 than it was in 1973. Even in the matter of current account 
imbalances and capital flows, measured in relation to GDP, statistics show that they 
were larger before 1914 than they were in the 1980s (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 26- 
28). 
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2) TNCs still constitute a limited part of companies, even if the greater part of large 
companies are multinational, which are `home-based' in the major developed OECD 
countries. Despite the fact that MNCs trade multinationaly, the location of their 
production and sales are mainly nationally. In contrast to MNCs, the major feature of 
TNCs is that they have no specific national identification, have an international 
management, and invest in any market that will give them the best return. By these 
features, TNCs could no longer be based in one national location and thereby be 
constrained by the policies of the nation state. 
3) In past decades, the flow of capital has mainly occurred among advanced industrial 
nations and a small number of rapidly growing economies. Between 1983 and 1989 
more than 85 per cent of advanced industrial nations' foreign direct investments (FDI) 
flowed to other advanced countries. Nearly 10 per cent of flows were to Asia 
(overwhelmingly to China) and Latin and South America which mainly contain the 
newly industrialising countries. Only 3.7 per cent of capital flows were to Third World 
countries. However, the geographical concentration of FDI in the biggest three 
economies (North America, Europe and Japan) has decreased to 66 per cent, but on the 
other hand, the new industrial nations in Asia and Latin America have increased their 
share to nearly 31 per cent, and other areas in the Third World and developing Europe 
have been seriously neglected (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 67). 
4) The concentration of trade, investment and financial flows in the advanced, 
industrial part of the world also shows that the contemporary international economy is 
far from global. In the early 1990s, about 80 per cent of world trade was conducted 
between more developed economies, particularly members of OECD. Knowing that a 
small number of advanced economies, the group of the five (G5) main economies, 
accounted for approximately 70 per cent of FDI, one should conclude that in actual 
fact, these few main economies constitute the global economy (Hirst and Thompson, 
1999: 196). 
5) Those few major strong economies (G3) have the real power. They have access to 
mechanisms to exert their control on the financial market, and they also direct other 
economic tendencies in the international economy. Thus, these economic powers can 
already regulate and control the global market. For example, through agreements they 
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can stabilise exchange rates, co-ordinate fiscal and monetary policies and operate in 
limiting speculative short-term financial transactions (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 121). 
As is evident from the discussion, although globalisation sceptics acknowledge that the 
process of `internationalisation' has been intensified, they tend not to draw far- 
reaching conclusions about the causal dynamics as well as the structural consequence 
of this social phenomenon. However, and despite the arguments presented above, it 
seems to me that the concept of globalisation has unquestionably been accepted by a 
major part of the social science community to the extent that it is widely believed that 
global economic pressures undermine domestic strategies of national economic 
management. 
Another reason which has been argued by the advocates of the globalisation thesis to 
have lead to the increase of the influence of the market, is the increasing capacity of 
firms to move production and capital to the newly industrialised societies. This is 
suggested to have decreased the influence of the labour movements. In contrast, it can 
be argued that despite the ever-increasing capacity of firms to move their production, 
the influence of labour movements, particularly those with broad and centrally 
organised influence in countries with a powerful Social Democratic Party in 
government, has not been seriously weakened. Although in the contemporary era of 
global markets, the structural power of capital has been increased, and in pursuing a 
higher rate of return on investments, capital tends to seek out high growth regimes, in 
reality, capital mobility is still relatively limited and mostly confined to OEDC 
countries. Despite the general trend since the liberalisation of the financial system for 
capital to invest where it can secure the greatest return, as some scholars (Hay, 2001; 
Garrett, 1998) emphasise, this does not create sufficient conditions to assume that the 
capital enjoys mobility at any price. While it is relatively easy for portfolio capital to 
be moved, when such a capital attracts to a particular locality and invests, it beds down 
and becomes difficult to be moved, simply because investment acquires a series of 
sunk costs, such as immaterial assets, which are translated into human and physical 
capital, some of which might be subsidised by the hosts. Consequently, as Hay 
(2001: 51) stresses, `once installed, exit options become seriously depleted and incur 
significant loss (in terms of irredeemable sunk costs). Thus, whilst it may be entirely 
`rational' for foreign direct investors to proclaim loudly and exaggerate wildly their 
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mobility and their much vaunted exit options - especially if they can make these sound 
credible - it is not surprising that the threat of exit is so rarely acted upon. ' In other 
words, exit options have been used as a threat rather than real economic option. 
Further, contrary to assumptions presented by the advocator of the international capital 
mobility thesis, which mainly stresses the minimization of labour costs as the most 
significant factor, and which decides the motive for mobility of the capital, in reality 
this fact has mainly had impact on labour-intensive industries. For high-tech and high- 
skill industries, which are capital-intensive sectors, the burden on competitiveness 
caused by the welfare state has not been the most decisive factor. For these industries, 
labour costs represent a small part of overall production costs and competitiveness is 
decided by quality and innovation rather than cost. That makes these firms less 
vulnerable to costs caused by generous welfare states. As long as the firms remain 
efficient and technologically competitive, they will be willing to pay for social 
protection of labour (Hay, 2001). 
The argument can be made more general. The process of globalisation does not 
necessarily undermine the economic sovereignty of a national government. Apart from 
the fact that exit options has given footloose capital an apparent weapon, in reality, as 
Garrett (1998) stresses, many economists have argued that market friendly 
governments should have a more active role in initiating policies that produce growth- 
enhancing collective goods such as public education and training and those applied to 
physical infrastructure. Apart from the benefits of these collective goods to citizens, 
they are also attractive to capital simply because they lead to increasing investment 
returns. Big governments are known to represent comprehensive income transfer 
programmes such as benefits for the unemployed, the sick, or the old. These 
expenditures, which have an obvious redistributive characteristic and are traditionally 
associated with strong states of a Social Democratic nature, are, according to Garrett 
(1998: 5) `compatible with strong economies performance in the global economy, 
provided labour market institutions are sufficiently encompassing. ' 
It has also been claimed that the TNCs can, by deciding the strategy of investment and 
production, influence employment on a large scale, and consequently affect the socio- 
political situation in national societies. This process is suggested to decrease the 
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influence of the unions. There are a number of reasons to be sceptical about this 
argument. One, as Vissner (1991) shows that between 1970 and 1990 the strength of 
organised labour has not changed considerably. During the period, the average size of 
union density, which is the number of union members relative to the size of the labour 
force, has decreased marginally in 14 of OECD countries, from 43 to 41.8. In Nordic 
countries, trade union membership was considerably stronger and more than half of the 
labour force was unionised. In Sweden, like two of the other Nordic countries, 
Denmark and Finland, union membership increased from 66 per cent in 1970 to 83 per 
cent in 1990 (Garrett, 1998: 64). Union membership declined by just one per cent to 
81.9 in the year 2000 (LO, 2000a). Another fact, which supports the argument that 
during the period the strength of organised labour has not decreased significantly, is 
that the central confederation of labour has not suffered major internal conflicts caused 
by growing divergence and conflicts of interests between groups of unionised labour. 
A reason for that might have been the fact that the share of members coming from the 
public sector has steadily increased. In countries with the highest total trade union 
membership, such as Sweden, 38 per cent of union members were in the public sector 
(Garrett, 1998). A third argument in support of the organised labour strength is union 
concentration. In this regard, data collected by Golden and Wallerstein (1995) shows 
that the authority of the largest confederations has not decreased in most of the 
industrial societies. A measure of union concentration is the percentage of all 
unionised workers who are members of the largest confederation. Between 1970 and 
1990, the average portion of members in largest confederation has decreased less than 
two per cent, which is quite marginal. Another measure is the average number of 
unions in the major confederation. The lesser the number of unions, the lesser the 
obstacles to collective action by the labour movement. Once again, data shows that the 
average number of affiliated unions in the largest labour confederation decreased from 
50 to 38 between 1970 and 1990. Therefore, the data presented in Golden and 
Wallerstein (1995) rejects the generalised notion that the `encompassment' of the 
unions which decide the concentration of authority in central labour organisations 
is in 
decline. Where powerful left-wing parties have been allied to encompassing labour 
market institutions, such as in north European social democratic corporatism, the 
economic policy has been more consistent and the domestic effects of globalisation 
less widespread (Garrett, 1998). 
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Soskice's (1999: 102) study of changes in production regimes, which means `the 
organisation of production through markets and market-related institutions', suggests 
that, although the systems of industrial relations have experienced significant changes 
in past decades, they still remain important: 
In those advanced economies in which business has been strongly organised that 
industrial relations systems have remained important; and we need to look to the 
capacity, power, and interests of business in those economies to explain the 
phenomenon. By contrast, where business has not been well organised - and, we will 
argue, has not had the capacity to build or maintain institutional structures needed to 
incorporate effective employee representative bodies - governments have seen or come 
to realise the need for a reduction, sometimes dramatic, in the influence of unions 
(Soskice, 1999: 103). 
Another area which seems to have been overstated by the hyperglobalisers concerns 
taxation and specifically TNC's desire to avoid paying taxes to national governments. 
There is no doubt that as a consequence of globalisation corporate taxation has 
converged at ever-lower levels. Throughout the 1980s corporate taxation decreased in 
most industrial nations, but the significance of this trend should not be overstated 
because the average rate of decrease was just two per cent (Garrett, 1998: 95). After the 
UK, Sweden was the country that had the highest reduction in corporate taxation. 
Despite that, during the 1980s, growth in public expenditure in many countries such as 
Sweden, continued. Looking at figure 2.1, one can understand the reason why lower 
revenues from corporate taxation in relation to total government revenues from 
taxation had no decisive impact on the government's spending. The revenues from 
corporate taxation constitute a small part of total government revenues. The major 
source of government revenue has been personal income taxation followed by 
consumption taxation. In the past decades these taxes together amounted to two third 
of total government revenues from taxation. The third source of taxation is employer 
contributions to social security funds. Although these contributions amount to one 
sixth of total government revenues, because the contributions are employee's social 
security benefits, they have to be paid regardless of the firms' location. By this picture, 
revenues from taxes on corporate profits represent less than 10 per cent of total 
government revenues from taxation. In other words, although corporate taxation is one 
of the four major types of taxation, it is the smallest one (Garrett, 1998). Apart from 
those, revenues from TNCs still represent a limited part of the government's revenues 
from the corporate. Therefore, one can conclude that changes in the level of 
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government total revenues through corporate taxation will not have a considerable 
impact on the financing of public expenditure. 
2.1 Sources of government revenue in OECD countries 
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Taxation apart, hyperglobalisers also tend to exaggerate when they discuss the new 
division of labour and production in industrial versus developing economies. Moving 
parts of labour-intensive processes to low-wage economies does not necessarily imply 
a negative impact on the advanced economy and its employment rate, or on the living 
standards of the labour force as a whole (Schwartz, 2000; Pierson, 2001a). The 
underlying messages of the arguments presented by Wood (1994) and Cline (1996), 
which implicitly relate the problem of unemployment in OECD countries to southern 
competition, are misleading because they neglect the potential in OECD economies in 
providing jobs in industries with advanced technology. Further, the rapid increase in 
employment rate in service sector has been a great substitute for manufacturing jobs. It 
has to be emphasised that in these economies the problem of unemployment almost 
only encompasses manufacturing jobs. The capacity of the service sector to create new 
jobs has increased all the time. As Department of Trade and Industry in UK and France 
reported (2000) the Service Sector in these countries have shown steady Growth of 
output and employment in public sector. According to OECD (2000), by the end of the 
1990s, service sector share of employment approached three-quarters of all jobs in 
several countries and accounted for virtually all recent gains in employment. 
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Apart from the fact that the major part of FDI still flows between rich countries, the 
southern economies imports from OECD are growing rapidly. That shows that growth 
in newly industrialising economies (NIE) directly affects the technologically advanced 
productions in OECD countries. In other words, although in the short-term, the rate of 
unemployment in OECD countries grew markedly but as a consequence of the 
modernisation of production, the industrial output in these economies has grown 
considerably, which in turn has led to the strengthening of the industry. Furthermore, 
while unemployment increased among low-skilled industrial workers, demand for 
skilled labour in high technological branches has been increasing. In other words, even 
though technological development toward `robotism' was an obvious labour-saving 
device in industrial manufacturing and service industries, there is no consensus about 
the effect of technological development in increasing unemployment. 
While Keane and Owen (1986) believe that technological innovation produces 
dramatic increases in both unemployment and productivity, propelling a form of 
`jobless growth' which shakes the full employment welfare state to its foundations, 
others (Therborn, 1986; Pierson, 2001b) reject any strong connection between 
contemporary unemployment and technological development. As an example, 
Therborn (1986: 58) puts forward the extraordinary robotisation of Swedish industry, 
which began in late 1970 and which should have had some negative effects upon 
manufacturing employment, but did not. He stresses that the relationship between high 
technology and employment is fundamentally ambiguous, and therefore, he rejects the 
notion that unemployment is the inevitable consequence of technical change. The fact 
that during the last three years of the 1990s, the rate of unemployment in Sweden 
decreased by half (from 8 to 4 per cent) demonstrates that other factors such as growth 
in economy and governments active labour policy, mainly in supporting the private 
sector or re-training the unemployed, play a decisive role in the increase of 
employment. In other words, technological innovations may lead to an increase in 
unemployment but only if other factors such as the economic growth and the national 
state's constructive labour policy fail to come off. 
Finally, although most scholars agree that financial and productive capital are more 
mobile now, which has some negative impact on national autonomy, there is no 
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consensus about the impact of increasing capital mobility on the welfare state. Some of 
them, such as Schwartz (2001), Pierson (2001a) and Garrett (1998) reject the 
conclusion that increased mobility would have caused weakness in the welfare state. 
Garrett (1998) seems to represent most critical views against the notion that financial 
integration would be a serious challenge to national autonomy simply because there is 
no significant fiscal and capital tax policy convergence among OECD countries. He 
believes in the effectiveness of social democratic supply-side policies, which by 
centralised collective bargaining and low relative unit labour costs, still attract capital. 
For Schwartz (2001: 23) the impact of globalisation is not just policy convergence 
among OECD countries, but also the political effects and interest conflicts which are 
caused by the new circumstances at a national level. One of those is the conflict 
created inside the labour movement over relative wage levels that has threatened 
centralised bargaining. As a result of the greater competitive pressures in the 
international market, the countries with highly centralised bargaining, such as Sweden, 
suffered large capital outflow during the 1980s (OECD, 1995). Despite that, even 
Schwartz dismisses the external constraints, such as the financial mobility argument, 
as the crucial argument for the welfare state cutbacks. Not even rising unemployment 
caused by the capital outflows is understood as the major reason for rising fiscal stress. 
By stressing that health and pension expenditures run at five times the cost of 
unemployment insurance and early retirement schemes, Schwartz's (2001: 24) verdict 
is that `health and old age pensions are the major cause for rising government 
spending, and thus presumably for fiscal stress. ' In other words, the major costs to the 
welfare states come from internal factors such as health and old-age pensions and not 
from external factors in the form of increasing unemployment caused by global 
economic changes. 
Globalisation and welfare regimes 
Summarizing the discussion so far, it can be argued that the globalisation thesis is 
correct to point out the potential problems with which national governments have to 
deal. High capital mobility and a flexible labour market are direct consequences of the 
development of the process of globalisation, which have caused increased competition 
from the newly industrialising countries to the advanced economies. This competition 
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meant that the advanced industrial relation and most of the generous arrangements in 
these countries have faced some pressures caused by external factors. The 
development towards economic globalisation has also meant that the traditional modes 
of solving the conflicts at a national level by measures based on consensus and 
agreements between the major national actors are more difficult than before. Apart 
from that, where the national government takes on an active industrial policy to 
support their own companies by subsidies or other supportive measures, the 
international demand for equal competitive conditions prevent such involvement. In 
such a process, it is also recognised that the pressures from private enterprises on the 
welfare institutions, and traditional industrial relations based on corporatist 
foundations have increased by the argument that these institutions endanger the 
international competitiveness of the companies (Shlaes, 1994; Rieger and Liebfried, 
1998). On the other hand, the increasing need for a flexible labour market caused by 
high capital mobility has had the obvious consequence that the number of people who 
suffered from the structural changes in the global economy increased. In such a 
process, while the demand on social policies increases due to increasing social 
insecurity, the nation-states fiscal capacity to satisfy these ever-greater needs is 
declining (Rieger and Liebfried, 1998). 
However, it was suggested in Chapter One that elements of these problems might be 
equally attributed to endogenous domestic factors. It may be that global economic 
pressures do mean that nation-states have to be more cautious about spending. The 
most recent social policy developments in advanced economies illustrate that national 
social policies cannot entirely avoid the effects of changes in international economic 
development, although these tend to be indirect. The crucial challenges come from 
endogenous factors even though the problems become more clearly and urgently 
visible when exogenous factors intensify pressure on the welfare system. In general, 
the structural problems of the developed welfare states are mainly related to the 
combination of declining fertility rates and the burden of an increasing proportion of 
aged people. These are the two factors, which have caused the major problem of 
financing the system of social transfer payments. Consequently, the argument which 
this thesis stresses is that although the need for welfare state reforms in the developed 
economies is clear, evidence regarding the ongoing crisis of the advanced welfare 
states show that this need is not a direct result of globalisation. 
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As mentioned in Chapter One, equally important in the debate about the changes in 
welfare states is the institutionalist thesis, which suggests that there are `welfare state 
limits to globalisation'. In this regard, it has to be emphasised that neither exogenous 
nor endogenous factors are themselves sufficient reasons for changes in social policies. 
In addition, social policy institutions and social groups who are affected by the 
structure of welfare provision, are the third factor that can inhibit the national 
government's policies, resisting changes that threaten their interests. Apart from the 
institutional resistance to the reforms, there is a privileged strata benefiting from the 
existing public sector or welfare arrangements that are powerful defenders of the 
existing system. These groups consist of pensioners, public sector employees, and 
long-term benefit-recipients in particular. The users of entitlements are highly 
dependent to the existing order, and could establish a defensive coalition for the 
continuation of the status quo. According to Rieger and Liebfried, (1998: 378) societies 
with deeper social policy structures are much more resistant to changes in social 
policies: 
The deeper social policy structures are embedded in interest groups, and the more political 
parties have internalised the welfare state ambitions of the claimant and provider classes, 
the higher are the hurdles for efficient welfare state reform.. . 
The rise of manifest and latent 
claimant and provider classes has decisively shrunk the social base for an open economy 
and at the same time sharpened political parties' attention to these new interests at the cost 
of the free market system. The numerical growth of `classes' - via broader access to a 
prolonged education and the institutionalisation of the `pension age', but also through 
welfare and unemployment insurance transfers, which can to a great extent replace market 
income, and finally through fiscal welfare's vastly complex structures of benefits and 
systems of `equalizing burdens' has shifted the lines of social conflict, highly socialized 
the structures of mediating interests, and thus altered the functional laws of the political 
market in favour of the welfare state clientele. 
During the era of globalisation, the role of the political establishment in retaining 
social policy institutions and benefits has increased largely. Accordingly, welfare state 
issues dominated the political debate, and by that, the pressure by social groups in 
favour of the existing arrangements on the actors in the political arena increased 
considerably. While the wider groups of beneficiaries or public sector employees 
resisted institutional changes in social policy institutions, the politicians have tended to 
point to international competitive pressure or to the policies adopted by the 
supranational economic and political authorities for legitimating changes in structures 
of social policy arrangements. In this regard, EU integration, the convergence 
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programme, and EU social policy were issues to which many initiatives to change have 
been referred. Therefore in the next section, the issues related to EU social policy and 
the impact of that on changes adopted in national states social policies will be 
discussed. 
The EU and its impact on the national social policies 
Since welfare states are predominantly national projects emerging over time according 
to specific national conditions, there is reason to believe that integration of nation 
states in a supranational unit might have consequences for the national social policies, 
and this area needs to be taken into account. The major focus of this section, therefore, 
will be an assessment of whether EU membership has had an immediate impact on the 
design of social policy in the member states. Has the EU directly intervened in each 
nation state's policy-making in issues concerning the welfare system? What is the plan 
of the EU for the future of the diverse existing welfare systems? Is there any plan for 
harmonisation of social policies to a common EU social policy? 
In broad terms, although in the recent decades widespread economic globalisation has 
increased the level of integration in Western social systems to an extent, the national 
character of social policies remains highly visible (Falkner, 1998; Hine and Kassim, 
1998; Rhodes, 1998). National governments tend to operate within the existing 
institutions and programmes and it seems that governments in industrial societies 
avoid initiatives which are likely to lad to a radical restructuring of the national welfare 
state. Systems of social provision are products of a long period of institutionalisation 
and are therefore strongly embedded in the national environment they have been 
generated by. For the EU or any other supranational body, it would be an expensive 
task to challenge patterns and path dependent processes at national levels by dictating 
new rules. However, one might argue that the necessity for at least a degree of 
integration for social policies within the EU is going to put pressure on the national 
states. Even so, by the end of the 1990s, integration in social policy still lagged far 
behind the integrative demands of the single market, but, as social policy has always 
been understood as a necessity for the advanced industrial states, there is reason to 
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believe that moves towards closer union will inevitably result in measures designed to 
harmonise social policy in the longer term. 
EU intervention in coordinating national states' economy 
Economic integration in the EU has so far had some obvious effects on national states 
economies, and although these effects have until now been experienced only 
indirectly, it is becoming clearer that EU intervention into national states' economies 
will in the future take an inevitability more open and direct character (Kolb, 1999). 
One of the negative effects has been the increasing competition between member states 
to reduce labour costs in order to attract capital investments to their regions. A 
consequence of such a policy will be national states' efforts towards the harmonisation 
of their taxation regimes. Even though, there has traditionally been a divergence 
between EU member countries' systems of taxation and social contributions, and the 
taxation system plays a very important role in economic competitiveness, in the 
process of harmonisation, a convergence in the way member states raise their revenues 
will be inevitable. 
Apart from such indirect intervention, the EU has, by the Maastricht criteria for 
monetary union, forced member states to introduce policies designed to control public 
expenditure (Falkner, 1998). These policies - balanced budgets, low inflation and low 
debts - are aimed, first and foremost, at changes in the social field. By containing 
social spending, the EU intended to coordinate the national state economic policies in 
order to make Europe more competitive in relation to other major economic blocs in 
the world. Although some of the member states with higher economic growth have had 
the space to resist the rising trend in social expenditure, most of them initiated far- 
reaching changes in their social policy agendas. Despite that, it has to be emphasised 
that the European Commission's efforts to legislate directly from above have been 
cautious. In the absence of political union, far-reaching regulations in different areas, 
including economic policies, would be firmly resisted. Therefore, to date, intervention 
has been modest and predominantly applied to the Single European Market. The 
integration of national economies has also been limited to the convergence plan, which 
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mainly focused on certain restrictive measures such as the low inflation, low debts, and 
balanced budgets mentioned above. 
In the field of social policy, certain moves have been taken which have predominantly 
been towards non-state welfare, provided commercially by employers or by the family. 
In this system, welfare outcomes will depend on employment-based contributions from 
the world of paid work, with the result that social inequalities between those in the 
labour market and those outside paid employment will grow more markedly. Although 
convergence within the EU is likely to result in some kind of EU regulations on social 
protection in the future, current trends developing in the EU suggest that the outcome 
of such agreements would be less generous entitlements. In other words, a kind of 
`divergence within convergence' is developing. This trend ensures that welfare 
objectives take second place to economic competitiveness in the process of EU 
integration. 
The State of social policy in the process of integration 
So far it has been suggested that EU integration until now has primarily meant indirect 
intervention in coordinating member states' economies. Regarding social policy, it has 
to be argued that four decades after the foundation of the European Community, and 
despite a high level of market integration, the process of European integration in the 
realm of social policy seems to have been less successful. In contrast to national social 
rights, European social rights have developed slowly, and therefore have not had the 
same meaning for citizens (Kolb, 1999; Jacobsson et al., 2001; Tallberg, 2001). 
Apart 
from some social legislation mainly concerned with the free movement of workers -a 
necessary condition for the implementation of the single market - social 
issues have 
remained largely ignored. 
The slow progress of social integration of the European Union 
is above all a 
consequence of the difficulties in the transformation of sovereign, competing, and 
highly developed nation-states into parts of a union. Beyond the competition between 
the nations, there has also existed a struggle between three major power sources 
in 
each nation that is between organised 
business, organised labour and political 
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hegemony. Such competition inhibited the process of social integration at the 
European level. As Liebfried and Pierson (1995b: 433) stress, `there is no 
disagreement that an analysis of the EU must begin with an appreciation of the EU's 
limited capacity for positive policymaking and an acknowledgement that member 
states and organised business will often resist centralised social policy. ' The Member 
States have strongly resisted interference in what they perceive to be an important 
sphere of national sovereignty. One major reason is that social policy is the area in 
which political actors feel able to create circumstances for domestic political success at 
a national level. 
Another reason is that member-states do not all have the same set of social interests or 
policy preferences (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Even among the 15 EU members, as is 
shown in figure 2: 2, the rate of expenditure on social security differs enormously. A 
proposal that is favoured by some is likely to raise objections from others. In the 
European Union, there has been a split between the core and the periphery on social 
policies. Whereas the poorest member-states advocated increased expenditure for the 
structural and cohesion funds, other countries, like the UK, opposed this expansion of 
the EU's role (Liebfried and Pierson, 1995b). The autonomy of sovereign nation-states 
and the enormous influence of the member states wielded within the EU explain the 
lack of the Union's active intervention in the area social policy. Even in those areas 
where EU decisions dominate, the member states were accorded wide decision-making 
authority, and they have also been given power over implementation (Sbragia, 1992). 
Compared to traditional federal systems, member states within the EU, from the very 
beginning, have had a predominant position. 
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Figure 2.2 Social Protection Expenditure and Receipts, as 
percentage of GDP (1980-1995) 
Source: Esspros (1998) 
However, with every new treaty, elements of national sovereignty have been 
eliminated, and the EU has been granted far-reaching authority to intervene in matters 
concerning the development of the single market. As Scharpf (1994,1998) points out, 
this permitted the EU to intervene in many aspects of public policy that relates directly 
to its core objectives. The EU's real problem, however, has not been so much the lack 
of a legal right of intervention, but the problem of decision-making in the institutions 
of the Union (Liebfried and Pierson, 1995a). Until the mid-1980s, the unanimity rules 
had protected individual member states, which were able to block decisions that 
threatened their interests. This arrangement obviously prevented the EU from 
exercising too much power. Although, the qualified majority voting (sixty-two votes 
from the total ninety-two) has made the decision making process more efficient and 
effective, it has to be emphasised that most social policy issues still require unanimity 
(Liebfried and Pierson, 1995a). 
However, looking at the process of EU development, one can conclude that policies 
adopted for one set of purposes are likely to have consequences in other directions. In 
other words, majority voting, which was initiated to accelerate the process of market 
integration, could also be applied to social policy making. On top of that, as Hine 
(1998) stresses, while the process of the creation of the single European market 
accelerated, other factors such as the globalisation of capital markets, competitive 
pressures from newly industrialising economies, and the increased restructuring of 
business could increase both job insecurity and income differentials. To avoid the 
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negative impacts of market-driven process of integration, the EU was expected to take 
policy initiatives to compensate the labour force from potential threats. The reason for 
such intervention is the decreasing ability of national states to finance social 
protection. The logical consequence of market building has been that nation-states 
have come under pressure to reduce social provision with the consequence that they 
would lose control of the social agenda at a national level. Measures for social 
protection therefore may have to be taken by the Community. In other words, although 
the Monetary Union, and the increasing pressures for budgetary convergence 
accompanying it, have eroded the control of member-states of parts of the social 
agenda, at the same time, by intensifying the market-driven process and increasing 
social exclusion, the need for social policy measures for compensating the excluded 
labour force has increased considerably (Hine, 1998). 
To cope with the problems, the social dimension has achieved greater importance and 
the concept of citizenship in the European Union has also entered into EU debates. 
Despite that, employment status continued to be the real focus of `social policy', and 
the concept of social citizenship rights within the European Union was by no means 
fully established. As Kennett (1994) stresses, even when the concept of `social 
exclusion' was debated, the Agreements paid no attention to non-worker categories, 
who in national social policies constitute social groups such as the old, certain women, 
unemployed, casual workers, new entrants to the labour market, and immigrants. 
Therefore, there was still a big gap between the generosity and comprehensiveness of 
the national social policies with universalist content, such as those in Nordic member 
states' (Sweden, Denmark and Finland) social policy on the one hand, and the rest of 
the EU on the other. Therefore, the process of integration in the EU would in longer 
term have a considerable impact on Nordic welfare policy, which was the most 
generously funded. 
Obstacles to a European-wide social policy 
Despite the fact that the need for EU decision-making in social policy has increased 
considerably, there are obstacles which prevent 
decision-making. One of the main 
obstacles is that decisions on social policy 
have to be made by consensus. Because 
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member states have developed different social policy systems, for the Union to achieve 
a common social policy through political consensus is a complex business. However, 
in certain respects - such as labour market issues and the working environment, in 
which a qualified majority can be used to make decisions - the EU has been successful 
in developing rules. The evolution of the EU has also marked the extension of the role 
of labour market parties - trade unions and employers' associations - in the 
achievement of greater social cohesion within member states. In the process of 
policymaking, many labour market issues have been delegated to the social partners, 
and as a result, trade unions and employers' associations now actively participate in 
social dialogue. The institutionalisation of consultation, co-determination and 
workplace agreements are the products of such cooperation. However, as Benner 
(1997: 71) stresses, the corporatist decision-making process might have the 
consequence that the employers use their `veto' to prevent the evolution of European 
social policy by refusing far-reaching proposal and initiatives. In other words, as long 
as labour market parties are prepared and willing to agree about social policy issues, 
the corporatist system will be successful, but the other side of the coin might be that, in 
the corporatist system, the parties could find themselves unable to reach constructive 
agreements. Apart from the power balance aspect, the EU-initiated cooperation 
between social partners helps to reduce unemployment at the supranational level. As 
unemployment has become the major reason for increasing social spending, the 
lowering of spending through such cooperation would have a crucial impact on state 
resources and would provide advantageous financial conditions for the further 
development of other social policy areas such as health care and education. 
EU social policy in the future 
In broad terms, there are two main scenarios for the development of EU integration 
and its impact on national social policies. A pessimistic scenario, would suggest that as 
the process of unconditional cost-reducing competition starts, member states would 
have no hesitation in reducing taxes, driving down working conditions, and 
deregulating to the point where firms are able to compete with competitors in other 
countries. As a result, member states would cease redistribution policies, and 
in so 
doing, would have to reduce benefits levels to a minimum. In reality, however, 
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competition has so far not led to a dramatic increase in deregulation, tax cuts or the 
reduction of benefits, although it seems as though these policies have been altered to a 
degree which is acceptable for the citizens of each society. In other words, positive 
integration has not been a decisive factor in the determination of the mobility of labour 
or capital. Capital will not necessarily move to regions with lowest tax rates. 
Companies appear to take other factors into consideration, such as good infrastructure, 
the functioning of the judicial system, the rate of financial crime and access to efficient 
and highly educated labour. Even labours will not just focus on low taxes when 
deciding about whether to work in a particular country. Preferences such as social 
insurance system, high-quality public services in childcare, health care, and the 
education system are also decisive factors. According to Majone (1993: 160), despite 
high levels of costs for investments, Germany attracts foreign investors mainly because 
of its good infrastructure and qualified labour force. 
The optimistic scenario, which this thesis stresses, is based on the conclusion that EU 
regulation, so far, does not represent an encompassing structure of economic growth, 
employment and social policy. National regulation is therefore still dominant, and at 
least in the short-term, will not be substituted by EU regulation, although in the era of 
international policy construction, national regulation has become more vulnerable. 
During the 1990s, EU regulation has been oriented towards standardizing some aspects 
of national regulation. This process, understood as a starting point for a more 
comprehensive supranational systemic interaction, has been successful in growth 
policy, whereas social policy and the labour market were organized by national 
regulation. Until now, the process of harmonisation in the EU has been based on 
voluntary efforts by national states, but it is obvious that convergence criteria 
suggested by the EU has had a crucial impact on the measures taken by national states. 
However, the lack of EU social policy makes us believe that the integration of social 
policy within the EU in the near future will be unlikely. As long as social policy 
remains a matter for nation states, the national characteristic of the welfare state's 
institutions will exist. Even if the EU moves towards a common social policy, the 
shape of that policy will be determined by the democratic political assemblies, which 
would listen to public opinion and the influential social groups who are in favour of 
certain arrangements. 
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Overall, by EU membership, the Swedish welfare state has found its final course 
mainly because it puts an end to the uncertainties which arose in the past three 
decades. While the process of globalisation threatened the foundation of the nation 
state, the development of the EU as a supranational union provided shelter for 
European nation-states threatened by global economic pressures. Although EU 
membership in the longer term may mean the further weakening of the role of the 
nation state, in short term, it will create a condition for social movements, political 
actors and other advocators of the `universalistic' welfare model to influence the 
formation of the supranational EU social policy. 
Conclusion 
The process of globalisation in the world economy has meant an increase of trade and 
openness of national economies to capital and to the impact of technological changes. 
Although the major part of trade is still located within the top five industrial economies 
and, likewise, the majority of foreign direct investments still takes place within the 
limits of the advanced industrial economies, the clear trend has been that nation states 
in advanced countries have increasingly formed trade blocs. The extension of free 
trade in the global economy has had certain impacts on production and the division of 
labour because the new order of intensifying trade demanded a degree of specialisation 
of production in different areas simply because, in the globalised economy, free 
competition makes it difficult for firms in the wrong kind of enterprises to survive. 
Every country has to find its comparative advantage and focus on those areas of 
production that give the best possible outcome. While some industrial nations like the 
USA have a particular advantage in computer technology, others like Japan are better 
in electronics, or like the UK, are better in finance. The obvious trend is that in many 
advanced economies, firms in agriculture, heavy engineering, and textiles will find it 
difficult to survive the competition with the developing economies. 
As it has been developing, the process of globalisation encourages a major reduction in 
manufacturing employment, particularly in Europe and other industrial economies. In 
many industrial countries, the labour loss in manufacturing caused the greatest 
implications for social policy. On the one hand deindustrialisation has led to the 
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disappearance of some industrial communities, which caused considerable costs to 
infrastructure and reductions in tax income, but on the other hand, the cost of funding 
the labour loss through higher unemployment and social security payments escalated 
public expenditure considerably. The widespread understanding is that the loss of jobs 
in manufacturing is the natural outcome of technological development, simply 
because, despite declines in employment, manufacturing output has been increasingly 
steadily. In the era of globalisation, therefore, governments will not attempt to protect 
employment in manufacturing by protective measures such as tariffs or subsidies. 
This policy is exactly what the IMF proposed in its prospectus for the world economy 
to EU members. According to IMF (1997), European countries have to remove labour 
market regulations and reduce the costs of social security benefits. By these measures, 
these countries would be able to create flexibility within their labour market and make 
business more competitive. In the past two decades, most European countries have 
followed this recommendation and also reformed their welfare systems. Consequently, 
one can conclude that the trend of globalisation has been fundamentally opposed to the 
welfare state. 
Since the welfare state is at root a national phenomenon, and since the nation state has 
been the foundation of the development of welfare in industrial societies, the ongoing 
process towards the reduced of sovereignty of nation states to sub-national regions and 
to industrial organisations has been suggested by the advocates of globalisation thesis 
as the most serious threats against the development of the welfare system. The thesis 
so far, however, has offered a sceptical evaluation of the globalisation thesis. The 
central argument is that the main aspects of the challenge to the welfare state did 
indeed come from budgetary stress caused by a series of post-industrial changes in the 
advanced welfare state economies, rather than purely from troubles associated with 
global economic changes. Problems such as slower economic growth, rising service 
sector employment, massive expansion of governmental commitments, the fiscal 
demands caused by population ageing, and the restructuring of households, are 
important factors, which regardless of changes in the global economy, would 
constitute a powerful source of pressure on the welfare state. In other words, each of 
these transitions which have been taking place in advanced industrial economies and, 
all have domestic origins, would have generated intense pressure on matured welfare 
85 
states, even if economic openness remained constant. Globalisation has accentuated, 
and to some degree even modified, the pressures on welfare states, but by no means 
could it explain the tendencies towards deficit spending and demands for programme 
cutbacks and other policy reforms which dominated in the era of multiple transition to 
post-industrialism in the past quarter-century. 
Apart from globalisation and post-industrial transition of affluent societies as two 
major agents of change, the European welfare state has been facing a third major 
agent, that is, integration in a supranational union. Although the EU has been trying to 
integrate the social policies of its member state, and to do so, has attempted to develop 
a kind of minimal social policy, in reality, it has been quite difficult to achieve a 
consensus about a common social policy. The general consensus seems to have been 
that the Union focus on economic integration and leave the social policy in the hands 
of the nation states. 
In the next chapter, some of the characteristics of the Swedish welfare system as it 
emerged after the Second World War will be explained. By discussing the ideological 
background, the creation of the instruments, and the implementation process, it will be 
easier to understand the ideas behind the formation of the institutional framework of 
the Swedish welfare system. Such an insight will help us to understand both the 
problem of reorientation which arose within the system, and that which was caused by 
external factors, such as integration in the global economic system or the European 
Union. 
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Chapter 3 
Social Democ "acy and the Development of the Swedish Welfare State 
The purpose of tl, is chapter is to explore the history of early social democracy and its 
acceptance of un , ersalistic social reforms and the content of the major elements of 
Swedish welfare; policy. The chapter also explores the expansion of the Swedish 
welfare system it the Post War period, mainly between the 1960s and mid-1980s, 
when the essenti, -. l parts of the welfare system were established. As modem welfare 
states are unden, ": ood as parts of complex, historically-generated configurations, the 
historical appro. ch makes it easier to understand the means and circumstances by 
which the institi¢: ional framework of the Swedish welfare state has been shaped. It also 
provides an insight into the fundamental prerequisites by which the system once was 
emerged and d , veloped. Some of the most crucial prerequisites were the hegemonic 
position of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the symbiotic relationship between 
the party and a centralised labour movement organised by the Swedish Confederation 
of Trade Unioff ýs, (Landorganisationen, or LO) and the strong performance of 
Swedish 
industry (Olss(`: 1,1994). 
These three p, werful institutions, which formed what we can call `the strong nation 
state', have d , minated modern Swedish society since the 
1930s. The creation of the 
Swedish well ire state, and its development according to a path dependent 
long-term 
and gocess, suggests that the three theoretical approaches 
in analysing welfare gradual ft 
states - eco' oDmic 
determinism, power resources, and path dependent perspective - 
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explain different stages of the Swedish welfare state development. While the post-war 
rapid economic growth provided the economic and industrial condition for the 
establishment of the modern welfare state, an influential labour movement, including a 
centralised labour union and a strong Social Democratic Party, provided the most 
appropriate conditions for hegemonic power in favour of an egalitarian welfare system. 
The chapter also argues that several decades of uninterrupted rule by the egalitarian 
labour movement lead to the institutionalisation of the essential parts of a welfare 
system which was firmly rooted in the social and political establishment. However, as 
discussed in the previous chapters, this strong state, along with other nation states, has 
been facing external pressures associated with global economic changes and 
membership .n the single 
European market. Moreover, at home, profound social 
transitions associated with post-industrialism put the welfare state under intense 
budgetary pressure. The Swedish economy has experienced serious difficulties such as 
low levels of economic growth, problems with inflation, the emergence of 
unemployment, changes in social investment and the financing of the welfare system. 
Beyond these problems, there have also been challenges to the dominant political 
position of the Social Democratic Party and to the position of the labour unions in the 
labour market. 
The key purpose of the chapter is to establish the case for an extensive welfare system 
existing by the time of the economic downturn in the late 1980s. The point to make 
here is that the generous nature of social provision with its universal coverage 
designed to meet the needs of each citizen became too costly in a period of economic, 
social and political change. 
Before examining these issues, we need to explore the foundation of the Swedish 
welfare state and the major elements in the Swedish society. This will give us a better 
understanding of the nature of the foundation of the Swedish welfare system - union 
influence in the labour market; the historical compromise between unions, the 
employers' organisation and the Social Democratic Party; and the stability of public 
support for the Social Democratic Party, as the major architect of the Swedish welfare 
system. This chapter argues that the key position of the Social Democrats, as the 
national party, has been the major factor in deciding the content and direction of the 
Swedish welfare state. 
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The dominance of Social Democrats in the Swedish politics 
The Swedish political system is known for its peaceful institutional development 
(Olofsson, 1979; Olsson, 1993). The country has not experienced an external war since 
the 1830s, and during the process of industrialisation there were no major antagonistic 
conflicts between the labour movement and capital. However, influenced by the 
development of the international labour movement, especially in Germany, a radical 
approach initially gained a presence within organised labour. The labour movement's 
ideological development was consequently characterised from the outset of the 
twentieth century by an apparent split between two different streams, radical and 
reformist (Olofsson, 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1992; Bergstrom, 1992). While the 
radical stream advocated fundamental changes and held on to the prospect of a non- 
capitalist social order, reformists believed in social reforms, which aimed specifically 
to at improving the situation of the working classes. Changes in working conditions 
and working class living standards, which lead to the deradicalisation of the main part 
of the labour movement, are practical evidence of this reformist ideology. The 
reformist approach inside the labour movement could be understood as a political 
strategy, which, with particularly reforms would achieve a transition from capitalism 
to socialism (Olofsson, 1979). 
Social Democracy and national interests 
Therborn (1992: 3) emphasises the SAP's dominant position in the Swedish political 
system as the decisive factor which allowed the Party to effectively create the political 
process in its own image. Such dominance was based on two elements. Firstly, the 
SAP came to be perceived as a national party with policies considered as being 
associated with the national interest. Secondly, the SAP occupied a key position 
both 
in relation to various interest coalitions in the party system, and among interest groups 
in the labour market. The Party won a majority of votes for the first time at the end of 
the 1930's. In three elections the party obtained an absolute majority - 50.4,53.8, and 
50.3 per cent respectively. Because these election victories coincided with the 
beginning of the Second World War, right wing parties found it difficult not to support 
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the SAP's basic national and social policy. Whereas neutrality in foreign policy was 
the most important part of the national interest in 1940, a social welfare policy became 
the core social component of this national interest in the domestic arena. Therefore, 
when the Population Commission of 1935 and the Population Enquiry of 1941 
presented a plan with a broad social policy ambition, all the bourgeois parties 
supported the idea (Hatje, 1974; Therborn, 1992). This connection between social 
policy and national interest, essentially created by the Social Democrats, became part 
of Swedish national identity and, in turn, both favoured the SAP's social engagement 
and gave it a unique hold on political power. 
The SAP's key position as a `national' Party was also a consequence of Sweden's class 
oriented politics. The biggest social group, manual workers, have been Social 
Democracy's main social base. In almost every election since 1930 the Party was able 
to mobilise the working class and in some elections (1948,1956-68) the SAP received 
more than 70 per cent of workers' votes - the highest degree of class mobilisation for 
any left party in a democratic election (Therborn, 1992: 6). 
Class politics is a phenomenon that began with the modern labour movement at the 
end of 19th century. At that time, the working class and the vast majority of the 
population was effectively excluded from politics. The labour movement was the first 
movement to establish political parties in many countries. In nations like Sweden there 
was therefore no doubt about working class loyalty toward the Social Democratic 
Party. In this matter even the trade unions, which also mobilised the working class and 
were therefore a potential competitor to the SAP, in fact grew in parallel as a partner 
with the Party, never competing for the loyalty of the working class. It is also well 
known that, until 1906, the trade union movement in Sweden was a political 
instrument controlled by the Social Democrats (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 5). This high 
level of co-operation between the SAP and the trade union movement gave the 
Swedish labour movement a very influential position in the labour market. (Amark, 
1986; Kjellberg, 1983). 
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Social Democracy and popular movements 
While the SAP dominated the political arena and dictated the political agenda and the 
rules of the political system, the LO continued its efforts to organise the labour 
movement and so possessed great influence in the labour market. By the 1930s, the 
Swedish labour movement was internationally the most organised, and enthusiasm for 
the unionisation of labour continued to prevail in the following decades (Kjellberg, 
1983: 36; Amark, 1992: 67). This enthusiasm was not limited to the labour movement 
itself, but also enjoyed remarkable support among Swedish white-collar workers. Since 
its formation, the TCO (the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees) has 
gathered a huge part of the Swedish middle class in support of the SAP's national and 
social policy. By this support, the SAP was forced to take the interest and social 
perspectives of the majority of people (especially the labour and middle classes) into 
consideration (see Baldwin, 1990). At the same time it has never ended up in a trade- 
off between support from the working class and support from the middle class 
(Therborn, 1992: 11). The notion that the middle class support to the SAP's programme 
has been an essential reason for the success of the labour movement is rejected by 
Amark (1992) who, on the contrary, believes that the Swedish middle class has been 
comparatively weak and fragmented. Instead, Amark emphasises a strong and well- 
organised business and industrial community, which has always been willing to 
negotiate with the labour movement. This notion, however, does not reject the 
argument presented here that co-operation between representatives of the working 
class (LO) and a strong part of the middle-class, which were organised in the TCO on 
the one hand, and the SAP on the other, strengthened the position of the Social 
Democratic Party in the Swedish power system. Without such co-operation between 
these two elements (the unions and the Party) the social democratic labour movement 
would not have enjoyed the strong position it gained in negotiations with the well- 
organised business and industrial community. 
Amark tends to miss the point that the 
willingness of the employer's federation (SAF) to negotiate with the labour movement 
was a consequence of the remarkable consensus between the Party and the Unions, 
which allowed them to possess a dominant presence in the Swedish social and political 
system. 
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An effect of this co-operation was that the deindustrialisation of Sweden in recent 
decades, which between 1965 and 1985 caused a decline in industrial employment of 
18.9 per cent, did not affect the SAP's dominant influence in Swedish politics 
(Therborn, 1992: 12). Had the SAP remained a pure labour party, of course, the strong 
class character of Swedish politics would have undermined the Party's position as the 
biggest party in national politics. As Esping-Andersen (1985: 31) has asserted, for 
social democracy, the nature of class formation and the pattern of class coalitions have 
been crucial elements in the development of particular forms of collective action. 
The LO and the TCO, as two strong popular movements in Swedish society, were part 
of a tradition which has its roots in the nineteenth century when the evangelical and the 
temperance movements emerged in Sweden. Both supplied the labour movement with 
many cadres who brought with them the culture of popular movement into the trade 
unions - in particular the experience of organising, educating and transforming people 
and changing their lives and living conditions (Therborn, 1992: 13). The tradition of the 
popular movement was reproduced during the 1930's even among farmers. 
Consequently, by the end of Second World War, all the key popular movements that 
have dominated Swedish politics had emerged in Swedish society. By the same token, 
the modern party system had also developed in the context of democratic 
parliamentary politics. The elements of class politics in the first social democratic 
government changed their character. As a party for the national interest, the SAP left 
class politics to organisations with pure class interests. In this way, class politics 
effectively became associated with LO politics, with the unions gaining much greater 
influence within social democracy. This apparent separation of the LO and the SAP 
does not mean that the former opposed the Party. On the contrary, the new division 
between the two allowed the LO to adopt a more active role in the political arena. In its 
new role, the LO actively began to participate in labour market conflicts, thus 
dramatically increasing its status among workers. ' As the central organisation of the 
working class, the LO showed its political importance when in 1938 it reached the 
main agreement with the SAF in the Saltsjöbaden. This agreement between the three 
matured institutions; the SAP, the LO and the SAF was a `peace treaty' that regulated 
While in 1945,69 per cent of working class belonged to the trade unions, this number increased to 76 
per cent in 1950 and grew further to 89 per cent in 1975 
(Kjellberg, 1983: 278). 
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the relations between labour and management with regard to collective bargaining and 
industrial action. 
Peace in the labour market: the `historic compromise' 
The SAF, which was also formed at the turn of the twentieth century, was, like the LO, 
a heavily centralised organisation. This feature of both organisations enabled them to 
reach collective agreements. These agreements, in turn, prevented competition 
between labour unions and companies about the price of labour, both in occupations in 
a particular geographical area and in different workplaces. The other main advantage 
of collective agreements was that the `contract' gave employers a stable environment 
of industrial peace and thus the possibility of accurately gauging the long-term costs of 
labour (Amark, 1992: 69). By this agreement the labour movement abandoned its 
ambitions about public ownership and in return achieved some improvement in hiring- 
and-firing rules in the labour market. Direct negotiations between the SAF and the LO 
also enabled the state to intervene in labour conflicts. As has been mentioned before, 
the Saltsjöbaden accords of 1938 are the most notable agreement between the SAF and 
the LO, and as Korpi (1983) had stressed, this, combined with the Social Democratic 
Party's realignment, has been described as the Swedish labour movement's `historic 
compromise'. The compromise provided the basis for industrial peace in the Swedish 
labour market for several decades. At that important meeting, both sides agreed that 
they would never again use conflict measures (strikes) in the labour market as a 
political weapon. Employment security was another important agreement at 
Saltsjöbaden (De Geer 1986: 369-72; Söderpalm, 1980: 28-36). 
Despite the fact that this agreement strengthened the LO's position, and thus should 
have been welcomed by the SAP, Social Democratic leaders realised that this process 
would decrease the SAP's influence over union activities. Knowing that there had been 
some potential conflicts between the SAP and the LO about political and economic 
principles and goals, such an increase in the LO's role in the labour market could have 
a negative impact on the Party's political authority. As 
Amark (1992: 70-73) has 
suggested, conflicts mainly arose between the SAP's long-term goals and the short- 
term objectives of the LO. While the Party focused on general interests, and for 
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example at the beginning of century wanted to struggle for political goals, like the 
right to vote, the LO continually stressed the need to improve working conditions. 
Until 1940, strikes and industrial peace were two main sources of dispute between the 
Party and the LO, but after 1940 a new issue, wage policy, created conflicts between 
them. While the SAP in its guise as a `national' party needed to minimise economic 
losses for the national economy, the LO expected the SAP to support its requests as 
part of the labour movement (Amark, 1992: 71). Because the Party stressed the 
importance of stable economic development, substantial wage increases were 
acceptable only if they did not compromise economic growth. However, as time went 
on, both the Party and the LO gradually moved away from the focus on industrial 
disputes and increasingly accepted responsibility for Sweden's general economic 
development. 
Overall, the strong labour movement could in cooperation with the SAP and the 
employer's federation establish a sustainable industrial relation, based on peace and 
consensus in the labour market. While the unions were supposed to avoid conflicts in 
the labour market, the employers were to meet the labour movements demands. 
According to `the agreements', the employers were to contribute to the creation and 
development of a generous welfare system. As we will explore later in this thesis, in 
such a welfare regime, the welfare state programme came to receive the largest 
attention from all the three major actors. 
The emerging welfare state programme: the main objectives of reform 
Summarising the discussion so far, one can argue that while until the end of World 
War I, Swedish Social Democracy's struggle was mainly focused on political aims, 
since the entrance into the parliaments and then the overtaking of the government in 
the 1930s, the Swedish labour movement has gradually modified its means and goals. 
The unique profile of the political development in Sweden was that even before the 
foundation of the modern parliamentary democracy, when the labour movement was 
still outside the political establishment, the conflict between social democracy and the 
conservative governments was less widespread than elsewhere in Europe. For 
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example, in the case of social policy, while in other parts of Europe, mainly in 
Germany, Austria and even in Denmark, every reform initiative on the part of 
bourgeois governments was rejected by working class parties as a measure designed to 
lure workers into the embrace of the class enemy, the Swedish socialists avoided this 
`negative socialism', believing that even limited reforms could have positive outcomes 
in the future (Esping-Andersen, 1992: 40). Therefore, unlike other socialist parties, 
which pursued a strategy of building only a workers' welfare state, the Swedish 
socialists and labour movement strove for democratic changes in society and, 
therefore, established a welfare system based on universal principle which would 
include all social classes. 
Some features in Swedish society facilitated this strategy. Compared to other European 
countries, Sweden was, until 1930, a more or less rural society, and the rurally-based 
workers, who were mired in poverty, lived in the social misery that accompanied early 
industrialisation. Therefore, for Swedish socialists it was not difficult to convince 
people about their principles of universalism and solidarity, which were the corner- 
stone in their plan for social policy (Esping-Andersen, 1992: 40-41). A universal 
people pension's, which was suggested in 1913, was the first reform, and was mainly 
proposed by the governing Liberal Party and supported by the Social Democrats. This 
reform not only provided for most rural workers but also favoured the agrarian classes 
who, for a time, had advocated a universal people's pension. For the Social 
Democratic Party, the support of the agrarian classes was crucial at this early stage 
because the party wanted to be known as a `peoples' party'. 
The notion of the Social Democrats as the `people's party' was promoted as early as 
1895 by the party chairman, Hjalmar Branting. Branting saw Social Democracy as 
capable of unifying all the `little people', including workers, peasants and the middle 
class (Esping-Andersen, 1992: 42). This notion was further developed into the famous 
notion of the `folkhem' (people's home) by Branding's successor, Per Albin Hansson. 
According to this model, the whole of Swedish society should be like a home, or 
family, in which national solidarity would prevail and all members and different 
classes would gain from the state's universalistic social policy (Isaksson, 1985). By 
establishing this model as a precondition for power, Social Democracy could 
successfully maintain the welfare state programme. The notion of a `people's home' 
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allowed the formation of cross-class alliances, thus allowing the agrarian party, which 
had been the main source of opposition to the Social Democrats, to become a main ally 
for the next few decades. The Social Democratic Party's capacity to build a red-green 
coalition was, according to Esping-Andersen, (1992: 43) one of the main reasons why 
Scandinavian Social Democracy came to power in the twentieth century. The other 
reason was `its ability to drop nationalisation and, instead, negotiate an accord with 
business based on Keynesian policies. ' 
The centrepiece of the Social Democratic Party's `people home' package was an anti- 
cyclical full employment programme, as well as a programme for social reforms. In 
both cases, Social Democracy could demonstrate its commitment to an efficient 
economy. By emphasising a production-oriented social and employment policy rather 
than cash support, the Social Democrats also demonstrated that there could be a 
`positive-sum solution to the enduring equality-efficiency trade-off (Esping-Andersen, 
1992: 45). The cornerstone of the social democratic welfare state programme in 1928 
was `better accident insurance; unified, universal health insurance; a universal people's 
pension; the abolition of poor relief; and unemployment insurance' (Esping-Andersen, 
1992: 45). The first phase of these reforms, which was implemented during the 1930s 
and the 1940s, evolved around the creation of full employment. Subsequent reforms 
included family allowances and rent subsidies. At that stage, the system only intended 
to provide of the basic needs for citizens. 
The universalistic welfare model certainly did not emerge according to a grand theory 
or a fully designed plan. Instead, it developed over several decades as the Social 
Democrats gradually came to meet the needs and interests of all social classes. In other 
words, although egalitarianism, as the core notion of Social Democracy, was always 
crucial to the Party, universalism, as a type of welfare state, was developed as the Party 
adopted a policy aimed at gaining the support of the whole nation. In the next section 
of this chapter, we will see how the SAP's ambition to establish an egalitarian society 
gradually shifted. While at the beginning of the 1920s the economic programme of the 
Party stressed economic nationalisation as the major goal, in the 1940s, creating a 
redistributive welfare system became the major objective. 
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Three phases in the formation of the Swedish welfare state 
Until the 1920s, the Social Democratic Party had no clear economic programme. As an 
opposition party, it had mainly contained basic general social and political principles, 
and some expressions of desire about economic reform. According to Bergstrom 
(1992: 132), the SAP's first programme (and economic policy) was presented when a 
Social Democratic government was formed. In that programme, which was debated at 
the 1926 party conference, the question of the nationalisation of the Swedish economy 
was still the most hotly debated issue. As the programme stated: 
The main cause of those faults which disfigure present-day civilisation is the private 
capitalistic mode of production which places rights of ownership in the hands of a 
minority, dooms the majority to propertylessness and dependence, and makes the 
opposition between worker and capitalists the determining characteristic of today's society 
(SAP party programme 1920: 2d par). 
This programme, which can be described as `Marxian', proclaimed that private 
ownership was the source of all injustice. Therefore, by abolishing private ownership, 
the conditions for the exploitation of the working class in all social domains would 
disappear, and as a result, all societal problems would also be solved. 
Shortly after coming to power, however, the first Social Democratic government 
realised that the goal of nationalisation was not easy to achieve. Committees 
established to inquire about the viability of plans for `nationalisation', `industrial 
democracy', and `trust control' failed to present any policy proposals. As Bergstrom 
(1992) has noted, some motions like those concerning industrial democracy, were 
buried in inquiries and remained in abeyance for many years. Although the 
nationalisation issue remained a live issue in party debates throughout the 1920s, no 
concrete and practical plan for the implementation of public ownership was presented. 
In parallel with the ongoing debates about nationalisation, Social Democratic 
governments also conducted an economic policy, which developed the seventeen main 
points of the party manifesto. The programme, which was obviously developed within 
a capitalist framework, raised many economic demands - for example direct 
programme taxation to secure `social capital-formation', the eight-hour working day, 
unemployment insurance, and so on. However, the party still had no independent 
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economic policy on unemployment. This lack of policy for combating unemployment 
persisted throughout the 1920s. 
In the Second stage of the revision of the Social Democratic programme and 
government policy, which began in the early 1930s, combating unemployment was the 
key issue. Two main reasons explain the SAP's new policy; first, after the serious 
setbacks in the general election of 1928, in which the SAP had put the emphasis on the 
`socialisation question', the Party distanced itself in the 1932 Party Congress, and 
chose a more pragmatic and reformist direction. It was argued that socialisation during 
the great depression would probably mean going from bad to worse. Second, and since 
the party aimed to be a governmental party being responsible for the state, it 
introduced the Wigforssian `new economic policy', which had many similarities to 
Keynesian policy. It promised to improve the situation for the unemployed, who were 
a large and significant group in society. The persistent emphasis on keeping 
unemployment down gained strong support from labour unions. That would give the 
SAP the needed support for its reformist programme, which combined full 
employment and economic growth with social and egalitarian reforms (Olsson, 1994). 
According to the new policy, while unemployment seemed to be permanent and not 
merely a phenomenon of the business cycle, the State should play a much more 
prominent role in stabilising employment at a high level (Landgren, 1960: 60-62). The 
key proposal was that passive measures against unemployment, which were limited to 
emergency relief, should be abolished. The State should instead provide relief works 
for market wages and employment conditions (Bergstrom, 1992: 138). 
Through this policy change a new era in Social Democratic Economic Policy began in 
which the state was regarded as an active agent, capable of intervening in the labour 
market, and in the case of unemployment, presenting long-term policies designed to 
stimulate domestic demands in order to counter economic recession. The core idea was 
that during recession periods, the State should be allowed to expand its investments, 
mainly in public relief works, but also to reform unemployment insurance and to take 
various other social and political measures to reduce the plight of the unemployed. 
Such investments should be financed with loans, and they would not necessarily be 
expected to make profits. The other condition would be that wage and employment 
conditions for public relief work would be the same as elsewhere in the labour market. 
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This measure would prevent employees in the public and private sector from becoming 
segregated. This policy also had a direct impact on the organisation of the budget. As 
Bergstrom (1992: 143) has described: 
The organisation of the budget was based upon the economist Gunnar Myrdal's idea that the 
budget should be balanced over a business cycle, not necessarily over an arbitrary period such 
as a calendar year. Myrdal's norm meant that state wealth should be maintained unaltered in 
the long term, which is the only rational interpretation of the demand for an annual balance. 
This budget policy has been considered the first conscious implementation of Keynesian 
economic policy in the world. 
In the Third stage, the Social Democratic Party in its revised 1944 programme and 
subsequent others, emphasised the importance of a planned economy. This was 
motivated by an acknowledgement of the state's need to expand its influence in the 
labour market in order to control unemployment and stabilise the economy. A planned 
economy, with strong elements of state ownership and state control over economic life 
would ensure that `the labour force and material resources are continually utilised for 
effective production' (The Labour Movement's post-war programme, 1944: 4. ) An 
increase of state control over economic life would also create appropriate conditions 
for the Social Democratic movement to achieve its aims on equal living standards and 
reduction of class differences through a fair distribution of resources. 
The SAP's modern welfare policy had its origin in the 1944 party programme, in 
which not only security against unemployment, which had been the central issue in the 
1932 programme, but also solidarity in social, economic, educational, and tax policies 
had a place. Security against illness and old age, through public insurance, protection 
for workers, and equality of educational opportunity, were among other demands. It 
was recognised that implementation of these demands depended on economic growth, 
which would lead to increased real wages, but by including them as elements of 
practical politics Social Democracy would have changed its economic policy to a more 
growth-oriented direction. By the 1950's, Social Democratic 
leaders like Tage 
Erlander, realised that problems of welfare were going to gain the upper 
hand, and 
problems concerning ownership rights and rights of 
determination would obtain a new 
character (Erlander, 1956: 258 in SAP, 1956). 
Against this background, and with regard to the fact that a dominant Social Democratic 
Party in cooperation with a centralised system of organised labour was the two 
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institutions that created the Swedish welfare system, social policy has developed along 
strongly universalist and redistributive lines. In the next section, I focus on the three 
main components of universalism 
The first includes services which are publicly produced but are available for all 
citizens. Such services are health care, basic education, and care of children and the 
elderly. Furthermore, that part of housing which is publicly regulated and subsidised is 
also included in this part of universal welfare policy. These services, which constitute 
the major part of service expenditure, are citizenship or residence rights, and from the 
start were meant to be provided free or with a small co-payment. The second element 
is the universal and flat-rate benefits that are also related to citizenship rights. Basic 
pensions and child allowances are among the most prominent benefits in this category. 
The third component consists of benefits paid to the working population whose 
participation in the labour market is temporarily or frequently interrupted; the 
supplementary (earnings related) pension scheme, sick pay and parental insurance are 
examples of such benefits, which all reflect earning capacity and, in the universalist 
model, provide a high level of income security. Labour market policies and 
unemployment insurance are further important components of the universalist welfare 
system. However, because major aspects of these policies have developed with strong 
trade union influence, for instance the unemployment insurance funds that have always 
been managed by the unions themselves, these arrangements will be discussed 
separately from those components of social policy initiated and driven by government 
and public sector. As measures to control the high rate of unemployment were the 
most important task of the first Social Democratic government in the 1930s, the next 
section of this chapter examines this issue before turning to core elements of social 
policy in the public sector. 
The three major components of universalist social policy 
Before the real start of the universalist reforms, a serious debate was conducted on 
within the SAP, in which opponents of such reforms argued that universal welfare 
benefits would help most those who needed them least and therefore would waste 
resources. `Distributing benefits without regard to need increased costs and 
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contradicted the Party's goal of aiding the poorest' (SAP, party styrelsen, 1944: 435- 
37). According to Baldwin (1990: 140), even the leaders of the Party admitted that 
universalist reforms would promote the interests of civil servants and others who were 
already well provisioned rather than the worse off. The mean-tested alternative would, 
instead, not only target the poor, and therefore more effectively improve their standard 
of living, but also save the government a huge amount of money (Baldwin, 1990: 141). 
However, it is important to note that the Social Democratic emphasis on universalism 
was not only based on ideological beliefs, but was also announced for tactical reasons. 
The increasing size and importance of white-collar salaried workers and the gradual 
decline of the blue-collar `working class' forced Social Democrats to take other 
classes' interests into consideration. The bourgeois parties' growing interest in the 
Universalist model, also a function of their recognition that it would benefit their 
supporters, also made Social Democrats determined to focus on the model. 
Pension reforms - the start of universalism 
The first prominent move toward universalism in Sweden began after the Second 
World War by a universal pension reform (Esping-Andersen, 1985). Benefits in this 
Social Democratic reform were flat-rate, and all Swedish citizens, regardless of their 
contributions, were eligible. The `folk pension' or literally `the people's pension', 
which in English is called `the basic pension', and mentioned above, was introduced in 
its primitive form in 1913, and has subsequently been modified on different occasions, 
but the Social Democratic universal pension reform of 1948 was, as Esping-Andersen 
(1985: 157) described, `a victory over both the old relief form of assistance and the 
insurance system favoured by the bourgeois parties. ' According to this reform, all 
citizens over 63 would be eligible to a certain amount that would be adjusted monthly 
in relation to a cost-of-living index. 
By this reform, Social Democratic welfare policy made a strong impact on Swedish 
society, and because a large majority of the population were targeted by the reforms, 
the universalist social policy could trump opposition from the bourgeois parties, who 
were still in favour of targeted benefits. An example of such opposition arose when the 
Social Democrats tried to improve the pension system, mainly because the system had 
failed to provide adequate levels of income replacement (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 160). 
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In the beginning of the 1950s, it became clear that the basic pension and other social 
benefits were not enough to compensate for general income growth, and therefore the 
standard of living among pensioners who were most dependent on the basic pension 
was felling. Moreover, the basic pension, as the only source of income, seemed to be 
inadequate for those in the higher income strata, and therefore, many of them would 
find private insurance as a supplement to the basic pension. In an attempt to prevent 
such a development, the Social Democrats proposed in the mid-1950s a universal, 
supplementary retirement pension system, the so-called Allmänna tilläggspensionen 
(ATP), which was earnings-related and insisted on compulsory membership for all 
employees. The aim of the ATP-system was to provide a level of security for 
pensioners which would not differ greatly from the standard of living they achieved 
during their period of active labour and to ensure that a person would receive a total 
pension amounting to approximately two-third of her/his best fifteen years' earnings. 
Whereas the basic pension was financed through income taxes, the supplementary 
pensions would be financed by employer contribution. 
It was through that the plan would be acceptable for both employer organisations and 
the bourgeois parties, but the other part of the plan, which gave the state the power of 
control over pension funds and their investments, aroused protests. The major 
objection to the ATP-system was that it was believed to result in an excessive 
concentration of economic power in the government. The accumulation of 
considerably larger funds would transform the pension funds to the largest source of 
investment in the country (Eltz, 1964: 28-9). 
As the first major universalist reform, the pension reform also demonstrated 
difficulties with the egalitarian, flat-rate reforms to come. One of these difficulties, 
which caused a political dispute with the agrarian party, was the measure taken by the 
Social Democrats to compensate pensioners in urban areas. For societies like Sweden, 
with wide geographical differences, the living costs for inhabitants in urban areas are 
greater than in the countryside. Flat-rate benefits would, therefore, decrease the 
standard of living for urban pensioners. To match that problem, the Social Democratic 
government decided to grant, on the top of the basic pension, some public assistance 
through means-tested supplements to urban residents. Such measures were an 
acknowledgement that the equality of uniform and flat-rate 
benefits has its 
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deficiencies, and expenses should somehow grade benefits such as pension. It also 
induced the Social Democrats to begin to advocate cost-related benefits. 
Differentiation of benefits, in turn, caused protests among rural inhabitants who 
believed that `the increased costs in the countryside undermined any justification for a 
differentiation of benefits that gave them less than urban dwellers' (Baldwin, 
1990: 144). 
Health insurance reform 
The universalist aspect of pension reform, which was meant to promote the interests of 
the worst-off, has also favoured the well-off. In the case of the health insurance 
reform, which was introduced as the second major universalist reform plan, the 
condition was totally different. From the nineteenth century, extensive private activity 
had led to the formation of sickness benefit society, and by the 1950s, over two-thirds 
of the population was covered by some voluntary plan (Rosenthal, 1967). However, 
the major deficiency with the sickness insurance system was that it only covered the 
most prosperous parts of the population in urban areas. The voluntary scheme did not 
cover those in greatest need because the major parts of the working class and rural 
inhabitants were excluded. A Universalist national program, could, by making health 
insurance compulsory for all, distribute the state's subsidies more equitably (Baldwin, 
1990). 
At this point, most of the advocates of universalist benefits were agreed about the 
problem. However, as in the case of pensions, the main concern was the way in which 
the cash benefits would replace income lost during illness. Because of geographical 
variations, the flat-rate benefits would give inadequate protection of income or 
standard of living during periods of illness, and therefore, would not be valid. As in the 
case of pensions, the solution was found in the earnings-related alternative, which was 
supported by the majority of people, as well as main interest groups like the LO. 
Despite that, the Social Democratic Party leaders, especially Gustav Möller, the social 
minister, supported the uniform rates by delivering the argument that in the earnings- 
related model, the state's subsidies would mainly help the wealthier rather than the 
worse-off. Möller believed that the state should provide a minimum but equal 
protection for all citizens and then allow them to arrange further protections (Antman, 
1996). Knowing that the rural population, who represented the poorest social class in 
103 
Swedish society, would be best served by the flat-rate model, one could conclude that 
the Social Democratic leaders decided to be in favour of the flat-rate model mainly for 
tactical reasons. Because, by advocating a uniform rate, they could keep the support of 
the Agrarian party for the Social Democratic reform policy. 
Despite the difference of opinions about the reform, which extended even inside the 
Social Democratic Party, the health insurance bill was passed by Parliament, but some 
financial problems and administrative complexities prevented its implementation. In 
1953, the view was changed and a new proposal, which concerned wage-earner's 
interest, was presented in Parliament. At this time the rural groups had also changed 
their view and softened their resistance to the earnings-related benefit. The agrarian 
groups probably realised that opinion inside the Social Democrat Party, which until the 
1940s had taken the concerns of the countryside into consideration and to their 
advantage, had by the 1950s strongly changed in favour of the urban working class and 
the growing middle class who advocated earnings-related benefits. In an evaluation of 
this change in opinion, Baldwin (1990: 146) comes to a clear verdict: 
This break with flat rates merely emphasised what had always been the case. The apparent 
egalitarianism of uniform benefits masked a distributive advantage for the countryside. In 
a nation with wide cost variations, formal equality meant real inequity. Rural inhabitants 
had won their case in 1913 and again in post-war pension and health reform. Not until the 
1950s were they sufficiently weakened that urban workers' interests finally left their mark 
in measures that resembled Bismarckian social insurance more than they did the 
supposedly socialist model of the Scandinavian welfare state. 
Soon after the start of the implementation of the Swedish National Health insurance 
system in 1955, it was shown that the Swedish system held a significant differences 
from other systems, for example, from the British National Health Service. While the 
British programme was above all based on a medical scheme, the Swedish model was 
primarily shaped as a social insurance system designed to compensate citizens whom, 
owing to disease, disablement, or unemployment for medical reasons, lost their 
income. The programme is, therefore, compulsory and covers all Swedish citizens, 
being financed by contributions from the insurance, the employer and the government. 
Social Deinocratic family policy 
The third prominent post-war social reform in Sweden was new family policy 
measures that were taken in 1948 and resulted in the introduction of universal child 
allowances. 
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To achieve this goal, the National Federation of Social Democratic Women had driven 
an extensive campaign over several decades to convince the male-dominated Social 
Democratic Party and the unions of its family policy. Apart from the campaigns, some 
significant changes in family structures made the introduction of more active family 
policy measures inevitable. 
A significant change in family patterns, which started from the turn of the century and 
became increasingly obvious during the 1930s, was the extension of birth control 
among the Swedish women (Hirdman, 1994). While around the turn of the century, 
families had an average of four children, the number had dropped to two children or 
less by the 1930s. The conservative groups opposed the use of birth control, and as a 
consequence, passed a law in 1910 that forbade information on, and sales of 
contraceptives. On the other hand, the Social Democrats started to understand the lack 
of benefits for mothers as the crucial reason for the growth of abortions. Knowing that 
as early as the turn of the century, about one-third of all families in Stockholm area 
consisted of single mothers and their children, who were burdened with the sole 
responsibility for their families, it would be more understandable why the rate of 
abortion had increased enormously and caused a crisis in population rate (Ohlander, 
1992: 217). 
During the 1920s, maternity policy was still absent from debates in the Social 
Democratic parliamentary group. In 1926, social insurance was defined to include 
sickness, accident, and unemployment benefits. Great attention was of course paid to 
the latter. Later, in 1928, the social minister, Gustav Möller, added the basic pension to 
the list. The question of maternity insurance appeared in the parliamentary group's 
minutes for the first time in 1930. Thus, Ohlander (1992: 222) argues that: 
Perhaps the weight given by the party to unemployment issues during the 1920s and the 
1930s could be contrasted with that given to maternal benefit issues, question involving 
women and children. It may be a way of analysing to what extent Social Democratic 
politics were primarily politics for men - Social Democratic women did not have the 
numbers to assert themselves in the party, nor were they able to be successful in those 
issues they considered important. 
Until the 1930s, when Alva and Gunnar Myrdal in their book Kris i befolkningsfrägan 
(1934: Nation and Family, 1941), focused on the family issue, the Social Democratic 
women's demand for different rights, such as general maternal insurance or child 
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support allowances did not receive a proper response. For example, after demanding 
regulations on mandatory leave after the birth of a child for a period of three decades, 
the law which provided maternity insurance and gave mothers economic support 
during the mandatory leave was not passed until 1931 (Ohlander, 1992: 214). 
Thereby the Social Democrats found `social reasons' as grounds for abortion, and to 
decrease the number of abortions, they proposed maternal aid and other legal support 
for the protection of new mothers, with the aim of attaining higher birth rates. The 
decision to build residential blocks for families in difficult economic circumstances, 
and the passing of a law that forbid employers from dismissing women employees on 
grounds of pregnancy were among other measures which were taken by the 
government (Ohlander, 1980). 
Social democratic family policy was thereby formed on the Myrdalian population 
policy, which saw the individual as a means rather than an end, and accordingly, 
society would be understood as the primary concern, and individual as the secondary. 
From such a point of view, which was initially seen by the majority of Social 
Democratic women as a negative attitude toward women's freedom to choose their 
own lives and interests, one should conclude that the procreation of children would 
simply be `a task' or a `woman's duty' to society. On the other hand, the logical 
consequence of such a policy would be that society should also take responsibility for 
the financial support of women and bring significant improvements to their life and 
social positions. Consequently, it has also been decided that benefits like maternal aid, 
maternity insurance, and later, child allowance, would be paid to the mothers instead 
of, for example, tax deductions from the father's income. Such measure would, as 
several authors (Ohiander, 1992; Hernes, 1987) have pointed out, increase, women's 
influence over the economy of the family, even though to a limited extent. 
During the 1950s, Social Democratic women put the emphasis on increased social 
commitments to single-parent families. Ulla Lindström, a Social Democratic minister, 
compared the situation of single-mothers to that of the proletariat, who during the 
1950s still belonged to the lowest strata in society (Lindström, 1969) The main aim 
was to show that the welfare of children is not only a responsibility for mothers, but 
also that there is a basic social conflict between production and reproduction. 
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Therefore, society should take the responsibility and resolve problems which arise in 
relation to parenthood and the care and upbringing of children. In other words, by 
taking on the burden of care and upbringing of the children, society would ensure its 
continued existence. 
The expansion of family policy reforms occurred during the 1950s. Different kinds of 
benefits to the families have been raised; for example, family housing allowances to 
low income families were introduced, and in the other main area of family policy, i. e. 
school and pre-school, school health provision, free school meals, and other reforms 
have been accomplished. These reforms had two strong Social Democratic features: 
firstly, child allowances were extended to all children, without any means-testing. By 
that, benefits would not be labelled as a charity but as a right for every citizen which 
society was obligate to provide. And secondly, allowances, as was mentioned before, 
were paid directly to the families (mothers) and not as a tax reduction. The later model 
would not benefit those worst off, because they would not have an appreciated income 
to deduct from (Kälvemark, 1980). 
The universalist model after the three main reforms 
Through the pension, health insurance, and family reforms, Social Democrats in 
Sweden demonstrated their inclination to implement an institutional social system. 
Stephens (1996: 34) described the development of the institutional model as follows: 
The institutional model combines citizenship benefits equal for all citizens with income 
security for the working population in cases of temporary (illness, unemployment) or 
permanent (retirement, work injury) interruption of work. The major transfer programmes 
(pensions, sick pay, work injury, unemployment compensation, maternity/parental leave) 
are designed to provide income security. 
Means-tested flat-rate social benefits were rejected and instead, earnings-related 
benefits were adopted as the dominant Social Democratic social policy. Although, 
from a traditional Social Democratic point of view, earnings-related benefits were 
understood as less favourable for the industrial proletariat as well as for other parts of 
the working class. Even the rural inhabitants would not gain by this model. Salaried 
employees were the only class to gain, at least in the short-term, from earnings-related 
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benefits. But gradually the Social Democratic movement realised that flat rate benefits 
guaranteed public support for the welfare system. 
The SAP had several reasons for introducing earnings-related reforms as well as other 
generous benefits that mainly favoured the middle class. First, if we evaluate the 
SAP's whole attitude toward the reform process, the Party has on different occasions 
accepted that salaried employees should receive benefits, sometimes clearly at the 
expense of manual workers, in hopes of securing broad cross-class support for reforms 
(Kruse and Stahlberg, 1977). For the SAP, the major goal was that of `locating all 
citizens within a common framework of provision' (Baldwin, 1990: 222). In other 
words, by inventing a policy which advocated an active public control through state 
intervention and legislation for the purpose of correcting imbalance, the SAP could 
socialise matters which had earlier been left free. Such a policy would be in contrast to 
the liberal concept, which had been tolerable toward inequalities and instead, 
advocated limiting statutory interventions to a minimum. As Kruse and Stahlberg 
(1977) pointed out, Swedish social policy, by its institutional character, has created a 
proper condition for the Social Democratic centralised planning. Such a policy could 
in a broader aspect secure the welfare of those worse-off. 
Second, and in order to achieve the first goal, Social Democrats realised from the very 
beginning that, only supported by the working class, they could never gain a majority 
of votes in Parliament. Forging cross-class alliances seemed the only way for the Party 
to remain in power. Until the 1950s, farmers were the only coalition partners for the 
SAP but, as time went on, demographic developments meant that the Agrarian Party 
became weaker and weaker, with salaried employees taking its place as the fastest 
rising social class. 
Consequently, the Social Democrats realised that in the long run, continuing welfare 
reform hinged on white-collar support. They recognised that salaried employees 
had 
enjoyed occupational provision and health insurance before a Social Democratic 
reform took effect, and that less attractive entitlements at a flat-rate level were unlikely 
to make any impression on them. They therefore demanded more benefits than they 
were already eligible to receive, such as statutory superannuation, on the condition that 
benefit rates should be determined in relation to earnings at retirement. The SAP also 
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found it necessary to calculate pensions based on the fifteen best years of earning, and 
to reduce required contributions from forty years, as had been planned in the party's 
earlier drafts for entitlement to full pension, to only thirty. All these benefits favoured 
white-collar groups and had to be paid for by reductions in blue-collar benefits and 
were accepted by the SAP, as well as the LO, as the necessary cost for securing the 
white-collar support for institutional reforms. 
Even if the pension reform, the health insurance reform and the generous family policy 
constitute the three major components of the universalist social policy, it has to be 
considered that they were underpinned by Sweden's labour market policy which will 
be explored in the next section. 
Labour-market policies and unemployment insurance 
Modern Swedish labour policy has its origins in the famous agreement concluded in 
1938 between the LO and the SAF, in Saltsjöbaden - the so-called `historic 
compromise'. The agreement was a cornerstone of Swedish industrial relations the 
policy of full employment being the main outcome of the new consensus. So far as the 
Social Democratic Party and trade unions are concerned, the long-term economic 
growth associated with full employment has always played an important role in their 
social and economic thinking. The struggle over the share of wages and profits in the 
value derived from production has consequently always come second to the key aims 
of maintaining full employment. LO leaders, from the very beginning, realised that 
measures for improving efficiency in business and industry lay in workers' interests 
and for this reason, recognised that wage increases should not exceeded the levels 
permitted by economic growth (Amark, 1992). 
`Full employment' has also been Swedish Social Democracy's main political goal. In 
this characteristic, Sweden, and to some extent Norway, have differed from all other 
welfare states. The policy of full employment has had a positive impact on the stability 
of the welfare system on at least three distinct dimensions. First, the use of human 
resources would be maximised and consequently both total production and tax income 
would increase. Second, by keeping people in work, potential demands on the welfare 
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system would be reduced. And third, by keeping the unemployment level low, the cost 
of welfare relief payments would also be avoided (Marklund, 1988: 88-89). In short, 
low levels of unemployment and high level of labour force participation would mean 
that more people supported the welfare state with taxes, while fewer drew on its 
benefits. Moreover, of course, participation in paid work was viewed as a component 
of individual welfare in its own right (Hagen, 1992). 
Since the Second World War, the focus on full employment increased further and the 
Swedish labour market has made full employment its highest priority (Meidner, 
1999: 12). When the War was over, the risk of post-war depression, similar to that of 
the 1920s, was thought to be high, Therefore, in Sweden, a special working group 
chaired by the economist Wigforss drew up a post-war programme for the labour 
movement in which full employment was given the highest priority. This policy was to 
be maintained through a demand-led `Keynesian' budget policy in which the budget 
would directly and concretely favour workers in their struggles to improve their living 
standards (Amark, 1992; Elvander, 1980). During the war, a vast majority of people, 
including the majority of women, had participated in the labour market and, therefore, 
it was appropriate to use the labour market as a means for the achievement of this goal. 
The increased domestic demand produced by wartime, not only in Sweden but also 
throughout Western Europe, created circumstances that made full employment a 
realistic objective. Reconstruction of the infrastructure and key industries, for example, 
demanded massive investment and all available labour was needed. The important 
question, of course, was whether the policy of full employment could be maintained 
during peacetime when the labour market was more stable. 
Since the 1940s some major strategies have contributed to the development and 
maintenance of Swedish employment policy. These policies which came to be crucial 
for the success of the industrial relation in Sweden were based on the `historic 
compromise'. One of the key elements of the compromise was the `solidaristic wages 
policy', which aimed to narrow the wage differentials between different groups of 
manual workers and also between manual and non-manual workers (Gould, 1988: 21). 
After the agreement of the 1938 these two major partners in the labour-market could, 
through centralised negotiation, agree about both wage levels and other industrial 
relations issues. The famous Rehn-Meidner model of `equal pay for equal work' was 
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designed to benefit workers and small farmers in rural regions, and women, but it had 
other central features, which had a more strategic impact on the Swedish labour 
market. By maintaining an agreed wage level for different jobs, it forced labour- 
intensive, low productive enterprises, which were reluctant to make necessary 
structural adjustments to rationalise their operatives or go out of business. On the other 
hand, a high wage policy favoured innovative and productive companies because, as 
efficient and profitable firms they could be sure that trade unions would not put them 
under constant pressure to pay wages higher than those of their international 
competitors (Meidner, 2000). It has to be mentioned that according to the principle of 
`solidarity in wage policies' the wage differential between companies ought to be 
successively reduced. That could be achieved `by giving priority to wage increases for 
groups of companies having the lowest income level' (Heckcher, 1984: 96). For this 
reason the wage and salary negotiations had to take place across the board and not for 
individual enterprises. Consequently, the level of wage increase would not be related 
to the profitability of the companies. This policy appeared to have favoured profitable 
firms because they were not compelled to increase their wage-level in relation to their 
profits. Such a policy would encourage the firms to invest further in the country, which 
would in turn lead to job growth (Ginsburg, 1993; Stephens, 1996). The government 
also encouraged highly productive firms to invest by providing low interest loans from 
public savings as pension funds. 2 
However, one consequence of the solidaristic wage policy was the large number of 
redundancies caused by the rationalisation of inefficient firms. To tackle this problem, 
the state Labour Market Board (AMS) was established in the 1940s. The AMS's main 
task was, through various state labour market schemes, to move displaced labour to 
high productivity sectors. According to the law, all vacancies and lay-offs on a 
national basis have to be notified to the AMS. The AMS made it easier for redundant 
workers to migrate to boom areas, mainly through the provision of relocation grants. 
Among other measures that the AMS introduced, was the retraining of redundant 
workers in training centres and schools, job creation measures, including relief-work 
projects, temporary employment subsidies, recruitment subsidies, and special measures 
for the occupationally impaired (Ginsburg, 1993). Apart from different kinds of paid 
2 When ATP system was established at the end of the I 950s, the pensions were saved in funds controlled by the state. These 
pension funds have after a few years after 
foundation been transformed to a prominent source of investment in the country. 
employment, other kinds of labour market schemes were introduced for the support of 
unemployed people. Early retirees, discouraged workers, and reluctantly part-time 
employees, were three groups who were covered by the generous labour market 
schemes (OECD, 1989a: 62). 
As one can conclude from the discussion in this section, the aim of the labour 
movement was to establish a style of industrial relation in the Swedish labour market 
that would ensure the growth and development of Swedish industry rather than purely 
demand limited benefits such as unemployment insurance. Through such a dynamic 
labour market the economic conditions of firms and the continuity of high employment 
rate could be secured, while Sweden remained internationally competitive. In this way, 
too, the development of universal and generous social policy arrangements could be 
ensured. 
The `Golden age' of the Swedish welfare state 
During the two decades after World War II, the formation of the Swedish welfare state 
was still in its `primary' phase. Throughout the period, Social Democratic 
governments succeeded in introducing reforms in all major areas of social policy: 
pensions, unemployment and sickness benefit, health and insurance policy, family 
policy and so on. However, expansion proved to be a protracted process. By 1960, 
social expenditure in Sweden was around 16 per cent of GDP, indicating that Sweden 
was only just above the average for the OECD countries (OECD, 1985). The 
expansion of the Swedish system certainly accelerated during the 1960s and reached 
its zenith in the mid 1980s. During the recession of the 1970s, when virtually all other 
capitalist welfare states reduced their costs, the Swedish government expanded the 
welfare state dramatically (Ginsburg, 1993). It was this public spending 
figure of just 
over 60 per cent of GDP in 1981 that gave Sweden its reputation as a 
high welfare 
spender (Brunsdon & May, 1995). 
The broad support for the solidaristic welfare policy by both labour and middle classes, 
and even the bourgeois parties, explains the continuity 
in expansion of the system even 
during the recession period after the crisis of the 1970s. Arguably, the Social 
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Democrats' efforts to form a social policy based on national interest rather than class 
interest seems to have been the most decisive factor in maintaining broad support for 
the system - support that persisted uninterrupted through the period of economic crisis, 
to the extent that even the bourgeois parties did not make any noticeable efforts to alter 
the system after they came to power in 1976. However, a rising budget deficit in the 
second half of the 1970s (from 4.0 to 13.2 per cent of GDP between 1973 and 1982) 
began to change the political climate, leading to increasing pessimism about the 
viability of the welfare state in `certain quarters' (OECD, 1985). The arguments that 
the welfare state inherently caused economic imbalance and stagnation became 
increasingly influential in public discourse, and the pressure on the Social Democrats 
as architects of a highly expensive system consequently grew. But because of the 
political costs involved with retrenchments no party openly advocated any serious 
changes in existing social provision. 
Following the establishment of the Swedish welfare state, income maintenance 
measures formed the main part of welfare expenditure, (i. e. between a third and a half 
of all welfare expenditures). Income maintenance encompasses pension programmes, 
sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, occupational injury insurance, housing 
allowances and various family and child supplements, and public assistance (poor 
relief). Because this range of provision is so extensive, the temptation has been for 
scholars (Olsson, 1990; Stephens, 1996; Brunsdon &May, 1995; Gould, 2001) 
studying the nature of change in the Swedish welfare system to focus on changes in 
income maintenance to the neglect of other sectors of the system. In its broadest sense 
the welfare state includes many other public welfare services such as education, day 
care, care of the elderly, public transit subsidies, housing subsidies, and active labour 
market expenditure; transfer payments in fact constitute less than half total social 
expenditure (Stephens, 1996: 35). 
In the forthcoming sections, the development of four major components of the benefit 
system is examined. The development of the pension system will be explored in the 
next section and this will be followed by an analysis of the other major areas of 
unemployment insurance, sickness insurance and family policy. 
113 
Figure 3.1 Social expenditure and income maintenance by major components, between 1950 and 1980. 
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The continuity of `peace' in the Swedish labour market 
During the three decades after the War, stable global economic development 
maintained high demand, which sustained full employment - although the risks of 
excess demand and inflation consequently loomed large (Amark, 1992). After the oil 
crisis of 1973, however, the `golden age' of post-war capitalism ended and growing 
economic problems put pressure on governments to reduce public expenditure. While 
most countries in Europe chose to allow unemployment to rise in an effort to reduce 
inflation and keep prices under control, the Swedes remained committed to the pursuit 
of full employment through an active labour market policy. As Ginsburg (1992: 43) has 
pointed out, during the 1970s and 1980s `Swedish governments built up large public 
sector deficits to finance the full employment commitment by direct subsidies to 
industry, expansion of employment in the welfare state and the active labour-market 
policies, all of which absorbed a great deal of unemployment. ' By the mid-1970s, the 
Swedish public sector already employed a quarter of the workforce, and throughout the 
1980s, employment in the public sector grew to account for a third of the labour force 
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(SCB, 1990). As a result, between the late 1940s and 1991, unemployment in Sweden 
was exceptionally low. Apart from the years 1982-4 when `open' unemployment 
reached 3.5 per cent, Sweden enjoyed an unemployment rate of under or around 2 per 
cent. As a result of full employment, competition for jobs diminished, and these tight 
labour market conditions instead meant that companies were forced to compete for 
scarce labour. 
Table 3.1 Standardised unemployment rates 
Average for 1964-67 1968-73 1974-79 1980-87 1989 
FRG* 0.6 1.0 3.2 6.0 5.5 
Sweden 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.7 1.4 
UK 2.5 3.3 5.0 10.5 6.4 
us 4.2 4.6 6.7 7.6 5.2 
OECD average 2.7 3.2 4.9 7.5 6.1 
Sources: OECD 1989b: table 2.20; OECD 1990: 22. 
*FRG: Federal Republic of Germany 
Until the 1990s, Sweden placed most emphasis on employment programmes, while in 
many other countries the level of unemployment insurance benefits characterised the 
state's and the welfare systems' ambition simply to `compensate' for unemployment. 
In Sweden, unemployment insurance benefit societies, which were heavily state 
subsidised, were controlled by trade unions. That could be seen as an effort by the 
Social Democratic Party to strengthen the position of the trade unions in the labour 
market. On the other hand, the state kept control of active manpower policy, the 
purpose of which was to facilitate industrial restructuring. The active manpower policy 
delivered through the AMS was fully supported by the unions which allowed industry 
to restructure according to prevailing economic pressures without resistance from 
organised labour (Olsson, 1990: 132). 
Pensions 
The statutory old-age pension scheme was the longest running element of social 
expenditure in Sweden. Since the universal pension reforms at the end of the 1950s, 
many employees in Sweden received pensions from three different sources: first a 
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basic pension and, in addition, an earnings-related supplementary pension (ATP) 
together with an occupational pension 
The national basic pension (folkpension), as the primary element of the Swedish 
pension system, was based on the principle of security and was paid to almost every 
pensioner who had been resident in the country for at least ten years. Everyone, 
irrespective of previous income was eligible to the amount. The national basic pension, 
which was based on the so-called `base amount', introduced in 1948 and modified in 
subsequent years, saw the original means-tested element abolished and a universal flat- 
rate pension established. Until 1993, the basic pension to a pensioner who was not 
married was based upon 100 per cent of the base amount and for a pensioner who was 
married to another pensioner, the national basic pension was 80 per cent. 3 The reason 
for the basic pension being related to the base amount was to protect it from the effects 
of inflation - the base amount increasing with the rate of inflation (Stahlberg, 1995). 
The national basic pension was designed to protect those with a low ATP (or none at 
all). A further measure for compensating pensioners in this position was the basic 
pension supplement. If the amount of ATP was less than 55.5 per cent of the base 
amount, pensioners received the basic pension supplement to the point at which the 
ATP and this supplementary taken together would make up 55.5 of the base amount. 
The third benefit to pensioners with low or no ATP contributions was income-tested 
municipal housing allowances, available on a nation-wide basis and introduced in the 
mid-1950s. 4 Taking all these three benefits together, the amount of replacement was 
approximately two base amounts, which gave pensioner a sufficient income and a 
reasonable standard of leaving (Greve, 1978: 2). 
The national supplementary pension (ATP) was the second main strand of the pension 
system, and was based on the `pay-as-you-go' and `defined benefit' principles. The 
ATP was based on work performance and for a full ATP, thirty years of gainful 
employment was required. The amount available depended on the income from the 
''Base amount' is a national sum that in principle follows the consumer price index, increasing with the rate of 
inflation (Stahlberg, 1995). In 1993, the base amount was SEK 34,400. This amount was approximately 20 per cent 
of an average manual worker's wage before taxes. 
4 it Nvas easy to claim an income-related housing benefit. During the first half of the 1970s more than 50 per cent of 
pensioners received this kind of benefit. 
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`best' fifteen years. The target level was set at 60% of past earnings. Past contributions 
and outgoing pensions were linked to a consumer price index, forming the so-called 
`base amount'. Pensionable income for at least three years' employment was the 
minimum demand for qualifying for ATP. An individual's annual income was required 
to be at least a sum larger than one base amount, and the maximum amount for 
qualifying was the equivalent of 7.5 base amounts (Stahlberg, 1995; Olsson, 
1990: 129). By being tied to the base amount, the ATP, like the national basic pension, 
was protected from the effects of inflation. 
The third source of pension was the occupational pensions, which, like the 
supplementary pension, was a compensation for loss of income and therefore based on 
work performance. The occupational pension, supplemented the national basic pension 
and ATP. For blue-collar workers in the private sector, STP was the negotiated 
pension, which was 10 per cent of the average income in the three best years between 
the age of 55 and 59. For white-collar workers in the private sector, the negotiated 
pension, called ITP, was based on the salary at retirement. One of the differences 
between the STP and ITP was that the latter provided compensation for annual 
incomes over the equivalent of 7.5 base amounts, but less than 30 base amounts. On 
the salary of up to 7.5 base amount ITP paid a pension of 10 per cent because it was 
also covered by ATP. ITP covered mostly wages between 7.5 and 20 base amount. It 
paid a pension of 65 per cent. For wages between 20 and 30 base amount it paid 32.5 
per cent (Stahlberg, 1995). 
Beyond these three forms of pension, which until 1999 made up the structure of the 
pension system, there were three other types, which were not paid according to age, 
but for other reasons, such as early retirement. 
The early retirement pension had the same structure as the old-age pension, which 
means that it included the national basic pension, the basic pension supplement (ATP), 
the negotiated occupational pension and the local authority housing allowances for 
those pensioners with low or no ATP. The main difference was that compensation 
from the latter source was higher for the early retirement pension than for old-age 
pension. 
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The Partial pension was designed for the working population between the age of 60 
and 64 who wanted to reduce their presence in the labour market by limiting their 
working hours. 
The Survivor's pension provided financial support for both widows and widowers, 
and also for children under the age of 18. Until 1990 a survivor's pension, paid to both 
men and women, was equivalent to about 30 per cent of their wife's and husband's 
earlier income (Stahlberg, 1995). 
Table 3.2: Pension payments from the national pension system and ATP (1992) 
Pension Pension Payouts 
Benefit in SEK millions 
Old-age pension 119,540 
Early-retirement pension 32,575 
Survivor's pension 11,592 
Partial pension 2,233 
Total 165,940 
Source: Socialförsäkringsstatistik. Fakta (1993) in Stählberg (1995) 
Sickness benefits and the expansion of the health system 
Since 1955, when the compulsory insurance scheme with earnings-related cash 
benefits replaced the voluntary sickness insurance, which was administered by local 
friendly societies, the level of all kinds of medical benefits has risen dramatically. One 
major reason for these changes was the Swedish Parliament's decision to integrate the 
administration of pensions and sickness insurance, thus relating sickness cash benefits, 
like pensions, to net earnings. As a result, the sickness cash benefits have been 
augmented on at least three occasions. The initial system from 1963, which was 
introduced after the reform, paid benefits in proportion to only 60 per cent of net 
income. In the late 1960s the level increased to 80 per cent of net income, and also the 
initial three days waiting period was reduced to a single day. In the mid-1970s, the 
system was changed to 90 percent of gross earnings, and moreover, general health 
insurance was extended to cover dental treatment (Olsson, 1990). Along with these 
improvements to benefit levels, other rules have also been liberalised, for example, the 
introduction of self-certification for the first week of sickness absence. During the 
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1980s the generosity of the system continued - the one-day waiting period being 
abolished in 1987. 
Bearing in mind that the objective of sickness insurance is to protect against loss of 
income, the reforms of the 1980s largely achieved this goal, because in the matter of 
cash benefits, the most widely used aspect of welfare, almost all wage-earners were 
entitled to at least 90 per cent of normal earnings. Above that, some employees, like 
private sector white-collar groups, received more because they had collective 
bargaining agreements for sick pay, which covered up to 100 per cent of income loss 
through illness. Most scholars (Hetzer, 1991; Höög, 1991; Korpi, 1989; Olsson, 1990) 
of Swedish welfare policy understandably suggest that, during the second half of the 
1980s, protection against loss of income during illness was very generous. 
Figure 3.2 Expenditure on sickness and health between 1950 and 1980. 
Expenditure on sickness and health, at constant 
(1975) prices (in million Skr. ) 
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Source: Olsson (1990: 131). 
Family policy 
Two decades after women's active entrance into the labour market, many researchers 
(Liljeström et al., 1976; Axelsson, 1992) examined the effects of women's paid 
employment, and pointed out some problems which were caused 
by this change in the 
role of women in the family. According to Liljeström et al. 
(1976), whereas women's 
paid employment had strengthened their position 
in society, they still carried the 
greater burden of unpaid domestic and caring work 
because of the continuation of the 
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sexual division of labour. Even in the labour market there were considerable 
differences between men and women's incomes and job opportunities. Therefore, the 
new family reforms from the 1960s were linked directly with the demands and 
opportunities for women's paid employment. The reforms were intended to provide 
women, and also children, with various kinds of protection and support (Ruggie, 1984; 
Lavin, 1985). The measures concerned two types of protection. First, certain services 
aimed to provide care or supervision of children, and second, a number of schemes 
were devised to give financial support to families. 
The care and supervision of children 
Swedish family policy, in which parents insurance also plays an important role, is 
based on equality demands and has therefore been shaped to provide comprehensive 
cover for the population. Knowing that during a long period of time, the work 
participation for women in Sweden has been the highest in the world (84 per cent in 
1992), it is possible to see why the system has provided such generous benefits. 
Generosity starts at birth. After the birth, either the mother or the father has the right to 
stay at home with paid leave until the child is 15 months old (Petterson, 1995). 
Consequently, with either of the parents at home (normally mothers), there is little 
need for day-care for children below this age, and statistics from 1992 show that only 
2.3 per cent of children aged 3-10 month had a day-care place. 5 
The municipalities - the Swedish local authorities - have responsibility for providing a 
range of childcare services. There are three major facilities: day-care centres for pre- 
schoolers; family day-care schemes; and after-school centres. Day-care centres are 
provided for children aged from six months up to school age. These centres take care 
of those whose parents are working or studying away from home. The family day-care 
schemes consist of a network of private homes, which also take care of children whose 
parents are working. These schemes are supervised by the municipalities and the 
people who take care of children in their own home (called childminders) are 
employed by the municipality (Lavin, 1985). 
5 The percentage has grown to 22.5 for children between 11-17 month (Statistics Sweden 1993 in Petterson, 
1995). 
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The municipalities were also responsible for providing after-school centres for children 
up to 12 years of age. According to different sections in the Social Services Acts, 
municipalities have also to provide other services for children - for example, child- 
care assistants - who have to look after children who are unable to come to the day 
nursery or the childminder; the provision of assistance to those children who can come 
to day-nurseries, but due to physical, mental, social, linguistic, or other reasons, need 
special services; the provision of home language training for children who have a 
mother tongue other than Swedish; the provision of services in open nurseries (pre- 
schools) - places where parents who look after their own child can visit in the course 
of the day to let their children mix with others engaged in a range of nursery activities; 
the provision of domestic help offers to housewives who are ill or otherwise in need of 
assistance. (Lavin, 1985). 
A comparison between eight Western European countries in 1993 showed that the total 
public support to children, in form of transfers, tax subsidies to the families, and costs 
for publicly financed services, was highest in Sweden. The full cost of support for a 
child `from the cradle to the A-level' was in both Sweden and Norway 1.3 million 
Crowns, almost twice as much as the Netherlands (0.7 million) or Britain (0.8) 
(Holgersson, 2000: 82) 
Table 3.3 The development of public day care 
Year day family day part-time children % of children 
nurseries care pre-school age 0-6 enrolled in the 
services 
1950 9 700 18 700 879 000 3.2 
1955 10 000 27 800 781 000 4.8 
1960 10 300 3 700 34 800 734 000 6.6 
1965 11 700 13 800 47 000 752 000 9.6 
1970 33 800 36 600 72 000 823 000 17.3 
1975 66 000 49 800 112 000 774 000 29.4 
1980 135 200 90 200 104 700 714 000 46.2 
Sources: Olsson (1990: 173). 
Financial support for fain Wes 
Financial support for families with children was of two main kinds. First, financial 
support which might be regarded as a typical part of society's measures to support 
families with children. Parental allowances, child pensions, and child supplements 
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were among these kinds of benefits which belonging within the social insurance 
framework. The second type of benefits involved different kinds of cash 
compensation, which existed alongside the Social Insurance schemes and entailed 
benefits like child allowance, maintenance advances, housing allowances and 
separation allowance (Lavin, 1985; Westerhäll, 1985). 
Among measures for supporting families, parent's allowances were the main financial 
contribution within the Social Insurance framework. These allowances compensated 
for the loss of income when parents have to stay at home in order to care for their 
children. This compensation constitutes two types of allowance: an allowance directly 
connected to the birth of the child, and an allowance for parents who have to stay at 
home to take care of a sick child. The latter benefit was the same as the earnings- 
related sickness insurance, which in 1986 was 90 per cent of income. The only 
criterion for eligibility was that the parent applying for it should have been registered 
at the Local Social Insurance Office for at least 180 consecutive days immediately 
before the birth of the child. The number of days for which benefits were claimable for 
either of the parents who stayed at home increased several times during the 1970s and 
thel980s (see Olsson, 1993: 170). However, the fact that the size of the allowance was 
related to the income of whichever parent stayed at home disfavoured families with 
bad employment records or in which mothers were students. In these cases, the mother 
was the one who was expected to take care of the child (Westerhäll, 1985). 
During the 1970s, due to the rapid increase of the number of single parents, another 
kind of uniform benefit, called the maintenance advance, was introduced. This benefit 
was paid to children in so-called `incomplete' families. In 1985, the amount, on an 
annual basis, was SEK 8,938 for each child. Other benefits, designed to enable 
financially weak households to reach a better standard of living, came in the term of 
housing allowance. These allowances were of different kinds, but at least two of them 
were important for families with children - the national housing allowances, and the 
combined national-municipal housing allowance. The size of the allowance, 
irrespective of its varieties, was normally decided in proportion to the family's income 
and assets, and also by the number of children and the level of the rent. In 1985, if the 
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basic combined income of both spouses was less than SEK 45,000, the family national 
housing allowance amounted to SEK 3,180 per annum for each child. 6 
Overall, in Swedish family policy, allowances were designed to even out the financial 
imbalances arising between families, mainly those with children and those without, as 
well as those imbalances arising over a lifetime. In 1982, the supportive measures for 
families with children constituted approximately 5 per cent of the gross domestic 
product. As shown in Table 4.5, the day-care services accounted for the largest share 
of the expenses, and the general child allowances constituted the most expensive kind 
of financial support. 
Unemployment insurance 
As a result of the very low unemployment levels after the 1950s, unemployment 
insurance was not an important expenditure item in Sweden, the main part of the 
unemployment budget being spent on manpower policy. Consequently, as Olsson 
(1990) points out, compared to other forms of social insurance in the country, and also 
on an international perspective, the Swedish unemployment insurance system had 
never been fully developed - indeed it clearly remained underdeveloped until the 
1990s. Nevertheless, since the 1950s, unemployment benefits have been generous, 
with almost 25 per cent of expenditure on unemployment being made up of cash 
benefits since the mid-1960s. As shown in figure 3: 3, after the 1960s, the AMS's 
activities grew quickly with expenditure on `mobility allowances, training services, 
educational allowances for retraining, employment creation schemes, regional 
development grants, and occupational rehabilitation schemes' constituting the major 
part of expenditure on unemployment. 
6 For incomes between 45,000 and 67,000, the allowance would be reduced by 15 percent, and for incomes 
above that limit, the allowance would be reduced by 22 percent. The combined national-municipal allowance 
follows the same rules as those governing the assessment of the national housing allowance. 
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Figure 3.3 Expenditure on unemployment, between 1950 and 1980. 
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Compulsory unemployment insurance was for the first time decided by parliament in 
1934 but the system was managed through trade union benefit societies. Consequently, 
a huge number of workers have been covered by the voluntary trade union system. 
While in 1950 only one third of workers were covered by the system, three decades 
later, the percentage increased to more than 80 per cent that shows the trade unions' 
enthusiasm for supporting the system (Ginsburg, 1993). However, the system was 
' 
voluntary and financed by government, trade union, and employer contributions. 
Despite the management of trade unions, Olsson Hort (1995), believes that the 
common eligibility criteria applied by the unemployment funds were tighter and more 
restrictive than the rules for other insurance provision, like sickness insurance. Twelve 
months membership of an unemployment insurance fund, and at least seventy-five 
working days spread over four months during the year prior to unemployment, were 
the primary conditions for an unemployed person to be eligible for these benefits. 
The reimbursement level was low at the beginning of the period. Until 1974, it 
fluctuated at around 50-60 per cent of lost income. Thereafter, the goal was set at 90 
7 In practical terms, sixty regional insurance funds, which were supervised 
by a semi-independent agency called the 
National Social Insurance Board, managed the payment of benefits. 
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per cent of previous earnings, and consequently a great many wage-earners have been 
entitled to maximum daily allowances (This generous level was maintained until mid- 
1993). An improvement occurred in 1988, which lead to the abolition of the five-day 
waiting period. Accordingly, the benefit was available from the first day of 
unemployment and was payable for up to 300 days (450 for those over 54 years of 
age). 
One of the differences between unemployment insurance and other insurance provision 
was that the former had not been fully integrated into the national social security 
system because it was still formally a voluntary insurance organised by unions. For a 
long period of time, insurance covered only a limited number of the unemployed. For 
example, in 1963 only 21 per cent of the unemployed were covered by this form of 
insurance; however, by 1978, more than half were covered, and this figure rose to 
more than two thirds of those unemployed by mid-1980 (Björklund & Holmlund, 
1983: 90ff). Since 1974, insurance schemes have also been introduced for those 
workers who are not members of an unemployment insurance benefit society, or are 
society members, but not entitled to benefits. This programme, administered by the 
National Market Board, generally offered less generous rates (Björklund & Holmlund 
1983). 
Swedish social spending in the mid-1980s 
The expansion of different schemes designed to support families, the sick, the 
unemployed, as well as, the more generous pension system caused a rapid increase in 
social spending. During this period, social spending in Sweden more than doubled. 
While in 1960 `real social expenditure's accounted for 15.9 per cent of GDP, which 
was just 2 per cent above the OECD average in that year, in 1981, the rate was 
increased to 33.5 per cent, which was the highest level of public expenditure on social 
welfare amongst the capitalist states (OECD, 1985). At the beginning of the period, 
spending increases were quite modest, and, as indicated, the growth of welfare 
spending as a proportion of GDP growth in Sweden was a few per cent above the 
OECD average. This limited growth in welfare spending at the beginning of the period 
8 `Real social expenditure' is a figure adjusted for price inflation in each welfare sector. 
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is explained by the prevailing fiscal conservatism, which prevented Social Democratic 
governments from increasing taxes considerably more than other nations. The take off 
came after the 1970s recession, when most capitalist welfare states decreased welfare 
spending to cope with the fiscal crisis caused by the recession, while the Swedish 
government protected and expanded the welfare state through a `progressive 
interpretation of Keynes' (Ginsburg, 1992: 34). In other words, instead of cuts in 
expenditures, the Swedes initiated larger investments in different parts of welfare 
system and introduced further reforms. This progressive policy aimed to increase 
demand and thus stimulate the supply side. 
Table 3.4 The growth of social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
Real social expenditure Real income 
As % real GDP elasticity 
1960 1981 1960-75 1975-81 
FRG 20.4 29.2 1.8 0.6 
Sweden 15.9 33.5 2.0 4.0 
UK 14.8 23.1 1.9 2.5 
US 11.3 20.2 2.3 0.9 
OECD average 
(19 countries) 13.7 24.3 1.7 2.1 
Source: OECD (1985: table 4). 
As a result, in the second half of the 1970s, welfare spending increased four times as 
fast as the economy as a whole and twice as fast as the OECD average. Knowing that 
the Swedish welfare state was largely financed from taxes, it was argued by many 
authors (Myrdal, 1982; Hadenius, 1986; Edlund, 1999) that the burden of public- 
spending expansion was placed on taxpayers. Income and wealth taxes increased 
steeply and progressively and as the Swedish Institute (1988) reported, in the late 
1980s, skilled workers with average wages paid 40 per cent of their income in taxes, 
which was highest rate in the world. By the same token, the employers had to pay 
payroll taxes for social contributions, which in the early 1980s were raised to 43 per 
cent (Swedish Institute, 1988). 
The reliance of welfare spending on tax income makes it more vulnerable. In the 
1980s, when the process of globalisation of the world economy began to accelerate 
(Steinmo, 1994), and the competition between countries to attract mobile capital 
increased (Whalley, 1990), the national states with generous welfare systems came 
under pressure to redesign their tax system 
in a more regressive direction. Thus, the 
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Swedish system was forced to abandon its progressive income tax and relatively high 
rates of corporate taxation. The inevitable consequence of such a process on the 
Swedish economy was tax reform, and accordingly, cuts in public spending in order to 
increase Swedish corporate competitiveness in the international market. 
Conclusion 
For many scholars (Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1992), the 
Swedish welfare state regarded as the zenith of Social Democracy's goals in building a 
society based on principals of universalism and egalitarianism. By having more than 
five decades of virtually uninterrupted rule, the movement had succeeded in 
institutionalising a model of advanced social policy in which benefits and services 
were guaranteed on an optimal level. The system not only aimed to satisfy the basic 
needs of the working class, but also had a unique and expensive costs structure, and 
aimed to achieve a high level of basic standards of social security. In many ways, the 
development of the Swedish welfare system as the model of `social democracy' helped 
to establish the content, values and principles of social democracy itself. Although the 
Swedish welfare state has not been shaped according to a grand Social Democratic 
design, because its evolution was a long-term gradual process, the movement has, from 
the beginning, emphasised that it aimed to achieve its goals by an active social policy. 
In pursuing this goal, the movement has, since the 1930s, followed a relatively 
coherent welfare policy. 
The social insurance system, formed the major part of Swedish welfare expenditure, 
and increased from 7 per cent of GDP in 1965, to over 18 per cent of GDP in 1985. 
The fundamental feature of the system during the `golden age' period was its 
redistributive nature. In comparison with other models that had developed along 
voluntary or market lines, the universal Scandinavian model stressed redistribution 
between social and risk groups, and was also compulsory for everyone. This 
politically-determined insurance system was based on a contract between the state and 
its citizens, and gave the entire population the right to be covered by the collective 
insurance system. As a result of this contract, the system guaranteed the welfare of 
individuals throughout their life cycle. In other words, the insurance system was 
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designed to generate economic security in a variety of life situations. The public 
insurance system was financed largely through proportional contributions and taxes, 
and according to the redistributive aim, the remuneration rules were formed to cover 
everyone on equal terms. This meant that contribution charges were levied on the 
earned income of people actively in work. According to the principle, remuneration 
should be paid in direct relation to the income being lost. 
The dominant trend in the expansion of the Swedish welfare system was that social 
insurance was progressively extended to cover more and more situations for increasing 
numbers of people. Transfers in the form of child-allowances, old-age pensions, and 
similar benefits financed by taxes or corresponding levies, became a more prominent 
element of the social and economic system. As the transfers guaranteed that all social 
groups would have a reasonably high standard of living, their spending power 
increased, and in doing so, consumption dramatically increased in society as a whole. 
By the same token, households' savings decreased. In theory, it was less important to 
save when every. citizen was eligible to at least a public pension, and could count on 
economic support in the case of sickness and unemployment. 
However, this `golden age' did not last. The economic and political conditions on 
which the generous Swedish welfare system was based, began to experience decisive 
changes during the 1980s, and as a result, the stability of the system came into 
question. Low economic growth was the first major difficulty, and the change in 
economic fortunes had a considerable impact on public finances, which clearly 
depended on reasonable economic growth for continued expansion. In following years, 
other changes, both global and national such as currency instability, the increasing 
internationalisation of trade, capital and finances, the enormous expansion of the 
public sector, and structural changes in social and demographic conditions, caused 
structural changes in the economy which would affect the infrastructure of the Swedish 
welfare state. As the architects of the system, with its large public sector, high levels of 
taxation and strong union movement, the Social Democrats were in a position to tackle 
the problems and restore economic stability, as well as to recreate proper conditions 
for economic growth. Therefore, in the next chapter, the focus will be on core 
structural changes which have occurred in the economic, social and demographic 
conditions of Swedish society over the past 15 years. 
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Chapter 4 
Structural changes in economic, political and demographic conditions 
This chapter explores the changes which affected the infrastructure of the Swedish 
welfare state and arguably undermined the social and economic assumptions on which 
much of Swedish social policy was based. In general terms, change can be analysed in 
three key areas; economic, politic and demographic. As the economic changes taking 
place in the past decade have been far-reaching, and had significant impacts on 
established social policy, this chapter is primarily intended as an exploration of the 
broader development of economic policy. While the emergence of unemployment, 
which placed a huge pressure on the public finances, has been regarded as the major 
structural problem, it is also the case that other structural changes in the economic 
sphere, such as liberalisation of the capital market, low levels of economic growth, 
problems with inflation, and changes in social investment and the financing of the 
welfare system, have also had a major impact on the nature and organisation of 
Swedish social policy. 
In discussions about the factors which caused changes in the economic conditions, as 
discussed in chapter 2, two sets of challenges are distinguished; the `exogenous' and 
`endogenous'. Exogenous factors concern the impact of economic globalisation and 
particularly the consequence of `economic openness' on nation states' ability to 
manage their own economies, while endogenous factors imply problems which are 
caused as a result of growing differences between existing social programmes and 
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evolving needs and risks occurring within particular societies (Esping-Andersen, 
1996a). The coincidence of the process of global integration with growing problems 
for welfare states made many believe that the major challenges to the welfare state 
were provoked by exogenous forces. 
This study certainly agrees that these exogenous problems are significant but it places 
most emphasis on endogenous difficulties, partly because pressures arising from 
globalisation are always experienced `locally' and also because of the institutional 
constraints imposed by existing programmes in the face of changing social needs. The 
existing welfare programmes were designed for industrial societies with the industrial 
working class as the dominant social group. While a new social order characterized by 
post industrialism with comprehensive changes in occupations, social classes and the 
life cycle, has caused large structural changes in advanced societies, the welfare states 
have been slow in adapting to these challenges. A great decrease in the numbers of the 
industrial working class in favour of growing employment in the service sector, 
changes in family structure with the rise of the two earner, single-person, and single 
parent households, a great increase in female employment, population ageing, and a 
decreasing fertility level, are all supposed to be causing a more strategic and 
fundamental kinds of difficulties for the existing welfare state. 
Despite the argument of this thesis, which considers the endogenous problems as the 
most crucial to the crisis of the welfare states, the first part of this chapter will examine 
the economic crisis of the 1990s, which involves both the problems that are mainly 
related to the economic policies initiated by the national governments, and those 
caused by global integration. Issues such as inflation, productivity growth in 
manufacturing and private services, macro economic performances trends in GDP, and 
changes in investment and employment are among, factors which cannot simply be 
related to the process of globalisation, but can also appear as endogenous changes. The 
chapter also discusses how the Social Democrats, as the most traditional advocates of 
generous welfare entitlements, have adopted a `flexible' approach to the relatively 
extensive retrenchments intended to readjust the public sector and social services to the 
new economic realities. The changes in the Social Democratic Party were partly a 
result of the changing political climate in Sweden, which during the 1980s was 
affected by widespread neo-liberal winds. The second part of the chapter explores 
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changes in political stability in Sweden which provided a historic opportunity for the 
system. The main focus is on the consensual political culture which prevented 
extensive changes. 
The third part of the chapter is devoted to an exploration of the demographic changes 
in Sweden, and their impact on both economy and welfare expenditure. A growing 
concern has been expressed about demographic changes. Falling patterns of fertility, 
aging of the population, and gains and losses through migration are factors which, in 
recent decades, have led to a growing concern about the future viability of the existing 
welfare commitments in Sweden, as in many other western-industrialised nations. The 
chief issues for the current Swedish debate on demographic changes are the falling 
fertility rate and the increase in the numbers of very elderly people. Despite the 
anxieties raised by demographic changes, they appear to have had minor immediate 
impacts on the emergence of the economic crisis of the 1990s, it nevertheless seem to 
have undermined the conditions for economic growth. As to the future, social and 
demographic challenges can be expected to have a crucial impact on both economic 
development and welfare expenditure. 
Swedish economic development: an overview 
The economic crisis of the early 1990s was the second major crisis for the Swedish 
welfare system. The first one occurred in the 1970s after the oil crisis, but at that time, 
as has been discussed in chapter four, although key economic indicators suggested that 
the performance of the Swedish economy was exceptionally dismal (Erixon, 1984), the 
Social Democrats kept to traditional Keynesian policies and did not renege on their 
commitment to full employment and a large public sector providing social services. In 
the second economic crisis, the Social Democrats abandoned Keynesian policy at an 
early stage and announced a willingness to contemplate structural changes in the 
economy. Although, at the most critical period of the economic crisis, the Party was 
out of office and the bourgeois coalition in government, the Social Democrats 
supported most of the attempts initiated to decrease government expenditure 
considerably. The argument in this chapter is that when the economic crisis began to 
affect the foundations of the Swedish economy, the Social Democrats, as the most 
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traditional defenders of the universalist and generous welfare state, declared their 
intention and willingness to support efforts which could restore economic stability. In 
other words, during the 1990s the Social Democrats' major goal was, first and 
foremost, to ensure the survival of the nation state as a whole, and not the retention of 
high levels of welfare provision at any price. In the short term this strategy led to far- 
reaching retrenchments in welfare expenditure, but in the longer term, it was felt that 
the measures taken by the Social Democrats had the character of readjustments in 
social policy arrangements in order to maintain the system rather than to change its 
entire `raison d'titre'. The underlying assumption seems to have been that only a strong 
nation state with sustainable economic growth could guarantee a generous welfare 
system. 
In the early 1990s several major changes in the Swedish economy, such as falls in 
gross domestic product and the dramatic rise in unemployment, caused an 
unprecedented economic crisis in the Swedish economy and challenged the stability of 
the Swedish welfare system. For the first time since the 1930s, when the process of 
modern welfare state formation in Sweden began, a large-scale economic crisis 
developed in the country. The crisis created severe structural problems, and led to the 
questioning of existing economic policies and the egalitarian motives, which 
underpinned them. A key aspect which dominated the debates was the public budget 
and the relation between the welfare state and economic growth. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, when the drop in GDP was clearly sharp and deep, economic recovery was 
closely linked to cutbacks in public expenditure (Agell, 1996; Freeman et al., 1995). In 
other words, changes in macro-economic conditions were understood to be one of the 
main factors which modified preconditions for social policy. 
Although the economic crisis was limited to the period between 1991 and 1993, and 
started with a banking crisis, this chapter begins with a discussion of changes 
in 
financial policy, which were initiated by the deregulation of capital market in the mid- 
1980s (Svensson, 1996: 35). An examination of the state of economic growth in this 
period, together with a consideration of the 
impacts of negative growth on the 
economy is followed by a discussion which 
focuses on changes in investment and 
employment. Implications for the 
financing of the welfare policy through a progressive 
tax system will then be considered. Briefly, key 
factors which caused the economic 
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crisis in Sweden included: the crisis of the banking system, the rapid re-emergence of a 
budget deficit, and a steep rise in unemployment. The rise in unemployment was 
foremostly due to an adaptive economic strategy taken by the Swedish government in 
mid-1980s. By liberalising the capital market, the Social Democratic government 
aimed to adapt the open Swedish economy to the new global economic order. Another 
motive for liberalisation of capital market was the Swedish political establishment's 
orientation towards the EU, where currency regulations were prohibited after 1990 
(Wihlborg, 1993: 274). This initiative provided a condition in which the long-term 
existing balance in the Swedish market, provided by the peaceful industrial relations 
structure, was disrupted. In the new area of the speculative economy, with weakening 
cooperation between the labour market partners, wages and prices rose unprecedently 
so that, by the end of 1980s, Swedish companies' competitiveness had declined 
considerably (Benner, 1997). As a result, the demand for Swedish products and 
services decreased. To cope with the higher costs caused by high wage rates 
redundancies were thought to be the only effective measure. The high level of deficit 
caused by the rise in expenditure, due to growing private sector unemployment, also 
forced the government to cut spending in public sector by further redundancies. 
Savings in both private and public sector changed the employment figures 
dramatically. These issues and other aspects of the argument will be discussed latter in 
this chapter but first it will be focused on the financial aspect. 
Liberalisation of the capital market: the beginning of the crisis 
Despite the problems with which the Swedish welfare system was confronted in the 
second half of the 1970s and early 1980s, many analysts (Jonung, 1999; Stephens, 
1996) believe that the major crisis actually began in the mid-1980s, when the Social 
Democratic government implemented some structural reforms that created a situation 
in which the economy became overheated. Among these reforms was the liberalisation 
of capital markets and the deregulation of credit markets before the tax incentives, 
which encouraged loan-financed consumption and speculative investment, were 
removed (Kautto, 2000: 17; OECD, 1994: 99). Since the mid-1980s and through the 
1990s, several large Swedish owned companies moved their home-bases abroad and 
more than 40 Swedish companies have been purchased by foreign investors 
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(Braunerhlelm et al., 2001). Through the 1990s, the number of employees in the 
Swedish owned groups abroad increased considerably. Central and East Europe were 
the places which had the sharpest increase. Between 1990 and 1997 the number of 
employees increased from 700 to 46 800 (ITPS, 2001). In 1997, the number of 
employees abroad in Swedish owned companies amounted to 627 000 which was 48 
per cent of the total number of employees. In 1987, the corresponding figure was 39 
per cent (ITPS, 2001). The figures show clearly that, as a result of deregulations in of 
the credit market Swedish firms moved grater part of their production, particularly in 
manufacturing sector, to low-wage countries. 
Tax reform was implemented later, when it was long overdue, the consequence being 
an increase in the saving ratio among households and a subsequent rapid deterioration 
in the budget surplus, which was itself mainly the result of the boom in the overheated 
economy, rather than a product of continued growth. While in 1990 the budget balance 
had a surplus of 4.2 per cent of GDP, three years later, in 1993, it had changed to a 
deficit of 12.3 per cent (OECD, 1995). At the time, when the Swedish economy moved 
into recession, the Swedish Crowns also encountered downward speculative pressure. 
The Swedish monetary authority's key measure - the raising of interest rate to an 
historic 500 per cent in an effort to stem speculation - failed and it found that it had to 
abandon the `strong currency' policy founded on a fixed exchange rate, and allow the 
Crowns to float (OECD, 1994: 99). The banking crisis, however, had a decisive impact 
on public finances because the fiscal impact of supporting the banking sector 
amounted to 3 V2 per cent of GDP in 1993 (OECD, 1995). Reasserting control over 
public finances became the main priority of economic policy in the early-to-mid 
1990s. 
In 1994, despite the withdrawal of support from the banking system, which was badly 
affected by the crisis of 1992, the high level of deficit continued, however, after the 
implementation of corrective measures in mid-1995, savings rose to 7 per cent of 
GDP, and growth in exports allowed for a measure of fiscal consolidation and thus 
confidence in the economy to be re-established. The savings plan was a part of the first 
Swedish convergence programme, which was presented to the European Union in June 
1995 and in which the elimination of the deficit by 1998 was described as the key 
strategic aim of fiscal policy (OECD, 1997: 53-55). This plan to bring the budget 
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deficit down effectively succeeded. In other words, membership in the EU and the 
necessity of performing according to the convergence programme has encouraged the 
Swedish government to adopt certain clear economic objectives which have had the 
additional benefit of eliminating uncertainties in decision making. 
The emergence of unemployment in the early 1990s 
The overheated economy caused by capital market liberalisation with rapid increases 
in wages and prices made the Swedish economy particularly vulnerable. As a result of 
an unsustainable inflation rise, the economic growth of the Swedish economy lagged 
behind other industrial countries, particularly those in the Far East, which were 
offering cheap goods to the market which made Swedish wages unsustainable. The 
malady caused by a sudden liberalisation of the capital market led to the emergence of 
a new liberal hegemony in Sweden in which, at the end of the 1980s, market forces 
demanded privatisation and greater competition (Gould, 2001). The market and 
bourgeois parties were determined to change the situation in the Swedish labour 
market, which by the end of the 1980s, was experiencing an extremely low level of 
unemployment because the expansive economic policy of the second half of the 
decade had created strong employment growth and - ironically - labour shortages. In 
1989, more than 60 per cent of Swedish firms in the manufacturing industry had a 
shortage of skilled workers (Konjunktur Barometer, 1990). In the same year, Sweden 
recorded one of the lowest rates of unemployment in the world (1.4 per cent), the tight 
labour market and the momentum in economic growth seeing wages increasing 
strongly - and this in contrast to other OECD countries, 
for whom high unemployment 
rates kept wages depressed. As a consequence of the Social Democratic government's 
poor management in handling the economy and widening the gap between the labour 
market partners in the second half of the 1980s, it became more difficult to keep the 
balance between economic growth, inflation, and public spending. With rapid increase 
in public spending, then, many economists such as Södersten (1992), Eklund (1993), 
Lindbeck (1997) and Gould (2001: 56), who for a while had criticised the public sector 
for being inefficient and having serious structural weaknesses, advocated structural 
changes. 
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In 1991, the new right-wing coalition government conceived its major task to be the 
depression of wages and price inflation, and thus the cooling down of the overheated 
economy. One major measure in this direction was to accelerate structural economic 
changes which were linked to the growing transnationalisation of key business sectors, 
changing patterns of corporate investment, and the heightened export dependency of 
Swedish producers (Pontusson, 1992). For the first time since World War II, a Swedish 
government ignored the commitment to full employment and let the Swedish labour 
market embrace greater efficiency in the utilisation of labour and capital. In an 
environment of high wage and price inflation, companies tended to intensify the 
process of substitution of capital for labour. This trend, which meant a parallel increase 
in Swedish market shares abroad and foreign producers' penetration of the Swedish 
domestic market, had a strong impact on the traditional make-up of Sweden's labour- 
market. Most significantly, the influence of both national government and trade unions 
on companies' labour policies decreased. One result of this was that Swedish 
productivity levels in terms of output per man-hour, which were weak in the two 
decades up to 1990, improved (OECD, 1999: 33). 
Because of the structural changes in the early 1990s, an upward trend in productivity 
was registered, which was even higher than the post-devaluation period (1981-84) 
productivity surge (Figure 4.1). In the period of overheating (1985-90), the average 
rate of productivity growth decreased in both manufacturing (1.7 per cent) and the 
service sector (0.5 per cent). The period of depreciation and restructuring (1991-1997) 
led to an increase in the average rate of productivity growth in manufacturing to 5 per 
cent, with even the service sector, despite the weak domestic market, showing a 1.8 per 
cent increase. 
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Figure 4.1 Productivity growth in manufacturing and private services 
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The consequence of these changes was an extreme rise in open unemployment, 
reaching a post-war peak of 8 per cent in 1993. Moreover, a further 6 per cent of the 
labour force was enrolled on various labour market programmes (Olsson-Hort, 
1995: 6). Between 1992 and 1995 more than 300,000 jobs, one tenth of all job 
opportunities in Sweden, disappeared. The job losses had not only occurred in the 
private sector, but because of retrenchment in the public sector, a large number of 
people have also lost their jobs. 
Redundancies in public sector: exacerbating unemployment 
Summarizing the discussion so far, it can be argued that, while the Social Democratic 
government's response to economic globalisation by liberalising the financial market 
resulted in a failure in the sense that an uncontrolled speculative economy replaced a 
highly organised labour market, with consequent high unemployment in the private 
sector, the bourgeois coalition adopted a policy which openly advocated 
comprehensive redundancies in public sector. The former trade union chairman, Stig 
Malm (interview), believed that the bourgeois coalition was handed `golden 
opportunity' to implement its old desire to downsize the public sector. Here, as a result 
of the considerable rise in unemployment in the private sector, the government faced 
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huge budgetary constraints on public sector finance. As low inflation became the 
major goal, and budgetary consolidation was initiated, cuts in the public sector became 
inevitable with retrenchments starting in central state employment and proceeding into 
municipal employment. 
Lundborg (2000) divides this labour market development into three phases. In each 
phase, different sectors of the economy were targeted. In the first phase, which he calls 
the `international phase' (1990-93), unemployment grew in the export sector. While 
the overheated economy in Sweden led to increases in wage-levels, and thereby an 
expenditure crisis, demand in international markets decreased. The strong Crowns had 
also worsened the conditions of Swedish firms competing in the international market. 
In the second phase, starting in 1992, the economic crisis was caused by the high 
interest rate. High inflation, combined with a fixed currency exchange rate policy, led 
to high interest rates, which in turn caused a fall in consumption. The consequence of 
falling demand was unemployment in the domestic private sector, mainly in trade, 
transport, construction and manufacturing industries. In the third phase (1993-97), 
which predominantly occurred during a period of Social Democratic rule, the public 
sector was targeted. During this period, the employment rate in the public sector 
decreased by 20 per cent. These redundancies in the public sector have to be seen as a 
product of the economic crisis of the early 1990s, and the resulting large-scale fiscal 
deficit. 
Table 4.1 Employment trends in Sweden, 1990 and 1998, employed persons 
1990 1998 1990-98 Change % 
Private sector employment 2 816 000 2 652 000 - 164 000 - 5,8 
Public sector employment 1 652 000 1 308 000 - 344 000 - 20,8 
Of which State employment 394 000 220 000 - 174 000 - 44,2 
Of which municipal employment 1 258 000 1 089 000 - 169 000 - 13,4 
Total employment 4 468 000 3 960 000 - 508 000 - 11,4 
Source: Labour Statistics (1997); Kautto (2000, p. 28). 
By 1993, however, the unemployment rate began to level off although during the 
second wave (1993-97) the level of unemployment was constant and the employment 
crisis remained a major challenge despite the recovery in the export sector. During the 
1990s, the rate of employment decreased from 83.1 per cent in 1990 to 74.2 in 2000 
(Kommunaktuellt, 2001) with high levels of unemployment continuing, and peaking at 
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8 per cent in 1998. Since that time a new wave has started in which the unemployment 
rate has decreased quite rapidly. 
The turning-point in employment 
Towards the end of 1993 business fixed investment, which had declined for three 
consecutive years, started to rise. Elements of the service sector such as distribution, 
and financial and business services raised the most, and, until the end of the 1990s, had 
an expansion rate of 40 per cent. Manufacturing investment also showed a rise, though 
not of the same magnitude. Conversely, housing investment stagnated during the 
1990s and only started to improve during the last years of the period, when prices 
started to rise (OECD, 1999: 25). The increase in business fixed investment has to be 
seen in relation to the expansion of the domestic market, which in turn has increased 
the rate of employment, mainly in the private sector. Public investment, however, 
traditionally the major source for increasing employment at local level, declined 
considerably during the 1990s. The downsizing of the local government sector 
continued in the second half of the 1990s, with public investment falling by more than 
20 per cent between 1995-97. However, from 1998 transfers from central government 
to local government to maintain the provision of services and employment have 
increased, with almost half of the increase in local revenues over the second half of the 
1996-2000 period coming from these transfers. This policy has strengthened local 
government budgets considerably with the result that demand on both consumption 
and investment has increased (OECD, 1999: 27-28; Lindberg, 2001). 
The improvement of labour-market outcomes in 1998 has to be regarded as a result of 
increased demand, both in private and public investment as well as a result of 
increased consumption. After the start of the Swedish economic crisis in the early 
1990s up to 1997, the broad labour market aggregates remained basically unchanged. 
Since mid-1997, the stronger trend in labour demand has lead to a considerable 
decrease in unemployment. In 1998, the unemployment rate fell from 8.0 to 6.5 
percent, and in 1999 to 5.5 per cent. In 2000, the Social Democratic government 
almost achieved its goal of reducing the unemployment to 4 per cent. 
Besides 
continued economic growth, in the 1998 bargaining around wage growth shifted 
down 
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and was projected to lead to aggregate wage increases of around 3'/2 per cent a year up 
to 2000. The limited wage increase during the 1990s, including the last years of the 
period with growing incomes for the companies, played a significant role for the 
improvement of labour-market outcomes (OECD, 1999: 28). While the structure 
industrial relations was certainly weakened, the SAF no longer being involved in 
central negotiations with the LO, as Meidner (interview) has pointed, the unions have 
concerned to restore economic stability and placed this priority above wage growth. 
Despite these achievements, the drop in the Swedish employment level, which mainly 
occurred between 1991 and 1993, had not been fully recovered by the end of the 
1990s. On the contrary, the process of the downward trend has continued, though at a 
slower rate. By 1998, the employment rate in Sweden was lower than it had been in 
1993. 
Figure 4.2 Employment rates in Finland and Sweden 1990-97, percent. 
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As a way of concluding, one can say that although the unemployment crisis in Sweden 
started in the export sector and continued in the domestic private sector, its major 
effects were left in the public sector. The high level of redundancy in the public sector, 
which was started by the right-wing government but accelerated during the Social 
Democratic governments, showed that the traditional advocates of `the strong state' 
found it difficult to defend the idea of large-scale welfare state employment as a 
measure to provide welfare services and increase employment overall. The 
redundancies attracted widespread criticism, mainly from union leaders (Malm, 
interview; Jönsson, interview) and scholars (Korpi, 1992), who described them as 
inappropriate because salaries were replaced by unemployment benefits, which were 
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also financed by the state. Since 1998, though, because of improvements in public 
finances, the employment rate in the public sector has steadily increased. 
Figure 4.3 Unemployment rate, 1983-2001, percent. 
9 
JOThe 
rate of unemployment 
C6 
4 
a3 
2 
1 
0 
Cbl oý`ý ono 0ý1 0ýý ono 00 00ý ooh, oo5 ex 
Co 
ooooýo 001 00ý o00 ýooo ýooý 
Year 
Source: OECD 1999: 22. 
It is too soon to say whether job growth in Sweden will once again be a product of the 
expansion of public services or if the trend is a temporary measure to ensure a balance 
in the provision of public services. One can conclude from the economic policy of the 
Social Democratic government that, after the take-over of 1994, the Party was 
determined to recover economic stability at any price. A 20 per cent decrease of the 
employment rate in the public sector during a period of Social Democratic rule shows 
that the Party still sees itself as a `national' party with effective management of the 
state's affairs as its first priority. Accordingly, if economic necessities dictate, the 
Social Democrats can be expected to adopt severe retrenchment measures in the public 
sector. 
Rapid economic recovery 
The great underlying strength of the Swedish economy meant that, despite a large 
budget deficit and extremely high expenditure caused by the high unemployment rate, 
relatively minor cuts in welfare spending were sufficient to prevent any financial 
collapse (Esping- Andersen, 2001). According to the OECD (1999: 21), by the end of 
the 1990s, most Swedish economic indicators pointed to a performance above the 
historical average. The objective of bringing the projected deficit for 1998 to below 1 
141 
per cent of GDP was not only achieved, but the budget also showed a surplus of above 
2 per cent. Economic growth, which had been either low or negative in the recession of 
1991-93, as shown in figure 4: 4, had increased, and with the exception of a rebound in 
1996, the momentum in growth has been maintained. In 1998 the Swedish growth rate 
stood at nearly 3 per cent. 
4.4 Output and income growth between 1983 and 2000 
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Source: OECD 1999: P. 22 
Another indicator of improvement in the economy was the inflation rate. Whereas 
during the 1980s inflation was high, the annual average between 1983-91 being around 
8 per cent, the rate decreased during the mid-to-late 1990s to a figure of around 3 per 
cent. The goal set by the Bank of Sweden of a2 per cent inflation rate (plus or minus 1 
per cent) has been allieved and maintained. During 1997 the rate was down to 0.9 per 
cent and fell even lower during 1998. In 1999 it hit on 0.3 per cent. This has lead to 
low market interest rates, on both long- and short-term loans. The Swedish Crown's 
rapid appreciation from late 1995, in combination with the low interest rates, slowed 
consumer price inflation substantially (OECD, 1999: 28). 
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Figure 4.5 Price inflation, between 1983-2000 
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Source: OECD 1999: p. 22 and SCB 2001. 
Another positive indicator relates to households' disposable income and consumption 
growth. At the beginning of the 1990s, the economic crisis had a negative impact on 
household purchasing power. Household disposable incomes, which were affected by 
the curtailment of transfer programmes, decreased during the 1990s. Even between 
1995 and 1997, disposable incomes were reduced on average by 1 per cent a year. 
However, in the last years of the 1990s, by expanding employment and high real-wage 
growth, income growth turned positive and, as a result, private consumption increased 
to 2 -to-3 per cent per year. In addition, Sweden's substantial financial savings and the 
rise in the share of financial assets in total wealth from below 20 per cent in 1991 to 
above 40 per cent in 1997 has caused a considerable rise in households net wealth, and 
this has strengthened consumption growth. In contrast with the 1980s, increase in 
consumption was not related to the banks' borrowing strategy or an accelerating wage 
increase, but to a real growth in the economy, therefore it did not exacerbate the 
balance of payments situation. Throughout the 1990s, the LO was particularly careful 
in negotiations to set a wage-level sufficiently high to provide wage increases and 
equality, but not so high as to endanger full employment (Meidner, interview). 
Impact on macroeconomic performance: towards market-friendly policies 
Having jeopardised the economic stability of the 1980s by poor management, the 
political elite, especially the Social Democrats were determined to re-establish order in 
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the Swedish economy. Since the liberalisation of financial markets had been 
accomplished and thus the national economy partly adapted to the new global 
economy, the Swedish economy was in a position to initiate two further measures. 
First, to enable firms to adapt their strategies and production to the demands of new 
global economy in order to ensure international competitiveness and second, to adapt 
the welfare system to the new order. The discussion about structural changes in the 
economic system in this chapter focuses on these two issues. 
With a steady decline in public sector employment and changing attitudes regarding 
job growth, which almost entirely came to focus on generating new jobs in the private 
sector, the 1990s came to represent market-driven strategies in the Swedish labour 
market. While the main sources of growth in the Swedish economy were exports and 
the associated build-up in manufacturing capacity, the consequence of this strategy 
was to support the export industry by including measures which favoured the export 
sector. A favourable exchange rate position, combined with the development of 
aggressive policies on the part of the employers association, which aimed at containing 
wages, were behind the export growth. Exports increased from 28 per cent of GDP in 
1990 to 46 per cent in 1998. On the other hand, imports also increased from 27 to 38 
per cent relative to GDP (OECD, 1999: 28-29). In addition to these changes, it should 
be mentioned that during the 1990s, certain changes in Swedish trade patterns have 
been particularly marked. First, an increase in Swedish market shares abroad, as well 
as foreign producers' penetration of the Swedish market, has occurred. Second, 
Swedish companies have expanded their exports to new markets. While the increase of 
exports to traditional markets in the European Union, the European Free Trade Area, 
and the United States, was 80 per cent from 1991 to 1998, exports to other OECD 
countries and countries outside the OECD increased by 110 and 140 per cent 
respectively (OECD, 1999: 29). 
The process implies that Sweden has increasingly deserted protectionist measures and 
has become fully integrated into the global economy. For the Swedish economy, which 
has always been strongly export-oriented, financial openness seems to have been an 
inevitable development even though it might restrict the state's capacity to manage its 
own political economy in the longer term. In this regard, it has to be emphasised that 
the critique against the Social Democratic government's policy regarding financial 
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liberalisation of mid-1980s should not be understood as a critique against the policy 
but the way it was implemented. By a gradual liberalisation the state and the 
companies as well as trade unions could have managed the process more effectively 
and prevented some of negative impacts it caused to the Swedish economy and labour 
market. 
In 1998, however, export growth slowed because of the economic crisis in Southeast- 
Asia and Russia, but domestic demand, which had stagnated since the early 1990s, 
sustained the upturn. Two factors explain these demand shifts: the appreciation of 
exchange rates and the decline of real interest rates which started to occur in 1996. 
Since then, the credibility of fiscal policy has improved, and as a result, the real 
exchange rate has again depreciated, and the real interest rate has continued to fall 
(OECD, 1999: 23). Export growth, combined with expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy, caused an accelerating trend in GDP after 1994 which peaked at 2.9 per cent in 
1.998. Despite this. positive change, the development of the supply potential in the 
Swedish economy has been exceeded by many other industrial nations. Since 1970, 
GDP in the fifteen European countries which now constitute the EU has grown by 90 
per cent, and for OECD countries in general, by 110 per cent; whereas in the same 
period, GDP increase in Sweden was 60 per cent. By the same token, Swedish GDP 
per capita, measured in purchasing power parities, which was 25 per cent above the 
EU average, has fallen to the average (OECD, 1999: 34-35). 
Figure 4.6 Macroeconomic performance, growth in GDP 1980-2000 
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The main reason for the relative decline in the Swedish economic performance seems 
to be the fact that other industrial nations, which during the inter-war and immediate 
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post-war periods were not as successful as Sweden, have caught up with Sweden over 
the past three decades. Concerning the decline of GDP per capita, three factors have 
affected this rate: the growth of the rate of the working-age population relative to the 
total; the relative decrease in the employment rate, and the weaker labour productivity 
growth in the two decades up to 1990. However, on the latter indicator, the trend 
reversed during the 1990s, as productivity levels in the Swedish labour market 
increasing throughout the decade (OECD, 1999: 33). 
Despite this recent increase in Swedish labour market productivity, there is still doubt 
about its durability and permanence. Knowing that the main source of labour 
productivity growth in Sweden was either a higher input per employee, one-off 
rationalisation efforts during the 1990s, or a post-devaluation surge, doubt about the 
efficiency gains in the utilisation of labour and capital remain. The tendency of 
Swedish multinational enterprises to relocate outside Sweden can partly be explained 
by fears about efficiency problems in the Swedish labour market. During the 1980s 
employment in Swedish outlets of the Swedish multinational enterprises fell by more 
than 100,000, whereas in their foreign affiliates it increased by close to 200,000 
(OECD, 1999: 40). By the same token, the share of Swedish multinational production 
abroad increased from 35 per cent in 1978 to 55 per cent in 1994 whereas production 
in Sweden decreased by almost the same percentage. In the first half of the 1990s, 
however, the better climate for enterprises in Sweden has arrested the strong trend 
towards weakness in Swedish production, while increases in production and 
employment-taking place abroad have slowed down. 
Figure 4.7 GDP growth and GDP per capita. GDP volume index 1970 = 100 
220 
200 
0 
180 
II 
160 
140 
W. W 
120 
100 - 
.. 
" 
. 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Source: OECD (1999, p. 35). 
OECD 
-- EU15 
Sweden 
146 
A further major change has been the increase in domestic production for export. 
Between 1990 and 1994, domestic production for export increased by almost 20 per 
cent, which in 1994, constituted almost one third of the total production of Swedish 
multinational enterprises. Domestic production for the domestic market persistently 
decreased, from 40 per cent in 1970 to only 10 per cent of total production in 1994. 
The fastest decrease happened between 1990 and 1994 when production for the 
domestic market decreased almost by 50 per cent (OECD, 199: 40). 
Figure 4.8 The distribution of Swedish multinational enterprises' sales in 
Sweden and abroad 
© Production in Sweden for sales i Sweden   Exports from Sweden 0 Foreign prduction 
100% 
90 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
1970 1974 1978 1986 1990 1994 
Source: OECD (1999, p. 40). 
Changes in foreign direct investment flows are another major factor which has had a 
significant impact on the Swedish economy. In the 1980s, mainly after the 
deregulation of the financial market in 1985, the net outward flow of direct investment 
was far higher than the stock of inward investment. Since 1991, however, the pattern 
has changed in two ways. First, throughout the 1990s there has been a balance in direct 
investment flow, and second, flows in both directions have multiplied. This suggests 
that the immediate threat against Sweden as a location for business and industry has 
decreased, but on the other hand, the establishment of a new industrial order in terms 
of production and industries can be perceived. While heavy industries like steel, pulp, 
and paper are concentrated in Sweden, the Swedish multinational enterprises abroad 
have concentrated on knowledge-based industries. It has to be said that the R&D 
intensity of Swedish units is still high, but what has happened is that the share of R&D 
undertaken in foreign affiliates has increased from below 15 per cent in the mid-1980s 
to 25 per cent in the mid-1990s. Foreign enterprises meanwhile, have increased their 
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R&D investment more than Swedish-owned enterprises (Moden, 1998; NUTEK, 
1999). 
Source: OECD (1999, p. 41). 
On the whole, OECD economists believe that `the larger international enterprises 
operate in a relatively favourable environment, but the economy still faces a major 
problem with respect to the service sector, and the development of small and medium- 
sized industries from domestic resources. ' They also mention some other problems in 
the Swedish economy such as `restrictive labour-market regulations, a complex and 
discriminatory tax code and high barriers to entry in areas where the public sector is 
still the dominant purchaser'(1999: 43). 
Consequently, it can be argued that the impact of globalisation lessened during the 
mid-to-late 1990s. While initially the different aspects of globalisation had certain 
impacts on welfare states these pressures eased during the 1990s and, as a 
consequence, it became possible to make adjustments to welfare policies which helped 
to retain major elements of the Swedish welfare system. 
The orientation of economic policy in the 1990s heralded an end to the Social 
Democrats' traditional strategy, which used devaluations and an implicit income 
policy to improve the terms of competitiveness of Swedish industry. That policy failed 
to take Sweden out of its fiscal, profitability, and industrial crises without 
compromising the two major principles of full employment and a universal welfare 
state. According to Ryner (1994: 277), `the 
devaluation was to facilitate a reduction of 
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the public and the external deficit, without leading to an increase in unemployment and 
cutbacks in social programmes. ' After 1991, though, the bourgeois coalition 
government started a process of changes in which the full-employment commitment 
was abandoned and welfare entitlements were cut back. Even the Social Democrats 
realised that, while the main sources of growth in Swedish economy are exports and 
the associated build-up in manufacturing capacity, support for the export industry has 
to be the major economic priority. 
As is evident from this section, the aim of the economic policy was to leave the 
structural revitalization of the Swedish industry entirely to market forces. In the 
process of the internationalisation of production in Swedish industry, the realm of the 
market consequently increased considerably, with firms being allowed to lead the shift 
to a new set of production priorities. Moreover, the shift to a new regime of 
accumulation and globalisation of finance has become stronger, and as a result, the 
Social Democratic government had limited possibilities to exercise extended controls 
on market forces, especially on globalising corporations. An era of deregulation, 
cutbacks in social expenditure and services, and decentralisation of wage 
determination has developed, in which the Social Democrats, in a defensive position, 
were forced to retreat from some elements of their traditional policy. In other words, 
globalisation did matter, but mainly as a `legacy' of the mid-1980s and early 1990s. As 
argued here, the core elements of the welfare system continued even though the 
pressure on the government to reduce the costs of the public sector increased 
considerably. The next section will focus on this issue. 
Financing the Welfare system 
The comprehensiveness and generosity of the Swedish universal welfare model has 
required a high tax level to finance government transfers and public consumption. The 
government's involvement in providing a variety of services and in the provision of 
different kind of social insurances has strengthened the state and the public sector's 
position enormously. Government involvement in the economy is not only extensive 
but is also based on a great range of economic activities within the government sphere, 
which is uncommon in most other countries (OECD, 1997: 66). To finance different 
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kinds of services in the areas of child, family and elderly care, social assistance, 
education, housing, health care, and the provision of social insurance via transfers to 
the retired, and compensation for short-term income loss, the budget and fiscal policy 
have had a more prominent role than elsewhere. In addition, knowing that in the 
universal welfare model social insurances and services have a strong redistributive 
purpose, the importance of a progressive income tax structure as the main source for 
providing for the expenditure of the system is clear. 
However, the severe economic imbalance of the 1990s put this model of universal 
welfare under intense pressure, mainly because the generous and heavily redistributive 
system had a negative impact on the economy's growth rate, as well as incentive 
effects on the labour market and saving and investment behaviour. In the coming 
pages, government outlays for public expenditure and the exceeding liabilities of the 
sector will be discussed. For this reason, the focus will mainly be on the structure of 
public finances and social expenditure, and the economic impact of the tax and transfer 
system. 
When the Swedish social insurance system was in place, by the beginning of the 
1960s, the share of public expenditures relative to GDP was almost 30 per cent. The 
rate was a few per cent above the OECD average but it has increased rapidly and 
steadily since that time, reaching nearly 65 per cent in 1982 - almost 25 percentage 
points above the OECD average and 15 per cent above the average of OECD countries 
in Europe (OECD, 1999: 100). As a result of the economic cycle in the mid-1980s, 
social expenditure experienced a downturn, but in the late 1980s, as a consequence of a 
fast growing economy which led to strong inflows of tax revenues, public expenditure 
rose strongly again. Despite the economic crisis in the early 1990s and weakened tax 
revenues, the upturn in social spending has continued at above 70 per cent of GDP. 
This time, the increase was not because of the generosity of the system but as a 
consequence of the steep rise in unemployment. As a result of growing unemployment, 
tax revenue decreased, and consequently, the gap between revenues and social 
expenditure increased. It was this decrease that led to the enormous budget deficit of 
more than 12 per cent of GDP in 1993 (OECD, 1997: 53). 
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To get public finances under control, the government had to tighten the transfer 
schemes. Since 1993 public spending had decreased steadily and by 1998, the rate was 
down to 60 per cent of GDP. By the same token, since 1994, the tax level has been 
increased by around 6 per cent since it was originally cut by the right-wing 
government in the early 1990s. 
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It is worth noting that major savings were achieved by the Social Democratic 
government, which took office in 1994. While the bourgeois government made some 
limited savings during 1992 and 1993, the Social Democrats implemented a 
comprehensive consolidation programme which included both tax increases and 
expenditure cuts. Savings made by the Social Democratic governments amounted to 85 
per cent of the total savings during the 1990s. According to Prime Minister Person 
(2000), two thirds of the savings were introduced during the first year of the Social 
Democratic government's return to power. Arguably, as Garrett (1993,1998) suggests, 
when governments are in a strong position and believe that unpopular decisions will 
not cause major electoral consequences, they might pursue unpopular politics. After 
the victory in the election of 1994, the Swedish Social Democrats possessed the 
mandate, both from a majority of the voters and the dominating social movements such 
as the unions, that if necessary they should adopt some unpopular decisions in favour 
of the state's economic well-being. The Social Democrats, then, initiated some 
retrenchments, which were meant to retain the welfare state rather than destroy it. On 
the contrary, during the period 1991-94, when there was a call for a system shift and 
the economic crisis provided the appropriate conditions for such a shift, the bourgeois 
coalition government was divided on many issues, and were therefore unable to 
achieve essential reforms in the system (Gould, 2001). 
Table 4.2 Timing and impact of savings decisions in Sweden 1994-98 
Saving decisions Billion SEK saved 
Saving decisions prior to 1994 19.0 
Savings decided in November 1994 42.5 
Budget measures 1995 39.7 
Spring measures 1995 13.0 
Spring measures 1996 26.0 
Negative effect from decreases in incomes -14.7 
Total 125.5 
Source: Swedish Ministry of Finance 1999, in Kautto (2000: 43) 
Consequently, the fiscal balance was improved from -10.3 per cent in 1994 to +2.4 per 
cent in 1998 (Ministry of Finance, 1999). The strengthening of the budget was the 
result of revenues increasing faster than expenditures (Kautto, 2000: 42). During the 
period, revenue increased by 59.5 billion SEK, whereas expenditures decreased by 
66.1 billions (Tema Nord, 1997). 
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Between 1990 and 1994, gross debts increased rapidly from 44 percent of GDP to 80 
per cent. As shown in figure 14, the deficit moved from a surplus of 5.4 per cent in 
1989 to a deficit of 12.3 per cent in 1993. Comparing Sweden with elsewhere, it is 
clear that the Swedish economy was suffering long imbalances, and public finances 
were more vulnerable than in other OECD countries. 
Figure 4.13 Gross debt of the public sector in Sweden 1980-98, per cent of CDP 
'% of GDP 
Year 
Source: OECD Ohs database (Summer 1999 update). 
The main priority of economic policy for the Social Democratic Party was, therefore, 
to reassert control over public finances. Although, the large deficit in the general 
government's budget balance appeared during the right-wing government of 1991-94, 
153 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996) 1998 
it was the Social Democrats who, despite their traditional association with generous 
public spending, advocated the severest tightening of transfer schemes. The famous 
statement by Persson (2000: 57), the then shadow minister in financial issues, in which 
he announced large scale cuts in public spending and far-reaching tax increases to cope 
with the fiscal deficits, together with the Party's election manifesto of 1994 in which it 
called for a mandate for far-reaching savings, indicated that the Social Democrats were 
fully confident about their capacity to manage the public finances. To this end, the 
1994/95 fiscal consolidation programme of Skr 126 billions, with temporary 
reinforcements for 1997 and 1998 by another few billions, which were designed to 
bring the budget deficit down, were more successful than expected (OECD, 1997: 55). 
Table 4.3 Central government's net lending, per cent of GDP 
Budget Outcomes difference 
1993 -12.0 -12.3 -0.3 
1994 -11.1 -10.3 0.8 
1995 -10.2 -7.9 2.3 
1996 -4.6 -4.0 0.6 
1997 -2.6 -1.3 1.3 
1998 0 2.3 2.3 
Despite sharp retrenchments in the benefit system and large-scale redundancies in 
public services, in an international context, Sweden has the highest rate of government 
spending and social transfers relative to GDP. As mentioned before, in 1993 
expenditure peaked at 70 per cent of GDP, which was around five per cent higher than 
in Denmark, which had the second highest percentage points. The gap between 
Sweden and the average level of other European countries has been 10 percentage 
points or more. According to OECD (1997: 66-7) records, almost all types of income 
transfers in Sweden were above OECD averages; unemployment benefits as well as 
active labour market programmes, and housing support services to families, elderly 
and disabled. The only area which was below the average was early retirement benefit. 
In the Swedish system, the overall transfer level to the working-age population is high 
and it increased from 8 per cent in 1965 to around 20 per cent in 1997. However three 
other countries have shown higher percentage points; the Netherlands, Finland and 
Denmark. The share of the population having transfers as their main source of income 
154 
also grew rapidly, being the highest among OECD countries in the 1990s. Whereas in 
1965 around 15 per cent of household incomes consisted of transfers, in the middle of 
the recession, in 1993, that share rose to 38 per cent, falling back to 35 per cent in 
1997. These changes show that the percentage of non-active population, relative to the 
active part of the population, has increased and by that, the heavy social contribution 
burdens put pressure on the economy (Table 5.4). Social services have also increased 
from 9 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 20 per cent in the early 1980s, although the 
percentage fell to 15 per cent in the late 1990s (OECD, 1997: 66). 
Table 4.4 Pensioners, benefit recipients and employment (1000 persons) 
I. Old-age pensioners 
II. Working-age benefit recipients 
Of which: 
a) Disability pensioners 
b) Unemployed 
c) ALMPs participants 
d) Sickness benefit recipients 
e) Family benefit recipients 
III. Employed 
Of which: 
a) Public sector 
b) Private sector 
Total (I + II + III) 
Indicators: 
Non-active to active population [(I + II)/III] 
Non-activity in the working-age population 
[II/III] 
Total pressure on private-sector resources 
[(I + II + IIIa)IIIb] 
1970 1980 1990 1997 
947 1 362 1 533 1 592 
606 835 1 009 1 286 
188 281 354 423 
59 84 69 342 
69 121 140 269 
262 274 289 129 
28 75 157 123 
3 529 3736 3968 3 567 
766 1 183 1 298 1 139 
2 763 2 553 2 670 2 428 
5 082 5 933 6 510 6 445 
0.44 0.59 0.64 0.81 
0.17 0.22 0.25 0.36 
0.84 1.32 1.44 1.65 
Source: Swedish Employers Confederation, in OECD (1999, p. 109) 
In short, from the public finance perspective, the economic crisis of the 1990s showed 
the vulnerability of the Nordic welfare model (Tema Nord, 1997: 595). 
As 
unemployment increased, the number of people who were 
in need of financial 
assistance from the public purse grew enormously. 
While spending increased, revenues 
declined because there were fewer people in employment contributing to the public 
purse. Moreover, the declining activity 
in the industrial and trade sector led to falling 
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tax incomes to the state. The only way to solve the budgetary problem was to increase 
borrowing. Harsh cutback measures were then inevitable, not only to reduce the level 
of borrowing, but also to save the welfare state from future cyclical attacks resulting 
mainly from increasing cost pressures caused by the ageing population (Kautto, 
2000: 31). 
In comparison to other countries, Sweden was not just exceptional in terms of its 
budget deficit, but because Swedish governments succeeded in balancing the budget. 
Balanced budgets were achieved from 1993 and were an effect of the consolidation 
programme. Success has been ascribed to the economic upswing, which created 
conditions for recovery, but, as many economists (IMF, 1999; Tema Nord, 1997) have 
stressed, policy adjustments played a decisive role in such `unqualified success'. This 
may also show the strength of both the economy, which has a strong potential for 
growth, and the ability of the governments, who in circumstances of crisis have the 
possibility to reduce replacement levels of certain benefits to balance the budget. The 
Swedish tax policy was another significant tool available for governments to stabilize 
fiscal deficit. In this sense, personal income tax, as we discuss in the next section, has 
been the most important ingredient in the Swedish tax policy, which has been subject 
to change due to the financial state of the public sector. 
The tax system in transition 
Modern tax policy has been one of the most powerful tools available for governments 
to combat market-generated inequalities and to redistribute wealth. In this regard, the 
major emphasis has been placed on personal income tax and payroll taxes, which, 
since the turn of the previous century, gradually expanded, and during the expansion of 
the welfare state these two taxes have been familiar aspects of modern tax policy 
(Peters, 1991). 
In the mid-1950s, the overall Swedish tax level was almost the same as the OECD 
average, but during the 1960s the increasing costs of welfare expenditure led to 
changes in the tax system and the introduction of new taxes. First, general taxes, in 
particular payroll taxes, became the major sources for the financing of the social 
insurance system. Second, in the late 1960s, general sales taxes were introduced, 
which rose quickly and were then converted to value added tax (VAT). In parallel with 
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these taxes, in the mid-1950s, employers' social security contributions were also 
introduced and raised steadily, the highest rate of 35 per cent being reached in 1980. 
As noted, income taxes and general consumption taxes constitute the major sources for 
financing the social insurance system. With the increasing cost, the degree of 
progression in the taxation system also increased, and so marginal tax rates for the 
wage earner, even those on average incomes, have increased dramatically. Marginal 
tax rates increased from 35 per cent in the 1950s to around 70 per cent three decades 
later. 
However, to reduce the pressure on high-rate taxpayers, certain measures have been 
taken such as mortgage interest relief (the deduction of interest payments to borrowing 
for acquire owner-occupied houses). 9 By such tax credits, which were intended to 
stimulate capital investment, real marginal tax rates were lower than the high nominal 
tax rates, because a considerable part of the interest payment (40 per cent) was paid 
back to the consumer. This policy also favoured firms, because by investing their 
profits during periods of low activity, the effective rate of corporate taxation 
decreased, with the result that instead of paying statuary tax rates of 50 per cent, the 
effective rate ended up in the range of 20 to 30 per cent (OECD, 1999: 109). However, 
the tax system was regarded as excessively complicated, especially by small and 
medium-sized enterprises, which were disfavoured in comparison to larger companies 
and had to pay higher effective rates of tax. The tax-reform of 1991, which embraced 
the principle of base-broadening and rate-cutting, also aimed to separate the taxation of 
capital income from labour income, but at the same time applied a uniform rate of 
taxation to capital income. This restructuring of the tax system in 1991, which led to 
lower tax rates, caused a revenue loss of around 6 per cent of GDP (OECD, 1999). 
According to OECD economists (1999: 110), tax reform had two main aims: 
The main aim of the reform was to reduce distortions and welfare losses stemming from 
high tax rates and narrow tax bases and at the same time to alleviate the tax system of its 
redistributive role by increasing child allowances and housing benefits. 
One major part of the reform was the harmonisation of the marginal tax rate on capital, 
which was brought down to 30 per cent, and the second one was the taxation of 
personal income, which would have the lowest rate at 30 per cent and the highest rate 
9 The generous tax deduction for interest payments for buying a house or other property amounted to 40 
per cent. With the tax reform of 
1990, the percentage was decreased to 30. 
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at about 50 per cent. The two main methods of financing the reform were the reduction 
of the tax deductibility of interest payments (from 40 to 30 per cent) and an extension 
of the base for VAT. However, this reform was never implemented fully because the 
large budget deficit in the early 1990s prevented this occurring. In fact, personal 
income tax has increased considerably, with the result that the highest marginal 
income tax rate on labour income has ended up at around 57 per cent (instead of 50 per 
cent). Moreover, the percentage of wage-earners facing the highest marginal tax rates 
increased from 30 per cent in the early 1990s, to 40 per cent in 1998. A further 
measure was the introduction of employees' social security contributions, which by 
1998 had reached 7 per cent. By these changes and others, such as the partial 
abandonment of indexation clauses, households lost 3 percent of their income (OECD, 
1999: 111). In consequence, the taxes paid out of wage income, which had fallen from 
63 per cent in 1991 to around 55 per cent in 1994, rose again, to a figure on a par with 
Germany and Denmark, though a few per cent lower than Finland, by 1996 (Figure 
4.14). 
Figure 4.14 Effective tax rates, Per cent 
65 
60. 
"Op 
Sweden 
/ "' "r' 
:'` 
go 
' -- -Denmark ss 
50 
"--- 
Germany 
45 
United 
40 
Kingdom 
United States 
35 
30 - Finland 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Source: OECD (1999, p. 110). 
Consequently, the main point concerning the tax policy, as the major tool for financing 
the Swedish welfare system, is that Swedish governments, especially the Social 
Democrats, maintained high taxes in order to retain the universalist and generous 
welfare system. As Gould (2001: 52) has noted, in practice governments had real 
problems cutting public spending. On the contrary, they had no hesitation in adopting 
additional taxes to bring the budget into balance as a means of ensuring the financing 
of welfare arrangements. As Gould (2001: 81) suggests, the Swedish Social Democrats' 
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`public thinking' made them restore benefits and services rather than prioritising 
taxations cuts: 
When the government went into the 1998-election campaign, it could have prioritised 
taxation cuts but explicitly set out the case for reviving health care, education and care for 
the elderly. This was in line with public thinking. For many, the people's home remained 
just that. It can even be said that it was being run more efficiently and was more cost- 
effective. But this did little to help the long-term unemployed, those on social assistance or 
recent influxes of refugees. This also was in line with public thinking. Some people were 
becoming excluded from the people's home. 
Changes in income distribution objectives (redistribution policy) 
Despite the continuity of high tax pressure, the level of income distribution decreased 
during the 1990s (SOU, 2001: 79; Halleröd, 1999). The main reason for this trend was 
that a large proportion of the budget had to cover expenditures caused by high 
unemployment. At the same time, while the lower social groups were wrestling with 
difficulties caused by uncertainties in labour market, the wealthier were able to take 
advantage of the more favourable climate for capital income. Knowing that since the 
foundation of the modern Swedish welfare state, income distribution objectives has 
been the major aim of the system such deterioration should be as a challenge to the 
redistribution policy. Before the disruption of the 1990s the redistribution policy was 
achieved in two ways: first, short term measures were adopted to alleviate poverty, and 
were expressed in social insurance and social assistance policies; second, measures. 
were taken to equalise economic opportunity in the long-term. These included the 
extension of education, increases in benefit levels to families with children, and special 
attention to old-age pensioners' welfare. Sweden has been recognised internationally 
as the country with the strongest elements of redistribution (Halleröd, 1999; Smeeding 
and Gottschalk, 1998; Björklund, 1998; OECD, 1999). The redistribution of incomes 
in Sweden has mainly been achieved through tax and transfers, and it has been 
calculated that the tax and transfer policy in Sweden has reduced the poverty rate by 
some 80 per cent in contrast to North America for instance, where the rate has been 
reduced by only 30 per cent. Despite the shock increase in unemployment in the early 
1990s, transfers ensured that seven out of every eight people were kept out of poverty 
(OECD) 1988). 
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The redistributive role of transfers, in particular housing and family transfers, was 
increased by the 1991 tax reform. Less progression in income tax was intended to 
reduce vertical equity, which led to a reduction in the tax system's redistributive 
function. However, as a consequence of the severe labour-market imbalances, tax 
reform was not fully implemented, and since 1991, the tax level has been increased 
considerably, and by that, the redistributive effect of the tax system was reinforced 
(OECD, 1999: 114). Overall, the redistributive features of the transfer and tax system 
in Sweden have protected the system of income distribution from the negative impact 
of cyclical influences, especially from the unemployment shocks in the early 1990s. 
In 1997, taxes and social security contributions in Sweden remained at 54.1 per cent. 
That could be compared to the rate in the other member states within the EU, which 
had a rate below 47.5 per cent (Euro state, 1999). One of the factors which explain this 
difference is the trend in the Swedish welfare system towards an increasing rate of 
benefit-dependence in the working-age population. While in the mid-1960s, around 16 
per cent of the population were relying on transfers, this percentage increased to 35 in 
the early 1990s. Population ageing reflects one half of the increase because pensions 
have increased most, but the percentage of the working-age population receiving other 
benefits has also increased. Statistics from 1996 show that 19 per cent of the working- 
age population received unemployment benefits, 11 per cent sickness benefits, 7 per 
cent disability pension, 17 per cent family transfers - mostly parental leave, 11 per 
cent housing benefits, and 7 per cent of the population received social assistance at 
some period during the year (OECD, 1999: 117). 
One possible interpretation of the increasing rate of benefit dependence is manifested 
in the bourgeois parties' criticisms of the system, which argued that the existing tax 
system prevented wage-earners from earning a living solely by virtue of their income. 
Others (Halleröd, 1999) hold up the universalistic and redistributive features of the 
Social Democratic model as an example of how benefits function to erode income 
differences. A third set of responses put the emphasis on the highly de-commodifying 
features of the Swedish welfare model, in which welfare entitlements are meant to 
promote an equality based on high living standards, rather than an equality based on 
minimum needs (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998). 
Because in the past two decades, as a consequence of financial reforms and increasing 
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speculations in the market economy which led to price inflation, Sweden, as many 
other industrialised nations, has experienced a trend towards increased income 
inequality, the state had to compensate for the worse off groups in society through 
different kinds of benefits. 
Regarding increased income inequalities in Sweden in the 1990s, while the disposable 
family income for the richest portion of the population (a tenth of the population) 
increased by 10 per cent, the poorer tenth of the population reduced their disposable 
family income by 13 per cent. Taking into account the large number of youths who 
were unable to find a job and therefore had to stay with their family, reductions in 
disposable family income for the poorer group could increase to 34 per cent (LOb, 
2000). Three major factors seem to have determined the widening of income 
differences. First, the rising unemployment rate, second, opposition to centralised 
bargaining, which encouraged wage flexibility and raised wage dispersion by 10 per 
cent between 1992 and 1999 (LOb, 2000), and, third, the deregulation of financial 
markets, which led to an increase in the gap between income from wages and income 
from capital, with the richest part of the population gaining hugely from growing 
capital investment. While between 1975 and 1998 the average annual rise in wages 
was 4.2 per cent, the average rise in the stock market was 24 per cent per year 
(Ahnland, 2001). 
Figure 4.15 Changes in disposable income for different groups of people, between 1991 and 
1998 
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This discussion can be summarised by noting that many observers (Nelander, 2001; 
Ahnland, 2001; Elmbrant, 2001) were concerned about the pattern of economic 
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development in the 1990s because of the widening gap between rich and poor, which 
they regarded as a major threat to the existing Swedish `people's home' (folkhemmet). 
Along with financial, structural, and demographic problems of the matured welfare 
systems internationalisation and deregulation of financial markets were also 
considered to be significant changes that facilitated market speculation and thus 
favoured those with access to capital. On the other hand, the national government was 
successively deprived of essential supply-side policies to secure full employment, 
price stability and redistributive aims. Thus, in such circumstances, one can conclude 
that `market failure' meant a sharp rise in the demand for transfers. Despite 
comprehensive savings in public expenditure, the traditional welfare state with its 
broad universal coverage and high income replacement rates continued to provide the 
bulk of transfers and services, although the rate of transfers were 10-15 below the 
highest rates of the 1980s. 
Summarizing the discussion about structural changes in economic conditions one 
could argue that the economic crises, caused at least partly by globalisation, have been 
brought under control as governments adjusted economic policies (especially wages 
and union policies) in the light of the crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. It has 
also been argued that unemployment was at the end of the 1990s under control, and 
that Sweden's open economy is now able to exist in the international economic order. 
It seems that the Swedes solved their difficulties without resort to neo-liberal measures 
- so they retained their system and have `endogenous control' of it. Nevertheless, there 
is one core endogenous issue that remains important for social and economic policy in 
Sweden, and that is the `demographic crisis' anticipated as the baby boom generation 
comes up to retirement. 
Changes in the political stability 
Before the appropriation by the bourgeois coalition in 1976, the Swedish political 
system, with almost four decades by uninterrupted governance by the Social 
Democratic Party, was known as one of the most stable systems. Although the 
coalition of the three bourgeois parties did not accomplish any major changes in the 
welfare programmes, during six years in office (1976-82), it could with regard to 
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changing processes in other welfare states, start an important debate about the 
vulnerability of the expensive welfare provisions in Sweden. The changing power 
balance in Sweden in the late 1970s, which occurred both in the political sympathy to 
the two major political blocs, but also in relations between the labour market parts, had 
for the most the most part weakened the position of the traditional advocates of the 
universal welfare arrangements. For a long period of time these advocates dominated 
the political arena, had strong public support and could expand the universal welfare 
arrangements. However, in the late 1970s they faced their first real challenges. The 
changing power balance had serious impact on the future direction of the political 
establishment. 
During the 1980s, the political debate in Sweden had changed its characteristic: it 
came to represent growing uncertainties about the ground pillars of the universalistic 
welfare system. The impact of the debate was so widespread that it made the Social 
Democrats, or at least an influential fraction in the top position of the Party apparatus, 
to advocate certain essential modifications in the economic and welfare policies. The 
party was then divided into two factions: the `modernisers' who suggested far-reaching 
changes in welfare arrangements in order to adopt the universal welfare system to the 
new economic and social order, and the `traditionalists' who rejected major changes 
and advocated limited programmic measures in order to make the existing system 
adapt to the new circumstances. As early as 1980, the modernisers in the Social 
Democratic party suggested a far-reaching reform plan according to which the welfare 
system would be adopted to the changing economic and political environment 
(Antman, 1993). The growing calls for changes in the welfare arrangements were 
obvious signs of a trend which represented a successive end of the famous historical 
consensus among the political parties and institutions in the labour market about the 
universal welfare state. It became clear that the system was no longer secure, but rather 
had become more fragile. Not only did conservative politicians reject the durability of 
the commitments to the generous welfare programmes but also in the intellectual 
debates a wave of disillusion regarding the persistence of the system in the changing 
world emerged (Gould, 2001). Although the broad popular support to the system had 
not been changed, the growing concern was whether the expensive universalist system 
could survive the major challenges it was facing. 
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For modernisers inside the Social Democratic movement the major reason for starting 
the changing process was changes in the domain values among the new generation 
who to a greater extent than before, were criticizing some authoritarian aspects of the 
comprehensive welfare state. According to Widar Andersson, one of the most active 
debaters among the modernisers, the relation between the state and the citizens had 
become mostly a top-down situation with great authority for the state and public sector 
intervening in every detail of the citizens' social life: 
By expansion of the welfare state the relation between the state and the citizens became 
increasingly unequal. The relation was based on a more patriarchal and hierarchical 
order. The system had arranged everything to the citizens. A major part of life for all 
citizens from the day they were born to the day they died was planed and performed by 
the state and the public sector. The sector, which was financed by the taxes, had 
established a great security system and every kinds of social service imaginable. 
Everything was planned for you from the first day you went to day nursery, through 
your schooling, your employment, and care system, elderly care. Everything was 
planned and organised by the state. The new generation could no longer accept such a 
paternalistic state and demanded changes and a new order. They wanted, for instance, to 
decide the school for their children, and the care for their ageing parents. The 
generation, which grew up during the 1960- and 1970s, launched the idea of self- 
administration instead of public administration. This was the first step towards a 
direction where demands for privatisation grew. For the Social Democrats it was 
difficult to accept such a change but as a governing party which for a long period of 
time had been in office, there was no other option than to adapt itself to the new needs, 
new desires and demands of the new generations. Social Democrats had always adapted 
their policies to new circumstances; so they had to do in this time, and what we 
suggested was exactly such adaptation and nothing else (Widar Andersson, interview). 
The neo-liberal winds 
Affected by the neo-liberal experimentations in other affluent democracies, 
particularly Britain and the United States, the advocates of the neo-liberal strategy 
argued for further essential changes to different aspects of the Swedish welfare system 
than what the Social Democratic modernisers suggested. The main critiques were 
directed towards the inefficiency, wastefulness and the self-aggrandisement of state 
bureaucracy. It has been claimed that political intervention distorted market 
mechanisms, a notion which was rejected by the Social Democrats that saw the welfare 
system as a form of investment in a competitive economy. According to neo-liberals, 
distortions were caused by generous transfer payments and the mounting tax burden, 
both of which acted as disincentives to productivity and industrial innovation. These 
two factors would also explain the sluggish growth of the Swedish economy in the late 
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1980s and early 1990s (Brunsdon & May, 1995). The generous benefits encouraged 
absenteeism averaging 25-30 days per year (Linton, 1991). 
As a country with the highest tax burden of GDP in the world (55% GDP) Swedish 
employers faced payroll charges amounting to 43% of wage costs. The burden was 
also heavy on employees who faced marginal income tax rates of over 50%. Such high 
tax rates had a negative impact on the efficiency of the companies, who would lose in 
a competitive international economy (Hanson 1984 in Brunsdon 1995). Another 
burden to the enterprises was the extensive regulations, which according to the 
bourgeois politicians caused considerable disadvantage for the Swedish enterprises. 
The changes in the tax system and the abolition of the major parts of the regulation 
system became inevitable: 
Deregulation of the financial market and the tax reform were two important steps in the 
right direction, which was liberalising the economic system. It has to be emphasised that 
some of the regulations in Sweden were very old; they were invented in the 1940s. 
Regulations in the housing sector, for instance, were introduced in 1942, as a response 
to increasing uncertainty caused by the War. The regulations meant to prevent the 
increasing of prices. Therefore, these regulations were abolished at the end of the 1970s. 
The financial sector also had to deal with many regulations, which were now no longer 
relevant. The Swedish economy had the same problem regarding the tax system. With a 
high marginal tax, at about 85% as late as 1982 (in north regions at about 89%) the tax 
system had negative impacts on incentives to work. Due to the two tax reforms, 
implemented in the early 1980s and early 1990s, the marginal taxes decreased to about 
50%. It was a widespread consensus about tax reforms, even if many economists and 
politicians, myself included, retrospectively criticise the order in which the reforms 
were invented. The tax reforms had to come first and the regulation of the finance 
market next. That could prevent the huge barrowing, which occurred in the late 1980s. 
The old tax system had a generous system of deduction (abetment) for interest costs, 
which is why the level of borrowing from the bank system for the purpose of purchasing 
buildings increased dramatically. The high rate of speculations caused by the bad timing 
in initiating reforms was the major reason for the economic crisis of the 1990s but, any 
way, the crisis was inevitable, it had to come but probably not in so large scale as it did 
(Bo Könberg, interview). 
While the liberal politician tended to explain the changes in the economic system as a 
necessity in order to liberalise the influence of the state on the financial sector, the 
spokesman of the enterprises put the emphasis on the changing relations in the 
international order. Globalisation, according to an expert in the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprises explains both the tax reforms and the deregulations of the 1980s. 
The Swedish government had no other option than to deregulate the financial market 
in order to make the Swedish enterprises more competitive: 
There was no other alternative for Sweden other than to open its border to the foreign 
capital and to follow for the outflow of the Swedish capital. If Sweden had decided to 
stand outside of the new global order, it would be the big loser because the country is in 
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great need of international trade. Knowing that the Swedish market is very small and that 
the Swedish enterprises had historically been dependent on international trade one could 
draw the conclusion that without international trade the economic system in the country 
would have collapsed and the wealth needed for welfare failed to come. If in the globalised 
order the conditions for Swedish enterprise in the country deteriorate, then the companies 
will leave the country for a more enterprise-friendly environment. High tax levels, for 
instance, was one of the most important factors which made companies move the 
production from Sweden. Such a threat launched by the actors in the market - to leave 
Sweden - put the pressure on the Swedish governments to adopt a more enterprise friendly 
politic (Anders Morin, interview). 
The need for liberalisation of the rules and regulations for the labour market was 
emphasised by the modernisers inside the Social Democratic Party, even though they 
rejected the notion that Sweden, until the 1980s, had a sort of closed economy with 
low level of mobility for the companies: 
In relation to the big economies in Europe, Sweden has always had a more open 
economy with great openness for deregulations, and for harmonisation of its economy 
with the rest of the world. While economies with greater home market, such as the 
French, German and Spanish, tend to counteract efforts subjected to harmonise the 
national economy to the others, in order to provide appropriate conditions for national 
firms to keep the national market in their control, the Swedish firms, in contrast, were 
mostly interested in operating in other markets. The Swedish enterprises were not 
interested in its home market, which was so little. Therefore, the Swedish firms have 
never been prevented by the state to be integrated in the international economy. The 
state has always been concerned to provide the best possible conditions for the large 
Swedish companies in order to compete with other international counterparts, which 
was viable by harmonising the Swedish regulation system in order to facilitate matters 
for the enterprises. I will emphasise that the deregulation of the financial market in 
Sweden was institutionalised according to an old Social Democratic view, which was 
adopted by Hjalmar Branting, who had rejected establishment of national border for the 
companies. The crisis of the early 1990s was not first and foremost a consequence of 
deregulations efforts or the political measures taken by the governments, but rather was 
caused purely by financial measures taken by the actors in the financial market (Widar 
Andersson, interview). 
The `traditionalists', who had strong support in the union movement, rejected the 
notion that the crisis was simply a consequence of financial measures. Some of them, 
such as Stig Malm, the then-chairman of the LO, blamed the modernisers in the 
government who had deregulated the financial market, which was widely believed to 
have led to massive speculation and consequently to unstable interest rates and 
currency levels. 
During the 1990s, the Conservatives were in power in many of the advanced economies 
such as USA, Germany, Britain and Japan, and the neo-liberal values dominated the 
international politic. While at the beginning of the period, the Swedish government was 
deter caned to stand against the pressures and to keep its own profile, which maintained a 
full employment policy, by the later part of the period the advocates of the harmonisation 
achieved grater influence and could perform some essential adoption to the ongoing 
processes in the conservative running economies. The deregulation of the financial market 
was one of the most important measures in that direction and led to the establishment of a 
casino economy in Sweden, with the bank crisis in 1992 as its most devastating 
consequence (Stig Malm, interview). 
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Deregulation allowed foreign investment by Swedish companies to increase 
considerably, which was not in the economic interest of the country and consequently 
disliked by the `traditionalists'. In many cases, the investments made during the 
property boom in the 1980s were unsuccessful, and the banks that had experienced 
major credit losses expected the government to save them from a total collapse. The 
result was that the public sector had to pay for unsuccessful investments by the 
capitalist owners (Amark, 1993). In 1991 and 1992 alone, the bail-out operation 
amounted to 75 billion crowns or 5% of GDP (OECD, 1994: 129), all of which had to 
be financed by the public. 
Downsizing of the big public sector and reducing public expenditures were the two 
other central themes which were stressed by the bourgeois. These measures would 
make it easier for the government to reduce tax pressure, which in turn would give the 
small and medium size enterprises opportunity to act more vigorously. Regarding 
welfare provisions, the advocate of radical changes mainly referred to the growing 
differences between the existing social and welfare programmes and real social 
demands as some of the major challenges to the system. The universal welfare system 
was designed to achieve ideals of universalism and equality in a society with a 
relatively homogeneous industrial working class. In a post-industrial society, the 
growing professionalisation and differentiation in the labour market have caused 
crucial changes in occupational structure. The job security for a majority of the labour 
force in manufacturing and the public sector has been replaced by more flexible 
adjustments in the labour market, which in turn has increased career uncertainty. 
Moreover, the structural changes in the `model family', with a steady rise of divorced, 
single-people, and single-parent households have increased the pressure on welfare 
arrangements. As the needs among different social groups have intensified the welfare 
programmes and services have also expanded. To avoid the risk of poverty among 
certain social groups, the universal welfare system had to compensate the major part of 
income decline of these groups. Such a development made some of the political parties 
such as the Centre Party, which in the past had supported the generous welfare model, 
to be in favour of a basic security system: 
We have many social arrangements, which have emerged in different stages of the 
development of the ý elfare system. The problem is that the social arrangements are so 
widespread that the welfare system is not able to exercise its control on the whole system. 
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People can move from one benefit system to the other simply because they calculate that 
they will be better benefited by the other arrangements. The system did not emerged so 
that it could be misused for such purposes. I am not saying that we misuse the system but I 
am saying that we have become more careless. It was not meant that we would use the 
benefits system as liberally as many people do nowadays. The security system was built to 
support those who were in real need because of unemployment, occupational injury or 
sickness whereas now the system is partially used arbitrary. We need to reform the whole 
system in order to prevent such misuse and to make it sustainable for a long period of time. 
As the exiting system stands, we cannot afford to finance the growing costs of the 
generous arrangements. Therefore we suggest a return to a basic security system which 
would reduce the cost to far less than it is in the existing system (Birgitta Carlsson, 
interview). 
As the political climate became more affected by the neo-liberal values, and the 
bourgeois parties' calls for changes increased, the political pressure on the Social 
Democrats also intensified. The public opinion polls since the election of 1988 had 
indicated a strong support for the Conservative party to approximately 30 percent, and 
far stronger decline for the Social Democrats to almost the same level, which increased 
the tensions inside the Social Democratic movement. The crisis in the Swedish 
economy at the end of the 1980s suffered from a high level of inflation and rise in 
wages and prices, causing the dividing line between the two major factions inside the 
social democrats to grow further. The `modernisers', who had a strong position in the 
leadership of the party and also controlled the department of finance, admitted that the 
economic problem was, at least in part, caused by the expensive public sector (Feldt 
1996). Before the election in 1991 they had recognised the need for cuts but did not 
achieve any while they were in office. Kjell Olaf Feldt (1996), the finance minister 
throughout most of the 1980s, believed that the level of transfers was too high, which 
both created a budget deficit and also impacted negatively on incentives to work. 
The opportunity for system shift 
After a long period of promotion of neo-liberal ideas, the advocates of a system shift to 
the Conservative and the liberals in front won the election of 1991. Even if the 
Conservatives could not achieve the levels which they did in opinion polls the four 
parties in the bourgeois front collectively achieved 10 per cent more than the Social 
Democrats, who managed to recover part of its decline but at the election landed 
around 38 per cent. A weak Left party that reached just above 4 per cent of the votes 
and an Environment party that failed to gain the support of 4 per cent of the electorate, 
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which was needed to enter the parliament, the Social Democrats did not have enough 
support in the parliament to form a government. The road was then clear for the 
bourgeois parties to build the coalition government, but since the coalition failed to 
achieve a majority they were reliant on the support of the anti-immigration party, New 
Democracy. While the Liberal Party rejected any form of cooperation with the New 
Democracy it became clear that the Bourgeois government had to be a minority 
government. This meant that the coalition could fail if all opposition parties voted 
against its policies. 
Despite the lack of clear-cut support for the Bourgeois government, which put it in an 
unfortunate position, the neo-liberal strategy was declared and the new government 
addressed its intention to change in some significant areas. Although the major 
challenge to the Swedish public economy came more than one year after the take-over 
by the new government when the budget deficit, as a result of steeply rise of 
unemployment, increased dramatically and the national debt stood at 80 per cent of 
GDP, the bourgeois addressed the expensive welfare arrangement as the major reason 
for economic unbalance. They stressed the rising costs of public expenditure and 
within that the generous level of social insurance benefits, such as sickness, work 
injury, early retirement and unemployment benefits as the main factor, which caused 
the economic problem. The burden of the public sector on the private sector was, 
according to the Conservative MP Sten Tolgefors, too heavy because the number of 
people who either were employed in the public sector or were dependent upon welfare 
benefits had risen enormously, from 2.5 million in 1972 to 4.7 million in 1992. As a 
result, in twenty years, the ratio of people dependent upon welfare benefits in 
proportion to those employed in the private sector rose from 0.9 to 2.3. Despite that, 
the changes in the welfare system were not as widespread as one would expect. The 
Conservatives placed the blame on the parties in the middle, particularly on the Liberal 
Party: 
The reason that we could not achieve greater changes in the area of social policy was 
partly that the department of social affairs was governed (controlled) by another party in 
the coalition and not the Conservatives. Apart from that it is also important to know that in 
that period of time the need for changes in social arrangements had not been sufficiently 
debated. Therefore, the support for changes in the public debate was not as widespread. 
What I can say is that at the end of the 1990s when we (the Conservatives) ran the 
Stockholm city council, we were able to make some radical changes in the welfare system. 
It has shown that our party took these issues seriously. 
- But during the coalition government, the Prime Minister 
Carl Bildt was the leader of the 
Conservatives? 
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Yes, but the social department was run by others. The parties in the coalition had different 
views about the welfare system and social policy arrangements and that made it difficult 
for the coalition to reach an agreement about a reform strategy for the welfare system (Sten 
Tolgfors, interview). 
Among the parties in the middle the Liberal Party was the one which addressed the 
lack of willingness to change the then-existing welfare arrangements. Even though the 
Party advocated large-scale liberalisations in economic aspects and supported a 
document (Ny start för Sverige, 1991 in Gould, 1995) published by the conservative 
party before the election in 1991, in which a `system shift' was recommended, in 
government, it acted as a defender of the universal welfare system and opposed major 
cutbacks in expenditure. Moreover, while the Party emphasised the need for pluralist 
provision and greater individual choice, in office, it nevertheless rejected the idea that 
individuals could best provide for themselves (Nordh and Westerberg, 1993). The 
Party was determined to keep most aspects of the welfare arrangements. By insisting 
on having control of the social department the party leader, Bengt Westerberg, secured 
almost whole welfare arrangements and even introduced some new reforms. His 
deputy in the department, which also led a committee for reforms in the pension 
system, rejects the critique that the coalition did not accomplish any considerable 
change of the system: 
The changes we accomplished in occupational injury insurance were crucial. The 
prognoses suggested that if the old system had continued, by the year 2000 the 
accumulated deficit in the occupational injury fund would reach to 100 billion Skr. The 
reforms we made in the system prevented such development. In other areas, such as 
sickness insurance, we adopted one waiting day before the benefit could be claimed. In 
the dental service insurance we made some deterioration as well. The other major 
change we made was the reform to the pension system, which has to be recognised as 
one of the greatest changes to have ever occurred in the Swedish welfare system. 
Despite these changes I have to admit that there were great differences between the 
coalition parties in many welfare issues, for instance in the pension system and that was 
the reason why we could not achieve more changes. From the Centre Party, which 
advocated only a basic pension to the Liberal Party, which suggested pension system 
based on income-compensating principal (Bo Könberg, interview). 
The liberal Party's refusal to dismantle the existing Swedish welfare state should not 
be seen merely as the party leaders' commitment to the welfare state's traditional 
values, but also to be understood from at least two other perspectives, which seemed to 
have an impact on the party's position. First, despite the economic difficulties and the 
growing attacks of many neo-liberal economists and the Conservative politicians on 
the existing welfare system, support for high public expenditure and the idea of 
collective state provision did not fundamentally change among the Swedes between 
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1986 and 1992 (Svallfors, 1994). The generosity of universal benefits was supported 
by a majority of people and it was therefore difficult for governing parties to make 
potentially unpopular decisions. Second, the public sector employed one third of the 
labour force. Those employed within the public sector would for obvious reasons 
punish those parties, which threatened the size of the public sector, because any 
reductions might affect their jobs. 
Birgitta Carlsson, the representative for the third largest Party in the coalition, the 
Centre party, admits that there were disagreements between the coalition parties about 
many things. At the same time she stresses other factors which explain the poor 
performance in transforming the welfare system: 
It is true that we have done just minor changes in the welfare system. It is also true that the 
parties in the coalition had different views about many issues but that was not the major 
reason for the poor performances, because we could discuss and make agreements about 
different issues. In my view, the bad economic situation was the main problem, which 
prevented us from initiating an active reform policy. We had to handle with two major 
economic problems: the banking crisis and the rapid increase in unemployment, with 
budget deficit as its consequence. Apart from those three years in office was a short time 
for the coalition to invent a widespread transformation of the welfare system (Birgitta 
Carlsson, interview). 
However, the critiques of the Swedish welfare system have caused some cuts to 
services and benefits, which began during the centre-right government (1991-94). 
More than two hundred thousand jobs in the public sector have been phased out and 
the level of welfare benefits decreased by 10%. In the same period, a degree of choice 
and pluralism has also been introduced. While reductions in the level of benefits could 
reduce the actual budget deficit, the widespread redundancies in the public sector had 
no obvious effects on the budget deficit simply because the wages paid to these 
employees were replaced by unemployment benefits. That made the then chairman of 
the LO, Stig Malm, believe that the large scale retrenchments in the public sector and 
welfare benefits during the centre-right government had ideological reasons rather than 
pure economic ones. The changes, according to Malm, were started in the final years 
of the Social Democrats' term in office, as a consequence of the retreat of the political 
establishment in Sweden against the neo-liberal values: 
It was not the Bourgeois coalition but the Social Democrats which prior to the 1991 
election, by changing course in employment policy, had put the emphasis on lowering the 
inflation rate. Traditionally, the Social Democratic movement had been a great supporter 
of full employment strategy and to achieve other aims, such as lowering of the inflation 
rate, was not its main objective. In converging to the liberal economies the last the Social 
Democratic finance minister, Allan Larsson, abandoned the full employment policy. The 
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Bourgeois government, then, completed the project by giving the highest priority to the 
savings through cuts in welfare expenditures. The savings in the public sector resulted in 
hundreds of thousandths redundancies. The measure did not solve the financial problem 
for the state because the government had to pay unemployment benefits to the redundant 
instead of paying wages. The difference was that you expelled a large number of work 
forces from well-needed services in elderly-care, childcare and other public services, and 
forced them into a passive form of living. This policy could only be explained by 
ideological reasons, and that is the liberals' effort to make the size of the public sector 
smaller in order to further cut taxes. That was a liberal policy adopted from Thatcher- 
administration, which the Swedish Social Democrats and right-wing coalition copied (Stig 
Malm, interview). 
The idea that the extensive redundancies in the public sector had their origins in the 
ideological changes which intended to downsize the public sector in order to reduce 
tax pressure is something that others have also pointed out. Long before the crisis of 
the 1990s the Social Democratic economists in the department of finance planned for a 
comprehensive tax reform, which was meant to be an essential part of the adaptation of 
the Swedish tax system to the neo-liberal order in the international market. Although 
the tax reform was a defensive measure initiated by the Social Democratic government 
in the late 1980s the centre-right government could, without any hesitation, implement 
it. Downsizing the public sector through redundancies had been the subject of much 
debate among modernisers. Widar Andersson supports the large-scale retrenchments in 
the public sector, but has added further arguments which differ from the Bourgeois. 
Instead of stressing the need for reducing the costs, the modernisers in the Social 
Democratic Party put the emphasis on reallocations of resources and efficiency of the 
labour force in the public sector: 
The Swedish Social Democrats have always supported the efficiency measures taken by 
the Swedish firms and institutions in the public sector. The key notion has always been 
that the allocation of the resources, such as the labour force, has to be done in the most 
effective way (Widar Andersson, interview). 
The consensual political culture 
Within the general picture outlined in the previous sections, it would be fair to expect 
that the majority of the political elite in Sweden would support the new political 
measures designed to tackle the problems arising with the mature welfare state. 
The 
problems are caused either by high public expenditure and demographic changes, or 
are a consequence of the challenges, which were appearing as new 
decisive factors 
identifying the changing conditions for the future of the welfare system. In reality, 
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however, the impression in the early 1990s was that, despite the decreasing level of 
welfare benefits, the social democratic political culture of the welfare state never really 
changed. As Heclo and Madsen (1986) noted, the social democratic welfare state 
project had become `the nation's project' and, therefore, far-reaching changes in the 
arrangements would face widespread protests over social classes. Accordingly, when 
the process of making savings in welfare expenditure was started in the early 1990s, 
not only the unions opposed the cutbacks in the size of public sector services and 
benefits, but also a majority of the political elite opposed far-reaching changes. 
Beyond the Social Democrats, which nearly accepted that expenditure cuts were 
necessary to cope with the budget deficit, other parties in the Bourgeois-coalition, 
especially the Liberal Party, also rejected efforts to dismantle the Swedish welfare 
state. 
In other words, despite retrenchments in the welfare system, political support for the 
universal welfare policy has remained strong. As Uddhammar (1993) emphasises, 
there has always been a consensus and broad agreement in Sweden between the Social 
Democrats and the bourgeois parties about the content of the welfare state. Therefore, 
the four-party bourgeois government, which governed the country between 1991 and 
1994, supported the principles of universal policy. The coalition has in its 
proclamation clearly declared its support for the system: 
Welfare policy in Sweden is in a large part universal... The alternative to the welfare state 
is a selective system aimed at supporting only those suffering the worst condition. Such a 
system has many drawbacks. It requires more testing and control. Someone has to decide 
who has the right to assistance and who does not. This leads easily to bureaucracy and to 
investigations that violate integrity. A selective system also creates marginal effects. 
Benefits fall as income rises. Many people risk falling into the poverty trap. The 
fundamental ideology of the welfare state, based on universalism, shall serve as guidance 
in the future as well (Records from the Swedish Parliament, Regeringens proposition 
1991/92, no. 100, appendix 6, p. 5 in Rothstein, 1998: 21-22, translation). 
One of the main reasons for the existence of the consensual political culture is the kind 
of the political system, based on representative democracy, in which no party could 
solely receive the support of a majority of voters in the parliament. The need for co- 
operation with one or more parties to establish a majority made the reigning parties in 
government more cooperative. According to this view, the government simply were 
compelled to cooperate in order to gain majority for their programmes. If the Swedish 
political system were like Britain's, in which one of the two major parties could gain a 
majority, then the need for consensual decision-making would not appear crucial. 
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Another explanation is that the Social Democratic Party has dominated the Swedish 
political system in modern times, especially in the period after World War II. While 
the party itself was formed as an alliance of conflicting social and class interests, such 
as both white-collar and blue-collar unions, as well as the radical and moderate 
ideological streams, it brought the consensual culture within the Social Democratic 
Party into the whole political establishment. In developing the modem welfare state 
the Party has become a `national representative' by seeking nation wide solutions with 
the involvement of a wide range of social and political interests. Knowing that in the 
political map, the Social Democrats have been located somewhere on the centre-left 
one could argue that it was easy for the Party to cooperate with both sides either with 
the Left Party or with the mid-parties (the Liberal Party or Centre Party). There are 
others who believe that consensual culture was first and foremost something, which 
developed in the relations between the parts in the labour market and that then affected 
the political system: 
The Social Democratic Party has hugely impacted the Swedish political system. When the 
consensual culture in Sweden is debated the impacts of the Social Democrats on the 
political system and the relations of this leading party to others must be stressed. 
Otherwise, when you compare other parties you will realise that there is not so much in 
common between the Conservatives and the Left Party, or between the liberals and the 
Left Party. I think the image of the consensual culture in Sweden particularly depicts to the 
relations in the labour market, which for a long period of time has been based on 
consensus and, different sorts of agreements, which were held for a long time. It refers also 
to the fact that the labour market parts never wanted to use the conflict as a political 
weapon, instead they could almost always reach agreements through central negotiations, 
thereby preventing strikes and other kinds of conflicts. In the political aspect, however, I 
will emphasise that the Swedish political system, with exception of the period 1995-98, 
has always had relatively strong bloc politics in which the differences between the two 
major blocs were very clear (Ingrid Burman, Interview). 
Having two political blocs with clear ideological differences does not mean that the 
political culture in the system is based on conflict. What matters is how the political 
actors act in the process of policy formulation, followed by decision making. In this 
regard, as I argued above, the consensual culture has dominated in Sweden. 
The 
consensual relation in the labour market, to which Burman refers, 
is nothing else but 
the effects of the political consensus in the labour market. For instance, during the 
reign of the Bourgeois coalition, although the Conservative Party 
had been critical to 
the existing welfare system, they never tried to dismantle the system. They were also 
aware that any attempt to challenge the basic principle of the universal welfare state 
could jeopardise the co-operation in the 
bourgeois bloc. Consequently, the cutbacks 
agreed by them in office were 
less comprehensive in comparison to what the Social 
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Democrats subsequently initiated. On the contrary, as Rothstein (1998: 22) emphasises, 
the changes caused by the Social Democratic government's policies, both between 
1982 and 1991 and also after returning to power in 1994, were more far-reaching 
because of the reduced compensation they introduced in various social programmes. 
These cutbacks, such as reductions in unemployment and sickness benefits, a higher 
retirement age, lower subsidies to municipal service and a reduced number of vacation 
days, actually threatened the principle of universal welfare provision. 
While the consensus within the political establishment has more or less remained the 
same, as both the Bourgeois coalition and the Social Democrats were in agreement 
about some measures to control the rising budget expenditure, in the labour market, the 
historical compromise between labour unions (LO) and employer organisation SAF 
came under considerable pressure. Moreover, the relation between LO and the Social 
democratic party, which historically had been close, gradually weakened. The 
challenges to the corporate system as a crucial political base to the welfare system was 
not a result of the Bourgeois government's consideration in weakening the influence of 
the unions, but it was an initiative taken by the SAF, the employers' federation, which 
did not follow the same approach as the Bourgeois parties. As the former chairman of 
LO stated, the SAF was determined to disengage the trade unions from all national 
corporatist bodies and thereby terminated its long-term cooperation with the LO. 
Since the early 1990s the SAF terminated their co-operation with the LO. They have 
withdrawn representatives from the boards of all state agencies. They will no longer have 
negotiations with us at the central level. We have no doubt that the SAF has changed its 
policy towards the LO and intends to ignore us in the labour market. The old consensus 
between the two parts is gone. It seems to me that the SAF is taking advantage of the 
superior position they believe they have got as a consequence of the ongoing process of 
globalisation. While the companies are moving from Sweden without any restrictions the 
SAF sees no reason why it should continue to negotiate with us. It seems to me that the 
SAF intends to take revenge of the LO for its radical demands in the past, such as the 
support to the wage-earner funds, the right to the co-determination and so on (Bertil 
Jönsson, Interview). 
It was also the SAF which recommended changing the labour laws in order to make it 
easier for the employers to fire undesirable employees and to provide temporary 
employment. Moreover, it was due to the SAF's pressure that the Bourgeois 
government abolished the trade unions ban on co-determination and certain changes in 
strike rights were made. The most important changes which the Bourgeois government 
accomplished were the abolishment of the wage-earner funds. Knowing that the 
establishment of these funds in the beginning of the 1980s caused the first ever 
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political manifestation by the capitalists in Swedish history it is easy to understand 
why the right-wing government had no doubts in abolishing the wage-earner funds. 
The Social Democrats' return to office - adaptation to EU 
The extent of voter support for the Social Democrats in the 1994 election gave the 
Party a mandate to re-establish order both in the economic system and in those welfare 
arrangements which had experienced some modifications. The Social Democrats were 
known as those who had the ability to restore the order to the state. This was after the 
governance of the Bourgeois coalition, which advocated a system shift. 
During the first year after the return the cooperation between the Social Democrats and 
the Left Party worked quite well. The two parties cooperated in increasing tax levels in 
order to cope with the budget deficit caused by the high unemployment levels. Soon 
after, the Social Democrats realised higher taxes could not keep control of the financial 
imbalances, and therefore decided to change direction and cooperate with the 
bourgeois bloc to make savings in the public sector (the Centre Party was the Party in 
the bourgeois bloc which the Social democrats asked for support). Apart from making 
cuts in some of the welfare arrangements in order to reduce the public deficit, the 
Social Democrats saw cooperation with the Centre as a way to adopt a more market- 
friendly policy and create a more stable base for government for the three coming 
years. The conflicts between the Social Democrats and the Bourgeois bloc were 
reduced to a lower level even though the Bourgeois party were critical towards the 
Centre Party for its exclusive cooperation with the Social Democrats. 
Cooperation with the Centre Party shortly after an election in which the Social 
Democrats had promised restoration to the welfare arrangements in those areas, the 
Bourgeois made cuts that caused serious disappointment among the traditionalists 
inside the Social Democratic Party, who were witnessing a new course in the Party. A 
new generation of the modernisers took over the Party and 
focused on EU membership 
as the vital priority. In this regard, they put the emphasis on maintaining an order 
in the 
public finance for the purposes of attaining convergence criteria 
decided by the EU. A 
new era began for Sweden. It was up to the 
Party to provide those conditions required 
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for both Swedish industry and enterprises in the more integrated and international 
market. It was also crucial that the political leadership provided the new tools and 
measures which the Swedish labour force needed in order to adapt to the changes 
which technological innovation and new divisions in the production process brought 
about: 
We have to be open to changes. The Social Democrats have no definite policy which 
would continue regardless of the situation we are living in. On the contrary, for a 
governing party the crucial thing is to follow the changing process both nationally and 
internationally and try to adopt the measures needed to promote technological 
development and competitiveness. Entering into the EU has been the most important 
event to occur in Sweden and which has reduced the control of the nation state in the 
process of decision-making. The national government can no longer protect the national 
market as it did before but it is up to the actors in the national market to improve their 
ability and competitiveness by investing in those areas they are best in (Widar 
Andersson, interview). 
Even if the savings and other measures taken by the Social Democrats had great effects 
on the Swedish economy with a surplus in budget at the end of the period these 
measures were interpreted as a move in a neo-liberal direction. The election result of 
1998 was a great disappointment to those who expected a rapid return to the pre- 
reform political condition. The Left Party doubled its votes, which was unprecedented 
in Swedish political history. The election result was a sign of growing popular 
discontent with the Social Democrats policies. It was during this period that 
widespread demonstrations against the deteriorations in welfare arrangements and the 
changes in the labour market took place. In response to this discontent that the Social 
Democrats paid greater attention to welfare reforms. During this period (1998-2002) 
the Social Democrats returned to the Left Party and the Greens and the cooperation 
among these three parties worked quite well through the entire period. The protest 
rallies by the workers and the new social movements seemed to convince the Social 
Democrats that the dominance of the neo-liberal values was decreasing and the support 
for welfare arrangements and redistributive measures had once again increased in 
society. The verdict launched by the Left Party's influential MP about the Social 
Democratic Party's policy confirms these changing standpoints: 
I think the Social Democratic leaders of today who are around the prime minister Göran 
Persson are on the left side of the modernisers who were led by Kjell Olaf Feldt, the 
former finance minister in the Social democratic governments in the 1980s, but they are 
undoubtedly on the right side of Olof Palme who led the Party before 1986 (Ingrid 
Burman, interview). 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to identify the structural changes which have been 
threatening the infrastructure of the Swedish welfare state, and arguably undermining 
the social and economic assumptions on which Swedish social policy was based. Two 
major threats have been traced; first is those either caused by post-industrial changes in 
advanced welfare state economies or troubles associated with global economic 
changes, and second are the changes in demographic trends. 
The process of globalisation of the world economy, as the crucial factor affecting the 
economy of nation states, has meant an end to governments' freedom to conduct an 
independent fiscal and monetary policy. In the tougher conditions dictated by the 
actors in the global market, finance and capital movements are, to larger extent than 
before, decided by a national state's success in acquiring the most appropriate 
conditions for international trade and investments. The more the nation state raises 
spending in order to maintain employment, or pursues redistributive ambitions, the 
more it will be vulnerable, simply because in the new economic order, appropriate 
conditions for competition have become more significant (Iversen, 2001). 
The economic crisis of the early 1990s with its several attendant major changes in the 
Swedish economy is to be seen as the direct consequence of changes, which were 
initiated by the Swedish government to adapt the country's economy to the process of 
globalisation. Although the major changes occurred in the early 1990s, the process 
started mid-1980 as a defensive response to the neo-liberal entry into the international 
market. The Social Democratic government's response to the new order was the 
liberalisation of capital markets and the deregulation of credit markets. These 
measures, which encouraged loan-financed consumption and speculative investment, 
were among structural reforms, which created a situation in which the economy 
became overheated. A rapid deterioration of the economy, with the equally rapid re- 
emergence of a budget deficit, along with a steep rise in unemployment and falls in 
gross domestic product were the consequence of what is called the `casino economy' 
in Sweden, which in turn challenged the stability of the Swedish welfare system. The 
crisis created severe structural problems, and led to the questioning of existing 
economic policies and the egalitarian motives, which underpinned them. 
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Parallel to these changes caused by exogenous factors, another structural change 
resulted from endogenous factors such as socio-economic transformation and new 
production processes. In the emerging regime of accumulation, new production and 
consumption norms challenged the stability of the Swedish economy and affected the 
demand for labour. New production technologies, and the increased automation of the 
widening division of labour between a greater or lesser skilled labour force has 
resulted in the decrease of `Fordist' manufacturing jobs and manual service jobs in all 
advanced economies, including Sweden. Although some of these job losses have been 
compensated by an increase in skilled jobs in manufacturing, and more particularly in 
services, there is no doubt that the advanced economies have been unable to replace 
the high employment levels of the Fordist labour market. The results of such structural 
change have been decreasing employment security, low wages and fewer benefits. 
The Social Democratic movement, which had started the process of reform in the 
financial market, realised that the economic crisis of the country would be exacerbated 
by the far-reaching changes in the welfare system planned by the right-wing coalition. 
Therefore, after the Social Democrat's return to office in 1994, the movement was 
determined to take the lead in solving the economic problems, particularly the colossal 
budget deficit. To achieve this goal, the party had no hesitation in increasing personal 
taxes, reducing the level of some entitlements, and ameliorating conditions for 
company investment. The strategy was successful. After a few years, the economic 
crisis was resolved. The level of unemployment steadily decreased and the budget 
deficit was consequently eliminated, with macroeconomic performance also showing 
an accelerating trend in GDP. In this regard, the crucial point is that the changes made 
since 1994 aimed to retain the Social Democratic version of the welfare state. In other 
words, at root, the measures were about keeping the universalist welfare state rather 
than transfornling it in a neo-liberal direction. In the process of change the obvious 
trend was that the market advocated institutional reforms, which would push the 
Swedish welfare system towards neo-liberal welfare strategies, while Swedish 
institutions themselves were opposed to system changes and thus determined to keep 
the existing order by endorsing only minimal changes. A further important issue is that 
the process of recovery was accomplished without running foul of the convergence 
criteria for EMU. On the contrary, apart from the fact that the share of public 
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expenditure relative to GDP is still high in Sweden, in other respects, such as the 
balance of the budget, Sweden has not only managed the criteria which allows a deficit 
of three per cent of the GDP in the past few years, but has had a surplus since 1999. 
In response to demographic changes, the major measure taken during this period was 
the creation of a new pension system - of which more in the next chapter. While the 
increase in the numbers of very elderly people will continue, and that will inevitably 
put the pressure on the service sector, pension reform was an effort to ensure the 
viability of the system for future generations. Although, some might argue that 
particular nature of the pension reforms constitute an important departure from 
Sweden's universalistic, egalitarian principles, as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
they have to be seen as a cautious measure designed to prevent a total collapse of the 
system in future years when the percentage of elderly in relation to the active labour 
force will accelerate dramatically. Another positive trend has been decreasing 
migration, which in recent decades caused high budget expenditures. Despite that, as 
the falling patterns of fertility, which in recent decades have led to a growing concern 
about the future viability of the existing welfare commitments in Sweden, continues, 
the relatively high level of migration throughout the 1990s is no longer seen as a 
negative factor for the future of the Swedish economy. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the intrinsic potential of the Swedish economy, and 
the determination of the Social Democrats to recover the economic imbalances at any 
price, made it possible to overcome the deepest economic crisis since the foundation of 
the modem welfare state in the country. On the other hand, once again it has been 
shown that while the uncertainty caused by the process of globalisation made the 
Social Democratic governments insecure about the development of the international 
economy, harmonisation with the EU has occurred according to a well-defined 
timetable. During the 1990s, the Swedish governments have shown an ability to 
correspond to those requirements that have been set by a supranational body. 
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Chapter 5 
Transformation in the Swedish welfare system 
Having presented a general overview of the economic crisis of the 1990s together with 
an account of demographic changes in Sweden in the previous chapter, the focus here 
will be on changes in social policy. Since social policy constitutes the major part of the 
public budget, governments look to make savings here in order to balance the budget. 
There are, however, different ways of cutting welfare. Some techniques, such as 
indexation, are difficult for the public to detect, and therefore preferred by 
governments for political reasons, but when the need for cuts becomes urgent, then 
reductions in cash benefits are considered to be the most efficient way to reduce 
spending. As the major part of reductions occurred through cuts in cash benefits, and 
as it is easier to study the changes to cash benefits over time, the major focus of this 
study will be on changes in cash transfers during the period under review, together 
with the pattern in which these changes occurred. 
The argument in this chapter is that, as long as the Social Democrats were in office and 
economic conditions were appropriate, the Swedish welfare system not only remained 
intact but gradually expanded. Retrenchments of the benefit system in the 1990s 
started when unemployment rose dramatically and the budget deficit increased 
considerably as a result. The first wave of retrenchment, which occurred in the first 
half of the 1990s, had a `defensive' character. This means that savings foremostly 
addressed the need to reduce the budget deficit, although the size of the spending cuts 
was less than the rise in expenditures caused by the unprecedented rise in 
unemployment. Between 1993 and 1997 the budget deficit rose by 12 per cent of GDP, 
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whereas retrenchments were actually quite limited. The bourgeois coalition 
government was not sufficiently dedicated to bring about far-reaching savings, partly 
because of internal conflicts, which made compromises about retrenchment difficult, 
but partly, too, because of public opinion, which did not favour far-reaching cuts in 
benefits. The argument here is that only powerful elites with public support can 
achieve retrenchments providing they are regarded as defenders of existing institutions 
(Pierson, 1996). 
In Sweden, the majority of incremental reforms were introduced in the second half of 
the 1990s after the Social Democrats had returned to office. As the architects of the 
welfare system, they seemed to have had the political legitimacy to initiate some 
essential changes in the welfare system in order to ensure its long-term survival. The 
public, particularly the traditional supporters of the welfare system in the trade unions, 
public service institutions, and other social organisations, viewed the reforms initiated 
by the Social Democrats without undue suspicion simply because the party was 
understood as the traditional defender of the welfare system. In other words, the Social 
Democrats were confident enough to take the measures needed to guarantee the future 
of the universal welfare system. Against this background, the reforms initiated by the 
Social Democrats since 1994 had a more adaptive character, with the view to adjust, or 
if needed, to change the system to fit the new circumstances. The reforms 
accomplished during the 1990s have not changed the structure of the universal welfare 
system and indeed even those changes, which might have had a more `structural' 
character, were not on a large scale. 
One of the more far-reaching changes occurred in the pension system in which 
pensions were adjusted to take account of demographic changes and predicted 
economic growth, although even here the essential parts of the system remained intact, 
and the only changes made were to the level of generosity of some benefits. 
Significantly, however, private alternatives in social care services were accepted, and 
by that, the exceptional nature of Nordic welfare states in their provision of social 
services in which all services, for example for the elderly and children, were provided 
publicly, disappeared. 
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Techniques of welfare reduction 
Reducing welfare spending is not an easy task for governments (Pierson, 1996,2001). 
Welfare cuts are always unpopular, and regardless of the areas in which governments 
chose to make cuts, they risk losing the support of groups who would be negatively 
affected by retrenchment. Moreover, if the need for saving is large, the number of 
recipients affected is also large. Reducing benefit levels by a limited amount is 
therefore preferable, even though this would affect the entire population and therefore 
be generally unpopular. Targeted saving, which directs the resources from the existing 
programme to groups in greater need, is another technique for welfare reduction which 
normally favours families and the young unemployed. 
Social policy analysts use different methods to measure changes in welfare spending. 
Some studies mainly focus on changes in welfare expenditure (OECD, 1999), while 
others (see Daly, 1997) examine changes in cash benefits over time or examine other 
approaches to welfare reduction (see Marklund 1988; Tarschyrs 1985). For example, 
Tarschys (1985: 32-54) and Marksund (1988: 44-51) point out five major methods of 
welfare cuts, which according to them have been used in the Nordic countries. At a 
more general level, these five methods, in Marklund's words, (p. 44) are: `modification 
of indexation rules, introduction of income-tests, increased service fees, benefit freeze 
and reduced compensation levels. ' 
Modifying the indexation of major programmes means that the social security index, 
which previously varied with the cost of the living index, no longer followed this 
pattern, but changed at a slower pace. Most households, but particularly full-time 
welfare recipients such as old-age and invalidity pensioners, and some groups of long 
term sick, lost a certain amount of their income. On the other hand, slower indexation 
is perceived as the fairest approach to welfare cuts because it distributes the cuts across 
social groups and across most benefits. Moreover, it has reasonable saving effects and 
also neutral effects on basic welfare principles (Marklund, 1988: 46). 
Income-tests, or means tests, are a technique, which allocates public benefits only to 
those in need. In other words, the better off are deemed not to need benefits and 
therefore, by introducing selective policies, the welfare system will, for the same 
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amount of public spending, contribute a more equal distribution of income. The 
income-test technique has traditionally been understood as a shift from universal 
towards selective welfare (Titmuss, 1963). While conservative parties have always 
tended to support income-tested welfare policies, labour movements have argued in 
favour of universal public benefits, such as public pensions, invalidity pensions and 
child allowances, because universalism not only ensures a fair redistribution 
(Marklund, 1988) and also greater `reach'. 
Increased service fees and decreased subsidies are other techniques, which have been 
used to moderate public spending. These techniques have particularly been used in the 
health system, in which individual fees for medical services have increased, and 
subsidies, in particular for pharmaceuticals and aids and appliances to the 
handicapped, have decreased. In the Nordic welfare model, increased fees for these 
services have not been seen as a source of income, but as a means of avoiding their 
unnecessary use (Markfund, 1988). The amount of money received as fees for the 
services actually comprises little, of total expenditure for the provision of services. 
The fourth technique involves freezing benefit levels, which means that governments 
and other central bodies avoid the increase of welfare spending through delaying 
decisions about rises in areas in which the level of benefits are adjusted annually. 
Housing and family policies are among the major areas here. For example, by not 
linking the child benefits to a social security index, governments in Nordic countries 
have effectively limited increases to below the rate of inflation (Marklund, 1988). 
Reduced compensation level is the fifth technique for governments to save welfare 
expenditure. This method is the most direct and obvious way of saving because the 
level of earnings replacement decreases or payment is delayed for a certain amount of 
time. This method has mainly affected the health insurance system but has also been 
used in other systems such as unemployment benefits systems and pre-pension 
systems. However, this method does not normally affect the majority of the citizenry 
because, in the case of sick leave, for example, the average number of days is low. On 
the other hand, many groups in the labour market are protected by different kinds of 
negotiated insurance. The system has also adopted measures to protect those people 
who are frequently or chronically sick. 
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Daly (1997), who has examined reforms in European welfare states for the 10 years 
from 1985 to 1995, focused on changes in cash transfers. The study emphasised both 
the procedures and principles governing the alternation of benefits during the period, 
and the pattern in which changes occurred. In other words, two sets of questions were 
investigated: first, what had happened to welfare state cash benefits over the period of 
the study concerned; second, how would the development of the welfare system and 
the pattern of its transition be evaluated. By studying those changes in cash benefits, 
which show significant trends over time, we would be able to analyse the implications 
of such developments, because governments normally do not admit changes in trends. 
Real shifts in historical events can only be observed by studying small changes, 
however, some of them are difficult to detect empirically (Myles, 1990). 
But why did Daly focus on changes in the cash benefits system? Would such changes 
be a relevant measure for identifying welfare state trends? According to Daly, one of 
the main features of the cash benefits system is its power to reveal the nature and 
quality of social rights. 
As the most tangible expression of social rights, cash transfers are wonderfully revealing 
of the terms on which individuals can make claims on public resources and the types of 
solidarity, which are fostered by systems of public support. They offer a rich field of 
interpretation. There is probably no better way to uncover how the state stacks individuals 
and groups vis-ä-vis each other on the resources hierarchy. Cash transfers, furthermore, 
lead to the heart of welfare states' objectives, variation in benefit height, type and general 
organisation allowing us to judge the relative priority attributed to poverty alleviation, 
income security and income redistribution (Daly, 1997). 
This aim can best be achieved by studying the institutional architecture of cash benefit 
systems. By enquiring about whether and how programmatic features of cash benefits 
such as rules of entitlement, the scope, level and duration of benefits have been altered 
through legislation over a period of time, we would be able to map out the level of the 
generosity of the system. Furthermore, the accessibility of benefits for people, the 
generosity of conditions within/out the public support system, and the period of time 
they are allowed to rely on the benefits, are significant facts that have to be 
undertaken. Most researchers (Stephens, 1996; Daly, 1997; Korpi and Esping- 
Andersen, 1984; Palme, 1990) who have studied the development of welfare states in 
European countries over the past two decades have focused on one or more of 
programmatic areas such as old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, family policies 
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and benefits to children, provisions for caring for the handicapped and elderly, 
sickness benefits, and means-tested social assistance benefits. The broader referents of 
change, as Daly (1997) emphasises, have been the boundaries between the state and 
the market on the one hand, and the family on the other. 
Changes in cash benefits might be a relevant measure for identifying trends in welfare 
states in a more general comparison. But for the Nordic model of welfare, which has 
been characterised as the most progressive and mature expression of welfare statism 
(Einhorn and Logue, 1989), . other aspects, mainly the quality of benefits and services, 
are more significant. As Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987) stress, and as discussed in 
chapter three, the Nordic Welfare States have achieved the objectives of solidarity and 
equality through comprehensive and universal policies of a high quality. 
Sweden's changing welfare state 
Among the core areas of welfare, provision for the elderly and unemployment 
measures make up more than half of the expenditure on public social budgets. 
Therefore, it seems natural that these areas became major targets for budget cuts. The 
crucial question, then, is whether the governments announce the cuts in the system or 
try to accomplish the changes without announcing. In contrast to cuts by `stealth' (e. g. 
indexation) the Nordic systems tend to reduce the level of benefits and services openly. 
In other words, from a Nordic perspective, transitions in the main areas of social policy 
such as the pensions system, unemployment benefits, health system and sickness 
benefits and family policy can show the trend of welfare system towards either 
extension or restrictions of provision. This section focuses on policy changes in these 
key areas. 
The discussion so far indicates that the policy of retrenchment differs completely from 
the policy of expansion. While cuts in entitlements and welfare services affects 
negatively the life situation of groups of population, most governments are concerned 
to use different techniques of welfare reductions so that the measures are not easily 
detected by the groups of recipients who could lose from the reforms. The methods of 
welfare cuts are the first indicators, which reveal the real intentions of governments. 
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The more a welfare state applies methods of retrenchment, which are difficult for the 
public to detect, the more likely it is that the cuts will have long-term character. 
Conversely, governments in generous welfare systems tend to employ either temporary 
reductions to manage a certain economic misfortune or substitute one kind of policy 
for another, for efficiency reasons, but do the change more openly. Even if an 
entitlement has to be cut, politicians in generous welfare states frequently make the 
changes without attempting to hide the lack of reform. In the Swedish model savings 
were produced without too much reference to short-terms political considerations. 
The other aspect of the policy of retrenchment relates to the overall trend underlying 
the policy change. To what extent are the key features of universality, high service 
quality and generosity vulnerable to fundamental transformation? Before starting the 
discussion about transformation in different social policy areas, it has to be emphasised 
that the analyses will not just focus on changes in cash benefits but also on the quality 
of benefits and services. After all the arrangements employed in different areas of 
social policy are in some cases (such as employment issues) so widespread that they 
receive greater resources than unemployment's cash benefits. In other words, the 
Swedish system tends to invest much larger in different ALMP measures than in 
unemployment's cash benefits. 
Changes in unemployment benefits 
Unemployment benefits in Sweden take into two major parts; one concerns investment 
in activation measures through subsidisation of employment and vocational training of 
the unemployed and, the second, concerns cash benefits. To cope with increasing 
unemployment or to maintain full employment, the Swedish welfare system has used 
traditional active labour market policies (ALMP), which played such a central role in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Regner, 2000). In periods of economic up-swing, the ALMP has 
been used to better serve the demand for labour, while during the period of down- 
swing in the 1990s, these policies were used to fight unemployment (Kautto, 2000). 
An obvious difference in ALMP measures during the 1990s was the increase in the 
number of measures taken to cope with the differing circumstances. While before the 
1990s there were three policy measures - vocational training, subsidised employment, 
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and employment support - by 1998,15 new measures were added to those three 
traditional measures (Kautto, 2000; Regner, 2000). 
Such variations in the kinds of measures created by the Labour Market Board (AMS) 
shows that in periods of crisis, extensive investment was put into the active labour 
market policy. A comparison of the number of people participating in all the various 
ALMP measures with the number of people in the total labour force shows that 
between 1990 and 1994, the ratio almost followed the same trend as unemployment. 
There is a consensus among commentators (Kautto, 2000; SOU, 2000: 3, p. 191) that 
the whole of the 1990s was a period of crisis in the Swedish labour market. A 
combination of international recession accompanied by problems with currency 
exchange rates, declining investment and a downturn in domestic consumption, caused 
a dramatic rise in unemployment. An unprecedented increase from 2 per cent in 1990 
to 8 per cent in 1993 resulted in the biggest public deficit since the 1930s, which many 
scholars (SOU, 2000: 3) have regarded as the major reason for Sweden's financial 
crisis. The decreased level of the share of employment from 84.8 per cent between 
1986 and 1991 to 74.5 per cent between 1995 and 1997, not only massively increased 
the cost of unemployment benefits, but also the declining employment rate led to 
falling tax receipts (Aberg and Nordenmark, 2000). 
The budget deficit caused by the employment crisis amounted to 210 billion kronur in 
1993 -a figure as large as expenditures for the social insurance system, defence, 
police and justice system taken together (SOU, 2000: 3: 40). Compared internationally, 
Swedish unemployment in the 1990s increased more dramatically than in other 
western-European countries (Lundborg, 2000). Moreover, it had a devastating impact 
on almost every section of the Swedish economy (Figure 5.1). The heaviest drops in 
employment were between 1990 and 1993, in manufacturing, trade and construction. 
Manufacturing industry, which was the biggest sector, lost the most jobs. Almost one 
fifth of the jobs in this sector vanished between 1991 and 1997. 
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Figure 5.1 Employed persons by industry in Sweden 1990/98. 
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While job losses in different parts of the private sector could be explained by the 
international downswing in demand, or the fixed exchange rate policy, decreasing 
employment in the public sector could mainly be explained by the budget 
consolidation programme. Moreover, the development of total employment in the 
private sector shows that job losses in that sector occurred between 1991 and 1993, 
with employment increasing during the latter years of the period under review (SOU, 
2000: 3). In contrast to the private sector, public sector employment decreased every 
year between 1991 and 1997. Between 1990 and 1998, the number of employees in the 
public sector decreased by 343,000. Indeed, the majority of the decline in total 
employment occurred among state employees. The number of state employees 
decreased from 394,000 in 1990 to 220,000 in 1998. Employment in municipalities fell 
from 1 258,000 in 1990 to 1,089,000 in 1998 (Lundborg, 2000; SOU, 2000: 3). 
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Figure 5.2 Employed persons in privat and public sectors 1990/98. 
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While in 1990, the ratio of open unemployment was 2 per cent, the ratio of other 
unemployed people who were participants in ALMPs measures was 3.1 (Figure 5.2). 
In 1994, when the rate of unemployment increased to 8 per cent, the ratio of 
participants in ALMP reached 7.2 per cent. Since 1994, though, the volume of ALMP 
has decreased each year. In other words, stabilisation in the unemployment figures was 
met with less effort in active labour market measures (Kautto, 2000: 83, p. 80). 
Figure 5.3 Unemployment rate and the ratio of participants in 
ALMP measures per 100 in labour force (15-64), 1990-98 
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Source: Lundborg (2000: 37, p. 16) and Kautto (2000: 83, p. 80). 
Despite that, in 1998, investment in activation measures was more than in 1990. The 
aggregate expenditure for active labour market measures rose from 9 to 21 billions 
during the decade (Regner, 2000: 37, p. 97). This suggests that, despite the years of 
crisis and changes in the welfare policies, Sweden still retains its labour market policy, 
with subsidised employment and vocational training of the unemployed as the major 
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measures. Furthermore, despite changes in the labour market and decreases in 
unemployment insurance in the 1990s, efforts for work creation and an active 
employment programme have intensified. Both right-wing and Social Democratic 
governments supported active labour market policies, which included escalated 
training and re-training measures to improve the competencies and skills of 
unemployed people. These measures were taken to prevent an increase in the number 
of long-term unemployed (Olsson Hort, 1995: 7). A range of reskilling, educational 
measures, and various forms of community work, have been offered to the 
unemployed, and those involved in these measures were entitled to labour market 
training grants, almost at the same level as unemployment benefits (Olsson Hort, 
1995: 7). This policy was based on studies, which had demonstrated the positive effects 
of active labour market policies in reducing open unemployment. One of these studies 
has suggested that Sweden's unemployment was reduced by 2.4 per cent due to active 
labour market policies in 1985 (Jackman, et al., 1990, in OECD, 1994: 109). 
The Societal consequences of unemployment 
Unprecedented unemployment has not just had economic consequences for the public 
budget, but it has also been problematic for Swedish society in general (Korpi & 
Stenberg 2001). Assessing its development during the 1990s, unemployment had a 
particularly negative impact on three social groups (SOU, 2001: 53). First, during the 
deepest part of the economic crisis, men were more adversely affected by 
unemployment. While in 1990, unemployment rates for men and women were similar 
(2 per cent), by 1993, rates rose to 11.2 for men but only 7.7 for women. However, 
with economic recovery in the later 1990s, men's unemployment rate dropped to the 
female level. Another social group, which suffered greatly in the 1990s economic 
crisis, was the younger generation. As shown in the figure below (5.4), in 1994, the 
rate of unemployment among the 16-23 age-group reached almost 35 per cent - four 
times higher than the rate in 1990. The severe situation in the labour market, which 
ended new recruitment in many companies and in the public sector, reduced the 
chances for young people to enter the labour market. As a result, the disposable 
income for this group decreased during the recession. Even after labour market 
stabilisation, the younger households were still behind, and the gap in equivalent 
disposable income, together with resulting inequalities, has continued (SOU, 2000: 40). 
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Figure 5.4 Unemployment rates by age in Sweden, 1990-97, per cent 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
Z60 
15 
10 
5 
0 
" 16-23 
U 24-55 
-- 56-65 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year 
Source: SOU (2000: 3, p. 194). 
The third group to be affected by the high unemployment rate was immigrants. During 
the worst of the recession (1990-93), the unemployment rate increased sharply among 
non-European immigrants, reaching its highest in 1995. The employment rate in this 
group decreased from 72 to 54 between 1990 and 1997 (SvD, 3/12/2000). One third of 
the non-European labour force was out of the labour market (either for the whole year 
or a short period of the year), while among European immigrants, the rate was slightly 
below 20 per cent. The situation continued to be very poor throughout the decade, but 
at the end of the period the unemployment rate started to drop considerably, reaching 
approximately 20 per cent of all immigrants in 2000 (Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.5 Unemployment rates among Swedishborn, European 
immigrants and non-European immigrants 1990-97 (Unemployed for 
either a whole year or a short period of the year), per cent. 
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However, as a consequence of a long period of unemployment, the income gap 
between immigrants and the Swedish born population has grown (Edin & Aslund, 
2001). Yet, the latest data from the year after the economic crisis shows that income 
differences are almost unchanged. Overall, the high unemployment rate in these 
groups had negative impacts on public expenditure, and as explored in the next 
section, this encouraged governments to change the benefit levels on several occasions 
during the 1990s. 
Unemployment insurance 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the dramatic rise in unemployment led to an equally 
dramatic increase in public expenditure. Consequently, the government decided to 
reduce the level of unemployment benefit, which formed the major component of the 
state budget. As late as 1989, when unemployment was still at its lowest level and the 
state budget was still in surplus, the Social Democratic government extended welfare 
measures for the unemployed. For example, the loss of income by the unemployed has 
been reduced to the minimum level; i. e. the level of benefit has been increased to 90 
per cent of wages. Furthermore, in the same year, the minimum level of compensation 
was increased by 25 per cent (Governments budget bill, 1988/89). However, in an 
effort to control the cost of the scheme, a five-day waiting period was re-introduced in 
1993 and the compensation level reduced from 90 per cent to 80 per cent of previous 
earnings. On the other hand, the formal duration of the compensation period remained 
unchanged at 300 days, and 450 days for workers older than 55. Benefits could also be 
extended through participation in ALMPs (Regner, 2000: 90-1). Membership of 
government-financed, but trade union-administered, unemployment insurance funds is 
open to all members of the labour force, and benefits can be claimed after 12 months 
of membership and 80 days of work within any five months period, subject to a 
willingness-to-work requirement of 17 hours per week and also a waiting period of 
five days. 
The Social Democratic Party, supported by the labour movement, promised that with 
victory in the election in September 1994 it would return to the old system and the 
compensation level would increase to the same level as before. However, in practice, 
the compensation level was reduced to 75 per cent (Figure 5.6). The government's 
main argument was that continuing financial problems, (i. e. in 1994 unemployment 
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had cost 130 billion Crowns, which was one fifth of the state budget. See Governments 
budget bill, 1995/96) made change impossible. 
Figure 5.6 Income replacement rate in case of unemployment 
percent 
year 
Source: Budgetproposition (1989/90-2000). 
Despite the reduction in unemployment benefit, a 1996 proposal for a time limit to 
unemployment insurance benefits was rejected, and therefore, no change in this matter 
was made (SOU, 1996: 5 1). Participation in active labour market policy schemes would 
be enough for the renewal of eligibility for benefits. This generous policy can be 
modified by a strict set of job availability criteria. Stressing job placement, and 
regulating the unemployed to jobs shows that, in contrast to many other countries, 
these measures reduce long spells in unemployment (Danish Ministry of Finance, 1998 
in OECD, 1999: 148). However, pressures on the unemployed to accept job offers from 
employment offices have not increased during the period. On this issue, the number of 
those receiving insurance who have received reduced benefits because of a refusal to 
accept offered jobs has not increased markedly (OECD, 1999: 77). Despite the fact that 
there is a formal upper limit to the duration of the benefit, and as noted, the funds have 
the authority to discontinue benefits for those who reject job offers, the option of 
requalifying for unemployment benefits through participation in ALMPs has saved 
many unemployed from disqualification. As Studies (Harkman et al., 1997) have 
shown, the reduction in replacement rate in unemployment insurance from 90 to 80 per 
cent in 1993 had a rather stronger impact on both the behaviour of the unemployed to 
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intensify their search for work, and also on the reservation wage the unemployed use 
to assess job offers. 1° 
As it has been illustrated, in fighting the rapid increase in unemployment, Social 
Democratic governments used the old weapon of activating and training the 
unemployed rather than simply paying cash benefits. While these measures expanded 
at almost the same pace as unemployment rose, cash benefits were reduced in two 
steps by a sum of 15 per cent. Despite suggestions from the employers and the 
bourgeois parties to further cut cash benefits, the Social Democrats avoided further 
decreases. These measures received support from the representatives in the unions who 
advocated continuity of the generous system but there were critics in the labour 
movement who blamed the Party for changes in its traditional policy. The former 
chairman of the LO was one of the critics, who at the turn of the 1990s, criticised the 
Social Democratic government for overestimating the threats caused by exogenous 
factors like globalisation, thereby rejecting the traditional labour policy: 
Until 1989-90 the domain in the Swedish labour policy was full employment. The main 
political goal was to create as many jobs as possible and through that both increase the 
production, which would lead to wealth, and by a very low rate of unemployment reduce the 
costs for the welfare state. We were supposed to tackle problems by increasing the rate of 
employment, and we did so throughout the 1980s. For instance, in 1982 when the bourgeois 
government faced an economic problem caused by an unemployment rate at nearly 4 percent, 
with a budget deficit around 90 billion Crowns as consequence, the LO and the Party, which at 
that time were in opposition made an agreement to overcome the budget deficit through a full 
employment policy. Therefore, after the take over, the Party succeeded in overcoming the 
economic problems. During the 1980s, however, the policy of full employment faced 
considerable attacks when the neo-liberal governments, for instance in UK, adopted new goals 
which suggested low inflation, balance in budget, and reductions in the influence of unions in 
the labour market rather than full employment. Prime Minister Thatcher suggested savings in 
the government's expenditure instead of full employment. In my view, in Sweden it was not 
the bourgeois government which, after the take over of 1991, took over from the neo-liberals in 
UK in order to change the course, but the Social Democratic government which, in 1990 
replaced its full employment policy with the policy of low inflation and, resulting from that, let 
the unemployment rise in the beginning of the 1990s (Stig Malm, interview). 
There is no doubt that at the turn of the 1990s the Social Democrats were in the middle 
of an ideological crisis due to the fact that essential elements of the traditional welfare 
system were targeted for reform. The traditional active labour policy was one of the 
areas received most attention by the advocates of change. Some of the modernisers in 
the Party were openly criticizing low efficiency levels in the public sector and thereby 
advocating `downsizing' the public sector. They regarded redundancies in the public 
10 According to this report the reservation wage tends to be reduced by 4 Crowns for every 10 Crowns 
cut in the replacement rate. 
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sector as necessary because the production of services in the sector had to be as 
efficient as in the private sector: 
If you compare Sweden with bigger countries in Europe, such as Spain and France, you 
will realise that in these countries, which have a larger unemployment rate than Sweden, 
both the private and public sector are very inefficient. You can see that in these countries 
the average number of workers in a restaurant, pharmacy or in a hospital is much higher 
than the real need. It seems that the working process in these countries have not been 
rationalised on the same level as we have done in Sweden. Therefore, there are a huge 
number of low-paid workers in both the private but much more in the public sector. They 
could argue that these people at least have a job. This is a honourable perspective but the 
consequence of such strategy will be that in these countries the public sector will forever 
be judged as an inefficient sector. On the contrary, we have always stressed that the public 
sector has to be rationalised as the technical innovation occurs and new methods for giving 
care and services are found. The allocation of resources in the public sector, particularly 
regarding the labour force, has to follow the same pattern as it does in the private market. 
Keeping low-paid and unskilled workforce in the public sector, such as in a hospital, for 
the sake of keeping the unemployment rate at lower level, is neither possible (because of 
higher technical and knowledge demands) nor a healthy and rational politic (Widar 
Andersson, Interview). 
Despite the ideological changes, the Social Democrats did not initiate the process of 
redundancies in the Swedish labour market. The process was begun by private sector 
firms during the Bourgeois Coalition's period in government. When the Social 
Democrats initiated large-scale redundancies in the public sector, the economic crisis 
was already widespread and the Party could blame the Bourgeois government for the 
enormous budget deficits it had left behind. That forced the Social Democrats into 
large-scale savings. However, as the leader of the Left Party states, the large-scale 
redundancies in the public sector and subsequent deterioration in unemployment 
insurance, were the major factors that caused anger and resentment among the 
traditional supporters of the Social Democratic Party. Persistence among supporters 
forced the Party to reconsider its position and made the Social Democratic leaders 
avoid further retrenchments, and look instead towards re-establishing traditional labour 
policy: 
Retrenchments in the public sector with huge number of redundancies in public services, 
deteriorations in unemployment insurance and, changes in labour legislations were the 
factors, which caused disappointment among the supporters of the Social Democratic 
party. Many of them turned to the Left Party. By the same token many activists in the trade 
Unions found the Left Party as the most genuine advocates of the interests of the wage 
earners. At the same period the protests against the Social democratic government 
increased. The Party was blamed for pursuing right-wing policies with redundancies in 
public sector and retrenchments in welfare benefits and services as result. At that period I 
was representing the Left Party in negotiations with the Social democrats and I could see 
that the protests had great impacts on the leaders of the party and as a result the Social 
democratic leaders changed the direction and adopted a more traditional policy which 
meant re-expansion of the public sector with employment of many new staff in the public 
services as a result (Ingrid Burman, Interview). 
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By announcing a goal of reducing the unemployment rate to 4 per cent by year 2000, 
the Social democrats tried to convince the labour movement that the traditional full 
employment policy had been readopted. 
As stated so far, it is possible to conclude that the rate of employment was the only 
area, which was mainly affected by global pressures. In the other three areas of 
pensions, health and sickness insurance and family policy, changes were not due to 
crucial transformations resulting directly from globalisation but as a consequence of 
the high budget deficit caused by unemployment. Therefore one can conclude that the 
globalisation had an indirect effect on most of the changes in different welfare 
programmes. In the case of pensions, an area where change has definitely occurred, of 
course, pessimistic prognoses about long-term crisis were the main reason for reform. 
Changes in the demographic trends are regarded as the major reason, which made 
changes in the pension system inevitable. 
Demographic trends and social circumstances 
We have looked at the economic changes and some of the adjustments in the Swedish 
economy in the 1990s, but an equally important part of economic policy, particularly 
when related to welfare, is the nature of demographic change. Sweden, like other 
industrial nations, is at the vanguard of the ageing process. During the past decades the 
numbers and proportion of elderly people have increased dramatically. While at the 
beginning of the 1970s nearly 14 per cent of the population were over 65 by 1991 the 
percentage grew to 18 per cent. It is expected that by 2030 nearly a quarter of the 
population in Sweden will be over 65 (SCB, 1994,1998). Such demographic trends 
and future predictions have been understood as a major threat to the future of the 
welfare state. The crucial point debated by commentators (Wells and Freer, 1988) has 
been that the ageing population represents a burden on society because the elderly are 
economically unproductive and increasingly frail, and therefore demand extensive 
social and health care. By 2000, the percentage of `old old' elderly - those over 80 - 
who were in great need of services was 5 per cent. The figure is estimated to grow to 8 
per cent by 2030. 
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Although Sweden has been among the countries with the highest percentage of elderly, 
and some academics (Malmberg and Lindh, 1995) even argue that the demographic 
figure has been a significant reason for the low economic growth in recent decades, 
others (Nygren and Person, 2002) disagree. They believe that although the percentage 
of the elderly will rise in Sweden, by the same token the percentage of those in the 
labour market will also rise. In this regard, the situation will be better in Sweden than 
in some other OECD countries such as the UK and France. Authors such as Bonoli 
(2000), also reject the ageing thesis, which according to him has been overstated. 
However, in the Swedish debate the advocates of the population-ageing thesis address 
the problem as a result of two factors. The number and proportion of elderly has 
increased partly because Swedes are living longer, but parallel to that, women have 
been producing fewer babies. The changing pattern of fertility with the declining birth 
rate, (i. e. the number of live births in one year per 1000 females of child-bearing age), 
can probably be seen as the most important factor explaining the population ageing. In 
past years the decrease in fertility has been especially high among younger women. 
Since 1990 the rate of fertility has decreased steadily among women below the age of 
30. In 1998, more than 70 per cent of all Swedish-born women aged 25 or lower had 
no children. Two decades ago the rate was 45 percent. Women's choice to delay 
pregnancy has been explained in two ways. First, it is now more common for women 
now to be educated to a tertiary level, and second, the majority of women in Sweden 
prefer to establish themselves in the labour market first, and only then have their first 
child (SOU, 2000: 3, p. 48). 
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Figure 5.7 The share of elderly and children in the population, 1900-2030 
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Whilst a decrease in fertility is the main factor responsible for the increasing 
percentage of older people in the population, the decline in mortality rates, which 
Sweden has also experienced in the past century, has also contributed to current 
population ageing. Although in the mid-19th century, the declines in infant mortality 
rate mostly reduced instances of infant death, and that lowered the average age of the 
population, in the past decades, the life expectancy at birth has increased dramatically 
(by four years since the 1970s). Combining the earliest declines in mortality that 
reduced infant deaths in the middle of the century with the great increase in life 
expectancy at the end of the century has contributed to the changing balance in the 
proportion of the population who are elderly. As is shown in figure 5.7, while the share 
of elderly in the population has increased steadily between 1920 and 1990, the share of 
children (0-17) has decreased, with an interruption in the first decade after the Second 
World War. 
Migration is the third major factor, which has influenced Sweden's demographic 
profile. During the 1990s, a considerable number of refugees arrived in Sweden. As a 
consequence, the share of the population who were immigrants increased from 7.5 in 
1980 to 11.1 per cent in 2000. The composition of immigrants has changed hugely: 
while in 1960 more than 300,000 of immigrants came from Nordic countries and 
199 
merely 3,000 came from non-European countries, in 1997, the number of Nordic 
immigrants decreased to 287,000 while the number of non-European immigrants 
increased more than 100 times to 322,000 people. As a result, the country's ethnic 
homogeneity has been replaced by multicultural diversity, and this has obviously 
changed the conditions concerning social policy and education policy (SOU, 2000: 3, 
p. 54). As shown in the figure, present demographic trends suggest that ethnic minority 
groups have a young age profile. As family sizes among immigrants is larger, the 
implication is that child care will be more costly, but in the longer term, the younger 
age profile of the immigrants will undoubtedly mean a greater supply of young labour 
moving into the ageing Swedish labour market. 
Overall, the dramatic demographic changes experienced in Sweden during the past 
decades radically altered the structure of the population. The interaction of fertility, 
mortality and immigration factors, as it has been shown, has changed the age structure 
in Sweden. While the long- term decline in the fertility rate seems to explain the 
ageing of the population, growing immigration has to be seen as a factor that has 
decreased the speed of the ageing process, at least to some extent. The future age 
structure of the population will, therefore, be related to these two key issues of fertility 
and migration. Whereas changes in the rate of fertility will not have an immediate 
impact on the age structure of the population, it will be possible to predict the age 
structure on a long-term scale. But in the case of immigration, there is widespread 
uncertainty, because the future of immigration will be determined by factors such as 
immigration policy and tendencies in the Swedish labour market. 
In sum, during the 1990s both the number and proportion of children and elderly 
people increased in Sweden. While the rate of fertility will determine development 
amongst younger age groups, predictions of the number of elderly will be an easy task. 
For example, it is known that the post Second World War baby boomers will begin 
retiring in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. 
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Figure 5: 8 Changes in age groups in Sweden, 1990-98 
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Transformation of the old age Pension system 
Since the pension reform of 1958 and the development of the ATP system, some major 
changes in the Swedish economy, in addition to demographic trends towards an older 
population, have caused serious financial problems for the system (SOU, 1994: 21; 
Palmer, 2001). The high inflation and reduced economic growth, which characterised 
the 1970s and 1980s, together with high unemployment in the 1990s, have prevented a 
rapid income progression in Sweden. Knowing that in the pay-as-you-go system 
(PAYG), pensions are financed by the succeeding generation, such economic problems 
will have consequences for the financing of pensions. 
The ageing population seems to have been the major threat for the financial stability of 
the System (Fehr, 2000). When ATP was introduced, the number of old-age and early 
retirement pensioners was quite low, and therefore, the working population was able to 
finance the costs of the pension system. As noted in chapter five, demographic changes 
have dramatically changed the ratio between the number of people in the working 
population and the number of old-age and early-retired pensioners. In 1990, the ratio 
was 2.38, but it is predicted that in 2025 the ratio will have reduced to 1.78, which 
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means that each member of the working population has to finance more than half of 
one pension (Stahlberg, 1995: 8). 
Furthermore, after three decades of the ATP, other weaknesses had been identified. 
1 These were summarised by Stahlberg (1995: 8-9) as follows: " 
* In the ATP system, pensioners' standards of living did not follow the changes 
in those of the working population. When, as a result of economic growth, the 
living standards of the working population increased, pensioners' standards 
declined, and when that of the working population declined the pensioners 
increased. 
* The principle of compensation for loss of income, which was an essential 
element when the system was constructed, had been eroded. 
* The connection between the amounts a person paid into the system and what 
s/he got back in the form of pension was weak. This might have a negative 
impact on people's incentive to work. 
* The pattern of income redistribution had become, as a result of the pension 
regulations, more unsystematic, which contradicts the purpose of the traditional 
income distribution policy. 
* In the PAYG system the incentive to save has decreased, because with the 
existing generous public pension system there is no need for contributions to 
private pension funds. It seems that in a funded system, as a result of more 
savings, the contribution to investment and economic growth would also 
increase. 
Furthermore, the rate of the pension in the ATP system was determined by an 
individuals' previous income. It was related to the `base amount' (about 20 per cent of 
the average industrial wage) and therefore, protected against inflation. In other words, 
changes in real wages in the labour market or in the productivity of the economy did 
not affect the rate of pensions. The rate of growth in productivity, however, had a 
decisive impact on the pension levy, paid by the working population. As long as there 
was reasonable economic growth and real wages rose, then the total wage sum, out of 
I1 Sunden (2000) has almost similar views regarding the weaknesses of the old pension system in 
Sweden. 
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which the pension was to be paid, increased, and as a result, the pension levy remained 
low. However, low real wage growth meant that the working population had to pay 
larger amounts in contributions. As shown in the table below, predictions about the 
future demonstrated that if the average annual growth rate was 1 per cent, pension 
levies for the national basic pension and ATP would amount to nearly 33 per cent in 
2015, and if there were no growth at all, the levy would have to be 48 per cent of total 
wages. 
Table 5.1 Pension levies for the national basic pension and ATP, with different GDP growth rate 
Year Annual real GDP growth rate 
0% 1% 2% 
1995 26.5 24.7 23.3 
2015 43.7 32.7 25.1 
2025 48.1 33.1 23.3 
Source: SOU (1990: 76, P. 30). 
Apart from this inherent weakness in the ATP system, it had, as OECD economists 
(OECD, 1994: 84) stress, `a large apparent effect on income distribution, mostly 
because it replaced private saving by public provision of income. ' The living standard 
of pensioners was above the level of welfare benefits, even for those who did not 
receive benefits from the supplementary ATP pension. Furthermore, the generosity of 
the national `basic pension', which is paid to all who have been resident in the country 
for a certain time, has ensured that the risk of poverty is virtually non-existent for 
pensioners, compared to systems in which public pensions are related to previous 
income. According to Barr (1992), as a result of this policy, the average risk of poverty 
was 5.3 per cent in Sweden, whereas in eight other OECD countries the average 
percentage was 9.7. However, financial problems in the pension system, mainly caused 
by the PAYG arrangement, have made reform inevitable. A central budgetary issue 
was the large tax wedge associated with the 40-year old system of government 
provision (OECD, 1999: 64). 
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The Political agreement for pension reform 
At the turn of the 1980s the political elite and representatives of major social groups, 
such as the unions and pensioners' organisations, were almost agreed that the archaic 
pension system in Sweden could not survive the accelerating pressures from the 
demographic changes and the structural problems in the economic system (Gould, 
2001; Lundborg, 2001; Lindbom, 2001). The need for a reconstruction of the system 
was deemed as inevitable. In the early stages, however, the political discussion about 
the possible scenarios for changes differed radically between the two political blocs. 
While the bourgeois parties suggested systemic changes in order to harmonise the 
pension system to the neo-liberal model, which stressed funded pensions, the Social 
Democrats defended the essence of the PAYG system mainly because it would retain 
the redistributive elements of the system (Lundborg, 2001). In the initial debates the 
Social Democrats maintained a defensive policy, which intended to keep the existing 
system and focused its efforts on trying to find new financing sources for the famous 
ATP-system. The strategy was intended to intimidate the voters in order to avoid large- 
scale changes in the system, which was deeply embedded. According to Social 
democrats transferring from funds such as wage earners to the pension funds could 
save the existing system. The conservative Moderate Party and the Liberal Party, on 
the other side, were highly critical of the Social Democratic option, which still saw 
socialisation as its major aim and suffered from a growth policy. Instead they 
advocated a policy, which stressed individual savings in private arrangements 
(Lindbom, 2001). The third bourgeois party, the Centre Party, differed from the other 
two by suggesting a basic insurance model, which would assume the loss of income 
principle but suggested basic pension, although with a higher ground level. The 
essential point here is that apart from these differences in the outset of the 1990s, all 
parties in the parliament came to a consensus that something had to be done with the 
pension system. 
The takeover of the bourgeois coalition in 1991 meant that the advocates of the private 
arrangements had the opportunity to establish a system shift that would give greater 
space to the funded element (Gould, 2001). Instead of doing so, the bourgeois 
government decided to set up an all-party parliamentary working-committee in which 
not only representatives from all parties in the parliament participated but also the 
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contracts were established with the two major interest groups, unions and the 
Pensioners' Organisation (PRO). Despite the deep conflicts inside the working group, 
in 1994 it succeeded to present the first draft of what was intended to be the new 
pension system. By then the bourgeois parties for the first time since the creation of the 
modern welfare state in Sweden became in charge of developing the reform process. 
Until that time, almost all initiatives to reform in the social policy system in general 
and also in the pension system in particular had been taken by the Social Democrats 
(Lundborg, 2001). 
A new era was also started in Sweden, especially for the Social Democrats who had 
become the champions of expansion of the welfare system. Now in opposition, they 
were compelled to observe the moves taken by the bourgeois coalition in order to 
transform those parts of the system, which were understood as being expensive. What 
worried the social democrats was how the Bourgeois government was going to change 
the system. In the case of the pension system, the central question was whether the 
ambition to reform was drastic or just partial. Were the Bourgeois coalition determined 
to carry out the process of liberalisation of the pension system to full effect or, at the 
moment of decision-making, would they avoid far-reaching changes in the system by 
keeping the essential parts of the old-system unchanged? Apart from this, the Social 
Democrats could enjoy the situation because they were not compelled to have the 
initiatives in a process of retrenchment. The situation was also new for the bourgeois 
who never had been in a steering position and who were now compelled to shift the 
course. Even if they stressed `the new start for Sweden' as `the only way' out of the 
structural crisis, they were far from eager to accomplish major reforms, even less to 
shape a new welfare system. As Pierson (1996) noted, since the policy of retrenchment 
is not a glorious option, why do the governing parties in affluent democracies avoid 
risking their popularity by dismantling the generous welfare programmes? 
Consensual mode of decision-making 
The initiative to establish an all-party working group was partly due to need that 
sharing the responsibility of the retrenchments offered to both political blocs. Apart 
from this, the Swedish political establishment had, over a long period of time, 
developed a consensual mode of decision-making which had resulted in a welfare 
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system, and which was supported by virtually all political actors. In this regard (spirit) 
the policy of retrenchment should not endanger programmes, which would cause the 
protest of large groups in society, such as in the middle class, or age groups, such as 
the pensioners. In the case of pension reform, it should not threaten the interests of 
those who already were of pensionable age or would reach the pension age in the near 
future (Lars Bergendahl, interview). Drastic changes in the benefit system, for instance 
in the pension system, would make the powerful interest organisations such as PRO 
(Pensionärernas riks organisation - Pensioners Central Organisation) furious. With the 
support of hundreds of thousands of pensioners who were dependent on public 
pensions, the organisation was in a position to stop every attempt, which would 
jeopardize the existing universal pension programme. 
Apart from the consensual tradition in the Swedish political system, there were other 
factors, which were crucial to the bourgeois government's ambition for an all-party 
agreement. First, the structure of welfare arrangements was the major obstacle, 
because it would prevent far-reaching changes to the existing arrangements. The 
pension system was a typical arrangement in which previous institutional choices 
limited the space for decision makers to adopt such far-reaching changes (Lindbom, 
2001). As old-age pension was based on a PAYG system in which current employees' 
contribution financed the previous generation's pensions, the political establishment 
would have limited options for making essential changes to the system. Therefore, 
every one-sided attempt by the bourgeois parties to shift from public-funded to 
privately-funded arrangements were bound to face institutional problems. In this 
regard, the role of the public sector organisations involved in the pension issue, such as 
the National Social Insurance Board (RFV, Riksförsäkringsverket), Department of 
Finance and Department of Social affair came to be crucial (Pierre, 1995; Marier, 
2001). 
Second, the government consists of four parties which were experiencing internal 
conflicts in the pension issue. The Coalition could easily split if the pressure on a party 
on such a major issue as the pension system become too great (Lindbom, 2001). By 
having the Social Democrats in a working-group, the pressure on governing parties 
could be reduced and be divided between both political blocs. Further, it could give the 
parties stronger reason to act unanimously against the Social Democrats. In other 
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words, by including all political parties in the process of decision-making in unpopular 
issues such as reforms in the pension system it would become difficult for the 
pensioners to trace the origin and cause of the change in the system. Moreover, the 
coalition did not have a majority in the parliament, which made it dependent on the 
support from other parties. 
Third, the unprecedented economic crisis, which seriously threatened the national 
economy and the stability of the society, provided a condition for national unity 
(Lundborg, 2001). In an almost catastrophic condition it was easier to establish 
national unity against those threats which endangered the elementary basis of the 
society. As early as 1984, when there was no sign of economic crisis, a previous 
committee for pension reform had stated that if the rate of unemployment increase and 
the growth rate remained at a low level the pension system would face serious crisis 
(SOU, 1994: 20). Against this background the Social Democrats could not ignore the 
fact that both growth rate and employment rate had reached critical level. 
Fourth, the Bourgeois Coalition were aware that the pension issue was so delicate that 
drastic changes in it could cause enormous protests among those who would lose out 
due to a transformation of the system. Apart from the organised interest groups there 
were recipients of the key benefits such as pensions, which could be expected to resist 
unpopular cutbacks in the pension system. That would give the Social Democrats 
reason to mobilise the social movements against the Bourgeois Coalition (Lundborg, 
2001; Lindbom, 2001). By its strong support in the unions and pensioner's 
organisation the Party was in a position which could create a common cause and turn 
the defeat in election into a victory. 
The active involvement from the Social Democrats in the parliamentary working group 
not only prevented the bourgeois from quick changes of the system but also prevented 
them from enervating the redistributed elements of the initial system (Leif Carlsson, 
interview). However, in the preliminary proposal, which was published in February 
1994, the two political blocs seemed to be in agreement about some crucial aspects, 
which in some element deteriorated for the employees. One of those was the shift from 
employer to employee contributions. The agreement met widespread protest from the 
trade union federations, which were not only dissatisfied by the contribution issue but 
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also were worried about the decreasing replacement rate from 67 per cent in the old 
system to not quite 50 per cent of the income in the new system. On the other hand, the 
employers' organisation demanded far greater changes to the existing system in order 
to move the contribution from employers to employees. Despite the great unhappiness, 
mostly on the LO and the Social Democrats' side, the agreement about the new 
pension scheme survived the election of 1994. After that, as a result of the Social 
Democratic Party's great victory in the election and the broad dissatisfaction in the 
movement, the Party asked for a renegotiation about some aspects of the agreement 
with the bourgeois parties. The move taken by the Social democrats caused widespread 
protests among the bourgeois who feared a total collapse (crack down) of pension deal 
(DN, 98/4/12). Three more years were needed before the five parties could reach a 
final agreement about the new pension system. However, the essential point with the 
agreement was that while both sides were convinced of the need to make changes in 
the system, pressures from the interest groups on their own sides prevented a rapid 
agreement. However, the political parties in both side, most of all in the labour 
movement, could in longer run overcome the resistance by the `radical' factions and 
reach an agreement in a consensual spirit, which would ensure a durable old age 
pension system. While at the beginning the Bourgeois parties emphasised private 
pensions or a greater funded element in the system, in the final agreement, which was 
approved by the parliament in the summer of 1998, they compromised a system which 
was largely based on public arrangement but introduced some minor elements of 
private funding (Lundborg, 2001). 
In 1994 a broad cross-party agreement on major pension reform emerged. Reforms 
were to be implemented in phases over a period of 20 to 25 years. One of the major 
elements in the reform package was the lengthening of the period to be spent in 
employment, either by rising the official age of retirement or extending the duration of 
contributions necessary for the level of pension. Overall this trend was popular in the 
1990s in most European countries (Daly, 1997). In Sweden the official retirement age 
has, from 1993, gradually been raised from 65 to 66 years. By this change the 
retirement age in Sweden is now higher than the standardised retirement age in central 
and South European countries, where it is 65, but is still lower than in some of the 
neighbouring Nordic countries such as Norway, Denmark and Iceland, which have an 
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official retirement age of 67. However, old-age pensions may be claimed from the age 
of 61 and, importantly, there is no obligatory retirement age in Sweden (OECD, 1999). 
The second strategy was a reduction in the average generosity of pensions, which has 
been affected by pushing retirement further back in the life cycle. In other words, the 
contribution period required for full pension has been raised. According to the new 
model from 1995, in which pensions are more directly linked to contributions, the 
basis for pension entitlement is now lifetime income rather than the best 15 years as 
previously. According to the OECD (1999: 65) the `best year' rule favoured the highly 
educated because they earned relatively highly amounts over a few years. By the same 
token, Stahlberg (1995: 12) stresses that in the previous system there was no systematic 
redistribution from higher income earners to lower income earners, but intermediate 
white-collar workers and senior white-collar workers, whose ATP were calculated on 
the basis of the 15 best years rather than their life-cycle incomes, received much larger 
ATP. Correspondence between pension and lifetime earnings, which is the core of the 
scheme, will therefore adjust pensions in real terms if income growth falls or even 
exceeds a certain standard. However, special provisions for time off work due to child- 
minding, military service and undertaking education at tertiary level will be made. 
Historically, the average contribution period required for a full pension had over the 
past decades, steadily been increased in OECD countries, from 13 years in 1960 to 26 
years in 1985 (Palme, 1990: 53). This trend accelerated during the 1990s, and the 
requirements have become more demanding (Daly, 1997). For Sweden, which before 
the reform of 1995 had one of the most generous requirement conditions, the new 
pension reforms caused a remarkable deterioration. Two major groups of losers in the 
new system were women who might have worked part time during a certain period of 
time, and immigrants who have been working in the country for short periods of time. 
The third main feature of the new pension reform was to reduce the value of the 
pension. In 1993 the `basic amount' for calculating the pension was reduced by 2 per 
cent. However, at the same time the means-tested supplementary part of the basic 
pension was increased, which has to be regarded as a partial compensation. 
Furthermore, pensions will, in the new system, be indexed to wages rather than prices. 
As a result, pensions and wages will follow one another when the economy fluctuates 
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(Stahlberg, 1995: 18). By this change, indexation of pensions has irreversibly been 
related to the public budget deficit. Consequently, in 1995 and 1996, the basic amount 
was not indexed fully, but only to 60 per cent of price increases. Despite improved 
public budget deficits in 1997 this 60 per cent indexation continued (Kvist, 1999). 
The fourth significant change in pension benefits is that, for labour-market reasons, 
early retirement no longer qualified a person for a disability pension. 12 Early 
retirement schemes and other special arrangements within unemployment insurance 
for early retirement (well ahead of the formal retirement age) were initially regarded as 
efficient measures against unemployment, particularly in regions with high 
unemployment. However, such arrangements have been reduced dramatically in 
Sweden and elsewhere over the past few years (Palme & Svensson, 1997). A 
combination of increased pressure by the Bourgeois parties (until 1994) and the need 
for cuts in social expenditure (after 1994 Social Democrats had come to office) led to a 
sharpening of eligibility rules for disability pensions. As a result, the number of new 
cases of recipients of disability pension decreased markedly (from 50,500 in 1990 to 
39,500 in 1999) (SOU 2000: 3, p. 80). On the contrary, by imposing low tax for older 
workers, Sweden has encouraged older male workers to participate longer in the labour 
market (Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998). Because in the 1990s unemployment in Sweden 
was high, sustaining participation rates for older male workers at such high levels had 
almost certainly a negative impact on the rate of unemployment. 
In the new system, the pension contribution will be 18.5 per cent of the employee's 
wage but it will be paid into two systems. The main part of contributions (16.5 per 
cent) will still go to the old PAYG system, but 2 per cent will be paid into a private 
funded system. As a result of all these changes, Sweden has moved from a position 
where, in 1990, pensions were very generous, to a position where that generosity has 
declined (Lars Bergendahl, interview). The most important means of reducing pension 
expenditure has been ending indexation. The basic pension was reduced by 2 per cent 
in 1993. In 1999, though, the basic pension were increased and was based on 99 per 
cent of basic amount, and in 2000, on 100 per cent - the same as before the crisis. 
12 Since 1972, people over 60 who, because of adverse conditions, were out of work, were entitled to an 
early retirement pension. During the 1980s, the number of people who for reasons purely concerning the 
labour market applied for early retirement was around 10 per cent (SOU 2000: 3). 
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Uncertainty about the future of the pension system, which started in the 1980s, has 
caused an expansion of private pension schemes. Despite the fact that the private 
schemes still constitute a limited part of the pension system, a failure of the new 
pension system could see these schemes gaining popularity. 
The outcome of the new pension system 
After nearly two decades of work in three different working-committees, the new 
pension system invented in the beginning of the 2000 and the first groups of 
pensioners who received parts of their pension through the new system received their 
pensions in 2003.13 The dividing line between the two major political blocs was clear. 
While the Bourgeois parties intended to increase the funding elements of the system, 
the Social Democrats strived to keep the major parts of the old ATP system intact. The 
outcome contented essential elements of the former in the way that even the new 
system became largely public; however, in the new system the definite percentage 
replacement rate was abolished and instead income-related pension was connected to 
the economic growth. Further, a limited amount of individual funding was 
incorporated into the system, which even then is connected to the rate of interest for 
the funds. In other words, the rate of pensions will not be decided just on incomes but 
also on the amount everybody pays to the pension system. Other that, in the new 
system the economic growth will have a decisive impact on the level of pensions. Only 
if the average growth rate stands at 2 per cent the income replacement rate provided by 
the new pension system is the same as the ATP system (Lars Bergendahl, interview). 
Everybody involved in forming the new pension system is agreed that the level of 
pensions in the new system would never be surely predicted for long. Everything 
depends on the economic development and also on the contributions to the system. 
However, those who understand the pension reform as an inevitable task tend to have a 
13 The Social Democratic government in 1983 set up the first working-committee with Sture Korpi as 
chairman. The Committee, which intended to keep the old system but suggested some changes in the old 
system, could not present its final report before the election in 1991. After the defeat of the Social 
Democrats the Bourgeois coalition appointed a new working-group with Bo Könberg as its chairman. 
The major part of the new system was designed before the election of 1994 but some adjustment was 
made after 1994. According to Lars Bergendahl (Interview) there are still some minor details of the 
pension reform, which require 
further negotiation. 
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more optimistic view about the outcome of the new system. The architect of the reform 
is one of them: 
Despite the fact that the pension system has experienced some essential changes I believe 
that the generosity and the redistributive capacity of the system is still there. We have to 
wait and see what the outcome will be in the future but what I could say now is that if the 
growth rate stands at about 1-2 per cent and if the life expectancy does not rises further, 
the level of income-related pension will be the same as in the ATP system. However, one 
could expect that the life expectancy is going to rise, therefore, we should hope for better 
economic growth. After all, knowing that the former pension system was no longer viable 
and a change in the system was inevitable, I believe that the combination of the 
contribution to the PAYG system and to the funded system will not differ greatly from the 
old system (Bo Könberg, interview). 
Experts in PRO also have an optimistic judgment about the new pension system but 
their main concern so far has not been the outcome of the system for the future 
generations. As one of the two main interest groups which participated in the process 
of formation of the new system, the main objective of the PRO first of all was to 
safeguard the interests of the present pensioners and those who in the near future 
would reach pensionable age. 
The initial position of the PRO was that those changes, which necessarily had to be 
done in order to cope with the demographic changes, should be done within the scope of 
the existing pension system, for example, by changing the indexation of the pensions. 
As time went on we realized that the five parties, which negotiated the new pension 
system, were in agreement about the principle of a new pension system. While these 
parties had the support of the vast majority of the Swedish people we decided to leave 
the critical approach and, instead, try to impact the outcome of the new system in order 
to make the changes appropriate to the interests of our members. Our first priority was, 
of course, to defend the interests of the present pensioners. Even if PRO realized that 
the main aspects of the changes would have impacts on the pension of the next 
generation of the pensioners, we were aware that some of the measures, such as changes 
in the indexation, were going to impact present pensioners as well. In other words, 
pensions would not any longer depend on the consumer price index but would increase 
at the same speed as wages would increase, but the basic pension would still follow the 
consumer price index (Leif Carlsson, interview). 
Many critics of the new system admit that the ATP system would have faced a serious 
crisis in the future. They agreed the system had to be changed, but some of the critics 
rejected the entrance of the funded schemes into the system, which according to them 
made everybody a shareholder. Even though one could avoid choosing a fund so that 
the money would be invested in the premium savings fund of the National Pension 
Insurance Fund, it seems that the critiques against the funding arrangements are mainly 
based on ideological grounds: 
Our pension system, which had a solidaristic characteristic before, has been destroyed. 
The old system was much better than the new system, which is definitely an adaptation 
to the market. I admit that we had to do something with the old pension system but there 
was no need to make the changes so fast and to such a large extent. We had absolutely 
no need to come to a solution, which has made me and many others like speculators in 
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share market. The new system makes me insecure because my pension has become 
dependent upon the development in share market and that is not the objective of the 
welfare system. I became a shareholder involuntarily and that is because the Social 
Democrats actively took part in transforming the old pension system, which was based 
on generosity and solidarity (Ingrid Burman, interview). 
Focusing on the changes made in the Swedish pension system, one might argue that 
the changes, at least in two respects, have been substantial. The most significant 
changes, which decreased the level of generosity of the previous system, concern the 
new `guaranteed pension' (GP), which replaced the former national `basic pension'. 
While the `basic pension' was based on the principle of security and was paid to 
everyone, irrespective of previous income, the GP reintroduced the means-tested 
element, which was abolished when the universal flat-rate pension was established. 
Knowing that the traditional Social Democratic welfare model was based on 
universalism, such a retreat to means-testing refers to a crucial shift of principle. 
Regarding the earnings-related second tier, although the shift from the PAYG system 
based on the best fifteen years of income, to the total lifetime contribution was an 
apparent decline both in generosity and from the universal values, the outcome would 
not challenge the redistributive capacity of the pension system. Conversely, the new 
system is going to have negative impacts for the intermediate white-collar workers and 
senior white-collar workers, whose ATP calculated on the basis of the best fifteen 
years were larger than the new system's life-cycle incomes. That makes the experts 
believe that while the new pension system guarantees the income of those who receive 
the `guaranteed pension' the uncertainty will remain for those with income-related 
pension: 
If we compare the income of those who received basic pension (folk pension) in the 
previous system with those who receive guaranteed pension I would say that there would 
be no differences between these two groups. So, the new systems will not disfavour those 
groups of pensioners. Other social benefits, such as housing benefits, will also remain 
unchanged. It has been emphasized that the income for these groups will be at same level 
as before. 
If the economic growth stands at poor levels and if the demographic changes lead to 
further increase of the percentage rate of the elderly what groups of the pensioners are 
going to lose as a result of the system? 
The high-income earners, of course. Let me explain in this way. If the economic conditions 
improves and the growth rate increases at higher level then those who earn more will 
receive far higher income pensions but if the growth rate stands at a low level, then again 
this group will loose. For those who receive guaranteed pension there will be no changes 
because their pensions are guaranteed (Lars Bergendahl, interview). 
Other losers in the new system are women who have had part time work, and 
immigrants who have been working in the country for short periods of time. Another 
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important change is the introduction of a fully-funded element, which is 18.5 per cent 
of the gross income which is contributed by both employers and employees. Although 
just 2.5 per cent of this contribution goes into private funds, the newly-funded element 
would represent a principle shift in the Swedish welfare system, which up to this point 
had been fully controlled by the public sector. Knowing that the Conservatives, 
supported by the Liberals suggested that 10 per cent of the contributions should go into 
private funds, one could illustrate that when the support for these parties is increased, 
they will try to increase the private funded element of the pension system (SvD, 
98/6/22). Many could believe that 2.5 per cent to the private funds compare to 16 per 
cent to the old PAYG system is not so much, but if we consider that 2.5 per cent each 
year will be about 20 billion we can calculate that after 40 years the accumulated 
premium in private funds will be around 850 billions. According to Kristersson 
(Motion 1996/97: Sf38), this will be 50 per cent more than the sum saves in general 
pension funds. 
The Private funds have also been criticised because of its high administration costs. 
While the old ATP system had a very low administration cost, according to Feldt et. al. 
(DN, 18/5/2003) the administration costs of the private funds will be about 22 per cent 
of the saved amount. This is because the large number of funds which the 
contributions could be placed in. 
By the pension reform of the late 1990s, there is no doubt that the level of generosity 
of the system has markedly decreased. In practice, both the basic pension, which was 
flate-rate, the right of citizenship, and related earnings were negatively affected. While 
the transformation from `basic pension' to means-tested `guaranteed pension' was a 
deterioration of the universalist foundation of the system, the changes to the earnings 
related element caused considerable loss for those with shorter work histories. Another 
important part of the welfare state arrangement regarding the elderly is social care, 
which has also been subjected to change. 
Sickness Benefits 
Sickness insurance has always been one of the key targets of neo-liberals and 
industrial critics who believe that the generosity of the system decreases the incentive 
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to work (Olsson Hort, 1995: 5). The deterioration of Sweden's economic position 
during the early 1990s provided critics with a rational for demanding changes in the 
social security system. Sickness insurance was the first benefit system to be targeted 
for changes. 
As late as 1987 a generous system of sickness benefit had been in operation (SOU, 
2000: 72-42). The Social Democratic government abolished the qualifying day and 
introduced a benefit based on 90 per cent, and in some cases 100 per cent, of previous 
income or even more. After this reform, the cost of sickness benefit rose dramatically 
from 23 billion Crowns in 1987 to 35 billions in 1990 and the average figure of 
absence from work increased from 20 days per year in 1987 to 24.4 in 1989 
(Budgetpropositionen, 1990/91). This situation could not be sustained, and in an 
attempt to reduce the cost of health insurance and absence from work, the Social 
Democratic government reduced the compensation levels for the three first days of 
sickness from 90 to 75 per cent in 1990. From the fourth day of illness until the end of 
the second week, the 90 per cent level was applied (Sjöberg & Bäckman, 2001). After 
a year, the costs of health insurance were reduced by 10 per cent. On coming to power, 
the right-wing government pursued budget savings and reintroduced the qualifying 
day. As a result, the costs of the health insurance system decreased by one third 
between 1991 and 1993 (SOU, 2000: 72). Even after the change of government in 
1994, the Social Democrats continued the same policy. Another reform in sickness 
benefits was to give the task of administration of the first fourteen days of sickness 
benefits to the employers, which has to be regarded as a tightening of eligibility. 
Employers' involvement would increase their interest in ensuring that employees 
remain healthy, and also lead to closer monitoring of absence from work (OECD, 
1994: 95). For the remaining period, as long as certain medical criteria were satisfied, 
sickness benefits are paid by social insurance without any upper limit. Long-term 
benefit was fixed at 80 per cent of the level of previous earnings. However, for most 
employees this is topped up by 10 per cent for a period of up to 90 days by subventions 
from the employer. After that, the level decreases to 80 per cent until the end of the 
first year when it is further reduced to 70 per cent (Olsson Hort, 1995: 5). 
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Figure 5.9 The costs for social insurance system 
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The growth of social insurance expenditure, which was strikingly high between 1987- 
1991, seems have been the main reason for cuts in sickness benefit. As shown in figure 
5: 9, between 1990 and 1993 the costs of social insurance declined by 25 per cent. In 
other words, there is a strong relation between generous compensation levels and 
utilisation of insurance resources. As a result of this reduction in compensation levels, 
the average figure for absenteeism has again declined significantly, from 25.7 
days/year in 1989, to 18.5 in 1994. 
Table 5.2 Number of days of sick leave per insured and major reforms 
Year effect Days sick leave Major reforms Estimated 
1955 12.0 Mandatory sick leave insurance with 3 unpaid day 
1957 13.5 
1959 12.5 
1961 12.5 
1963 12.5 Compensation level raised +2 
1965 15.0 
1967 15.5 Unpaid days reduced to 1 +4.5 
1969 19.0 
1971 18.9 
1973 18.1 Raised compensation level +2 
1975 22.4 
1977 22.2 
1979 21.0 
1985 18.0 
1987 20.0 *No unpaid days, raised compensation +1.5 
1989 25.7 
1991 21.0 *Reduced compensation - 0.6 
1993 18.3 * One unpaid day 
1995 18.5 
Source: OECD, (1994, p. 96). 
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Figure 5.10 The costs of health insurance system, 1990-98, in million krona 
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As in the case of unemployment insurance, the replacement rate and number of waiting 
days applying to sickness benefits has had an obvious impact on the effective labour 
supply via absence from work. In Sweden, this kind of absence (including children's 
sickness) has historically been around 15 per cent of the labour force. According to 
research (Gustavsson and Klevmarken, 1993), for every 10 percentage points change 
in the replacement rate in the public-run scheme, the overall absentee rate has also 
changed by 11/2 percentage, while the imposition of a waiting day has decreased the 
absentee rate by 0.3 percentage points. Another study (Edgerton, 1997) estimates that 
the percentage points on the sickness rate would increase by 1.1 if a second waiting 
day were also imposed. 
As a result of decreasing compensation levels and a tougher insurance policy, which 
led to a decrease in the absentee rate, the public's health seems to have suffered 
considerably. Many people who were suffering from illness chose to not stay at home 
because of considerable reductions in their income. They then seem to have 
increasingly suffered from illness later in the decade and, therefore, the absentee rate 
increased sharply in 1999. As is shown in figure 5.11, the average figure of 
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absenteeism, for those who were sick for more than 30 days, increased by almost two 
times between 1997 and 2000. Moreover, the number of those taking early retirement 
increased by 30 per cent during the first half of 2000. According to analysts (SOU, 
2000: 72, p. 75), the tightening of eligibility rules has created a situation in which many 
people who experience long-term illness are waiting to be classified as early retirees in 
the coming years. 
Figure 5: 11 The number of persons who have been sick for a 
30 days period, 1980-2000 (April) 
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Overall, at the beginning of the period, as a consequence of the economic crisis, the 
generosity of sickness benefits has sharply diminished. The rate of sickness benefits 
has decreased to 80 per cent of income and a waiting day has been reintroduced. The 
changes caused a remarkable reduction of health insurance costs in the middle of the 
period, but as economic conditions have improved, the severity of eligibility criteria 
for health insurance has been reduced and the number of persons sick for periods of 
more than 30 days has increased. Moreover, the number of early retirees has increased 
considerably. 
Sickness benefit, the first target for retrenchment 
During the 1990s, the sickness benefit was subjected to change at least eight times 
(Sjöberg & Bäckman, 2001; SOU, 2001: 57). As soon as there was a need for cuts in 
social expenditure the governments addressed either parts of the sickness insurance 
scheme for savings. Among the areas that have been affected in various ways, were the 
compensation levels, rules governing the income on which benefit entitlement was 
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based or, qualification requirements. Among other changes were the reintroduction of 
an initial unpaid waiting day and a change in introducing the two-week employer 
period. The main reason why the sickness benefit was subjected to changes has been 
the high amount of absenteeism due to sickness. While the generous benefits system 
compensated more than 90 per cent of the employees' income when they were sick, 
one could understand why the absenteeism rate due to sickness increased so rapidly. 
That made the critics suggest that the generous benefits encouraged widespread abuse 
of the system. As is shown in the balance sheet (Ds, 2002: 32), as a consequence of 
changes in the system, the number of sick leave cases fell sharply by around 20 per 
cent between 1990 and 1995. Hence, the costs of the sickness insurance also decreased 
enormously. 
On the other hand, when the economic crisis of the early 1990s recovered and the 
widespread anxiety (concern) for unemployment disappeared the absentee rate 
increased dramatically again without any considerable improvement has been made in 
the sickness benefits. Between 1995 and 1999 the number of sick leave cases increased 
by almost 60 per cent (Ds 2002: 32). These two trends mean that while in the severe 
economic situation the deterioration in sickness benefits compels the sick people not to 
stay at home but go to work; consequently, the amount of absenteeism due to sickness 
decreases, while in a more secure economic condition the deteriorated benefit levels 
can not prevent the sick people from staying at home. In other words, it is not the level 
of sickness benefits that has crucial impacts on the level of leave due to sickness but 
the increasing threat of becoming unemployed in severe economic conditions. 
The high amount of absenteeism due to sickness has increased the concern about the 
trend and at the beginning of the 2000s the problem received great attention (Sjöberg 
& Bäckman, 2001). Among the interviewees representing political parties there have 
been three major approaches. First, those who rejected further cuts in the sickness 
insurance and instead stressed the importance of a more effective rehabilitation 
programme in order to restore the sick to return to the labour market. Second, those 
who advocated a real reduction in the benefits and, instead, suggested a minimal 
protection (basic insurance system) and, third, those who wanted to keep the existing 
benefit system based on compensation of the income loss but suggested further 
reductions in replacement rates. 
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The Social Democrats and its supporting party in the Parliament (the Left Party) 
advocated the first approach. These parties like the unions seem to believe that the 
increasing rate of poor health had to do with the severe conditions caused by the 
economic crisis of the early 1990s and, therefore, should not be handled by 
deterioration in benefits. They were not interested in further cuts in entitlements. On 
the contrary, these parties advocated further reforms. One of the most debated issues 
was the increase of the level of the social insurance ceiling i. e. the maximum amount 
of income on which a sickness benefit may be assessed (Ds, 2002: 32). For a long 
period of time, the ceiling has remained stable at 7.5 times the base amount, which is 
only adjusted with consumer prices. The Ceiling has favoured the members of LO 
because among this group only 1.7 per cent of the women and 8 per cent of men had 
an income above the ceiling. Among the members of the TCO the corresponding 
figure was 6.8 and 40 per cent whereas among the members of SACO 27.5 per cent of 
women and 61.5 of the men earned above the ceiling (Palme, 2000: 75). Therefore, 
while during the 1990s the real wages increased more than consumer prices, the 
number of employees with an income higher than the ceiling increased rapidly. The 
interesting point is that the Left Party has also demanded an increase of the ceiling, 
which would increase the compensation level for those with high incomes: 
In order to increase the support to the general welfare system and to make those with 
higher income be more solidaristic to the universal welfare system, the social insurance 
ceiling should be increased. During the past years, the Left Party has been working hard to 
increase the social insurance ceiling because our Party believe that a universal welfare 
system has to benefit both those with low and those with middle wages. The freezing of 
the ceiling level at 7.5 times the price base amount has led to the dissatisfaction of many 
employees who earn more than the ceiling and, therefore, the sickness benefit they receive 
is far below their income (Ingrid Burman, Interview). 
The concern of the Left Party and the Social Democrats in increasing the level of the 
ceiling has to do with the increasing volume of private insurances. As a consequence 
of being paid less compensation in the event of illness, more and more wage earners 
with higher incomes in the private sector made agreement-linked insurances in order to 
compensate their loss of income. Between 1990 and 1999 the number of individual 
health insurance policies in four major companies in the private insurance sector rose 
from 170.000 to 395.000 (Ds, 2002: 32). 
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Second, the Centre Party and the Green Party, which only advocated a basic insurance 
system, suggest no increase in ceiling or in the level of benefits. These Parties ask for 
efficiency in the treatment of sick people and a more efficient rehabilitation program. 
The Centre Party suggests that the regulations should be reformed in order to reduce 
the costs for the insurance and to encourage these absentees from the job to return to 
work as quickly as possible: 
The existing insurance system encourages absenteeism. You are either fully sick and 
should stay at home or are fully recovered and then are allowed to return to your job. 
There is not anything in between. I do not believe that those absent from work because 
of illness should be excused in 100 per cent in every case, but instead that sick leave 
should be granted due to nature of sickness. In many cases the period of such absence 
could be 75 per cent and/or 50, and maybe just 25 per cent. Administrative personnel 
who broke her leg could go back to work after one week or two if the leg is in plaster. 
Why should the system force her to stay away from the job? (Birgitta Carlsson, 
interview) 
The experts of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises point to the high level of 
costs for sickness insurance as the single largest cost for the enterprises in Sweden. In 
this respect, it has also been argued that by involving high levels of taxation, the 
welfare state erodes incentives to work, save and invest, and all these have caused 
market distortion. The Confederation suggests not only a reduction of the benefit 
levels but also a tightening up of definitions around sickness. The attitude of the 
physicians and medical officers to the sickness insurance has to be changed: 
The attitude of the physicians to sickness is too liberal. Many doctors grant sick leave 
not because of a medical reason but because the patient demands it. In many cases such 
permission to be absent from work has negative impacts on the health of the one who 
asks for it. By staying at home for a long period of time it will be more difficult to 
return to the labour market. The lack of professional behaviour from the medical 
officers has had negative impacts for the companies, for the country and for the patient. 
The other problem concerns the lack of efficiency in the Social Insurance Offices, 
which are not capable of examining those cases, which need quick evaluation in order to 
instruct and plan rehabilitation programmes. Unfortunately, most of their time is spent 
in the administration of the payment of the benefits (Anders Morin, interview). 
The third approach has been launched by the Conservatives and to some extent even 
by the liberals who suggest a second waiting day before which the benefit could be 
claimed. According to this perspective, the existing system is too generous and the 
level of excess insurance too little. Such generosity reduces the incentive to work. The 
loss of income has to be greater for the individual, otherwise, the level of absenteeism 
will remain high: 
There has been too little discussion about the high level of absenteeism because of 
sickness. There is a need for a new regulation system in which the level of excess 
insurances has to be increased. It has to be expensive for individuals to get sick. The 
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generous system encourages people to stay at home because of illness. The benefit level 
should be far lower than 80 per cent, which it is at now (Sten Tolgforss, interview). 
Despite the resistance from the Social Democrats to avoid changes in the basic 
principles of the sickness insurance system it seems that the mounting financial 
challenges will force them to make some minor change to the system. The cost of 
sickness insurance, especially for those cases of at least 30 days' duration has 
increased consistently since the end of the 1990s (Socialstyrelsen, 2002). Apart from 
reducing the level of sickness benefits, which can always be an option for governments 
in the era of spending cuts, another measure could be the role of the employers in the 
task of administration of sickness benefit increases from fourteen days, which has been 
the case until the start of the 2003, to four weeks. Such a requirement could increase 
the pressure on the companies to tighten the eligibility. 
Family Policy 
During the `Golden age' of the welfare state different aspects of the Swedish family 
policy had been developed to a degree that internationally the Swedish welfare state, 
like the other Nordic countries, was recognised as one, which offered the most 
generous entitlements to the families (Axelsson, 1992). By different kinds of 
supportive measures, the Social Democrats pursued two major goals: first, they 
provided equal opportunities for children from all social classes to make a career, 
independent of their parents' income and, second, they enabled women to enter the 
labour market. Different aspects of family policy programmes would provide enough 
benefits and services to families to ensure that young couples would not hesitate to 
combine a career with having children. The economic crisis of the 1990s, which 
challenged all the entitlements had some effects on different programmes of family 
policy but, as explored in this section, in contrast to the other three social policy areas 
already discussed, family policy programmes were largely saved from the 
retrenchments of the 1990s. The broad support for family policy arrangements was 
crucial because, in the era of retrenchment when most other social policy areas were 
targeted, these programmes could support those families, where breadwinners were 
subjected to redundancies or other mishaps caused by the market. As family benefits 
are generally of two different types - either in relation to birth and maternity, or for the 
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care of young children - this section will cover both aspects, which contain key 
elements such as parental leave, housing subsidies and child allowances. 
Parental benefit 
In the 1990s, extending policy arrangements to facilitate parental leave has been one of 
the major identifiable policy trends in many European countries (Daly, 1997). In this 
regard Sweden was once again in the lead position. By increasing the duration of leave 
through parental insurance in 1990, to 15 months, Sweden has developed its policies 
on parental leave more generously than in other OECD countries. Since 1995, at least 
one month of parental leave has to be taken by the parent who is not taking primary 
responsibility for childcare. This policy is regarded as a measure to encourage fathers 
to stay at home with their young children. So parental leave in Sweden and the other 
Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Norway has not only been treated as paid 
leave, its duration has also been increased (Björnberg and Byork Eydal, 1995). 
Conversely, in the 1990s, as wage replacement levels became less generous in 
comparison with previous decades parental leave benefits have also been negatively 
affected. In the 1980s, for example, the value of transfers was increased with 
replacement rates for absence due to the care of a sick child going up to 100 per cent. 
In the 1990s, however, this trend was reversed. Not only were waiting days in sickness 
and unemployment benefits reintroduced and labour-market criteria ceased to qualify 
on their own for disability benefits, but also in 1996 replacement rates in all social 
insurance schemes were reduced to 75 per cent (Increasing to 80 per cent again in 
1998). Replacement rates for parental insurance were the latest benefits to be cut. Both 
the two main political blocks were determined to avoid cuts in family policy, but it was 
realised that differences in the level of benefits would encourage abuse of the system. 
For instance, parents, who themselves were ill preferred to claim parental leave to care 
for a sick child, leaving them in receipt of their full wage, rather than sickness benefit. 
Therefore, in 1994 the rate was reduced from 90 to 80 per cent and then in 1996 to 75 
per cent - again increasing to 80 per cent in an attempt to 
harmonise the level with 
other benefits. By this change in 1996, the replacement rates in all social insurance 
schemes were reduced to a uniform level, i. e. 75 per cent (Budget propositionen, 
1994/95: 17). Despite this deterioration in replacement rates in all three Scandinavian 
countries (to 80 per cent in Norway and Sweden and to 60 per cent in Denmark), they 
still have the highest rates among OECD countries. 
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Housing subsidies 
Another important element of family policy is housing subsidies, not least because 
they aim to provide high quality housing to low-income families. In 1988, Sweden was 
ranked second, after the Netherlands, in subsidising housing (Table 6.3). Housing 
subsidies had at that time increased housing consumption of all income groups but 
particularly of low-income families. As a result, the number of households who were 
living in overcrowded conditions decreased, and by 1987 was estimated at only 2 per 
cent, which was far below the level in most other countries (Boverket, 1993). 14 Even in 
this field the system kept its universalist features. By interest subsidies, the system has 
also favoured high-income families who normally own more expensive houses and 
therefore gain more concerning interest subsidies. During the 1990s, housing support 
to families with low incomes remained quite intact but for high-income families 
interest subsidies were reduced from 40 to 30 per cent. However, a series of changes 
were introduced in housing subsidies, which led to a tightening up of both the levels of 
benefit and the area covered. Further, it was also decided that the housing subsidies 
should not any longer be paid to people over 28 years of age without children (Ds, 
2002: 32). 
Table 5.3 Housing subsidies and standard. 
Country Sum of Rent Construction Square meters Housing 
subsidies subsidyl subsidy2 per person consumption 
minus 
housing tax 
per capita 
adjusted by 
PPP, 1990 
United Kingdom -2.44 1.14 0.36 26.8 2.238 
Belgium 0.23 0.01 0.23 n. a. 1 984 
Netherlands 1.56 0.40 1.91 n. a. 2017 
Denmark -0.16 0.59 0.43 49.0 3 648 
Finland n. a. 0.33 0.48 30.0 2 566 
France -0.19 0.32 0.45 31.5 2 450 
Norway n. a. 0.14 0.28 43.0 2 370 
Sweden 1.49 0.73 1.28 47.0 3 338 
-0.03 0.17 0.18 34.9 2 725 GDR 
1. Subsidy paid to households, usually means-tested and restricted to rental housing 
2. Subsidy paid to housing owner as a lump sum after construction or an extended interest subsidy 
Source: Boverket (1993) in OECD (1994, p. 84). 
14The criterium for overcrowding is more than two persons per bedroom (Boverket, 1993). 
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As stressed in the balance sheet of Welfare Commission (SOU 2000: 40, p. 40), during 
the economic crisis of the 1990s housing subsidies had been given the character of a 
family policy measure in order to reduce the financial pressure on the groups. While in 
1991, the number of households drawing housing subsidies was 328,000 at the middle 
of period (1995) when the rate of unemployment was at highest level the figure was 
556,000 (Ds, 2002: 32, p. 130). 
Child allowance 
The general child allowances, as the other key element in family benefits, have 
increased marginally during the 1990s. The amount of child benefit, which during the 
severe years of the early 1990s increases only slowly, was raised towards the end of 
the 1990s (nominally from 7,680 per each child in 1997 to 9,000 Crowns in 1999) as a 
result of the economic upswing. 
For families with children, the generous norms in social assistance have been of great 
importance, because during the 1990s, a significant part of households were unable to 
obtain a reasonable living standard for reasons of low income. In another words, their 
after-tax earnings from work were below the social assistance norm, and therefore 
different kinds of allowances were needed. It was the major reason why in the tax 
reform of 1991 an increase in child allowance was addressed as the instrument, which 
would compensate the redistributive effects, which were partly abolished by the tax 
reform (Palme, 2000: 78). In 1991, among married or cohabiting couples with three or 
more children, more than half earned below the norm; among couples with two 
children, the percentage was 30, while 90 per cent of single parents with two children, 
and 70 per cent with one child earned below the norm (OECD, 1999: 123). 
Child and housing allowances in particular were decisive allowances, which ensured 
that household incomes would reach the social assistance norm (SOU, 2001: 57). In the 
severe years of the1990s, nearly one third of the households in the lower social strata 
increased their incomes to above the norm because of these allowances. The rest had to 
be covered by the social assistance benefits administered by local authorities. Because 
of the generosity of the system, some measures have been imposed to prevent its 
misuse. For instance, families who applied for the allowances had to realise their 
accumulating savings before accessing the social allowances. The average duration of 
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social assistance in 1993 was 4.5 months, and 7.5 per cent of the population received 
cash assistance at least once during the year (OECD, 1997: 96-97). The design, content, 
and levels of support were, until 1997, decided by the municipalities, which gave 
discretion to local authorities to adapt levels to local circumstances. A survey made in 
1994 shows that when there is a need for budget savings in the municipalities, 
politicians on the local level tend to reduce the rate of social assistance, and thereby 
ignore the norms decided by the parliament (Bergmark, 1995). As a result, around 75 
per cent of municipalities ignored the centrally-provided norms and adopted lower 
levels. In 1997, by imposing a nation wide norm on most components of the support 
system, the central government has restricted the room for local discretion and thereby 
prevented income loss for households (OECD, 1999: 105). 
In sum, despite that the structures of different social programmes have remained 
unchanged through the 1990s, as a result of a limited savings in all programmes the 
total financial support to families has decreased (Gähler, 2001). The only programmes, 
which have shown an increase in total costs was expenditures related to parental, leave 
which during the 1990s rose from 15.7 to 19 billion Crowns (figure 5.12). 
Figure 5.12 The costs of family support 
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Childcare services, which together with elderly care services, forms the core of social 
care services, have shown considerable improvements during the 1990s. Between 1990 
and 1997, the rate of children aged 1-2 years that had access to child care services 
increased from 44 to 57 per cent. For children aged 3 to 6, the rate increased from 64 
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to 76 per cent. Despite that, the municipalities were not successful in providing school 
law for all children aged one to twelve years, as had decided places. 
Figure 5.13 The rate of children in nursery, after-school 
recreation centres, and registered childminding homes, 1975- 
1997 
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Figure 5.14 The number of children between the age of 3 months and 6 
years in municipality child care services in January, and new demands 
for further places (New demands), in spring 1980,1983,1986-1996. 
600 
500 
400 
C 
N 300 
0 
200 
100 
0 
New demands 
Have places 
Source: SCB (1996); Bamomsorgundersökningen (1996). 
Overall, the family policy area has experienced lesser changes than other policy areas. 
For instance, child allowances never actually decreased during the 1990s. Parental 
insurances were another benefit that was saved from retrenchment up to 1996. It seems 
that during the period, the main objective of family policy was to save different kinds 
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of allowances and benefits, which were addressed to the families, from retrenchment. 
In consequence, benefits would ensure that the economic differences between families 
with children and other families would remain constant, and if possibly even decrease. 
Moreover, family policy enabled both parents to an increasing extent to combine a 
working career with parenting. Despite this policy of preventing the deterioration of 
the situation for families, the economic situation of families with children underwent 
great changes during the 1990s (Gähler, 2001). However, after 1997 the process of 
deterioration stopped and the living standards of families started to increase. In recent 
years, both increased employment and reduced taxes have compensated families with 
children for some of the deteriorations in their standard of living. Changes have also 
been made in the rules relating to family allowances, in favour of the worse off (Hoem, 
2000; SOU, 2000: 37). 
Among the political parties there is a widespread consensus about keeping the family 
policy saved from seasonal changes. There is a perception, which will not understand 
the family policy as an insurance system: 
Staying at home because of the birth of a baby and then taking parental leave in order to 
raise a newborn baby is not really like other absenteeism from work. Taking care of 
kids is an issue for society and not just for the mother who gives birth to a baby. 
Therefore the benefit to the mother and her family should not be understood as being 
the same as other insurances. I mean that family insurance is not really insurance but a 
kind of support from society to the family and, therefore, should not be threaded as a 
benefit related to somebody's state in the labour market, which could be a subject for 
change. The family benefits have to be saved from retrenchment (Bo Könberg, 
interview). 
Similar concerns were raised by the spokeswoman of the Centre Party on social issues 
when she asked for an increase of the level of ceiling i. e. the maximum amount of 
income on which parental benefit may be assessed: 
In order to reward motherhood, the level of ceiling has to be increased from 7.5 to 11 
times that of the base amount. This is because, during the past decades the age at which 
women first become mothers has been raised. That shows that more women prefer to 
give birth to their first child after having made a career in the labour market. By a 
gradual increase in the level of the ceiling, these groups will find that motherhood will 
not lead to a considerable reduction in their income. Apart from that we should also 
raise the basic parental benefit for the younger mothers who mostly are students and 
have no previous income on which the parental leave counts. The basic parental benefit, 
which is 60 skr/day, should be increased to 200 (Birgitta Carlsson, interview). 
The stress on keeping benefits for families with children, made by the spokesman of 
the two Bourgeois parties, shows that the support for generous benefits to families is 
very intact. As with the case of the pension system, the signs of a consensus 
in family 
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policy are promising. By the existing low fertility rate in Sweden there are strong 
reasons to believe that some of the benefits will be extended (Esping-Andersen, 2001). 
Further changes in Swedish system; transitions in social care 
Although, the level of Swedish pensions has been generous when compared 
internationally, the Nordic welfare states are exceptional for their unique scope of 
publicly provided services, as some commentators (Castles, 1998; Birch Sorenson, 
1998) stress. According to NOSOSCO (1999), in 1997, the share of social and health 
services of all social expenditures was 41 per cent in Sweden, which means that 
services took up a significant portion of GDP. In comparison to other welfare states, 
services in the Nordic model have been of high quality, run by professional staff, and 
have catered to the needs of those resident in the country. However, care services for 
the elderly, who together with childcare services form the core of social care services 
(Sipilä, 1997), have increased since 1993, following considerable reductions between 
1991 and 1993 (SOU, 2000: 3). Since 1993, as demonstrated in figure 6: 7, expenditures 
related to old age increased continuously in Sweden, with the exception of 1995, 
accounting for close to 13 per cent of GDP and 36 per cent of all social expenditure by 
1997. According to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the share of services to 
the elderly was 22 per cent of all old-age related expenditures (Kautto, 2000: 83, p. 60). 
The higher levels of expenditures for older people in Sweden particularly explain the 
higher wage levels of care workers and staff ratios. It has to be stressed that a great 
deal of the expenditure on elderly care services are personnel costs (SOU 2000: 38). 
These costs have decreased since the number of personnel in elderly care, care for the 
handicapped and the health care sector were reduced by 94,000 people between 1990 
and 1998 (Szebehely, 2000, p. 198). By these reductions, Sweden's favourable 
position in providing elderly care services diminished in relation to other welfare states 
- although in 1998, the trend of personnel in elderly care showed an increase, a feature 
explained by the growth in state subsidies to the municipalities in 1997 (SOU, 2000: 3, 
p. 169). 
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Figure 5.15 The number of employees in health system and elderly care, 1990-98 
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The fact is that the number of older elderly who need more services increased by 17 
per cent between 1990 and 1998, while, as figure 5.15 shows, the number of personnel 
in the health and elderly care sector has decreased by 15 per cent in the same period. 
This means that the care services were reduced to the groups who were in greater need. 
Further, the services to elderly changed the character, from support to the elderly who 
needs support in their everyday life to those who are in greater needs to medical 
services (SOU, 2000: 38, P. 214). 
Figure 5.16 The number of personnel in health care and elderly care, and older 
elderly among population respectively, 1990-98. Index 1990=100 
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Another clear trend in Sweden was a move from institutional care towards more home- 
based care - although home help services have been reduced markedly. As Szebehely 
(2000) shows, the number of recipients of home help decreased by 36,000 between 
1990 and 1997. As shown in figure 5.16, in 1989, almost 50 per cent of the `old old' 
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received help. In 1997, the percentage decreased to 43 per cent. Among the `younger' 
elderly (65-79), the share decreased from 10 to 7 per cent (SOU, 2000: 3, p. 171). By 
this time, services were targeted more accurately, this new pattern effectively meaning 
that less people receive more services. 
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Figure: SOU (2000: 3, p. 171), figure 2.2: 21. In Kautto (2000: 83, P. 69). 
Regarding the direction of the welfare system, as Kautto (2000, p. 70) has noted, 
during the 1990s, the ideal type of Nordic model experienced two reverse trends. At 
the beginning of the decade (1990-93), there was a shift from public services to 
transfers, with pensions and other benefits being increased. One major reason for the 
change seems to have been the need for saving on the part of local authorities, which 
after the `Ädelreform' in 1992, took over the responsibility for social care services for 
the elderly. The second half of the period saw expenditure on services increase faster 
than expenditure on transfers and cash benefits. In other words, the welfare system 
once again focused on public services. These two trends clearly show the difference in 
the ideology of the bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats. While the former by 
emphasising `freedom of choice' aimed at reducing the size of the public sector and in 
the longer term looked towards private care arrangements, the latter were concerned to 
keep the public service as a strong institution. According to those on the labour 
movement, the worse-off would lose from the privatisation of care services (Malm, 
interview; Meidner, interview). 
In sum, the development of elderly care has now moved away from the traditional 
model in which home help and other similar services set the Nordic model apart from 
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the rest of Europe. By heavy increases in user fees, the access of people in the lowest 
income strata to services decreased, surely an indication that services in Sweden have 
lost their original character as the epitome of the caring state. As Kautto (2000) and 
Szebehely (1998) stress, through these changes the degree of universalism in the 
pension and elderly care has decreased to some extent. To reach a verdict about the 
development of the whole welfare state the next chapter focuses on sickness benefits, 
which in the past decades was subject for changes. 
Retaining the universalist system 
Apart from those areas of the Swedish welfare system which this study has explored, 
other studies, such as `the balance sheet for Swedish welfare during the 1990s' (SOU, 
2001: 79), which comprehensively examined the development of the Swedish welfare 
system also came to the conclusion that despite some changes in different 
arrangements the essential parts of the system are still intact. However, the study 
stressed that the living conditions in Sweden have experienced some crucial changes, 
and accordingly, the share of people who suffer from different kinds of misfortune 
resulting from the changes in the economic conditions, has increased (SOU, 2000: 41). 
Rapid increases in the unemployment rate are considered to be the major root of the 
problems (SOU, 2001: 53). Beyond that, the deterioration of conditions for the labour 
force meant growing mental stresses caused by the decrease in labour market security. 
More people were wrestling with economic problems and lower income levels, which 
increased their long-term dependency on social allowances (SOU, 2000: 40). 
The balance sheet has also pointed to some improvements, some of which occurred 
during the 1990s. The most important one is the rapid increase in wage levels, which 
rose faster than in earlier decades (Le Grand, et al., 2001). Among other improvements 
were increasing literacy rates and decreasing mortality - especially infant mortality. In 
other significant areas, such as the population's disposable income, as Fritzell (2001) 
stressed, after a decrease in the mid-1990s, by the end of decade the figure rose to the 
same level as it was in 1990. Differences in class and gender were another issue, which 
has not changed particularly during the period. However, by widening wage 
differences between the public and private sector, one could argue that the economic 
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situation for women, who are over represented in the public sector, worsened. Overall, 
according to the balance sheet, as the number of redundancies in the public sector 
increased, so the number of employees in the public services had to be increased. 
Three groups are pointed out as the major victims of the economic crisis of the 1990s. 
Single mothers, who on a larger scale than before were dependent on different kinds of 
social contributions, non-Nordic ethnic minorities, and young people, all had great 
difficulties entering into the labour market (SOU, 2001: 54). Apart from these three 
groups, the balance sheet put the emphasis on children and families as other victims of 
the 1990s who needed some additional support from the welfare system to avoid the 
poverty trap. Despite the fact that during the 1990s long-term poverty has increased, in 
Sweden, Kangas (2001) and Esping-Andersen (2001) believe that the measures taken 
by the strong welfare system in supporting these vulnerable groups saved them from 
declining further into poverty. 
Furthermore, the balance sheet emphasises on the resilience characteristic of different 
benefits, which decreased when the economic conditions deteriorated and went up 
when the crisis was overcome - although not to the same level at which they had 
previously stood (Ds, 2002: 32). In other aspects, the sheet also stresses some changes 
in the institution of welfare, which diverged from the historical pattern. At the 
beginning of the period, a process of decentralisation in the provision of welfare 
services started, but it did not last. In the second half of the period, once again, the 
state's role was increased by certain initiatives, which aimed at adjusting the 
increasing differences among the municipalities (Hans Lindberg, interview). The 
second significant divergence in welfare institutions was a tendency towards 
privatisation in the delivery of services within a framework of public financing (SOU, 
2001: 52). Although, during the period, private initiatives increased in most of service 
areas, the changes have been modest, and by the end of the 1990s, the majority of the 
services were still provided by the public sector. 
Overall, the balance sheet stressed some structural changes, which have occurred in 
Swedish society, which are likely to have a crucial impact on the future of the welfare 
system. One of these is the demographic changes, which constitute both falling 
patterns of fertility and aging of the population, and also gains through migration, 
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which has markedly changed the composition of the population in Sweden. The other 
is labour market change, which have seen moves towards new forms of production, 
mainly in high-tech areas, which are in the process of replacing more traditional 
industries (Näringsliv, 12/9/01). This move is clearly in the direction of 
deindustrialisation and consequently companies have called for greater deregulation in 
the economy to facilitate the mobility of both capital and also some parts of 
production. Apart from the two major structural changes, which are a resource of both 
endogenous and exogenous factors, the verdict of the senior members of the 
Committee, which provided `the balance sheet for Swedish welfare during the 1990s', 
is that despite the crisis of the 1990s, the Swedish welfare system remains intact, but 
there are some tendencies in other directions. 
The political decisions, which are going to be made in the near future, are going to be 
crucial for the future of the system. The processes and development in this country, and 
not international development, decided the content and direction of the welfare system 
and its institutions (Johan Fritzell, interview). 
A comparison made in the late 1990s (table 5.4) showed that Sweden still had one of 
the most generous social insurance systems in the OECD (OECD, 1999: 123-4). The 
judgement about the high standard of the system was based on some of its main 
features: 
" Despite the decrease in different benefits replacement rates (mainly 
unemployment and sickness insurance), they are still high. On top of that, this 
the duration of eligibility in all the above-mentioned benefits that makes the 
Swedish system so distinct - most other countries have upper limits. However, 
one should say, while 80 per cent income replacement might still seem high, 
these benefits are taxable (Olsson-Hort et al., 1993). 
" As a result of the extensive use of income-supplement programmes, the 
coverage of the main social protection programmes among the working-age 
population is higher than in most other OECD countries (Table 5.4). 
" Rigid employment protection and industrial relations legislation make the 
Swedish labour market workforce-friendly. The system also has a double safety 
net, because it secures both incomes and jobs. However, the generosity of the 
social system, especially in the matter of job security, may have a negative 
impact on the flexibility of internationally-high enterprise. 
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" The social assistance norms are still high, and since 1998, the local discretion 
to differ from the norm limited. 
According to OECD (1999: 126), while reforms to the insurance system undertaken 
during the 1990s have put it on a more sustainable footing, the eligibility criteria for 
different benefits are still very generous, which gives some disincentive effects to the 
system. While the social insurance system in Sweden is institutional and therefore all 
citizens, regardless of their contribution, are eligible for some of the major benefits 
(health, education), in the case of rising social expenditure, the only solution for 
central government is to increase tax levels. Even in the case of unemployment 
insurance premiums, which are paid by the workers, it is based on a given level of 
unemployment. Any changes from a certain level have to be financed by the 
government. Therefore, OECD economists (OECD, 1997: 101) believe that a stronger 
link between social insurance expenditure and employee and employers contribution 
has to be established. 
The Bourgeois parties, particularly the Conservatives, have the same approach. By 
arguing that in the past decade social insurance measures have been subjected to 
different political interventions due to the economic crisis, the Bourgeois parties 
(particularly the Conservatives) suggest that different insurance systems should be 
independent from each other and, above all, independent from seasonal political 
decisions: 
One of the essential changes that in the past decade have been occurring in the Swedish 
political system is that the numbers of changes in the system, which have been made 
through a democratic process, have decreased considerably. Most decisions have been 
made through agreements in order to cope with economic and financial crisis. Such a 
process not only prevented an active involvement by the representatives of a majority of 
the Swedish people in the process of decision making but also the decisions made in the 
situation of crisis were often compromises rather than carefully prepared plans. In other 
words, the changes in different parts of the welfare system have been a consequence of the 
financial problems, crisis or other kinds of problems. The political establishment was 
forced to follow other objectives than those decided and planned according to a well- 
planned strategy. Such a process decreases the predictability of political decisions (Sten 
Tolgforss, interview). 
This approach suggests that if the bourgeois would have decided to extend the process 
of adaptation of different social arrangements to the new order, as they did in the case 
of pension system, establishment of independent insurance system from each other will 
undoubtedly decrease the redistributive element of the Swedish welfare system. 
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Table 5.4 International Comparison of social insurance schemes, Percentage change in annual 
disposable income for the average production worker from moving from employment to social 
insurance, 1996. 
Benefit Sweden* Denmark Germany UK Canada 
Sickness, one week** -0.8 0 0 -0.4 -1.5 Twelve months unemployment 
- Insured -29 -35 -42 -79 -44 
- Non-insured -71 -57 -48 -79 -91 Work injury 
- Total incapacity 0 +26 +15 -57 -10 
- One-third incapacity 0 -5 +12 -17 +1 
Family allowance 
- One child +4 +4 +5 +3 +2 
- Two children +7 +9 +10 +6 +3 
- Three children +11 +13 +17 +8 +6 
Maternity leave 
- Maximum duration -9 -6 0 -4 -7 
- Common duration -2 -3 0 -3 -4 
Old-age pension*** 
Full work record -36 -44 -25 -47 -45 
No work record**** -61 -50 -100 -84 -58 
Source: OECD (1999: 12) 
*Based on a general replacement rate of 75 per cent in social insurance in 1997, the increase to 80 
per cent in unemployment insurance in the fourth quarter is taken into account. 
** Including occupational pensions 
*** Maximum (and not average) benefit in public schemes but without additions from occupational 
schemes. 
****Relative to disposable income of an APW . 
Conclusion 
Having examined the development of the major social policy arrangements during the 
1990s, the question that arises here is whether the alterations to the system suggest that 
the Swedish welfare regime has indeed changed to a less institutionalised version of 
the post-war welfare system, or whether it is simply `stuck' in its traditional post-war 
mould? 
We know from this and other studies (SOU, 2001; OECD, 1998; Kautto, et al., 1999; 
Gould, 2001) that the level of cash benefits has decreased and there have been cuts in 
most of the welfare services. We also know that there have been some serious attempts 
towards decentralisation and privatisation of welfare services. However, comparing the 
actual changes that occurred during the period with the amount of pressure, generated 
by economic problems, one could conclude that the system has remained largely intact. 
According to Esping-Andersen (2001), if the Swedish crisis had occurred in central 
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European countries, the outcome would have been huge. The Swedish system is 
constituted by strong institutions, which can resist pressure caused by both economic 
crisis and other changes that threaten its foundations. Despite a weakening base of 
political support for the system, through the weak support to the Social Democratic 
Party in the elections in 1991 and 1998 elections, and the weakening of organised 
labour, welfare institutions have survived relatively intact. 
Analysis of the changes in Swedish welfare arrangements in the 1990s implies that 
they had a programmatic rather than a systemic character - meaning that the level of 
benefits were subject to changes, rather than the nature of the benefits themselves. The 
only exception is the pension system, which experienced more far-reaching changes. 
Even in the case of services, qualitative changes, such as the movement toward 
privatisation in the delivery of services, were quite limited and the framework of 
public financing has never been questioned. Moreover, the distributive characteristic of 
the welfare system and its legitimacy are still strong (Holmberg and Weibull, 1997). 
The consequences of changes in terms of path dependency or a breakthrough are clear. 
While everything has been changed in some ways, nothing has changed in others. In 
other words, goals and means are separated. The goals of the welfare system, as an 
institution, remain intact, while the means to achieve those goals have changed in 
some respects. Further, the impact of globalisation has been less marked than might 
have been imagined. Strong political commitment and strong civil society, with social 
movements as their major agents, prevented radical changes in both replacement rates 
and provision of services. 
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Chapter 6 
The nature of debates about the Swedish welfare system 
The chapter reviews the main issues, which have been crucial to the development of 
the Swedish welfare regime and are considered to be essential for the future of the 
system. As the welfare state is mainly a democratic project, historically supported by 
democratic political and social movements (such as trade unions), its future is also 
mainly dependent on the strength and support of the existing power resources, such as 
the public, the political establishment, and the labour movement. The concern of this 
chapter, therefore, is to map out the existing attitudes of key social and political groups 
to the function and development of the universalistic welfare state. 
In this respect, the political support of the system, both among Social Democrats and 
the unions, as the traditional advocates of generous benefits, and the bourgeois front, 
as well as the employers' federation (SAF) will be examined. By the same token, the 
condition of the corporatist system within the Swedish political establishment, which 
was crucial to the emergence and development of the `Swedish model' will be 
examined. What happened to the `historic compromise' between the trade unions and 
employers organisations? Is there still consensus between them about the nature of 
Swedish labour policy, particularly with regards to wage policy and measures against 
unemployment? Apart from the political and corporatist establishments, how has 
public opinion about the welfare system developed? Has discontent with the system 
increased, or is public support still widespread? 
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Contemporary debates about the Swedish welfare system are clearly related to the key 
challenges, which have threatened its universal character (Rothstein, 1998; Esping- 
Andersen, 1996). In this regard, as discussed in the previous chapters, internal factors 
such as demographic challenges, and external factors, mainly caused by the process of 
economic globalisation, have received most attention. While the debate was initially 
based on these and other real problems that welfare states have been facing in the past 
decades, the focus of this chapter will be on institutional or `structural' threats to the 
continuity of the system. These challenges come mainly from rising uncertainty among 
certain social and political actors who, in the era of welfare state expansion supported 
the process, but in an era of crisis now harbour doubts about the system's capacity to 
survive, and therefore advocate structural changes in the system. Apart from cuts in 
welfare spending in general, and different kinds of benefits in particular, the advocates 
of structural change suggest far-reaching changes in the delivery of public services, 
which involve far-reaching privatisations. Bearing in mind that in the Social 
Democratic welfare system, public delivery of services was a cornerstone, the 
privatisation issue would have a crucial impact on the system's future. However, the 
chapter argues that despite some privatisation initiatives, changes in this area have 
been modest and the major part of service provision continues to be in the hands of the 
public sector. 
As will be argued here, the strong political consensus between the Social Democrats 
and the non-socialist parties about the foundation of the generous welfare system has 
become fragile. Likewise, the historic compromise between the labour movement and 
the employers' organisation has been virtually forgotten. Furthermore, among scholars, 
most Swedish economists have seriously questioned the inexorably rising welfare 
expenditure, without paying attention to the importance of the system's legitimacy. In 
discussing the future of the welfare state, the economists tend to emphasis increasingly 
upon economic rather than social factors. On the contrary, the argument in this chapter 
is that, taken as whole, the real threats against the universal welfare model seem to 
come from changing attitudes towards the redistributive welfare system, rather than 
real problems caused by economic problems or demographic changes. 
However, as will be argued, despite rising criticisms of welfare universalism by 
leading economists, which led to growing uncertainty among political and academic 
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elites, other factors have favoured continuity. Public support for the generous welfare 
system remained quite strong throughout the decade of crisis. In the political sphere, 
despite frequent calls for changes from the neo-liberal intelligentsia, and some doubts 
voiced by the Social Democratic `modernisers', the leftish bloc retained the necessary 
strength in the political arena to continue its universal welfare policy. Moreover, the 
strong institutions, which have been created by the welfare system, also came to its 
aid. The system has effectively resisted any attempts to change it made by the non- 
socialist government, such as the far-reaching privatisation of public services. 
This chapter focuses on four crucial issues which are likely to influence the future of 
the Swedish welfare regime: first, the political support specifically for the Social 
Democratic Party as the architects of the universalist welfare model; second, the future 
of Swedish corporatism, and the strength of the labour movement and the unions; 
third, the legitimacy of the welfare state and public support for state welfare; and 
fourth, the impact of the entrance of private competition into service delivery on the 
role of the public sector. During the expansion of the welfare system, and subsequently 
during the `Golden age', political stability, the stability of the labour market, and the 
stability of central and local institutions in administering social policy and delivering 
of services, were crucial. The argument, therefore, is that as far as the essential 
characteristics of these institutions are (despite some changes) still the same as before, 
the basis for the continuity of the system prevails and so, the system will survive. 
The state of political support for the welfare state 
The stable political situation maintained by the long-standing political domination of 
the Social Democrats is probably the major characteristic of the Swedish welfare 
system. Apart from the presence of a strong labour party in power, the consistency of 
Swedish politics had to do with the consensus, which was established among political 
parties about the crucial elements of social policy. As a result, all political parties 
have 
shown loyalty to the introduction of progressive income taxation, which made 
it 
possible to introduce social legislation. One of the reasons behind such political 
consensus was the Swedish election system, which in contrast to the British system, 
for example, did not allow for one-party governmental dominance (Grönnegärd 
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Christensen, 1997). Since almost all Social Democratic governments were in 
minorities, and needed compromise to get support from some `middle' parties (either 
the agrarians or the Liberal Party), they were compelled to compromise about each 
policy to win a parliamentary majority. As Grönnegard Christensen (1997: 373) 
emphasises `lack of majority... induced the Social Democrats to show moderation'. 
Accordingly, a kind of consensus, both regarding tax policy, in terms of raising money 
for the government, and tax-financed social protection through a redistributive social 
policy, has been developed. However, the need for compromise has not stopped the 
Social Democrats from expanding the redistributive welfare system but it provided a 
base on which they could reach sustainable agreements with the middle parties about a 
range of economic and labour market issues. As a result of such sustainable 
compromises, the Swedish welfare state was marked by considerable stability. 
Politically, no major institutional innovation has occurred in Sweden over the past two 
decades. The constitutional reform of 1975, which changed the two-chamber system to 
a single chamber, was the most recent reform. This change removed a `veto-point', 
making it easier for incumbent governments, who were no longer compelled to seek 
majorities in two chambers. Concerning political support for the reforms, however, the 
long-standing power balance, which was perhaps the Swedish political system's chief 
characteristic, has been eroded. The political domination of the Social Democrats, 
always regarded as an important corner stone of the Swedish model, has been 
considerably weakened (Stein, 1991). Since the 1930s, the support for the SAP had 
varied within an extremely narrow band, and it had not mustered less than 40 to 50 
percent of the vote. During the 1990s, however, the figure changed. A few months 
before the general election of 1991 the SAP's standing in the polls decreased to less 
than 30 percent, which was the worst recorded result since opinion polls began. In the 
1991 election, the Party was defeated, securing just 37.7 percent of the votes, its worst 
score since 1928 (Aylott, 1999). 
After the poor performance of the right-wing government between 1991 and 1994, 
however, support for the Social Democrats increased, and receiving 45.1 per cent of 
the votes, they returned to power. The Party, which since the 1930s gained its 
dominant position by giving the impression that it had pulled the country out of 
depression and built up the welfare state, was less successful at gaining public support 
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for its anti-depression policy in the 1990s. Despite considerable achievements in 
eliminating the large fiscal deficit, the Social Democrats experienced further marked 
decline in popularity. In the 1998 election, the Party received just 36.4 per cent of the 
votes, and in so doing achieved a new worst record. In contrast to the 1991 election, in 
which the nonsocialist parties were the beneficiaries of the Social Democrats' 
misfortune, in 1998, the Left Party and the Greens were very successful. 
Figure, 6.1 The support for the Leftish bloc, in the past three 
decades 
  Environment (Greens) 
Leftish Party 
Q Social Democrats 
Sources: http: //www. riksdagen. se/arbetar/siffror/val7O_98. htm 
According to Holmberg (2000), the Social Democrats' cutbacks in welfare benefits 
were the main reason that people switched their support to the Left Party and the 
Green Party (Miljöpartiet). Accordingly, the rise of the Left Party's support to 12 per 
cent has increased anxieties among Social Democrats who are clearly facing a second 
front from the left. The success of the Left Party and the Greens in the 1995 European 
elections, in which they received 12.9 and 17.2 per cent of the votes respectively, was 
alarming for the SAP who lost many of its traditional supporters to these two parties 
(Aylott, 1999). However, the Social Democrats remained in power, mainly because the 
Left Party and the Greens decided to support a Social Democratic government rather 
than providing the right-wing alliance with the opportunity of building a new coalition 
government. 
In light of the above, the power balance between the socialist and non-socialist parties 
has remained virtually unchanged. The entrance of the Green Ecology Party into the 
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1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 
Riksdag in 1988 increased the number of parties with leftwing tendencies from two to 
three. On the other hand, a new party has been included to the broadly defined centre- 
rightist bloc - the Christian Democratic Party. Moreover, yet another party, New 
Democracy, with a populist strain, entered Swedish politics in the early 1990s. The 
Party had a significant impact on the Swedish debate by campaigning on a strong free- 
market, anti-tax platform, and calling for larger tax cuts than any of the other 
nonsocialist parties. New Democracy was more committed to cuts in welfare 
expenditure and immigration controls than the other four parties in the non-socialist 
bloc. However, the Party, which received 6.7 per cent of the votes in the general 
election of 1991, suffered from internal splits, and consequently, quickly vanished 
from the political arena. This early demise meant that, the SAP kept the necessary 
strength to continue its welfare state ambitions. However, as voter support for the SAP 
has decreased and the number of parties in the leftwing bloc has increased, the Left 
party has no reason to continue its tacit support for the SAP, which it has loyally done 
over past decades. For this reason, since 1998, the Social Democrats have had to take 
greater account of policy proposals suggested by the two other leftwing parties. After 
the election of 2002 the pressure from the Greens and the Left Party for greater 
influence on the governments policy has increased. Although the support to the Social 
Democrats increased by almost 3.5 per cent to 40, the party still needs the support of 
both Greens and the Left Party. 
Table 7.1 The results of elections (1970-2002). 
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 
Bourgeois parties 
Conservative 
Liberal 
Centre 
Christian Democrat 
Total 
New Democracy 
Socialist parties 
Social Democrat 
Left (formerCommunist) 
Environment (Greens) 
Total 
11,5 14,3 15,6 20,3 23,6 21,3 18,3 21,9 22,4 22,9 15,3 
16,2 9,4 11,1 10,6 5,9 14,2 12,2 9,1 7,2 4,7 13,3 
19,9 25,1 24,1 18,1 15,5 12,4 11,3 8,5 7,9 5,1 6,1 
1,8* 1,8* 1,4* 1,4* 1,9* - 2,9* 7,1 4,1 11,8 9,1 
47,6 48,8 50,8 48,8 45 47,9 41,8 46,4 41,6 44,5 43,8 
- - - - - - - 6,7 1,2* - - 
45,3 43,6 42,7 43,2 45,6 44,7 43,2 37,7 45,3 36,4 39,8 
4,8 5,3 4,8 5,6 5,6 5,4 5,8 4,5 6,2 12,0 8,3 
1,7* 1,5* 5,5 3,4* 5,0 4,5 4,6 
50,1 48,9 47,5 48,8 51,2 50,1 54,5 45,6 56,5 53,9 52,7 
* To be represented in the Riksdag, a party must receive at least four per cent of all votes. 
Source: SCB, Allmanna valen, del 1 for respektive är. 
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On the other hand, the political offensive of the non-socialist parties for changes in the 
existing pattern of the welfare state has shown the vulnerability of the traditional 
welfare system. The move towards deregulation, decentralisation, privatisation, a 
market economy approach to social matters, and a mixed economy of welfare, has 
formed a pattern, which suggests that the political consensus for the Swedish model is 
facing a serious challenge. Despite the fact that the Liberal Party opposed the scale of 
public expenditure reduction proposed by the Conservatives (called Moderata 
Samlings Partiet, or Moderaterna), one cannot deny that the arrival of neo-liberal 
values in the highest echelons of the political establishment is likely to have significant 
effects on the future of the universal welfare state. Major elements in the Conservative 
party's policies implied the necessity of a `system shift', a fact that could not be 
ignored by the Social Democrats. Since the Conservatives' programme called for `A 
New Start for Sweden', stressed freedom of choice for citizens, and therefore carried a 
certain ideological impact, pressure increased on the Social Democrats' traditional 
statism. 
Having said that, it is crucial to note that these challenges to the welfare system's 
traditional political support were not as serious as they were regarded during the 
1990s. There are three reasons for this claim. First, although the Social Democratic 
Party is not as dominant as before, the Left bloc together has been stronger in the past 
three elections (1994,1998 and 2002) than before. Second, the co-operation between 
the three parties in the leftish bloc (Social Democrats, Left Party and the Green Party) 
has been working quite successfully. Apart from some minor disagreements between 
the three, the Social Democratic government has encountered no major political crisis 
since the election of 1998. Third, the neo-liberal offensive, which was mainly driven 
by the employers' organisation and the bourgeois parties during the 1990s, has 
declined considerably. In political debate, the calls for reductions in benefits or the 
privatisation of services have largely vanished. These parties seem to realise that 
crucial changes to the welfare system would mean a significant cost for them and 
therefore avoid challenging the public's will. 
The political base for the future of Social Democratic model 
The strong resistance of the political establishment and social institutions against 
international pressure caused by the process of globalisation gives the impression that 
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the future of the system, to a large extent, is going to be decided by political actors. If 
the economic crisis is to have a crucial impact on the future of welfare arrangements 
nothing more than the unprecedented high unemployment of the 1990s could provide 
reasons for such altering in the course of the welfare politic. There is no doubt that the 
changes made by the centre-right government were far poorer than one would expect 
(Gould, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001). The argument that 
the diversity among the four bourgeois parties, which formed the government, was one 
of the major obstacles for implementation of a clear-cut neo-liberal policy might be 
true, but that itself is a part of reality. It means that the advocates of systemic changes 
of the Swedish universal model constitute just a fraction of the right-wing coalition, 
the conservative Party. The parties in the middle, which necessarily must be included 
in a Bourgeois government, would have greater influence on the outcome of the policy 
than would the neo-liberals. Therefore, in mapping out the future direction of the 
Swedish welfare system one should focus on the political parties' perception about the 
future development of the political system. How do they understand the existing 
welfare regime based on universal principles, the socio-economic conditions for its 
future, and the political support for its survival? In this regard, the position of the two 
major political blocs and the scenarios about new potential or possible constellations in 
forming new coalitions as well as their relations to the existing welfare system is to be 
discussed. 
There are not many scholars who would reject the notion that the Swedish welfare 
model is created by the Social Democratic movement. Different parts of the system 
have been constructed by a crucial involvement of the Party as the architect of the 
system. (DN, 25/7/2002). While the social institutions and welfare arrangements have 
been established for a long period of time and have been included as an inseparable 
part of society, one can not deny the fact that the Social Democrats are still understood 
as the major defenders of the system. Despite the decline in the political support to the 
Party, there are scholars who emphasise that the dominance of the Social Democrats is 
still very crucial for the continuity of the system: 
I think the political power of the Social Democratic party will be one of the major facts, 
which will determine the future of the Swedish welfare system. The Party has been the 
major architect of the system and could, during its long period in office, develop a strong 
apparatus for its administration. For its survival the system needs continuous political 
support. Although other political parties in Sweden support the welfare programmes in 
principle, the support of the Social Democratic Party has been crucial. The relatively poor 
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support for the Party in the 1991 and 1998 elections, which was a bit more than 35 per 
cent, has shown that something is happening in the public opinion, the long-term support 
to the Party is changing. It is not as secure as before (Sven Hort, interview). 
One of the most striking features of the Swedish social democracy is that the Party has 
been successful in keeping the unity among different sections and groups within the 
Social Democratic movement. On the one hand there has been a strong labour union 
with advanced redistributive demands and on the other hand, a large middle class with 
various interests. The Social Democratic Party, which for this reason should be 
regarded as a `political front' consisting of groups with conflicting demands, could 
survive the past two decades of political changes with relatively limited internal 
conflicts. However, the two major factions responded differently to the process of 
change. While the traditionalists have had a more defensive approach to calls for 
change, the modernisers seemed to have had the role of `new-thinkers' who have 
intended to design both the ideological shift in the perception of the `strong welfare 
state' and also to design the adaptation of the welfare state to the new social and 
political order. 
The modernisers who, since 1986, have been leading the Party, and thereby, the state 
apparatus have shown a great readiness in adapting the welfare system to the new 
order. One of the central areas in which the ideological adaptation has been occurred 
was the positive response to the perception of `freedom of choice', which had been 
launched by the neo-liberals and received large attention among the people. Whereas 
the traditionalists rejected the whole idea as a bourgeois attack against the universal 
welfare state's ground pillars, the modernisers justified the idea: 
For the new generation, which had grown up in a welfare state and had no primitive needs 
such as those, which were crucial for the first generation, the possibility of having greater 
influence in determining their own future became crucial. For the Social Democratic Party, 
which has been a governing party for ages, it was crucial to understand the new waves and 
the changes in the people's minds and try to adapt itself to the new demands rather than 
resist it. That is a rule for every governing party who wants to keep the power. In contrast 
to the `traditionalist', our reasoning was that without positive response to the new values 
and demands, the party would lose its support. Further, a generous welfare state could only 
survive if the people were to pay for it and they would only do that if they were satisfied 
with what they received. Satisfaction comes to those who have the freedom to choose. The 
traditionalists could not accept this because according to them `freedom of choice' were 
bourgeois words. We did not think like them and, therefore, entered the notion `freedom of 
choice' into the Social Democratic policies (Widar Andersson, interview). 
The openness of the modernisers in changing what they called the traditional views in 
favour new ideas based on the demands of the new generations and also the openness 
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to the views which earlier were recognised as bourgeois had to do with the new 
political condition in Sweden. Since their defeat in two successive elections in the 
1970s (1976 and 1979) it was thought that the era of relatively secure governance for 
the Social Democrats was over and that the Party would have to cooperate with other 
parties in order to gain a majority in the parliament. Even though the Left Party was 
still the first option for the Social Democrats, the modernisers realised that the Party 
could not merely rely on the Left Party but could, to a larger extent than before, 
cooperate with the other parties, particularly those in the centre. The new pattern of 
closer collaboration between the political parties, regardless of their traditional 
ideological conflict, dominated the political climate in the 1990s. The will to reach a 
consensus has not only been demonstrated in the pension issue, but also with the 
Social Democrats' successful achievement of a consensus with the Bourgeois party on 
other issues such as defence, energy, finance agreement, and EU membership. That 
made, for instance, the leading politician in the Centre Party, Anders Carlgren, to 
advocate long-term political co-operation with the Social Democrats (DN, 4/4/1995) 
. The systematic cooperation with the Centre Party from 1995-98, when the Social 
Democrats could have chosen to cooperate with the Left Party, shows clearly that the 
Social Democrats felt more comfortable with some distance between themselves and 
parties to their left. The Social Democrats seem to want have the freedom to choose 
cooperation with either parties on the left or the right: 
There is a need for consensus between the bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats if 
the aim is to carry out a sustainable policy in important issues. The era in which we could 
count on the support of the Left Party is over. By the way, I am not worried at all about the 
decreasing support to the Party. Contrary, I am very glad for that. The nightmare for a 
party is that by having a majority in the parliament, if you then fail to achieve what you 
have promised you cannot blame the failure on the lack of a parliamentary majority. The 
present situation is the most favourable for the Social Democrats because they have at least 
four parties for cooperation and can choose cooperation between either of the blocs (Widar 
Andersson, interview). 
The adaptation of a new strategy by the Social Democratic Party in having an open 
attitude towards both the left and the middle makes it difficult for the Left Party and 
the Green Party to count on long-term cooperation with the Social Democrats. The 
traditional alignment of political parties in two different blocs could be seen as history. 
By the new, more floating approach, it will be up to the Social Democrats to ask for 
cooperation from the either side. The increasing support to the Left Party at the end of 
the 1990s, which was a result of the Social Democrats flirtation with neo-liberalism in 
order to manage the financial crisis, made it clear to the Social Democrats that the 
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threat from the left was far more dangerous than it was before. A strong Left Party 
could be an attractive haven for the desertion of the traditional supporters of the Social 
Democracy who were unsatisfied with the policy of retrenchment. The changes in the 
political profile of the Left Party towards a more pragmatic approach, with a more 
adaptive characteristic to the political environment, would make the Party more 
threatful to the Social Democrats because it could easier gain the votes from social 
democracy (DN, 7/10/2001). 
On the other hand, the Left Party has no other option but to cooperate with the Social 
Democrats and to try to affect opinion in the trade unions and the leftish fraction inside 
the Social Democracy in favour of its own policies in order to pressurise modernisers 
into choosing the leftish rather than the centre bloc. For the Left Party, which cannot 
consider any cooperation with the Bourgeois parties, there is no other option. Apart 
from the Social Democrats, the only other Party with common goals with the Left 
Party is the Green Party, which is nearly in the same isolated position. Another 
function of the Left Party is to respond to the increasing protests against the far- 
reaching retrenchments made by the Social Democrats and to try to represent their 
demands: 
The flirtation of Social Democratic party with neo-liberalism made many sympathisers for 
the party, particularly members of the LO, angry, because they couldn't recognise their 
Social democracy which made many deteriorations in the welfare system. Therefore, in the 
1998 election they found the Left Party to be the one defending the generous welfare 
arrangements and voted for us. After the election the Social Democrats realised the threat 
and turned to the left. That shows that the importance of the Left Party in preventing the 
Social Democrats from a further move to the right. As long as we were little we were 
neglected by the Social Democrats and they took our support for granted. Now they realise 
that there is an alternative on the left side and, therefore, pay more attention to sustain the 
welfare system (Ingrid Burman, interview). 
From a Social Democratic welfare model to a social liberal model 
The new political condition with a more flexible Social Democratic party is something 
that the two centre parties in greatly appreciate. It seems that they have realised that 
they would have larger possibilities in achieving their political goals through 
cooperation with the Social Democrats. Among the reasons for such a perception could 
be the strong position of the leftish bloc in the Swedish politic, the differences between 
the four Bourgeois parties particularly regarding welfare arrangements, and the 
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domination of the Social Democratic Party in the political system of Sweden. 
Moreover, with a more flexible Social Democracy, which tends to move to the centre, 
it would be a mistake for the parties in the centre to continue to emphasis traditional 
bloc policy which dominated Swedish politic for many decades. However, the 
readiness for such cooperation is greater for the Centre Party than the Liberal Party 
(Carlgren, DN, 4/4/1995). Apart from the historical aspect regarding the cooperation 
between the Social Democrats and the Centre in the past in many issues, the 
differences between them is far less than those between the centre and the 
Conservatives. The latest cooperation between these two parties, which took place in 
the period between 1995 and 98, was the most important one, not least because it 
offered the political stability which was needed to restore order to on economic system 
in crisis: 
The cooperation with the Social Democrats was very useful for the Centre Party. We 
succeeded to pursue some aspects of our policy and achieve some of our major goals. The 
Social Democrats responded positively to our demands in allocating extra to the rural area 
and more resources for investment in development of the infrastructure. Apart from that, 
the cooperation provided a strong political base, which made it possible to pursue a strong 
economic policy in order to reduce the budget deficit. That, in turn, led to low interest 
rates, which have been crucial to the success of enterprises and larger investments (Birgitta 
Carlsson, interview). 
While the Centre Party avoids challenging the Social Democratic universal welfare 
model by suggesting its own profile, which is a basic insurance system, the Liberal 
Party has no hesitation in advocating major changes to the existing Social Democratic 
system. Even though the Party, like Social Democrats, support the universal welfare 
system, they have no marked redistributive objectives. In other words, instead of a 
Social Democratic model, which is based on universalism, comprehensiveness and 
egalitarism, the Social Liberal welfare model ignores egalitarism as a crucial aspect 
because in its liberal ideology, it has no redistributive objectives. In other words, the 
main reason for such difference is ideological but, according to Bo Könberg, who 
could be seen as the architect of the social liberal version of welfare system in the 
present Swedish parliament, the generosity of the Social Democratic welfare model 
makes the welfare system too expensive and therefore vulnerable. However, the 
reforms in the pension system suggest that the system is moving towards a social 
liberal model and the liberal advocates of change hope that with the help of 
modernisers inside the Social Democratic Party, there could be new reforms in other 
parts of the social security system, such as sickness insurance and unemployment 
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insurance which would transform the Social Democratic welfare system in Sweden 
towards a more social liberal structure: 
The generosity of the system could be pointed out as the reason for the financial problems 
and, then, the public might turn the system back. I believe we could avoid such a scenario 
by modifying the system and by making different parts of the social arrangements 
independent from each other. According to this perception, the only aim of the pension 
system should be levelling the income of those who live long and those who do not. The 
only aim of the sickness insurance system should be to level out between those who 
become sick more often and those are seldom absent due to sickness. We could have the 
same objective for the unemployment insurance, that it level out the income of those who 
have a job and those who are out of the labour market. In all these systems the aim has to 
be compensation for income loss not as it is now -a redistribution of incomes. By doing 
so, the systems will be independent of each other and they could be managed relatively 
easy (Bo Könberg, interview). 
The social liberal welfare model, as Könberg suggests, indicates a separation of 
different arrangements in order to make each of them into a pure insurance system 
with the same mechanism, which governs the private insurances. In other words, the 
contributions to each insurance system will be paid either directly by wage earners or 
through the government as the collector of income taxes (Motion till Riksdagen 
1998/99: Sf 278). By delegating the responsibility of management for each social 
security system to an independent insurance system the state will virtually lose control 
of the inputs and the outputs of these systems. According to this model the influence of 
the state in using the tax system and other contributions to social security systems as 
instruments for redistibutive purposes is totally eliminated. The public insurance 
system will then have exclusively an administrative function with minimal political 
objectives. Such a model is the result of a traditional liberal standpoint, which 
contrasts with the Social Democratic approach but could be tempting for the 
Conservatives, who suggest far less redistributive elements than the existing system. 
The position of the Centre Party is unique. Although the Party has expressed its wish 
to join a Bourgeois coalition and since the 1970s it has actively been involved in all 
Bourgeois governments the Party has no problem in supporting or being part of a 
government which is formed by the Social Democratic Party run a Social Democratic 
welfare system: 
We are a Party at the centre of the political map and intend to pursue a centre policy but as 
we are at present, we are not strong enough to achieve that goal alone. We need to 
cooperate with other parties. The question is, why we should limit ourselves to cooperate 
with either right-wing or left-wing blocs? Our aim should be cooperation with whichever 
bloc which best would promote the interest of the country and the interest of those who 
voted for us.. . 
There are lots of aspects of Social Democratic politics that we are not happy 
with but if the Social Democrats move a bit to the centre we would never reject a 
cooperation with them and I think the Centre Party is not alone in this policy. I am sure 
that the Liberal Party has the same approach about cooperation with the Social 
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Democrats.. 
. 
If a coalition composed of the Social Democrats, The Liberals and the Centre 
Party with a centre profile would be established I am sure that the universal welfare politic 
would survive for a long period of time in Sweden and above all that, could aggressively 
stop every attempt from the EU for harmonisation of the Swedish social policy to the rest 
of the Europe (Birgitta Carlsson, interview). 
As has been presented so far, there are two major approaches in competition over the 
future. On the one hand the traditional Social Democratic approach with large support 
from the labour union and the Left Party, which suggests a full restoration of the 
generous and redistributive welfare system; on the other hand, the social liberal model 
which intends to eliminate the redistributive elements of the system in favour of 
stability for insurance systems. In this competition the response of the modernisers 
inside the Social Democracy to these two challenges will determine the outcome and 
the future of the Swedish model. So far, the modernisers still intend to keep elements 
of the redistributive feature of the system but there are other factors which will also 
have decisive impacts on the political process. One of these is the relation between the 
employers and the unions in the labour market, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
The Corporatist system in crisis 
Summarising the development in the political institutions in Sweden, one can argue 
that the political stability in Sweden still remains intact and the political support to the 
existing welfare arrangements is still very extensive. The second feature of the 
Swedish system has been the stability of the labour market, resulting from the so- 
called `historic compromise' reached in 1938 among the corporatist institutions. While 
the Social Democratic Party cushioned the continuity of welfare policies through its 
moderation in the political arena, the labour unions safeguarded the stability of the 
labour market by reaching an agreement with the employer's central organisation. The 
agreement not only covered a range of economic and labour market issues, but also 
produced a climate of mutual understanding on which other strategic issues concerning 
the introduction of progressive taxation, as well as the building up of the modern 
Swedish welfare state could be provided and supported by the major interest groups 
representing both labour and capital (Michelletti, 1991). 
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In the labour market, the changes seem to have been more extensive. The major 
change occurred when the rate of unemployment experienced an unprecedented in rise 
the early 1990s. For many analysts, the commitment to full employment and a 
relatively high tax level were two main preconditions of universal welfare states 
(Rothstein, 1998; Brunsdon and May, 1995; Stephens, 1996). The very low 
unemployment rate and high labour force participation not only reduced the costs for 
unemployment compensation, but also increased the state revenue, and as a result, the 
government was able to pay generous benefits and subsidise services to all citizens. On 
the other hand, by advocating high tax levels, the state could develop measures to 
achieve the political-industrial structure, which would secure an active labour market 
policy, rather than income replacement for those displaced in the labour market. The 
rise in unemployment in a labour market which, since the War, has not faced such high 
unemployment, is an obvious sign that demonstrates that industrial relations in Sweden 
face a crucial crisis, and by that, the era of `historic compromise' apparently having 
come to an end. 
The other condition, which made the corporatist system in Sweden viable, was the 
strength of these three parts. Each of these bodies had strong support in both society 
and the labour market. The Social Democratic Party won more than 40 per cent of the 
votes in all elections between 1932 and 1976. In some elections, public support was 
around 50 per cent. In the labour market, the employers' federation, SAF, included 
some of the world's best-known multinational companies - VOLVO, SAAB, 
Electrolux and Ericsson. On the other hand, the LO, the federation of manual trade 
unions, organised more than 90 per cent of all blue-collar workers. By the same token, 
80 per cent of the white-collar workforce was also unionised (Gould, 1996). The 
strength of these three parts provided exceptional conditions for successful centralised 
negotiations. Representatives of the labour market organisations could not only deal 
with the level of wages and the conditions in the labour market, but also play a major 
role in decisions concerning the government's social and economic policies. 
These conditions have gradually changed since the early 1980s. The major change was 
related to the power balance between the three main parties, which has altered. First, as 
stated in the previous chapter, support for the Social Democrats has decreased to 
around 36-38 per cent. Second, as a result of a decreasing share of blue-collar workers 
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in manufacturing, the number of members in the LO has also decreased considerably. 
Third, the internationalisation of the economy has seen Swedish companies moving 
abroad and Swedish employers losing domestic market share to inward investors. 
Consequently, during the 1990s, all the three parts of the Swedish corporatist system 
have weakened gradually, and consequently the era of their indisputable dominance in 
the Swedish labour market is over. Although these changes have indeed been real, it is 
too early to draw conclusions from this matter. In the political sphere there is still 
strong public support for the universal welfare state and in the labour market the trade 
unions still retain strong support from blue-collar workers. Even though manufacturing 
employment has decreased, as the former trade union chairman states, the number of 
workers in the service sector has steadily increased and constitutes a new base of trade 
union support: 
If you look at the statistics you will find that the number of members in the LO has all the 
time increased. What has happened is that new groups of members replaced the traditional 
groups such as those in manufacturing, industrial workers, minors, metalworkers, and 
woodmen. While the per cent of the traditional workers has steadily decreased the 
percentage of the new groups who are those in the public care services and in the private 
services increased quite faster. As a result, the total number of members has not only 
decreased but also increased but it is rue that the divisions of the squads are different now. 
However, the interesting point is that among the new members a large number are 
employees in the public sector, mostly females. The Municipal Workers' Union with more 
than 500 000 members is the biggest section of the LO. Others are members of the Hotel & 
Restaurant Workers Union, Building Maintenance workers' Union, Commercial 
Employees' Union, Transport Union and more than ten other unions. Therefore, these 
groups have more support to the generous welfare system, which they are in greater degree 
than the traditional members are benefited. The new group of members are also more than 
the traditional members concern about the employment and retrenchment in public sector 
because the changes would affect them directly (Stig Malm, interview). 
Even if we assume that parts in the Swedish corporate system are now weaker than in 
the early 1980s, one might argue, that when compared internationally, the Swedish 
labour movement is still the strongest and continues to influence the political process. 
The strength of labour unions is partly because of the high percentage of membership, 
but partly because of the union's crucial impact on industrial relations. The close 
partnership with the Social Democratic Party is another factor, which also gives the 
unions influence in the political processes. 
For others (Pontusson, 1992; Pestoff, 1991; Stephens, 1996), the weakening of the 
various elements of the national labour market, followed by structural changes 
in the 
advanced industrial economies, seem to be crucial mainly 
because it had impact on the 
attitude of the employer's organisation towards negotiations on a national 
level. These 
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authors put the emphasis on the internationalisation of the Swedish economy, which 
increased the volume of trade as well as financial transactions, and also the 
multinationalisation of enterprises, successively undermined the old distributive 
strategy. As a result, Swedish industry, which since the 1970s had become increasingly 
multinational and export oriented, also became less interested in a compromise with 
domestic labour. Several commentators (Pontusson, 1992; Stephens, 1996) have 
pointed out the changing character of Swedish business, which was caused by the 
increasing strength of capital and the change in its interests. 
During the 1990s, Swedish business and the bourgeois parties intensified their 
criticism of the Swedish public sector and welfare state expenditure, advocating 
privatisation, deregulation and tax cuts as methods for containing state spending. 
According to Bertil Jönsson, the former chairman of the union (1993-2000), the SAF 
terminated central bargaining in the early 1990s and in doing so, weakened the 
position of the trade unions. 
Since the 1990s the SAF has refused to join in negotiations with the LO. It seems to me that 
since they believe in the era when the capital freely moves across borders and there is no 
control by the national state to prevent the large Swedish enterprises from moving their 
production abroad, there is no need for them to negotiate with us. They have adopted an 
offensive position in relation to us. In the era of globalisation with the dominance of the neo- 
liberal ideology the SAF understand the situation as being very plausible. It seems that they 
believe that it is the time for harvest, which means that they could take everything they missed 
during the past decades, when both of us were obliged to compromise. Now, even if we want to 
continue the talks, they deny those to us and instead prefer to make agreements with the LO- 
sections in every workplace. By doing so, they aim to split the union and in doing so, decrease 
the strength of the powerful labour movement (Bertil Jönsson, interview). 
In a further move, the SAF withdrew representatives from the boards of all state 
agencies in 1991. This enabled employers not only to attempt to avoid the compression 
of wages between low and high paid work requested by the LO, but also to completely 
ignore the solidaristic wage policy and the introduction of wage `dispersion' 
(Stephens, 1996). The SAF explained its new standpoint by arguing that the 
solidaristic wages policy had led to a wage drift which threatened business 
competitiveness (Rehn and Viklund, 1990). The experts in the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprises do not hesitate to point out their intention to weaken the strong 
corporatist relation in the Swedish polity. As an economic reason they suggest that an 
end to the central bargaining would favour the expansive sectors, which in turn would 
provide a good future for the Swedish economy: 
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The central bargaining could lead to wages, which would favour the branches with a low 
level of productivity or lower demands on their products in the market. It would be a 
mistake to have the same level of wages for these two sorts of branches through central 
bargaining. What it has to come down to is that the procedure of bargaining should take 
place in the companies where there is a better understanding about the space for wage- 
increase. If the central bargaining continues there is always the risk that for some branches 
the level of the wages which is bargained in the central level would be higher than the 
companies' profits, and in others, which have a high profitability, the wage increase would 
be lower than it should be (Anders Morin, interview). 
A number of other trends in the international economy aggravated the situation: the 
collapse of fixed but flexible exchange rates, the increase of oil prices, and increased 
international interest rates as a result of many governments' attempts to fight recession 
with deficit spending. Moreover, the deregulation of financial markets reduced the 
government's ability to control economic development at a national level: 
Internationalisation led to a successive deregulation of Swedish financial markets during 
the 1980s. This deprived the government of essential elements of its supply side policy 
that in the past had been used to secure full employment, price stability, growth, and 
redistributive aims. Active labour market policy became increasingly the sole remaining 
policy tool Stephens (1996: 49). 
However, the end of centralised wage-bargaining made wage restraint more difficult, 
which has been to the disadvantage of employers. Several commentators (Stephens, 
1996; Martin, 1991) have indicated that the real reason for ending wage-bargaining 
was that employers wanted to weaken the LO, both politically and economically. The 
unions' attempts to extend economic democracy during the 1970s and 1980s, partly 
through the Meidner's plans, seemed to be a key reason for the SAF's measures against 
them (Brunsdon and May, 1995). Meidner believes that the changes made in the 
Swedish welfare regime have been large enough to mean that the basic pillars of the 
`peoples' home' are not what they were in the past. Therefore, the initial system and 
the Swedish model has experienced a kind of `system shift' : 
The attacks to the basic parts of welfare system seem to have led to a system shift in 
Sweden. In the economic sphere we could point to the privatisation of state monopolies, 
the abandonment of the policy of full employment, the upsurge of non-productive 
speculative investment, resulting in destabilization of the economy and substantial 
loss 
of jobs in manufacturing. Wage earner solidarity, especially the system of nationwide 
collective bargaining through which the unions had pursued their solidaristic wage 
strategy, are no longer sustained, which is another sign of a system shift. All these 
changes were intensified after the deregulations in the financial market. Deregulations 
of currency flows and regulations pertaining to investments abroad have resulted not 
only in substantial capital outflow abroad and transferral of Swedish companies abroad 
in the name of multinationalism, with sharp decrease of job opportunities and 
employment in Sweden, but also in a virtual deindustrialisation of the country which 
has led to income differences between those in and those out of the labour markets 
(Rudolf Meidner, interview). 
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The enterprise flexibility in Sweden, which was seen to depend on wage flexibility, 
has not led to the expected degree of decentralisation in wage bargaining. According to 
OECD (1999: 148), by 1998 only a small number (15-20) of companies had opted for a 
decentralised wage settlement. As a result of these changes in Sweden's corporatist 
structure, which according to Pontusson (1992) was mainly the result of a `counter 
offensive' by the employers and SAF against welfare capitalism, some initiatives 
against the universalist welfare system have been noted. One of these is the expansion 
of occupational and private provisions. As Kangas and Palme (1993) have pointed out, 
at the upper end of the labour market, company and private pension schemes grew 
considerably. Occupational and private provision, however, could not threaten the 
universal welfare system in the short term, but it could lower the demand for state 
provision, and therefore reduce the public's willingness to fund it. Moreover, 
occupational provision would mean a shift to `enterprise welfare', which could have 
the effect of binding individuals to their companies rather than to universalist 
provision. The changes suggested by the advocates of the employers' organisation not 
only refer to replacing state provisions by the private sector but also suggests a new 
design for welfare arrangements, with new priorities from the present system which 
stress a high level of benefits to another system in which replacement rates in benefits 
should be lower and, instead, the welfare system should mainly focus on services to 
groups who are in need: 
The aging problem is crucial to the present welfare system in Sweden. Apart from 
pensions, the costs of elderly care and the health system are to be higher in the future. By 
raising levels in the different benefits, the system will face further crisis in the future. 
Therefore we should change the course and adopt new priorities. Instead of high benefit 
levels in the social security system we should invest in the service sector. The major areas 
would be childcare, school, and elderly care and health system. We have to give up the 
high benefit levels and just have minimum protections. The present system with 80 per 
cent compensation in all insurance system will soon or later collapse (Anders Morin, 
interview). 
Overall, during the 1990s, although the employers were determined to ignore the 
solidaristic wage policy by arguing that it would threaten business competitiveness, the 
labour movement did not change its attitude towards cooperation in the labour market. 
While the end of centralised wage bargaining would make wage restraint more 
difficult, and that would have been to the disadvantage of employers, the trade unions 
avoided conflict in the labour market by not demanding higher wage growth than that 
to which the employers would agree (Bertil Jönsson, interview). In this way, the 
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unions followed the traditional pattern in favouring the national interest in the period 
of economic crisis. 
By this strategy, the LO could survive the increasing pressure from the employers, and 
gain political support from the Social Democratic governments. Apart from the 
consensus strategy advocated by the LO, the fact that the union could, throughout the 
decade, keep itself united, made the employers' move to fragment the union 
unsuccessful (LO Avtal, 2001). Although the SAF initiated wage flexibility and 
advocated decentralised wage bargaining, there were few companies who decided to 
undertake a decentralised wage settlement. The employers' organisation seem to have 
realised that the historic cooperation with the unions in wage bargaining was a crucial 
factor for existing stability in the relationship with labour and were concerned to keep 
it intact. Therefore, despite the ideological reasons for advocating of a decentralised 
wage bargain there has been an acceptance that wage settlements takes place at central 
level. For this reason employers and unions in the industrial sector agreed to set up a 
private mediation institute, which works as a voluntary substitute for incomes policy 
(Elvander, 2002). Such cooperation on voluntary basis would prevent the intervention 
of the state in labour market relations. 
Swedish corporatism and the impact of interest groups on the welfare system 
So far, it has been suggested that the corporate structure of the Swedish political 
system, with its great impact on interest groups' active involvement in the formation of 
the social welfare policy, has suffered structural problems. It has also been suggested 
that, while all the three elements have gradually been weakened, the only part of the 
structure which independently wanted to break with the corporatist tradition was the 
SAF, which was determined to take advantage of the process of globalisation. The 
labour unions, which historically had been the strong competitor of the SAF on a 
national level, had weakened and, as a consequence, the employers were tempted to 
take advantage of such changing power balance. In other words, the corporatist 
institutions of Harpsund Democracy which, according to scholars (Hoefer, 1996; 
Mishra, 1984), was the decisive factor that cushioned peace in the labour market and 
gave stability to the Swedish model, is no longer as secure as before. Since the start of 
turbulence in the Swedish economy and changes in the relations between the three 
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major pillars of the system, the broad consensus about the consistency of the corporate 
structure of the system has been eroded. Based on the changes mentioned above, many 
observers (Bergstrom, 1993; Michelletti, 1991; Peterson, 1994) have recently 
questioned the consistency of the corporate structure of the system, and claimed that a 
process of decorporatizing of the Swedish model has started. On the other hand, some 
others such as Hoefer (1996) reject the notion that the Swedish system is 
decorporatizing to the extent that has been recently asserted. 
The major argument concerning the decorporatization of the system is that the balance 
between organised interests and the state, which characterised the Swedish model of 
corporatism, is considered to be a thing of the past (Michelletti, 1991). This conclusion 
is based on Michelletti's definition of corporatism, which is `... an integral relationship 
for decision-making and implementation between the state and encompassing interest 
organisations. Encompassing interest organisations represent the greater part of the 
collectively which they can organise as members' (1991: 148). Michelletti adds some 
other characteristics to the Swedish experience of corporatism, i. e. `the incorporation 
of antagonistic, encompassing interests in state policy making. ' 
One of the major changes which, according to Schmitter (1989), seems to have caused 
the weakness of the corporatist arrangements, is the process of globalisation and 
Europeanisation, which has led to the decreasing importance of the national state. As 
Sweden joined the EU, many decisions, which had been taken by the national state, 
became the responsibility of the European community. Consequently, as the space for 
national policy determination has decreased, the interest groups, as the minor entities 
on the national level, have also found the space for influencing the process of decision- 
making increasingly limited. 
Secondly, and as a result of increasing globalisation, the existing integration among the 
three major actors in the corporatist system has decreased considerably. As the 
Swedish companies in the deregulated financial market have, to a larger extent, moved 
their capital abroad, the power relation between the Swedish Employers' Confederation 
(SAF), on the one hand, and the trade union federation (LO) and the government, on 
the other hand, has decreased considerably. In other words, there is now less need for 
the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises (former SAF) to join negotiations with its 
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corporatist counterparts to reach agreements concerning regulations in the labour 
market, wages etc. 15 As Bertil Jönsson, the former chairman of the LO, stresses, 
changes in labour legislation, mainly the collective agreements, were the main 
conditions for the SAF to enter into negotiations with the LO. Jönsson referred to the 
obvious unwillingness of the SAF to join in any bilateral negotiations with the LO: 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Union have had a weaker position in relation to the 
SAF. Capital has got a stronger position in relation to Labour. This circumstance made the 
SAF reluctant to cooperate with the LO. The SAF seems to believe that `the season of 
harvests' has begun for them in which they have the best opportunity to carry on a policy 
based on their ideological ground. During the 1990s, the frosty relation between the SAF 
and the LO has encouraged the SAF to dictate its conditions to the labour movement 
(Bertil Jönsson, interview). 
Accordingly, it seems that corporatist co-operation, which has been an integral part of 
a rational strategy to protect prior policies in the labour market, has lost its importance 
for the employers. 
Thirdly, the move towards privatisation of social services accelerated during the 
1990s. As has always been known, the Swedish Social Democrats have traditionally 
emphasised the notion that social services for common human needs should be 
provided on a no-profit-based administration (Hoefer, 1988). Having said this, some 
private services were, to a limited degree, permitted in medical and child-care services. 
By the same token, the size of government became a target for change, and, the 
bourgeois parties and the employers' organisation called for decentralisation in parts of 
the public sector. As Rothstein (1988) emphasises, as far back the 1980s, the SAF had 
no active policy for decreasing the size of government programmes, which had 
15The 
changing attitude of the Swedish employers towards the labour movement has its roots in the 
1970s political conflicts between these two interest groups (Aylott 1999; Gould 1993). After the 
establishment of welfare-statism, the labour movement saw itself in such a strong position that it 
demanded greater industrial and economic democracy. Politically, the LO demanded trade unions' rights 
to codetermination in company management. Since the LO and SAF failed to reach an agreement on an 
extension of industrial democracy, the LO used its influence on the Party and put pressure on the 
government to pass a law - the Codetermination Act of 1976. This law gave trade unions the right to 
take part in company decision-making. In the same way, the LO put forward the proposal for the 
creation of wage-earner funds. According to the original design, all enterprises of a certain size would 
pay 20 percent of their profits to these funds, controlled by trade unions, which would gradually increase 
their stakes in the firms. These measures, particularly the second one, has been understood by employers 
and non-socialist parties as a move from capitalism towards democratic socialism (Gould, 1993). The 
idea of wage-earner funds, not only deteriorated relations between SAF and the LO, but also united the 
forces of the centre-right in Swedish politics. Consequently, as Aylott (1999: 199) emphasises, `Swedish 
employers considered that the labour movement had breached the terms of the country's class 
compromise. Centralised, peak-level wage-bargaining, so crucial to keeping wages in check, began to 
lose its discipline. ' 
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consistently been raising the budget for social welfare services. Such a policy has to be 
understood as a part of the corporatist arrangement in Swedish politics, which resulted 
in a widespread consensus between the SAF and the Social Democratic governments. 
However, during the 1980s the policy of decentralisation initiated by the Social 
Democratic governments, suggested an obvious change in the ideology of welfare 
statism. The removal of regulations in social services, health care, and planning, on the 
one hand, and the provision of greater autonomy for the municipalities to control the 
finance and organisation of services on the other, were among the crucial changes 
made in that direction (Elander and Montin, 1990; Gould, 1993: 172). As Sven Hort 
stresses, such a move has weakened the position of the `strong state' on which the 
Social Democratic welfare model was based: 
If we look at the Swedish system from a historic perspective, we will find that the system 
was mainly based on the dominance of the `strong state', which in practice meant that the 
central government had greater power in exercising its influence. The essential parts of 
welfare programmes were adopted by the central government. The regional and local 
governments could not avoid the policies, which were mostly addressed in order to reduce 
the gaps between regions. However, the system has faced two challenges, which above all 
questions the authority of the `strong state'. On one hand, the increase in the local 
government's power has reduced the influence of the strong state but on the other hand 
there is the process of privatisation, which in the area of delivery of services has acted as a 
competitor to state. The role of state is not as strong as it once was, but it is still strong 
enough. Even though the system is still almost intact there are some threats against its 
essential parts. The authority of the central government, which could be more efficient in 
its redistributive aspect and delivery of services, receives competition from private 
enterprises (Sven Hort, interview). 
In contrast to what has been stated so far, Sven Hort, like some other commentators, 
such as Hoefer (1996) and Rothstein (1998), rejects the conclusion that corporatism is 
dying in Sweden. Hoefer criticises those authors who generalise `a few minor changes 
to the whole corporatist system' and without any behavioural and empirical testing of 
corporatist theories, claim that corporatism in Sweden has ended. According to Hoefer: 
If Sweden is becoming fewer corporatists, one should expect to see changes in certain 
behaviours exhibited by government and interest groups. These changes are not happening 
to the degree one would expect if the literature on the corporatist system in Sweden were 
completely correct (1996: 69). 
Hoefer examines the level of corporatism in Sweden by analysing the information 
collected from a survey about the Swedish interest groups' participation in the process 
of policy-making, mainly in social welfare issues, in 1986 and 1994. The study 
confirmed that the use of compromise and consensus in policy making is not declining, 
likewise, the role of encompassing organisations is not diminishing. Group- 
government relations are still strong, and the conflict and competition between interest 
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groups is not increasing. Further, the group leaders' influence in the process of law- 
making is almost the same as it was before. 
Hoefer's finding in this empirical study is that there are few, if any, grounds supporting 
the suggestion that a process of the demise of corporatism in Sweden is occurring. His 
study presents interesting findings, although it may be too optimistic to assume that 
this process is not happening in Sweden. As pointed out by the former chairman of 
LO, Bertil Jönsson (interview), `the worsening of the relationship between the LO and 
SAF is a fact which has had widespread effects on relations in labour market. ' One of 
the consequences of such a trend, to support Jönsson's argument, is that fragmented 
bargaining, which was suggested and to some extent initiated by the employers have 
had some impact on wage rates in general, and on public sector wages in particular. 
Apart from that, despite the initiatives by the trade unions to cooperate with the 
employers, capital mobility from Sweden has increased considerably (Lindvall, 2002). 
Overall, in contrast to the political elite, which has adhered to the `consensus' by 
keeping to the major course of welfare strategy, there has been an obvious split in the 
labour market. The corporatist system is undoubtedly experiencing its deepest crisis 
since the 1930s and `decorporatisation' is likely to have an impact on the nature of the 
welfare regime. The essential impact, though, is that the climate of mutual 
understanding, which was crucial for the introduction of the progressive tax policy, as 
well as the building up of the modern Swedish welfare state, could vanish. The 
commitment to full employment, which was also crucial for the expansion of a 
successful universalist welfare state, could also suffer from the lack of consensus 
between key actors in the labour market. Despite that, it has to be emphasised that 
although the crisis of the corporatist system has weakened the underpinnings of the 
regime, it has not (yet) destroyed it. 
Public attitudes towards the Welfare System 
The discussion so far suggests that although the problems caused by endogenous and 
exogenous factors tended to erode the support of the employers for the welfare state, 
the support of the other actors such as trade union and the political parties, especially 
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those in the left-wing bloc to the welfare system, are still intact. This leads us to 
conclude that democratic institutions, which are highly anxious about the public 
opinion, cannot deviate from the dominating standpoints among the public concerning 
welfare state. Democratic wisdom seems to suggest that short-term changes, for 
instance caused by economic crisis, may legitimise periodic retrenchments but 
suggestions for profound institutional changes are likely to be rejected by those who 
benefit from the system. In other words, the long-term trends in public opinion, which 
occur over decades and are in favour of welfare state, are more decisive (Svallfors, 
2001). The more that social groups are dependent on the benefits and services provided 
by the system, the more widespread the reaction to the changes will be (Pierson, 1996). 
The general election of 2002 has clearly shown that the Conservative Party, which held 
a definite anti-tax policy during the election campaign, and its party leader advocated 
large scale reductions in tax levels, faced the greatest defeat in its history (from 22.9 to 
15.3 per cent). The evaluation of such defeat by Bo Könberg is striking. Könberg is 
one of the senior members of the Liberal Party, which gained most of those votes of 
people who turned the Conservative's anti-tax campaign back: 
The conservatives have always stressed tax reductions but the reason that they faced the 
greatest defeat in this election by losing almost 8 per cent was their unproportional stress 
on tax cuts, when the Swedish people did not place the tax issue of the top of their lists of 
priorities. A crucial reason for this was that during the past years the wage-earners have 
realised that the amount they receive after taxes and other contributions has actually been 
more than before. Apart from that the wages had been increased whereas tax rates had 
been decreased. Therefore, there was no need for tax cuts. On the other hand, the 
Conservatives could not explain to the people how they planned to make a tax cut by 130 
billion skr/year without implementing major cutbacks in replacement levels, and without 
deteriorating the quality of social services (Bo Könberg, interview). 
It suggests that the liberals are fully aware that crucial changes in benefit system are 
not acceptable by the public opinion. Even the Conservatives have realised the fact and 
therefore, short after the election of 2002 replaced most of the leaders who were 
blamed for the disasters election result. Replacement of the tax-cut-friendly party 
leader, Bo Lundgren with Fredrik Reinfeldt (which formally will take place in autumn 
2003), who is a more traditional conservative with greater concern to social issues, 
illustrate the greater concern of the Conservatives to public opinion (Aftonbladet, 
11/5/2003). 
However, even if the tax issue was not the central matter for the public, by making it 
out to be a central issue the Conservatives caused reactions in the public opinion. 
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According to one of the leaders of the Left Party, Ingrid Burman, the outcome of the 
election not only rejected the Conservative's claim that Swedes are against high tax 
levels but also showed that a majority of the Swedish people actually support the 
policy of restoration of the welfare system: 
The election in 2002 had two central messages: first, the return of the Social Democratic 
sympathisers to the Party, since the Party had been changing its policy towards a 
restoration of the welfare system; second, that the election showed that a majority of the 
Swedish people rejected the policy about major tax cuts which had been advocated by the 
Conservatives. Instead, the people chose the policy of restoration of welfare system, which 
had faced considerable retrenchments during the 1990s. The Swedish people also indicated 
that they prefer larger investments in the public sector and public care, such as in school 
and elderly care, than receiving more money through tax cuts. Therefore, in the history 
books, the election of 2002 is going to be named as the tax election (Ingrid Burman, 
interview). 
However, public opinion is not united in supporting the welfare state. Different social 
groups hold different views about social policy arrangements. Although the labour 
movement was the major driving force of the welfare system and initially defended the 
interest of the people who suffered most from the risks connected to the market 
economy, it soon realised that the continuity of the system needed a broader support. 
The advocates of welfare in Nordic countries were therefore keen to develop a system 
based on far-reaching consensus among the key political forces (Goul Andersen et al., 
1999). Apart from social classes, the Nordic welfare states, by initiating women- 
friendly policies, which increasingly integrated the women in the labour market and 
thereby provided full citizenship for Scandinavian women, also widened social support 
for welfare to the maximum (Karvonen and Selle, 1995). Therefore, the Swedish 
welfare state has, since its formation, aimed to provide a broadly accepted and 
legitimate framework for the extension of social justice. For the Social Democratic 
Party and labour unions, as the architects of the system, only the institutionalisation of 
the welfare system could secure a desirable degree of `social justice'. Therefore, from 
the very beginning, these bodies pursued the institutionalisation of welfare reforms. 
The real aims of the institutional parameters were security, decommodification, labour 
training and mobilisation, and redistribution of resources (Stephens, 1996). 
Citizen welfare has been provided by certain key features of the system, such as high 
replacement rates for most transfers, liberal qualifying conditions for benefits, the 
broad scope of citizenship rights, comprehensiveness, and service intensity. Because of 
the emphasis on `decommodification', the basis for entitlements to income or publicly 
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provided goods in the Swedish welfare system has been citizenship status rather than 
market participation or market position. Because these measures have been viewed as 
the central means of achieving the essential goal of the welfare system - distributive 
justice - they also constitute the system's source of legitimacy. Considering that such a 
goal has been achieved by the state's active intervention in the distribution of social 
and economic welfare, state interference has also been legitimised as the guarantor of 
continuity in welfare provision. Therefore, for a defender of a more conventional 
perception of the welfare state such as Rothstein (1998), the question of legitimacy 
mainly deals with the welfare regime's normative character, and its historical success 
in constructing a more egalitarian and just society. Economists like Lindbeck (1994) 
and Rojas (1999), on the contrary, focus on the economic consequences of the welfare 
system, and their major concerns are the system's negative impact on efficiency and 
growth. In this view, the concern lies with what extent public policies with tax- 
financed social transfers and public services create disincentives to efficiency and 
growth. 
Legitimacy of high-taxing and high-spending state 
Based on long-term development of welfare state legitimacy, the argument is that the 
support of the public opinion to the system has been crucial to the continuity of the 
system. As long as support for the institutions of the system remains strong, the 
political actors avoid too much efforts of retrenchment, which would clash with the 
will of the public. However, one of the major issues in the recent debates about the 
crisis of the Swedish welfare state has been the erosion of public support for the 
system. The discussion about the long-run decline of the welfare state is not new. Ever 
since the late 1970s, critics of the system have argued that ambitious welfare policies 
and increased state expenditure will inevitably evoke resistance to the high-taxing, 
high-spending state, and thereby undermine support for a public welfare state 
(Wilensky, 1976; Hibbs and Madsen, 1981). Later in the 1990s, with increasing 
debates about `post-modernism', others (Gundelach and Riis, 1992) stressed the 
growth of middle-class life styles, alongside increasing individualism as the factors 
which tended to erode the support for the welfare state. Such resistance would cause a 
crisis of public legitimacy for the welfare system, and change political priorities 
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among the public. As some critics (Musgrave, 1990; Ingelhart, 1990) point out, the 
changing attitudes have clearly been recognised in the wave of tax reforms, which 
have swept over many western welfare states in the 1980s. This view was rejected by 
advocates of the institutional approach (Goul Andersen, 1993; Svallfors, 1996) who 
pointed that the changing attitudes have occurred in residual welfare states and not in 
the universal welfare states in which almost everybody is potentially benefited by the 
arrangements. In these systems, in Nordic countries, not only support to the welfare 
systems eroded but also scepticism to the tax system, which is the highest in OECD, 
are far less than in countries which have far lower tax levels. 
As stated, one common reason for the decreasing support for state-based welfare is the 
negative effects of high social spending on the economy. Welfare states based on an 
egalitarian ideology, and financed by taxes collected by the state, it is claimed, lead to 
decreased economic competitiveness and distortion in market relations with negative 
work incentives, hidden employment, and weakened entrepreneurship (Edlund, 2000; 
Atkinson and Mogensen, 1993). A second reason concerns the expansion of the 
welfare state and the conviction that the system has reached its rational limits. It has 
been argued that the welfare state has succeeded in solving the problems it was 
originally created to deal with, and therefore there is no immediate need for further 
expansion. Critics also focused on the financial aspects of the system, and on high 
taxation in particular. For prosperous social groups with less obvious needs for welfare 
services, ambitious welfare policies have been experienced as a heavy burden. Such 
dissatisfaction with such a costly system, it has been argued, explains a trend of 
increasing discontent with taxation in Sweden. Several economists (Lindbeck et al., 
1994; Rojas, 1999) have described the growing tax burden, mainly incurred by a huge 
public sector labour market rather than the cash transfers of the welfare state, as the 
Achilles heel of the system. In many Western welfare states, direct visible taxes, along 
with high-spending public services, have become the main targets of criticism for the 
growing anti-tax movement. But has tax discontent really increased in Sweden? Is 
there any evidence to confirm the claim that public discontent with taxation has risen 
and that support for the welfare state in Sweden has eroded? 
There is no empirical data based on popular attitudes towards taxation, which would 
prove the claim that discontent with taxation in Sweden has risen. Those who point to 
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a trend of increasing discontent with taxation mostly base their claims on unfounded 
suggestions, rather than on an empirical examination of public attitudes. On the 
contrary, nationally representative surveys conducted in Sweden between 1981 and 
1997 show that, as Edlund (2000: 58) stated, `a long-term trend of increased 
dissatisfaction with taxation cannot be detected. ' On the contrary, as Stenberg and 
Svallfors (1992) concluded during the 1980s, a majority of Swedes believe that, 
balanced against the public benefits provided by the government, taxes were not too 
high. Between 1981 and 1991, the percentage of people who believed that the general 
level of taxes in Sweden was too high decreased from 84 to 71 percent. By the same 
token, the percentage of people who believed that marginal taxes were far too high 
decreased from 82 to 59 per cent. Accordingly, one can conclude that discontent with 
taxation decreased considerably during this period. A survey of the late 1990s (Hjerm 
and Svallfors, 1998), however, shows that tax discontent gradually increased 
thereafter, particularly between 1996 and 1997. The Survey also revealed that 
increased discontent during the 1990s was related to changes in tax and welfare policy. 
Increasing tax levels in the second half of the 1990s, combined with cutbacks in 
welfare programmes, aggravated the perception that, while public sector expenditures 
increased, public benefits provided by the government decreased (Edlund, 2000). 
Among the interviewees representing the three political parties in the Bourgeois bloc, 
none tended to question the legitimacy of the welfare state by pointing to a trend of 
increasing discontent about taxation as a major concern. As Birgitta Carlsson stresses, 
the concern is to increase the efficiency of the existing welfare system: 
Since the creation of the welfare system or to be precise since the existing arrangements 
demonstrated weaknesses our major concern was to find repair the insufficiencies here and 
there. We have also repaired the arrangements as they initially founded. We have never 
tried to question an arrangement in order to replace it with a new one, which would be 
more efficient, adapted to the new era and new needs. Our major critique of the system is 
that different arrangements are totally independent from each other and that makes it easier 
for abuse of the system. By establishing a common system it will be easier to grasp the 
whole system and by preventing abuse we could save a lot. In other words, all existing 
arrangements have to remain in a new modern system but they have to be organised in a 
new and more efficient way (Birgitta Carlsson, interview). 
If the changes suggested by Carlsson are carried out, it will undoubtedly lead to great 
savings in welfare costs which will in turn make tax cuts possible, but the point here is 
that the reforms are addressed to implementation of the services and not their existents. 
Even the liberals avoid relating the calls for changes in the existing welfare 
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arrangements to the legitimacy issue and the high costs of the generous welfare 
system, but they rather represent ideological objections against the state monopoly on 
the implementation of public services: 
I think a majority of the Swedish people will for a foreseeable future support the universal 
welfare system. The only problem, which could really threaten the system, is bad 
performance in the Swedish economy. A long-term economic crisis could not only cause 
financial problems for the social arrangements but also could increase doubts in the public 
opinion about the legitimacy of the system (Bo Könberg, interview). 
The Conservatives are the only party which clearly points to high taxes as a burden for 
individuals, and target the high-spending welfare state as a key feature of political 
disappointment. In the political debate the party represents the core opposition to the 
high-taxing and high-spending state: 
We have always criticised the existing welfare system where high taxes are to finance the 
high benefits. We have always advocated lower tax levels and suggest lower benefit levels. 
With lower tax levels can people manage their individual economy without the 
intervention of the state? Only those who are in great need should receive helps from the 
state. If our policy implements the people who need most will receive greater support 
something the existing universal model cannot offer (Sten Tolgefors, interview). 
The Social Democrats, who through the tax reform of 1989 won the support of 
professionals, managers, and other high-income earners, after returning to power in 
1994, increased the marginal tax rate for high-income earners, believing this measure 
to be the most efficient way of balancing the budget. An additional 5 percent extra tax 
on income, which was added on the top of the marginal income tax rate, was 
implemented. In addition, some changes in social spending were implemented to bring 
down budget costs. Cutbacks in replacement levels, stricter qualifying conditions, and 
reduced social services were among such measures (Palme and Wennemo, 1998). It 
appears that the impact of these two measures caused dissatisfaction among both high- 
income earners and strata with fewer resources. Whereas both groups were similar in 
their demands for lowered taxes, they differed in their concern over the distribution of 
taxes and tax progression. Not surprisingly, the working classes were better disposed 
towards a progressive distribution of taxes. Knowing that both the working class and 
the middle class have benefited from welfare policies such as universalist social 
services, income-related policies and the commitment to full employment, their 
support for the progressive tax system is understandable. 
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However, some scholars (Pakulski and Waters, 1996) reject the notion that class 
divisions continue to have a decisive impact on the creation of identities and interests, 
particularly in view of the emerging process of post-industrialisation and globalisation. 
Accordingly, attitudes to taxation manifested themselves in patterns of consumption 
and value-commitments, and therefore, identities and interests are no longer 
structurally determined. Others (Svallfors, 1999) take a different view, and argue that 
attitudes towards tax increases and cutbacks in the welfare programme continue to be 
determined by class. Compared with the lower social strata, higher income earners 
such as high-level salaried employees and the self-employed, disapprove of 
progressive taxation more strongly. Nevertheless, the eroding support for the welfare 
state seems to have mainly been a result of increased dissatisfaction with the level of 
benefits and the quality of the services received for the taxes paid (Edlund, 2000). The 
stress on the inefficient allocation and organisation of social services by right-wing 
parties seemed to have had a particular impact on the growing discontent about tax 
levels. Despite the fact that Sweden has the highest tax rates in the world, the provision 
of services in the country has been heavily criticised. Another major criticism launched 
by the right was concerned with the negative impact of taxation on employment. In a 
situation of continuing high unemployment, the argument that reduced taxes would 
provide new jobs could gain a degree of support among citizens. 
Despite the emphasis on an increasing public discontentment with high taxation, and 
growing critical views about the social services provided by the welfare system, and 
the reduced level of benefits, several scholars (Svallfors, 1999; Edlund, 2000) reject 
the suggestion that public support for the welfare state has declined. On the contrary, 
they emphasise the strong support for welfare state in terms of service delivery, 
financing and social spending during the 1990s, which not only decreased, but in some 
instances has slightly increased. Among high-income earners, however, support for the 
system has certainly decreased. Suggestions also stress that if further cutbacks in the 
welfare state transform the system towards a less ambitious and less universalistic 
welfare model, the public support for the system will decrease among larger groups of 
the citizens. 
To retain the strong support to the welfare state, the architects of the system need to 
convince middle class voters to continue their support. The leader of the two main left 
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parties (the Social Democrat, Göran Person and the leftish Gudrun Schyman) declared 
that by keeping the universal characteristics of the Swedish system, they intended to 
encourage the middle class to continue to support the generous welfare arrangements 
(DN, 30/4/2001). Even the liberal leader, Lars Lejonborg defended the universal 
welfare politic and generous replacement rates. The only major difference with the 
Social Democrats was the Liberals' greater concern to introduce the private insurance 
system as a complement to the existing state welfare arrangements (DN, 1/5/2001). 
Summarising the discussion about the public support for the welfare state, recent 
studies have not found any `declining long term trend in support for the welfare 
system' (in Nordic countries) (Goul Andersen, 1999: 255). Although the willingness of 
the growing well-to-do middle-class to finance social spending might have lessened, 
this loss of support has also been observed in countries with residual welfare states in 
which only the poorer groups are the beneficiaries. While the Nordic systems provide 
benefits to everyone, protests at high tax rates are far lower in these countries than in 
the `liberal' regimes. In Sweden, criticism of the welfare system seems mainly have 
been a result of increased dissatisfaction with the level of benefits and quality of the 
services received for the taxes paid. As a result, in the early 1990s, the right-wing 
government started a process of privatisation in delivery of services, which was 
principally crucial to the future of the universal welfare model. 
The privatisation of public services 
Another challenge to the welfare system was the questioning of Titmuss' institutional 
model in terms of service provision. In the course of the 1980s, the delivery of public 
services came under heavy criticism. Consumers of public sector services were one 
major source of critique that expressed dissatisfaction with the delivery of services for 
two reasons. As clients and patients, they had no choice over the type of neither 
services delivered, nor a choice over where to obtain them. The bureaucratic features 
of the system were also an object of criticism. Politicians were the second group 
concerned about the cost of the services, which had increased enormously (Stephens, 
1996). Consequently, in the beginning of the 1990s, municipalities and county councils 
have contracted out a part of the provision of public services to private companies. 
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Education and care were two main areas, which were affected by the new policy. For 
the bourgeois coalition, who designed the privatisation of public service production, 
the change had a partly ideological basis. It was implementation of Carl Bildt's 
`freedom of choice revolution'. But partly it was seen as a solution to the strained 
economic circumstances (Rothstein, 1998). 
However, provision of public welfare by providers other than the public sector was by 
no means a new phenomenon in Sweden. The informal care of children and other 
dependants, unions' administration of unemployment insurance and also their 
recreational and educational services, and voluntary organisations supported by public 
money for help to women, children, refuges and other social groups, have been among 
such initiatives (Brunsdon and May, 1995; Meyer, 1994; Andersson, 1996). Housing 
is another example which, according to Brunsdon and May (1995: 14), `more than any 
other provider sector suggested that a "mixed economy" prevailed, albeit heavily 
regulated and subsidised by the state. ' Consequently, private production of services 
would not necessarily mean any direct threat against the universal welfare state, 
although in Nordic welfare states, social services have historically been provided by 
the state rather than by subcontracted private firms (Stephens, 1996). However, strong 
opposition to the privatisation of public services exists in the labour movement. On the 
other hand, the bourgeois parties have responded to increasing dissatisfaction in 
society by arguing that private alternatives could compete with the public sector in 
terms of cost effectiveness. As social and political pressures on the labour movement 
have increased, the Social Democratic Party has been forced to accept the idea of 
private competition, on the condition that the state regulates and finances the services. 
The conservatives, who had suggested a complete privatisation, retreated from their 
neo-liberal standpoint and accepted the principle of state regulation. However, they 
stressed the necessity of increasing fees for services and in this respect there remained 
an important difference with the Social Democrats, who believed that such a policy 
would create a tiered system of services (Stephens, 1996). 
When the process of effectiveness of minor parts of service delivery in some areas of 
Stockholm started at the end of the 1980s, the union and employees were those who 
most resisted this initiative, but as the chairman of the committee which initiated the 
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process of reform in Stockholm pointed out, there was a consensus among the political 
parties: 
There was a consensus between the political parties in Stockholm city council that the 
delivery of services, as it was at that time, was too expensive and therefore efficiency 
measures were necessary. The initial goal of the reform was not to replace the public 
delivery of services by private delivery but to use privatisation of limited elements of 
services to pressure the public sector into being more efficient. The Social Democrats who 
rejected the idea for a long period of time supported the initiative. Even the Left Party 
could not deny the need to change. However, after the victory of the bourgeois coalition in 
1998 in the municipality elections in Stockholm, the object of privatisation was changed. 
The Conservative-led coalition was determined to successively replace the public delivery 
by the private entrepreneurs. In some areas of Stockholm privatisation of services 
increased to 50 per cent of all services, but in other parts due to large dissatisfaction with 
the policy, public delivery of services remained fairly intact (Ebba Bodell, interview). 
The expansion of privatisation, as developed by the right-wing parties in Stockholm, is 
criticised by Bodell (2002), who suggests that the Conservative Party has gone too far 
in eroding the quality of services: 
In the beginning of the reform process the only objective was to promote an alternative 
form of production due to market premises in order to increase the level of efficiency. It 
was assumed that the private service delivery would have a positive impact on the public 
delivery of services. As the process of privatisation began actualising, the Conservatives 
became more eager to increase the dimension of privatisation by extending the number of 
private alternatives. We realised that the initial objectives were virtually forgotten and the 
Conservatives were pursuing an ideological objective, which was to achieve a systemic 
change by privatising a major part of elderly care. Later, when it had been revealed that the 
eagerness of private companies to earn larger profits led to poor quality of services and 
mismanagement in some of the elderly care homes, such as in Polhemsgärden in Solna, 
then, our party (Stockholms Partiet) decided to leave the committee (Ebba Bodell, 
interview). 
The freedom of local authorities, both in municipalities and counties, to choose 
between state provision of welfare services or to turn to private companies was 
undoubtedly a dramatic change. That was the major reason behind the increasing 
diversity between the municipalities. Depending on factors such as the political 
majority in every local government, the response of public employees in the 
workplaces, and the response of the elderly who were the consumers of the services, 
each municipality could determine its own method for providing services. In some 
districts in the centre of Stockholm because of their recourse to greater political 
support to the privatisations, the private sector expanded quickly and the private 
companies could create an alternative elderly care to the ordinary public provision. 
However, in most other municipalities, such as Haninge in the south east of 
Stockholm, neither the political majority nor the consumers of the services were 
enthusiastic about the entrance of private companies: 
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The attitudes of the public sector employees towards privatisation were different 
dependent on which activity in the public sector was subjected to privatisation and also 
dependent to the methods according to which the privatisation were implemented. Some 
of the high-educated employees with strong positions in the labour market welcomed the 
privatisation because it would mean higher incomes and better work conditions to them. In 
this category you could find nurses, midwives and some of teachers. For low-educated 
groups, privatisations would mean deterioration of both incomes and conditions of work. 
Therefore one could say that in general terms low-paid employees were mostly against 
privatisations. If you compare the level of wages for these groups in public sector to their 
counterparts in private sector you will realise that the public employees have both higher 
incomes and a more secure terms of employment (Hans Lindberg, interview). 
Among the public sector workers, there was an extensive protest over the transition to 
the private sector. As a consequence of such protest, which mainly occurred during the 
early years of the Bourgeois government, many attempts at privatisation were 
unsuccessful and the state provision of services remained unchanged. The extension of 
privately provided services had great impacts on the working conditions of publicly 
managed services. The great burden of work stifled the joy among part of the labour 
force, which in the long term caused sickness among the nurses in the public sector: 
During the 1980s working as a nurses in the hospital was very encouraging. The staff felt 
great satisfaction simply because the only thing we would think about was the quality of 
the services we produced. Our workplace was full of creativity and everything was 
continuously developing. The discussions were about the new technological equipment 
and the new methods of treatment. There was no discussion about shortcomings, financial 
problems or retrenchment. During the 1990s, though, everything associated with creativity 
and development seems to have been forgotten. Everywhere you could hear talks about 
savings, efficiency measures and how to cut the services. The employees felt heavy 
pressures on their shoulders by being a nurse. Many nurses have given up and left the 
public sector (Ulla Söderlind, interview). 
Since the start of privatisation, however, the focus seems to have been partly on the 
compatibility of private production and the universal welfare state, and partly on the 
distinction between public production of services and public financing of the services 
(Rothstein, 1998). Among the political parties, the Social Democrats, as the original 
architects of the universal welfare system, have always stressed the importance of 
public service production. In the Social Democratic state, democratic political 
institutions would control the quality and shape of service provision, mainly through 
the control of public employment. However, since the 1980s, this policy has partly 
been changed. The Social Democrats moved towards an emphasis upon community 
care and, for example, many institutional homes for the elderly were closed. Since 
then, municipalities have been responsible for providing residential services for the 
elderly and also for finding alternative ways of organising childcare, and to this end 
they have been allowed to charge higher fees. The Social Affairs Minister in the 
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Bourgeois government took this a step further and encouraged the municipalities to 
introduce more choice and competition in service provision (Gould, 1996: 82). The 
transition from institutional homes for elderly care to community care has meant a rise 
in fees for the services, which caused complaints among the poorest (Midfelt, 1993a, 
in Gould, 1993). Reduced compensation for work injury benefits was another change, 
which was initiated by the Bourgeois government (Midfelt, 1993b in Gould, 1993). Bo 
Könberg who initiated the reduction in work injury benefits points to the reform as one 
of the most successful of those accomplished by the Bourgeois government: 
The reform in work injury benefits meant a huge financial gain for the public economy. A 
forecast of probable development of the costs for the work injury benefits predicted that 
with no changes in the system the accumulated deficit for the work injury fund in 2000 
would have reach 100 billion crowns but as a result of the reform initiated by us the deficit 
turned dramatically to zero (Bo Könberg, interview). 
The Social Democratic modernisers shared the same view as the Bourgeois 
government that most of the welfare programmes are too expensive and something has 
to be done. In other words, some of them went against their original doctrine and 
openly criticised public service production as costly, unproductive and of a lower 
quality than privately provided services: 
I think municipalities and counties have difficulties in handling the role of employers in an 
appropriate way. To put it bluntly, they have poor performance as employers. Their main 
problem is how to combine the role of being a politician, as the representative of the 
citizens, with being on employer for a huge number of people who have voted for them. I 
am a member of the executive board in Falun City council and I could tell you that as an 
elected politician I, like other politicians, realised that after the election we suddenly 
became the employer for more than 5 000 employees which were working in different 
sections such as schools, child care services, elderly care services and so forth. Only the 
schools administration where I am the chairman has an annual budget of 1.1 billion, with 
several hundreds of employees. You see, that is a big company. According to my 
experiences the public administration in city councils and municipalities is very amateur. 
The treatment of the citizens, which are the consumers, is inappropriate with less concern 
to their specific needs and wishes. Likewise, the public sector has no plans for 
development of the personnel who work in different institutions. Since part of the services 
have privatised, many municipalities and counties have pulled their socks up and have 
tried to run their activities in better ways (Widar Andersson, interview). 
One decade after privatisation was beginning for some of the public services in the 
municipalities and the counties, the major argument presented by the advocates was 
the improvement of the quality of services. Privatisation was suggested as an 
alternative form of service delivery. Although there has never been any question of 
individual financing of the services, the advocates of the traditional Social Democratic 
model pointed to the privatisation of service delivery as a first step towards a total 
privatisation, which would include the individual financing of services. Even most of 
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the modernisers, such as Mona Sahlin (DN, 4/27/2001) criticised the far-reaching 
privatisation attempts taken by the Conservatives in Stockholm's City Council, which 
were considered to be a policy that might be implemented in the whole country if the 
Conservatives led a government again. The modernisers clearly rejected such a 
development: 
There is no support in the Social Democratic ideology, which would support the idea that 
the politician should run the delivery of services, which is financed by public sector. The 
Social Democratic governments in Sweden started the public delivery of services in the 
1960s when the major expansion of the welfare state took place. It has been assumed that 
the public financing of services automatically needed public delivery as well. The pioneers 
had no idea that the big state, which would manage everything, would face such significant 
problems, complications, and bureaucratisation. They also did not know that the services 
produced by the public sector would be more expensive. They even could not imagine that 
the services produced by public sector would be provided, as they would suit the 
bureaucrats and not the consumers. The public delivery of services as it was executed in 
Sweden between the 1960s and 1980s, and was known as the only Social Democratic 
method for delivery of public services should be understand as a bracket and nothing 
more. The role of the politician will be more important in the future. Instead of acting as 
poor employers they will examine how the private actors perform their jobs. The role of 
the politician is not to act as a manager of a company but the one who makes the policy 
and evaluates the performance of the actors (Widar Andersson, interview). 
It has become clear in speaking with Bourgeois politicians that they have virtually the 
same arguments in favour of privatisation of the delivery of services as the 
modernisers in Social Democracy. Most of them emphasise that by `privatisation' they 
mean the delivery and not the financing of services, which in the Social Democratic 
welfare model has been understood as public services. Such consensus is based on two 
major reasons. First, there is large support for the public financing of services because 
public financing is so deeply embedded in the Swedish society that every major 
attempt to dismantle it would cause enormous protest. Second, there is a large 
consensus between the Bourgeois Party and the modernisers inside the Social 
Democratic Party about the need for an extension of private delivery of services. Any 
attempt to extend the privatisation of services to the financing aspect would divide the 
unity and stop the process of privatisation, which in some areas, such as private 
schools, has been successful. However, by listening to Bo Könberg, who in the past 
quarter of a century has had some real fights in order to achieve some concrete changes 
in different parts of the system, one gets the impression that the process of 
privatisation of services will not stop at just delivery of services: 
In the past 25 years in the parliament, I have observed that for a long period of time the 
Social Democrats severely rejected every suggestion regarding privatisation, not only 
concerning financing of the services but also on the delivery issue. When we started to 
discuss these issues in early 1980s all the Social Democrats were against the whole idea. 
They could even not accept that the task of cleaning in the hospitals could be delivered to 
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private companies. Throughout the 1990s, the Social Democrats were unanimously against 
the start of some private schools. They even made a law, which forbade the school making 
profits. At about same time there was another battle about the start of a few private care 
centres. In the beginning of the 1990s, the conflict was focused on the reform of family 
doctors. At the end of the 1990s and early 2000 the Social Democrats have been rejecting 
our suggestion about the start of an emergency hospital. In all these areas we were those 
who suggested for changes and in all the cases the suggestions met large conflicts from the 
Social Democrats, but we have compelled them to retreat centimetre by centimetre (Bo 
Könberg, interview). 
The opposition of traditional advocates of social democracy to privatisation efforts is 
not due to the efficiency aspects of the public services but to more strategic concerns. 
One of these, according to the senior economist of the labour movement (DN, 
7/10/2002), was the bourgeois' parties aim to sale public properties to the private 
sector and thus to provide opportunities for tax cuts. They believe that the privatisation 
of public properties would temporarily increase the income of the public sector by 100 
billions. Even though in shorter-term such income could benefit the budget balance 
and make tax cuts possible but in longer term, the replacement of taxes by sale of 
public properties would cause financial problem to the welfare arrangements. 
The bourgeois parties' eagerness for privatisation was particularly demonstrated when 
the coalition government made it possible for profit-making child care agencies to be 
set up. As a result, the costs for childcare were raised and children who could not pay 
the fees were excluded from day care (Johansson, 1993 in Gould, 1993). However, this 
and some other reforms carried out by the bourgeois government in child care, and the 
deterioration in financing of schools, was reversed shortly after the Social Democrats 
returned to power, but the care of the handicapped, which has been improved 
considerably during the bourgeois period of governance, remained unchanged. 
Another major change, which intensified during the 1990s, was the process of 
decentralisation and deregulation of the education system. The privatisation and 
marketisation of education, which had been introduced by the Bourgeois government, 
continued by the Social Democrats and by 2003 the number of students in independent 
primary schools had reached around six per cent (Skolverket, 2003). In metropolitan 
areas such as Stockholm and Göteborg, the generous rules for establishing 
independent, tax-paid schools led to a dramatic increase of independent high schools 
and the percentage of the students in such schools reached to 14 per cent (Skolverket 
2003). Studies made by Skolverket stress that the increase of independent school has 
lead to more ethnic and socio-economic segregation (DN, 15/4/2003). Students with 
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Swedish backgrounds avoid schools where the rate of students from ethnic minorities 
is high. However, despite the changes in the system, neither the Social Democrats nor 
the centre parties have fundamentally questioned the high welfare standards and the 
public financing of services. Moreover, privatisation of services has not led to 
satisfaction among clients. After having experienced privately provided services, a 
large majority of Swedes believed that, with the exception of child care, state or local 
authority delivery was the best approach (Svallfors, 1992). The popularity of most 
welfare programmes seems to have been sustained through the 1990s with greatest 
support to the public health care followed by childcare and elderly care (Goul 
Andersen et al, 1999). 
In sum, the public's verdicts on the privatisation in some social services have played a 
decisive role in the future of the redistributive welfare system in Sweden. A positive 
attitude to these reforms could be a guideline for the political elite for further 
privatisation. It is also crucial to emphasise that the aim of the reforms, at least for the 
Social Democrats and some parties in the bourgeois front, was not to transform public 
delivery of services to private enterprises but by the partial privatisation it aimed to 
make the public services more efficient. In practice, though, even such partial 
privatisation caused protest between both the provider and consumer of the services. 
Despite the fact that the privatisation efforts were quite modest the wide protests 
against these initiatives proves that institutionalisation of the welfare benefits and 
services in the Swedish society runs deep. 
The impact of institutional legacies on the reform process 
Most scholars dealing with the Swedish welfare state and the processes through which 
the system has been created, stress the importance of the historical dimension of 
modern politics and administration. In this respect, some commentators (Steinmo, 
1993; Lindbom, 1995; Rothstein, 1998) in their recent works in particular, pointed to 
the importance of the institutional legacy as a key factor in the welfare reform process. 
One of the main arguments presented by these authors is that welfare institutions were 
created in an open political process, as a result of comprehensive political bargaining 
(Grönnegärd Christensen, 1997). 
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As institutions are based on a broad consensus and not purely on a Social Democratic 
ideology, a major strategic policy such as a comprehensive welfare state also had to 
enjoy broad social support. Accordingly, the Swedish welfare state has been shaped 
over a long-term historical process in which common macro-institutional features have 
induced the political parties, regardless of ideological make-up, to formulate policies, 
which fit with the character and culture of Swedish welfare (Gould, 2001). In this 
sense, political forces, administrative actors, and institutions that formed the welfare 
state, followed generally accepted rules, and therefore, may be said to have historical 
legitimacy. Consequently, as a national project, the concept of the `welfare state' has 
been understood as a national model with a long-term historical legitimacy, and has 
therefore been supported by the vast majority of the political establishment. Broad 
political consensus and a process of continuity and evolution of the welfare state have 
given the system such legitimacy that any suggestion for comprehensive changes 
arouses protests both in society itself, and among political actors in the establishment. 
However, as the necessity for institutional change increases, political actors may 
initiate and implement institutional reforms, which are undertaken as a result of the 
implementation of new strategies. But the more radical and thorough such reforms are, 
the more it will be necessary for the political parties to reach broad consensus about 
them. 
Such phenomena explain not only the legitimacy of the present shape of each political 
system, but also, as Steinmo (1993) emphasises, why welfare states created in the mid- 
twentieth century diverge from each other in such radical ways. In the political 
debates, there seems to be a tendency to overvalue the role of ideologies and values, as 
well as preconceived interests, as the crucial factors that explain the process, and 
which have driven state actors to develop certain public policies. On the other hand, 
the role of institutions, which are products of historically created systems of incentives, 
and therefore explain the nature of the policies and preferences on which a particular 
welfare regimes is based, might be underestimated. Understanding the preferences, 
which have historically decided the direction of the policies, helps us to understand the 
changes made to welfare states, and the nature of possible changes in the future. In 
other words, as an analytical instrument, such an approach captures the dynamic traits 
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of policy making. Consequently, it might also explain the structure of different parts of 
the welfare policies, and the ways the policies have been implemented. 
In a comparative study of the financing of the modern states in Sweden, Britain, and 
the United States, Steinmo (1993) stresses the role of institutions as historically created 
systems of incentives that prompt certain actions and discouraged others. Accordingly, 
political institutions such as electoral systems, parliamentary organisation and rules, 
committees, bureaucracy, and corporatist structure, have determined the development 
of public policies in each country. 
Finally, as Pierson (1996,2000), Esping- Andersen (1990), Soskice (1999), Huber and 
Stephens (2001) suggest, in different ways, even this study emphasises that welfare 
states as democratic projects emerged and developed through a historical process, 
supported by key political and social movements which dominated in each society. 
The dominant political approach in each society shaped welfare arrangements 
according to its ideological preferences and the interests of powerful social groups. As 
to the future, the duration and survival of the arrangements not only depends on the 
strength and support of existing `power resources' such as the public, the political 
establishment and labour movement, but also on the instance of institutional factors 
which were created and are frequently sustained by political actors and those working 
in the state and local organisations. In other words, institutional factors create 
`structural' pressures that make change difficult, or `path dependent'. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been argued that the strong support for the universal welfare 
system in Sweden has prevented large-scale changes. Calls for change have their 
origin in debates, which started in the mid-1970s, due to growing economic crisis in 
the industrial world. The economic crisis of the 1990s, caused by the endogenous and 
exogenous pressures, was the second major shock, which endanger the continuity of 
the universalist welfare state in Sweden. While virtually all industrial nations 
responded to some degree to the crisis by comprehensive retrenchments in their 
welfare entitlements and public services, Sweden kept its redistributive welfare 
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policies almost intact. Support for the universal welfare system from the three sources 
of power - political elite, the interest organisations, and public opinion - remains 
widespread. Therefore, despite the high budget deficit of the early 1990s, even the 
non-socialist coalition government avoided major changes of the existing programmes 
and apart from some minor reductions in the level of benefits continued with almost 
the same generous social policy. 
However, the continuity of the universalist welfare system depends on the support of 
these three sources of power in the future. Although the crisis of the early 1990s 
represented the most serious challenge ever to the generous welfare system, and 
particularly gave rise to discussion in favour of large-scale retrenchment, the political 
support to the system is still intact. The advocates of the system, above all the Social 
Democratic Party, have been determined to defend welfare institutions by making only 
minor changes in benefit levels and services. While the Party experienced its largest 
decline in popularity since the 1930s, it was determined to re-establish its public 
support by adhering to its traditional policy in favour of the universalist welfare 
system. Although the Party initiated the largest possible retrenchments in public 
expenditure these have not changed the basic structure of the system. By this policy 
the Social Democrats hoped to win back public support and to protect the welfare 
system from further decline. By restoring economic order and securing public services 
and benefits at the same time, the second half of the 1990s represented the success of 
the Social Democrats social and economic policy. Since the Social Democrats gave the 
impression that they pulled the country out of economic crisis and also managed to 
keep the essential parts of the welfare system, the reputation of the Party both 
representative of the Swedish nation and the architect of the welfare state were re- 
established. Although the support for the Social Democrats remains fragile and despite 
the fact that the party still has problems regaining the popularity it enjoyed until the 
1980s, one cannot deny that the Social Democrats managed the crisis of the 1990s 
successfully. 
For the longevity of the corporatist system, the outcome of the crisis of the 1990s is 
less certain. Since the LO was excluded by the SAF from labour market negotiations at 
the beginning of the decade, industrial relations in Sweden have been facing crisis. By 
undermining the historic comprise which had secured stability in labour market and 
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favoured the process of building and expanding the welfare system, the employers' 
organisation has ignored the importance of industrial stability. Although, the unions in 
their weakened position almost unilaterally try to take responsibility for maintaining 
industrial peace, particularly by keeping wages down, stability in the labour market is 
not as secure as it used to be. The collapse of the centralised collective bargaining and 
tripartite negotiations over wages and working conditions between state, business and 
unions has seriously threatened stability in Swedish industrial relations. 
Finally, despite retrenchments in the welfare system, support for the universal welfare 
policy has remained strong. Public opinion has also consistently supported the existing 
universal welfare system, and despite the increasing neo-liberal debates in the past two 
decades, which predicted inevitable resistance to the high-taxing, high-spending state, 
popular support for the universal system has remained unchanged. Another trend 
advocated by the neo-liberals, and which could have weakened the foundation of the 
universal welfare system, was privatisation of the delivery of public services. In the 
initial stages of providing services, the delivery of services by profit-making agencies 
was not successful in satisfying the consumers, who were not satisfied by the public 
sector services either. After having experienced the delivery of services by these 
agencies, one can conclude that the consumers will still prefer public service 
production. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to identify the changing nature of the Swedish Social 
Democratic welfare regime in the latest decades (the last 15 years) of the 20th Century. 
The question is highly relevant because the Swedish welfare state faced central 
problems in this period. The challenges to the system made at least some analysts 
believe that, in the new economic circumstances, structural changes to the traditional 
Social Democratic regime would be inevitable. What were these challenges, and how 
did they affect the continuity of the system? In response to these questions two kinds 
of problems came into focus. The first could be the endogenous problems, which 
mainly were related to the matured welfare system with the limits caused by its highly 
redistributive and egalitarian features, and the second was the exogenous problems that 
essentially were caused by the economic globalisation. Apart from theses two 
problems a third type of issue concerned political support for the system, which it has 
suggested, has experienced significant changes. As these issues dominated during the 
1990s, one could conclude that the welfare systems in general, and the universalistic 
model such as the Swedish model in particular, has experienced its deepest crisis since 
its creation, and therefore it would be highly likely that the system has been 
extensively transformed. The central question, then, is whether Sweden will be able to 
continue with its universal welfare regime or whether it is likely that this will gradually 
be eroded? The `answer' discussed in this thesis is that, despite the pressures caused by 
the problems mentioned above which have weakened the overall stability of the 
system, the original pillars of the universalistic welfare system are still strong enough 
to keep it intact. 
This thesis suggests that the discussion about the welfare state crisis has mainly been 
based on one-sided account in which the policy of retrenchment was understood in the 
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same pattern as the policy of expansion. On this account, economic conditions and the 
power resources approaches have received the greatest attention whereas the role of 
institutions in continuity of the welfare arrangements has been neglected by most 
scholars. This thesis not only puts the emphasis on the importance of institutional 
structures and the legacies of previous policy choices but also suggests that there is a 
profound difference between the policy of retrenchment and the policy of expansion. 
As Pierson (1996) has argued, while the expansion of welfare arrangements was a 
popular process based on large public support, the policy of retrenchment, on the 
contrary, has been an unpopular option with large political costs involved and, 
therefore, much more problematic to initiate and pursue. Despite that, the severe 
financial crisis, caused by endogenous and exogenous factors, compelled the state to 
take some measures to reduce welfare spending. Before focusing on the internal and 
external problems to the welfare state, or discussing about the likely trends for the 
Swedish system, in this concluding chapter I intend firstly to find a synthesis between 
the three theories which explain the three factors which having provoked growing calls 
for retrenchment. The factors are economic changes mainly as a consequence of 
globalisation, political shifts as a consequence of weakening labour movement, and 
rising costs associated with maturing welfare state arrangements. 
Synthesising Welfare State Theories 
The challenge which many scholars have considered to be essential threat to the 
existing welfare regimes is economic globalisation. Through increasing dominance of 
the actors in the market, economic globalisation is thought to have had a significant 
impact on welfare states and has made them experience substantial changes in their 
arrangements with a drift towards a more neo-liberal system. Although this notion had, 
at least during the 1990s, a widespread influence among authors, an opposite 
standpoint has developed which rejects globalisation as the major agent of change 
towards the welfare system. This alternative perspective foremostly downgraded the 
impact of globalisation on welfare states change on individual countries by 
emphasising the continuity that policies on national level have to have with the past. 
Economic globalisation might initiate the agenda in the national market economy but it 
would not, by itself, completely change national welfare regimes. A third perspective 
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argued that even if globalisation is considered to exist and have an impact on welfare 
states, national institutional structures would prevent the direct impacts of 
globalisation on welfare systems. According to this view, institutions which have 
become deeply embedded are difficult to change. Policy changes are path dependent 
because the institutional framework and the national welfare ideology of each welfare 
state resist against initiatives that aim to bring about crucial changes. 
This thesis has adopted this most recent perspective as its main argument in 
investigating and discussing the role of globalisation in bringing about changes in 
national economies in general and the recent development in the Swedish welfare 
regime in particular. The option of this perception was based on the nature of the 
development of the Swedish welfare system, which since creation has followed a 
general universalistic welfare pattern and expanded enormously. The tremendous 
expansion of social programmes in most welfare states in general and in the 
universalistic system in particular changed in a few decades the nation-state's role and 
size and, through that, the role of the welfare states. By these changes the content and 
the structure of the advanced welfare state became increasingly `embedded' as 
expectations of the population for continuity of benefits and services increased. 
Consequently, any analysis of the possible changes or retrenchments of the systems, 
needed to understand the relation between the politics of retrenchment and the politics 
of welfare state expansion. The conditions and factors that influenced the process of 
expansion have changed and new parameters such as new social and political groups 
with new preferences, new welfare structures and institutions and so fort have 
dominated the advanced societies. In exploring this issue, the first chapter briefly 
examined the key theories that attempt to account for the development of welfare 
regimes. Among theories explaining welfare states expansion three perspectives 
dominate. `The logic of industrialism thesis' explains the emergence of welfare state as 
a modernist project in relation to the process of industrialisation and economic growth. 
`The power resources perspective' discusses the process of expansion of welfare 
systems as a consequence of a political struggle between the main political and social 
classes in capitalist societies, and, finally `the institutionalisation approach', stresses 
the mechanisms that facilitate the continuity and survival of arrangements in events of 
changes in the power balance. 
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Of these perspectives, the institutionalist approach offers, the most plausible answer to 
the question of welfare state `staying power' by stressing the path-dependent quality of 
much social policy development. In this approach welfare states are understood as the 
products of multiple factors which have been working together over an extended 
period of time (Pierson, 2001). The historical continuity generates preferences and 
self-reinforcing processes or path dependence that are hard to reverse. Even though the 
economic conditions changes and the political support for a certain course of political 
development shifts, the policy preferences and commitments which once initiated and 
adapted long ago in a society are not easy to change. The path dependent approach is 
therefore a theory that can apparently explain the difficulties for internal actors whose 
actions are limited to the sphere of the adapted commitments, and external forces such 
as globalisation, which also promote welfare state retrenchment practices. As long as 
democratic institutions in national political systems continue to have legislative power, 
political actors are compelled to follow the will of the voters in keeping social 
arrangements at levels that are publicly acceptable. Apart from political parties - 
particularly those on the left - which traditionally represented the interest of the mass 
public against the interest of the market, the new social movements, and a range of 
interest groups which either constitute those who work in the public sector or 
beneficiaries of different entitlements prevent - or at least resist - every effort to make 
radical changes to the system. 
Against this background, one could conclude that contemporary changes or 
adjustments in welfare states are a result of a combination of these three factors. None 
of them could alone decide the policy of retrenchment. Likewise, none alone could 
decide the continuity of the systems. However, despite the necessity of an existing 
balance between the factors mentioned above, there are some internal and external 
limits to welfare states which provide essential problems for welfare systems and force 
them to make certain `adjustments', and in some cases crucial changes. The central 
question raised here was, whether exogenous factors, mainly the process of 
globalisation in world economy, or endogenous factors in the form of budgetary 
pressure caused by mature social policy arrangements could be the major agent of 
changes in the Swedish welfare system. 
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In discussions about changes in the Swedish welfare system, developments in the 
international economy and their impact on national economies was the dominating 
issue. Globalisation was considered as the most crucial challenge to the national 
economies. In this regard, with respect to the openness of the Swedish economy and its 
dependence on trade, globalisation has been constituted primarily as a process 
affecting the internationalisation of Swedish firms within the global market. The 
consequence of such a process was assumed to have been that the era of nation states' 
control on firms and industrial relation had ended with the result that the freedom of 
governments to conduct fiscal and monetary policy, which Keynesianism was based 
on, was eroded. In the new order, governments could no longer maintain full 
employment policy, which in the case of the Swedish system was one of the basic 
pillars of welfare. Likewise, it was even more difficult to pursue a redistributive policy 
with high social spending without paying attention to the actors in the international 
market. Companies could move production to low wage economies, where social costs 
were much lesser than in the advanced economies. This happened in the 1990s with 
high unemployment rates and declining tax revenues as the consequence. 
Although, the increasing unemployment rate with unqualified labour as the major 
victim was partly a direct consequence of the process of `deindustrialisation' caused by 
globalisation, it was not the major reason. Looking back to the 1970s and 1980s we 
can see that all other industrial nations faced the problem of competitive labour costs 
with mass unemployment in low-skilled, labour intensive mass production as a result. 
The point here is that when in most cases the industrial nations took the exit strategy 
with the consequence that subsidized workers left the labour market, Sweden and other 
Nordic countries chose retraining strategy together with a public employment strategy 
which resulted in a very low unemployment rate (1,2 per cent in Sweden in 1989). In 
other words, even though globalisation became a problem for all economies, welfare 
states responded differently to the outcomes of it especially in the matter of 
unqualified labour. At the beginning of the 1990s, when the right-wing coalition took 
over and the pressure of the neo-liberal ideology was enormous, the full employment 
policy was abandoned even in Sweden. To be clearer, changes in the policy of welfare 
states, for instance in employment strategy, was not purely an economic option but a 
political one. As long as there was a broad consensus among domestic institutions in 
the political sphere or in the labour market about a national strategy in employment or 
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a level of spending for the whole welfare system and its arrangements, economic 
problems per se could not play the crucial role. If the openness of the economy would 
decide the direction and the content of a welfare state, then the Swedish economy 
which is known as one of the most open economies in the world could not have 
developed its redistributive character throughout the post-war era. Further, if the 
influence of the international economic order, as the advocates of globalisation thesis 
suggest, was so crucial then it could have compelled the Swedish welfare system to 
adapt to the residual welfare states much earlier. It seems that the crisis of the 1990s in 
Sweden has largely to do with the erosion of consensual partnership than with the 
impact of globalisation. Even though globalisation was present in debates about the 
futures of welfare and in reality caused acute problems for unskilled labour, it was 
applied more as an argument by the advocates of retrenchment than actually 
constituting a crucial threat for welfare states. The problem of rising unemployment 
among the unskilled proved to be manageable, as it was before the crisis. Therefore, in 
the second half of the 1990s, after the re-election of the Social Democrats, they applied 
the combination of retraining schemes and increasing public employment as the major 
measures for coping with increasing joblessness. 
Arguably, the crisis that the Swedish welfare state has faced was mainly linked to the 
disruption of the broad consensus that existed for a long period of time between the 
trade unions, employers' organisation, and the political parties. Because of such 
consensus a relation of trust had existed between the partners, which helped them to 
overcome conflict through negotiation. As a result of such consensual social 
partnership, full employment and generous welfare arrangements became compatible. 
During the 1990s, as a consequence of intensification of the process of globalisation, 
criticism against welfare regimes increased, and as a result, the relation between the 
various parts of the labour market parts changed. The inability of actors to mediate 
conflicting demands depended mainly on the changing balance of power resources. 
First, the labour movement lost part of its strength due to deindustrialisation of labour 
intensive and uncompetitive firms, which encouraged larger firms to move part of their 
production abroad. On the other hand, influenced by the globalisation issue, the 
employers advocated a more aggresive position towards the national labour unions and 
demanded an adaptation of the firms' social costs to the international level. Second, in 
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the political arena the support for the Social Democratic Party decreased, whereas the 
bourgeois coalition supported by a neo-liberal ideology, won the election of 1991. 
Beside the changing power balance between the labour market partners and in the 
political arena, which resulted in the erosion of consensual social partnership, criticism 
against the high expenditure level of matured welfare states increased considerably. It 
was certainly accepted that the universal Swedish system was facing serious 
challenges, which made adjustments in the system inevitable. Some of the challenges 
suggested, had domestic origins which referred to the growing differences between the 
existing social and welfare programmes and real social demands. Demographic 
developments in terms of the growing needs of older people, which had to be met by 
the welfare states, were such an example of changing preconditions, and this in turn 
put pressure on existing welfare state arrangements. Population ageing has been known 
as the most central demographic change, but development in other aspects such as 
increasing numbers of single parents and single households, all have resulted in 
increasing social difficulties to which `welfare' is considered a solution. Apart from 
these specific demographic changes, development in the labour market area with 
postponed entrance into labour market and early exit from it are the factors which 
altogether have increased the burden of support. Such an increase in economic 
dependency ratios have disfavoured the universalist welfare system, which initially 
was shaped for societies with much lower levels of social need. 
One of the most expensive programmes which caused deep concerns for the 
sustainability of income protection system was the rising cost of the pension system. 
Demographic trends towards an older population have been anticipated to cause 
serious financial problems for the pension system. When the system was introduced, 
the number of old-age and early retirement pensioners was quite low, and therefore, 
the working population was able to finance the costs of the pension system. The 
dramatic change in the ratio between the number of people in the working population 
and the number of old-age and early-retired pensioners resulted in a restructuring of 
the pension system. The pension reform of the late 1990s, which undoubtedly 
decreased the system's generosity and should be considered as a deterioration of its 
universalist character, was a direct response to these changing social needs. Even if at 
the present time, with existing resources, the system can sustain current levels of 
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income protection, the concern about anticipated changes in future decades has 
influenced decisions to modify existing pension schemes to safeguard future spending. 
While at this stage growing needs relating to demographic changes have made the 
restructuring of the pension system inevitable, the concerns about the growing needs 
can be caused by other demographic and social pressure appears to be crucial and that 
makes the welfare state to initiate further restructuring in areas which potentially could 
face difficulties. 
Although growing burdens of dependency and changing macroeconomic conditions 
suggest that the key outputs of the welfare state would see some crucial modifications 
this study has demonstrated that cuts made in different benefits and services have not 
been as dramatic enough to amount to 'transformation'. Apart from the pension 
system, where changes were essential, cuts in other areas were relatively limited. 
These changes, mainly in benefit systems, were initiated to reduce the immediate 
financial problems caused by changing macroeconomic preconditions. The dimensions 
(size or proportion) of the crisis of the early 1990s were so widespread that the cuts 
included almost all cash benefits. Therefore one could argue that the changes were 
programmatic rather than systemic. Lowering compensation levels by 10-15 per cent 
was the most significant measure which was first introduced in unemployment benefit 
insurance but was soon extended to the other cash benefits. Other techniques of 
welfare reductions such as tightening the conditions of entitlement, shortening periods 
of payment, modifying the indexation of major programmes and so forth have also 
been used. As the savings were intended to cope with the immediate financial crisis, 
governments, especially after the 1994 election, initiated the cuts without major 
hesitation or political consideration. The Social Democratic government, particularly, 
announced cuts in areas where it could be sure of making more dramatic savings. 
Looking back to the changes in welfare state arrangements, it can be observed that 
while advocates of retrenchment demanded far-reaching retrenchments - and in view 
of the fact that there was obvious potential for more fundamental changes in the 
system - the actual changes to the system was modest. At the end of the 1990s, 
different aspect of the Swedish benefit system were still more generous than other 
countries and the system could offer universal coverage to the citizens. 
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Even in the case of social, health and other services the Swedish model has kept its 
essential principles. In providing services, huge area of welfare state activities continue 
to respect the initial features of comprehensiveness, universalism and generosity. By 
emphasising universalistic egalitarianism the system still treats the citizens equally 
regardless of their position in society and labour market, and all households have 
access to almost all necessary services which originally were established by the system 
and were thought to address the fundamental needs of households. Furthermore, the 
services are still tax financed, provided mainly by the public sector and are of high 
quality. However, it is true that the introduction of market models in public services 
which seriously started in the 1990s, demonstrates that the Social Democrats have 
overcome their resistance to privatisation and accepted the idea of private competition 
with the state in the supply of services. Although the delivery of services is still subject 
to state regulation and financing, and the process is still in its initial stages and 
constitutes a small part of service delivery, there is no doubt that there has been a trend 
towards private service delivery, and that, in the longer term this move could threaten 
the public provision of services. Knowing that private alternatives have also been 
introduced in the pension system, one could argue that the Swedish system is 
experiencing a trend towards privatisation. This is really to suggest that, while changes 
have so far been far too modest, it is possible that significant changes could occur in 
this area in the future. 
Overall, the conclusion is that although the internal and external pressures on the 
mature welfare system have increased, the base of the trade unions has weakened, and 
also the political changes in favour of far-reaching retrenchment provided proper 
conditions for fundamental changes in the system, the structure of benefits and 
provisions remain fairly intact. As, during the severe economic conditions of the mid- 
1990s, the system succeeded in keeping its fundamental principles almost unchanged, 
there is reason to believe that the system's resistance to fundamental changes remains 
high. On the other hand, where the adjustments of benefit and provision were 
inevitable, the Swedish welfare system has been open to gradual adaptation. 
The resistance of the system to far-reaching changes suggested mainly by the actors in 
the market depended first and foremost on the high level of legitimacy of welfare state 
which over the period has enjoyed broad popular support. Even though the economic 
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crisis of the 1990s affected popular attitudes, the modest cuts in certain areas in order 
to overcome the crisis did not cause dramatic protests and popular support in favour of 
the existing schemes remained intact throughout the period. A range of social groups 
who are recipients of benefits and the large group of public sector employees were the 
two key groups who supported the welfare state most strongly. The stable support of 
these groups, who taken together constitute a clear majority of the population, 
indicated that the system has, over an extended period, created social forces which will 
defend it against attempts at radical change. 
The strong relation between the trends in support for the welfare state and the modest 
changes in the welfare arrangements, especially during the period of severe economic 
crisis, indicate that welfare states are still mainly political projects and their future is 
decided foremostly by the legitimacy they enjoy among the public. Therefore, political 
changes are to be seen as the most essential precondition for continuity versus decline 
of the welfare systems. In this regard, the continuous support of the Social Democratic 
Party and continued participation in government seems to be the major guarantee of 
the survival of the universalistic welfare model. As the trade unions, as one of the three 
major parts in the corporatistic model of Sweden are as strong as before, it is crucial 
that popular support for the welfare system has strong advocate in the political 
establishment. One has also to stress that the advocates of the universalist welfare 
system should not only defend existing schemes but should also continue to develop 
and adapt the system to changing conditions. Here, economic problems, regardless of 
their domestic or external origins, are potential threats, for which political solutions are 
needed. Although the changes of the 1990s were comparatively modest this study has 
shown that the system can be vulnerable. The strong resistance of the Swedish welfare 
system to the pressures caused by economic crisis cannot necessarily be counted on in 
the future. Even here some might argue that, the impact of change on the system has 
been underestimated. When the economic crisis of the 1990s began, the generosity of 
different kinds of cash benefits and services were exceptionally high, with the result 
that the marginal cuts made could not endanger the level of generosity of the system. 
But, it has to be emphasised that the potential of the benefits and services to resist 
further retrenchments without greater damage being done is not as strong as before. 
Another crisis, similar to that of the early 1990s, might' seriously undermine the 
foundations of the universalist system. 
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As a way of discussing the future of the Swedish system, one can point to factors such 
as the vast popular majority in favour of the welfare state, the continuous strength of 
the pro-welfare state blocs, and the fast recovery of the Swedish economy as the three 
crucial elements, which secure existing programmes. There is still broad support for 
most aspects of the welfare policies, although some criticism of bureaucracy and 
suspicions of abuse can be find. The Social Democratic Party is still the most popular 
party, and even though its dominance is not as secure as it was up to the 1980s, the 
decrease in its popularity has been compensated by the increase in support for other 
parties who also are in favour of the generous welfare system. In the macroeconomic 
aspect, since the mid-1990s most curves point to an improvement of the economic 
situation. The rate of unemployment has decreased steadily to around 4 per cent in 
2002, through the period the growth rate was just above the EU-average and the 
inflation rate has been low. Concerning the full-employment target, although at the 
beginning of the period it lost its primacy in favour of goals of price stability and a 
balanced budget, the approach which obliges the unemployed to enter education or 
training has been intensified. In other words, the anticipated fear that global 
competition was expected to create a great army of less-educated unemployed did not 
occur, or to be more correct, in reality the situation could be handled by the 
government's activation and education policy. 
Overall, and as a way of concluding this thesis, it can be argued that the new tendency 
in Swedish welfare policies is mainly attributable to the normative and political basis 
of the system rather than to economic necessities created by `globalisation'. As this 
study suggests the Social Democrats' original welfare goals continue to exist, both as 
legitimating requirements and as constraints on political actors. To this extant the 
specific characteristics of the system have been preserved. Although the Swedish 
system has experienced minor changes in different programmes, the normative legacy 
of the system, based on universalism, comprehensiveness and generosity remains 
intact. 
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Appendix 
Widar Andersson, a former Social Democratic member of parliament who, despite being only 
48, has been known as one of the most active and controversial debaters in favour of the 
process of modernisation in the Social Democratic Party. As Chairman of the National 
Assembly of Independent Schools (Friskolornas Riksförbund) Andersson has been involved in 
the privatisation of one of the two major sectors in the public sector. Further, as a member of 
the executive board for Falun City council he has had insight into the way local governments 
are running. As a strategist in the Social Democratic movement, a goal in this interview was to 
throw light on the essence of the modernisers' argument about the necessity of changes in the 
welfare system. Apart from that, as a politician in support of privatisation who acts as manager 
in organisations which put plans and decisions into effect the informant, Andersson was 
questioned about the executive aspect of privatisation efforts. 
Lars Bergendahl is an expert in the Pensioners' Central Organisation (PRO). Because of his 
insight into the pension reform of 1998, he could answer questions about the different aspects 
of pension reform. He could also compare the new system with the old one and in particular 
clarify whether or not the new system has increased the gap between different groups of 
pensioners. 
Ebba Bodell, a senior member of Stockholms Partiet, a local party that for a long period of 
time has had representatives in the municipal council of Stockholm. The party is officially 
neutral in competition between the two political blocs but in the past two decades has 
cooperated with the bourgeois parties. With its limited support the party has held the balance 
of power between the blocs and thereby could have some influence in the council of 
Stockholm. As the chairperson of a committee for privatisation of old-care services Bodell 
posses great knowledge about the process of privatisations and the debates, which were 
occurring during her term as chairperson. At the time of the interview she was working as the 
chairperson of social district 3 in Stockholm's county council. 
Ingrid Burman is one of the two senior members of the Left Party who at the time of the 
interview temporarily led the Party. Apart from that, Burman is a member of parliament and 
also the chairperson for the Committee on Health and Welfare. Since entering parliament in 
1989 Burman has been following the development of the welfare policies. Therefore, the major 
part of the questions to her dealt with the political debates about the expansion and 
retrenchment of the welfare system and how the Left Party has understood the process of 
changes. 
308 
Birgitta Carlsson has been a member of parliament since 1991, and represents the Centre 
Party (former Agrarian Party). As a member of the two Committees (social insurance and 
industry and trade) she has had great insight in the two areas, which have had crucial impacts 
on the development of the welfare system in the decade of the crisis. The Centre Party has had 
a unique position in the Swedish politic. In the past decade it has cooperated with the 
governments from the two major blocs. After a long period of cooperaton with the Social 
Democrats the Party became a member of the Bourgeois Coalition both from 1976-82 and 
1991-94. During the second half of the 1990s, the Center was in close cooperation with the 
Social Democratic government. 
Leif Carlsson was one of the high-ranking employees in the department of social affairs. As a 
member of the Social Democratic Party Carlsson also had insight into the political debates in 
the department and could be questioned about the development of ideas and events during the 
1980s. During the 1990s Carlsson became the chairman of the Pensioners' Organisation in 
Stockholm County and through that has followed the political debate, especially about pension 
reform. The questions for him, then, were about the political discussion about the pension 
reform. 
Johan Fritzell is a senior member of the Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm 
University. As a senior member of the Welfare Commission (Kommitten Välfärdsbokslut) he 
was actively involved in the committee, which was set up to produce a comprehensive 
assessment of welfare developments. The result of the research was then published in a 
balance sheet for the 1990s. The interview with Fritzell concerned the research which the 
welfare committee was working with and the major focus that it had. 
Sven Olsson-Hort is professor of Sociology at the University College of Södertörn in Sweden. 
He is the author of Social policy and Welfare State in Sweden (Lund: Arkiv, 1990), and many 
other essays, which have examined the changes in the Swedish Welfare system. The interview 
with Sven Hort focused on the political conditions for the future of the universalist welfare 
model. In this regard, the informant was also questioned about the changes in power balances 
(both between the political parties and in the labour market) and the impacts of 
decentralisation, through increasing power of the municipalities, of the `strong state'. 
Bertil Jönsson is the former chairman of the LO (1992-2000), who represented the union in 
the decades when the Swedish economy and welfare state faced the most serious challenges 
since the creation of the Swedish welfare system. The questions in the interview with Jönsson 
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were partly about the changes which have occurred in the Swedish welfare system but most 
importantly how the relations between the LO and the employers' organisation had been 
developed during the 1990s when he was in charge of the LO. 
Bo Könberg was a member of the Bourgeois government 1991-94 and since then he has been 
a member of parliament, representing the Liberal Party. By being a member in several 
parliamentary committees such as the Committee on Social Insurance, Committee on Finance, 
advisory Committee on EU Affairs, Könberg is able to offer good insight about the political 
debate. Before the membership in the parliament Könberg was a County Council 
Commissioner and through that he acquired insight into the county councils (Landsting). As 
the chairman of the committee which provided the pension reform, Könberg is known as the 
architect of the reform. The interview with Könberg was partly about the pension reform but 
also about the changes which have occurred in other insurance systems. By being in the 
Coalitions government and then a representative of the Liberal Party on social issues, Könberg 
was involved in the political debates and could be asked about the policy of retrenchment both 
during the coalitions government and the Social Democratic period. 
Hans Lindberg is a senior advisor in planning issues in Haninge kommun. By working in 
different development projects in local administration he has received great insight into the 
problems which the local administration had to handle in implementing the central 
governments policies at a local level. He also has insight into problems which have risen 
between the political and administrative levels in municipalities. 
Tommy Lundin, is the chairman of liberal party in the municipality of Haninge located south 
east of Stockholm county, and which has a population of 70 000. As a high-ranking member of 
local government in the municipality with responsibility for social issues, Lundin has had great 
insight into the problems which the municipalities in the metropolitan regions dealt with. The 
interview with Lundin was mainly concentrated on how the central government and the 
municipalities in the metropolitan area have focused on developing measures to provide the 
foundations for sustainable growth in these regions. In this regard, the support of the central 
government in order to contribute to the creation of new employment opportunities and other 
efforts aimed at increasing the level of social inclusion were questioned. 
Stig Malm, the former chairman of the LO during the 1980s, who also was a member of the 
executive committee of the Social Democratic Party almost at the. same period, is one of the 
most famous debaters in favour of the so-called traditional social democratic values. Malm 
was the one who was most opposed to the efforts which were made to reduce the level of 
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benefits and the extent of the public services. In the interview with Malm the questions 
focused on the conflicts inside the Social Democratic movement. The aim was to get a clear 
picture of the arguments, that have been launched by the traditionalist advocates of the Social 
Democracy. Apart from that, Malm was questioned about the changing relations in the labour 
market and the changes in different social arrangements and the impacts of them on the labour 
force. 
Rudolf Meidner is professor of economics and one of the most well-known trade union 
economists who, since the 1950s, has been developing the `Swedish model'. The Swedish 
labour market policy, with a centrally coordinated `solidarity' wage policy was to a 
considerable degree initiated by Rudolf Meidner in cooperation with another economist, Gösta 
Rehn. Since then, they have been evaluating different aspects of Swedish labour market policy 
and exerted a profound influence on Sweden's development. In the interview the questions 
were mainly about the changes which had been occurring in the Swedish labour market and 
whether the changes caused by globalisation led to a system shift and dismantling of the initial 
welfare state of the first generations of the Social Democrats, that Meidner once established. 
Anders Morin is the expert on social insurance and welfare system in the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprises, which was established in 2001 by an amalgamation of the former 
Employer's Organisation (SAF), and the Confederation of the Swedish Industries 
(Industriförbundet). There was a dual focus in the interview with Morin: first, how have the 
Swedish enterprises understoodd the changes in the Swedish welfare state and second, how has 
the state of corporatism in the Swedish labour market changed? Apart from that Morin has 
been asked about the impacts of the economic and financial changes and the membership in 
EU on the Swedish welfare state. 
Ulla Söderlind is a middle-range manager in the Landsting, who has been working with 
development issues in Haninge kommun in the past few years. Since she began her career as a 
nurse in the health care system at the end of the 1970s she has had great experience in the 
development of the public sector in general and the health care services in particular. She has 
also experienced the process of changes which have occurred at the local level, and, by that, 
has knowledge about the problems that have emerged in relation to the implementation of the 
new policies. The attitudes of the employees and the clients to the changing process are among 
other issues which Söderlind meets in her job in the local level. 
Sten Tolgfors is a member of parliament, representing the Conservative Party since 1994. His 
parliamentary mission is membership of Committee on Social Insurance. Tolgfors was 
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questioned about the Conservative Party's standpoints on the welfare issue and the changes 
which have occurred in the system. 
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Questioner (interview guide) 
1. Do you believe that the Swedish welfare system has experienced structural changes 
during the 1990s? Have the changes been systemic in the way that the essential parts 
of the system changed, or have they just had programmic characteristics, which would 
indicate that the system is still as it was before, but that the level of benefits and 
services been adapted to the economic conditions? 
2. What was the major cause to the changes in the Swedish welfare system? Were they 
internal reasons which caused the problems, or were there external factors which were 
behind the problems or crises of the system? 
3. How would you describe the state of the Swedish welfare system at the beginning of 
the 1990s? How would you (or your political party) handle the situation? 
4. How would you evaluate the way the two political blocs dealt with the economic crisis 
of the 1990s? Do you think the increase rate of unemployment, as the biggest problem 
of the period, was due to changes in the production in industry or changes in the full 
employment policy? 
5. How would you define the changes in different insurance systems? 
6. Would you describe the reforms made by the Bourgeois coalition as a major change in 
the system? Why did the Coalition government not accomplish crucial changes it 
addressed previously? 
For the future: 
1. How would the political parties support the generous welfare system? What would be 
sufficient support for the system? 
2. The relation between labour market parts has not been as consensual during the 1990s 
as it was previously. What is your forecast about the relation for the future? 
3. The process of the privatisation in the delivery of public services started in the 1990s. 
How would the process continue in the future? Would the private sector replace the 
public delivery of services? 
4. What have been the effects of EU membership on the Swedish welfare state? Is there 
any risk that the EU might design a common EU social policy for all member states, or 
is it likely that the countries would adapt their social policy completely to EU policies 
to a greater extent? 
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Questions to the employees in the public sector: 
1) Do you see any major changes in the public care system when you compare the 
situation now with what it was during the 1980s? How would you describe the 
essential changes, which have been occurring in the public sector in general, 
and the health care system in particular? 
2) How do you see to the working conditions in the health care system? How do 
the employees feel about the situation? Do you see any considerable changes in 
the structure of the workforce and individuals' attitudes towards the working 
conditions? 
3) Do you see any radical changes in public opinion towards public services? 
4) How would you describe the process of privatisation of the health and other 
public services? How has the employees responded to the process? Do you 
think the process is going to intensify in the future? How would the public 
react? Are the public's attitudes towards the privatisation issue changing? 
5) What is your picture of the future? In which way is the public sector and public 
services going to change? 
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